



Christian Salvation
Its Doctrine and Experience




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ROBERT ALEXANDER WEBB, D.D., LL.D.



Christian Salvation

Its Doctrine *and* Experience

By

ROBERT ALEXANDER WEBB, D.D., LL.D.

*Late Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology in the
Presbyterian Theological Seminary of Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky*

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Christian Salvation

In Doctrine and Experience

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Dedicated
to the
Students of Dr. Webb

Robert Alexander Webb, D.D., LL.D.

A Sketch

BY REV. CHARLES R. HEMPHILL.

Robert Alexander Webb, the son of Robert C. Webb and Elizabeth Dortch Webb, was born on the 20th day of September, 1856, at Oxford, Mississippi, and fell asleep in Louisville, Ky., May 23, 1919. He spent the first fifteen years of his life on the plantation of his father, and enjoyed the sports and out-door life of a boy on a Southern plantation. He always cherished the happiest memories of his boyhood days. When he was fifteen years of age the family removed to Nashville, Tennessee, and at seventeen he became a student in the Webb School at Culleoka, Tennessee, noted for its high quality as a training school. From this institution he passed to the Southwestern Presbyterian University at Clarksville, Tennessee, from which he was graduated with highest honors in 1887. At the closing exercises that year the Baccalaureate sermon was delivered by the Rev. John L. Girardeau, D. D., Professor of Theology in Columbia Seminary, one of the most eloquent preachers and orators our country has produced. The ardent spirit of the young man was so profoundly impressed by the preacher that he determined to pursue his theological studies in the Seminary at Columbia, in which he matriculated the following September. The Seminary had an able faculty and young Webb appreciated all of his professors and zealously performed every task, but it was Theology that engaged his deepest interest and it was Dr. Girardeau whose Christian character most attracted him, whose eloquence most charmed him and whose profound thinking and inspiring instruction most excited his intellectual powers. The older man took the younger into companionship with himself, and many were the hours they spent together in discussion of profoundest themes of theology,

and this companionship became the more intimate when, after graduation, the young man became one of the household through marriage with Miss Sally, second daughter of Dr. Girardeau. Death soon dissolved this relation, but the two men were always father and son. It was a frequent counsel of Dr. Girardeau to the Seminary graduate to accept a call to a church in the country rather than in a town or city. His reason for this advice was that the young minister forms his intellectual habits in the first three or four years and that the country offers the best opportunity for continuous and systematic study and for the formation of studious habits. Dr. Webb, acting upon this counsel, became the pastor of Bethel Church, in York County, South Carolina, one of the oldest and largest country churches in a region originally settled by Scotch-Irish and dotted with Presbyterian churches. In his case Dr. Girardeau's judgment was fully vindicated. The young man gave himself with complete devotion to the study of great themes in theology and to the Christian Scriptures, and it was in the five years spent in this country church that he consolidated the results of all his previous studies and laid the foundation for his intellectual achievements in later days. From Bethel Church Dr. Webb went to Davidson College, North Carolina, as pastor, and a year later became pastor of Westminster Church, Charleston, South Carolina. In 1892 he was called to the Chair of Theology in the Divinity School of the South-western Presbyterian University, which had been filled since the opening of the Divinity School in 1885 by the Rev. Joseph R. Wilson, D. D., father of President Woodrow Wilson, and from which Dr. Wilson had resigned. The University was favored at this time in adding to its faculty of older men several able young men, and the Divinity School sent forth a succession of graduates who proved themselves most effective ministers and not a few of whom have risen to distinction in the church. From the outset Dr. Webb displayed all the qualities of a great teacher, and in these early days, as in all after years, he left an ineffaceable mark on every man who passed under his hand. His students spread his fame as a teacher and a Christian theologian and he speedily attained a reputation which increased with every passing year. In 1908, Dr. Webb, in response to a unanimous call by the Board of Directors, became Professor of Apologetics and Systematic

Theology in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of Kentucky, at Louisville. This most important Chair had been vacant since the death in 1906 of the eminent theologian and teacher, Francis R. Beattie. Dr. Webb soon made a place for himself in the Seminary circle and the community, and though he lived the somewhat retired life of the teacher, he won many warm friends here as everywhere, and in and out of the churches there were many who admired the great scholar and the courteous Christian gentleman.

It would be pleasant to enter into personal details and recollections of Dr. Webb and to speak of him as preacher and pastor and ecclesiastic, but the limits of this sketch forbid, and there is opportunity only for an effort to estimate him in the office of a teacher of theology in which he served for twenty-seven years. For this office he was fitted by natural endowments, by bent of mind, by an almost perfect intellectual discipline, by deep Christian experience and by broad attainments. He commanded the whole field of theology and had thoroughly mastered all the historical systems of theology and the philosophies underlying or akin to them. He was not, however, a mere expositor of theological systems, but, on the ground of both Scripture and reason, a convinced and thorough-going adherent and advocate of the Augustinian or Calvinistic system of theology.

He had a keenly analytic mind, and with this power of analysis was united an equal power of logic which marched with unbroken step from premise to conclusion. Added to these was an unusual capacity for profound, clear and patient thinking which explored every recess of a subject, and an ability to set forth the results of study and thought in a style simple, clear, pungent and often flashing out in all the colors of rhetoric. These intellectual qualities were transfused with an ardent love of truth, an absolute submission to the teaching of the Holy Scripture, and an adoring devotion to the Lord Jesus Christ.

Dr. Webb's method of instruction was the combination of text-book and lecture, along with daily inquisition of the student. In his questions he was very skilful, and while he would sometimes play the student as the fisherman plays the fish, it was always in kindest spirit. He threw his whole soul into his teaching and often the professor's chair became the preacher's pulpit

and he bore down on the heart and conscience of the student with powerful appeal. His students were deeply attached to him and gave him the warmest affection and the most unstinted admiration. They knew him to be their friend, wise in counsel and sympathetic with them in their doubts and difficulties. In all their ministry they remained loyal to him, and through them he has had an incalculable influence in holding the Church steadfast to her faith and to her mission.

It was the often expressed wish of Dr. Webb's students and many other friends that he should publish his lectures, or reduce them to the form of a usable text-book in theology. Had his life been prolonged he might have been induced to undertake this. The wish is met in part by the present volume.

While at Clarksville Dr. Webb published a treatise on the Theology of Infant Salvation, in which he convincingly shows how the Calvinistic system provides, on the basis of the Scriptures, for the salvation of all persons who die in infancy. Some years later he delivered a course of lectures on the Smyth foundation at Columbia Seminary, which were repeated at Jackson, Miss., and published under the title of *The Christian Hope*. At various times articles of his appeared in the *Presbyterian Quarterly* and in the religious papers. The two volumes and the occasional articles alike exhibit the ability, knowledge, and conscientious work always characteristic of his strong and disciplined mind.

Dr. Webb was taken away in the maturity of his powers, and at a time when the Church needs his steadying influence, and his unsurpassed ability in training young men for the ministry. He lives in the characters and teachings of his hundreds of students, who in this and other lands are preaching the glorious Gospel of the blessed God.

On October 23, 1888, Dr. Webb was married to Miss Roberta Chauncey Beck, of Columbia, S. C., who with their two children, Miss Annie Webb, of Louisville, and Robert A. Webb, Jr., M. D., of London, England, survives him. A great multitude throughout the Church share their sorrow in the loss they have suffered, and are grateful to God for him and for the grace by which he wrought so much for the Church and the world.

Preface

This volume is published in response to the urgent desire of former students and numerous friends of the late Professor Webb, and in accordance with affirmative action of the General Assembly of 1920 upon overtures from five Presbyteries "asking that the Executive Committee on Publication be instructed to take steps looking to the publication of a volume of the writings of the late Dr. R. A. Webb."

Mrs. Webb kindly put Dr. Webb's lectures and other writings at the disposal of the Executive Committee, and at its request two of Dr. Webb's colleagues in the Kentucky Seminary and five of his old students were constituted an Advisory Committee to select the material for the proposed volume.

In making the selection the Advisory Committee was controlled by the desire to secure unity of subject and completeness of treatment, and to avoid trenching on material that might properly make up another volume should its publication be found practicable. After much consideration the choice fell upon the lectures dealing with Soteriology, or the Doctrine of Salvation, which discuss a single general subject, and cover it more completely than was found true in the case of any other subject. It has not been thought proper by the Committee to do any editing of the lectures beyond making a few trivial corrections and transliterating Greek words referred to by the author.

The Executive Committee has been favored in having the cheerful and efficient aid of representative men in the Synods and Presbyteries, mostly students of Dr. Webb, in obtaining advance subscriptions to the volume.

The book is sent forth to the Church in recognition of an able and loyal son and a gifted teacher of many of her most useful ministers, and in the conviction that by it her faith in the doctrines of Grace will be confirmed.

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CHAPTER I.

Introduction

Soteriology.—Theology Proper, or Theism, is the doctrine of God; Anthropology is the doctrine of Man; Soteriology is the doctrine of Salvation. It is formed out of *soter* (saviour) and *logos* (discourse). It is that department of general theology which treats of the Redemption of sinful men. Its task is to discover and expound the biblical *ordo salutis*.

Ordo Salutis.—But is there any *ordo salutis*, or plan of salvation? In saving sinful men may not God proceed in an emergent and haphazard fashion, adjusting his saving acts to the circumstances as they occur in human history? May not the facts of the Gospel be without order, incapable of being reduced to any programme whatsoever? If so, there can be no soteriology, or systematic exposition of a gospel plan of salvation. There are three proofs for the *fact* of an *ordo salutis*: (1) biblical, (2) logical, (3) analogical.

(1) **Biblical.**—The Scriptures speak of an Economy of Redemption. "The dispensation of the fulness of times" (*oikonomian tou pleromatos ton kairon*) (Eph. 1:10). These "times" are gospel times, they have contents a *pleroma*, a fullness of gospel items or facts, and these contents are dispensed," not in confusion and disorder, but as an "economy." "Economy" is derived from the Greek *oikonomia* which is compounded of *oikos* (house) and *nomeo* (to arrange). It therefore signifies something as orderly as a well arranged house.

(2) **Logical.**—The Scriptures give us all the Elements of a Plan. These are three: (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) means for the accomplishment of that object, and (c) the application of the means to the accomplishment of that object. The gospel object is the salvation of sinful men, the means for the accomplishment of that object is the saving

work of Christ, and the means for the application of the saving work of Christ to the accomplishment of the object of saving sinful men is the work of the Holy Spirit. Where we have all the elements of a plan we logically have the plan itself.

(3) **Analogical.**—All the analogies between Nature and Grace, (and the Redeemer frequently said the kingdom of heaven is like certain things in nature) support the proposition that there is a plan of salvation. The natural sciences delight to assert that the universe is a cosmos and that all the laws of nature are orderly. If God works in an orderly and methodical way in creation, how much more would we expect him to operate in a regular and unchaotic fashion in redemption?

Elements.—Soteriologists collect and arrange the elements of the plan of salvation under three heads: (1) Predestination, (2) Atonement, (3) Vocation.

They get these three elements, or departments, by observing that the Christian Scriptures represent the Triune God—Father, Son and Holy Ghost—as the saviour of sinful men. Each person in the Godhead exercises a saving office, and performs a saving work, in the redemption of sinful men; and the beneficiaries of divine grace owe the praises of their salvation, co-ordinately and co-equally, to the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost. In offering up his thankful worship and grateful praise for the salvation of his soul, no man is warranted in making distinctions in the Trinity and rendering more, or different, gratitude to one of these adorable persons as distinguished from the other members of the Godhead. In redemption, as in creation and providence, these three persons are equal in power and glory, and the blessings of redemption are to be ascribed alike to each. The Christian is right when he sings the Long Meter Doxology.

The economic offices of the Trinity in the salvation of sinful men may be shown by a homely illustration. It is the office of an architect to draw the design of a building—sketch it on paper—conceive it in mind—give to the house mental,

ideal, decretal existence—the general outline and all the specifications and details. Then it is the office of a contractor to take this design—this conceptual house—from the hand of the architect, gather his workmen and materials, and actually erect the building according to design and specifications—make the ideal or mental house a real or concrete house. Then, according to our custom, it is the business of the man who runs the moving car to get the family and its belongings and move them into the house designed by the architect and built by the contractor.

In this homely figure the Father is the Architect of the house of redemption, the house of many mansions, in the language of the Saviour; the Son is the Contractor, who by his incarnation, life and death, actually erects this house of redemption, in all things according to the pattern which he receives from the hand of his Father, altering it neither by addition nor subtraction, or in any manner whatsoever; and the Holy Spirit runs the analogue of the moving car, using the gospel, the ministers, Christian workers and the Church as his force for collecting God's people—those for whom this house of redemption was designed and erected—and actually moving them into its possession and enjoyment—making of them conscious Christians.

Leaving figures, the technical term for the saving work of the Father is *Predestination*; for the saving work of the Son is *Atonement*; and for the saving work of the Spirit is *Vocation*.

These terms are to have their exposition in the proper place.

Outline.—Soteriologists dispute with each other about the proper and biblical order of these three elements or doctrines in God's *ordo salutis*, and their arrangement of them gives rise to several parties or schools of interpreters of the Plan of Salvation.

Sublapsarians.—These are low Calvinists. Their order is (1) Predestination, (2) Atonement, (3) Vocation. Their name indicates that they place Predestination under (*sub*) or

below (*infra*) the fall (*lapsus*) of mankind. In their view God's predestination terminates upon men viewed as created and fallen, and out of this created and fallen mass of mankind he elects some to everlasting life and passes by others and leaves them to their sinful fate. Then as a means to this end, he sent his Son into the world to make an atonement for the sins of all the elect, and his Spirit to effectually call all of these into saving relations to Christ.

Supralapsarians.—These are high or ultra Calvinists. They are so called because they conceive of God predestinating some to life and passing by others—as uttering his saving purpose—before or above (*supra*) the fall (*lapsus*) of all mankind. They insert creation and the fall between predestination and atonement, and so give us this logical order: (1) Predestination, (2) Creation, (3) the Fall, (4) Atonement, (5) Vocation. Interpreted, it means that God first decreed to save and damn; then that he might have some objects upon whom such a decree could terminate, he next decreed to create men as they were created; then that they might be in a salvable and damnable condition, he next decreed their sin and fall; and then sent his Son to make the atonement and his Spirit to effectually call through the gospel. Such an *ordo salutis* is abhorrent to metaphysics, to ethics, and to the Scriptures. It is propounded in no Calvinistic creed and can be charged only upon some extremists.

Hypotheticalists.—These are sometimes called New Schoolmen or Hypothetical Universalists or Moderate Calvinists. They give us this order: (1) Atonement, (2) Predestination, (3) Vocation. These place the work of the Son first, and construe it as universal; then the work of the Father, and interpret it as elective and partial in its saving results and intentions, and then the work of the Spirit third, and interpret the gospel call as effectual only in the case of the elect. It is repugnant to the Scriptures to represent Christ's saving work as preceding the work of the First Person in the Godhead: violative of the uniform Trinitarian order of life and action. It is repugnant to the gospel to

represent the Father as passing by any persons for whom Christ has made atonement. Christ and his Father are always one—there can be no discord between them.

Arminians.—These propose the following *ordo salutis*: (1) Atonement, (2) Vocation, (3) Predestination. That is, Christ made an atonement for all sinful men universally and indiscriminately, and the Spirit likewise calls all men universally and indiscriminately, and then the Father elects such as believe, repent, and obey the gospel, and reprobates all other persons. This scheme holds the mind of the Father in abeyance until he has seen the results of the work of Christ and of the Spirit. It thus violates the Trinitarian order of thought, life and action. The house of many mansions must logically wait until the divine Architect can find out for how many persons there will be need. The gospel represents that men are chosen to be holy, while this view represents men as being chosen because they are holy. According to the gospel, men choose Christ because he first chose them; according to this programme, God chooses men because they first chose him. According to the gospel, God first loves us in Christ Jesus; according to this interpretation, we first love God in Christ Jesus, and then he consequentially loves us.

Sentimentalists.—Sentimentalists, Pelagians, Rationalists, and all who are neither sublapsarians nor supralapsarians, nor new schoolmen, nor Arminians, construe the scheme of grace by deleting altogether the doctrine of predestination. For them there are but two elements in the plan of salvation: (1) Atonement, (2) Vocation. The Father is but a spectator of the saving work of Christ, and the Spirit—a mere onlooker at what these two are doing in the sinful world—a mere receiver of the results which they obtain.

Calvinists.—The *ordo salutis* of the Calvinistic creeds and confessions is: (1) Predestination, (2) Atonement, (3) Vocation. In other and interpretative words: (1) Redemption as conceived by the Father, (2) Redemption as executed by the Son, and (3) Redemption as applied by the Spirit.

CHAPTER II.

The Covenant of Grace

Soteriologists of the federal school think that the Plan of Salvation took the form of a *Covenant*. They specifically call it *The Covenant of Grace*. That other arrangement under which occurred the sin and fall of the race they call *The Covenant of Works*.

Elements.—A covenant is an agreement between two or more persons. Analyzed, there are three factors or elements in every such agreement: (1) Parties, (2) Conditions or Stipulations, and (3) Sanctions. That is, in every covenant there are the contracting parties who make the agreement; then there is the stipulation, or matter about which the agreement is made, and then there are the sanctions, or the thing which makes the engagement sacred and binding—the thing promised on condition that the agreement is kept and the forfeit or penalty which must follow on condition the agreement is broken by either party.

Parties.—The parties to this covenant of grace are the three persons of the Godhead. They are equal and sovereign, and so capable of contracting with each other. This covenant is made between them, *about sinful men*. Sinners are not contracting parties. They are neither metaphysically nor morally capable of contracting with Almighty God. A holy being could enter into covenant relations with a sinless creature, but he could not enter into such an engagement with a creature whose moral depravity renders him incapable of complying with the very terms of such a contract. The party of the first part in this covenant of grace is the Father and the parties of the second part are the Son and the Holy Spirit. It is an inter-trinitarian agreement concerning the salvation of sinful men.

Stipulations.—In this covenant the Father agrees to equip the Son with a human nature necessary to perform his redeeming task, to plentifully sustain him in his undertaking and give him a people for his reward, organized into a kingdom. In it the Son engaged to become incarnate, to obey perfectly both the penal and preceptive requirements of that moral law which men had violated—in short, to make an atonement. In it the Spirit engaged to convict, convert and sanctify sinful men and present them to the Father a holy people, without any moral spot, or blemish, or wrinkle, or any such thing. In short, the issues of this transaction hang upon the *obedience* of the Son and Spirit to the conditions under which they are to be sent into the world upon this saving mission.

Sanctions.—The sanctions of the covenant of grace are life and death—life upon condition of obedience, and death upon condition of disobedience. That is, the Son, if he makes the stipulated atonement is to have all the blessings promised in the covenant, and if he fails he would forfeit his life as any other transgressor; and the Spirit, if he converts and sanctifies according to the agreement, is to have all the blessings promised thereunder, and if he breaks down in his task he too must forfeit his standing before a righteous and covenant-keeping God. It is a solemn transaction. Failure on the part of either person in the transaction would be the failure and break-down of the Godhead. It cannot fail. The covenant of grace is bound to issue in triumph because of the very nature of the parties entering into the agreement.

Sinners.—Now the desideratum is how can sinful men become beneficiaries of this covenant of grace made between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. True, it was made about them; but how are they to become participants? Sinful men need two things in order to become partakers of this covenant: (1) a legal right and (2) a conscious experience. The first is given by *election*, and the second by *conversion*. No man, and especially no sinful man, has a natural right—a right that inheres in and arises out of the very nature

of the case—to be a beneficiary of this covenant. Such a legal title must be given him by grace. He must be appointed, or designated, an heir. This act of appointment Calvinistic soteriologists call *election*. By it they are accustomed to say that the sinner is given a right to become a Christian. But an heir must have not only a title to his estate; he must also actually enter upon his inheritance and consciously enjoy it. It is *conversion* by the Spirit that makes a legal Christian a *conscious* Christian. No sinful man has the power to enter upon the blessings of this covenant of grace even if he had the legal right to do so. A something has to be done within his nature. The Spirit converts him and leads to unite himself to Christ by faith. It is, therefore, by election and conversion that the sinful man becomes a beneficiary of this covenant of grace between the three persons of the Godhead. Not by one, but by both. Election without conversion would give a title without the conscious blessing; and conversion without election would give him the blessing without a right to it. In short, election by the Father gives the sinner a right to the atonement made by Christ, and conversion by the Spirit gives him that atonement as a life and experience.

Grace and Works.—The Scriptures persistently and consistently contrast grace and works. They tell us that if sinful men are saved by works, then they are not saved by grace, and that if they are saved by grace, then they are not saved by works. They are antithetical systems. They cannot be compounded or mixed. Sinners are salvable by grace just because they are not salvable by works. A “grace” is anything which is given; a “work” is anything which is done. In a scheme of “grace” man is a beneficiary, a recipient, a patient; in a scheme of “works” he is a doer, an agent. Hence the first covenant, the one under which man sinned and fell, is called a Covenant of Works, because its blessings were suspended upon something which he was to do; while the second, the one under which he is saved, is called a Covenant of Grace, because its blessings are suspended upon something which is to be given to him. His title is given to him

by election; the atonement is made for him by Christ; he is regenerated and sanctified by the Spirit. Hence he does not save himself; he is saved by grace. The triune God is the saving agent and he is the saved patient. This is but saying that sinful man does not save himself, but that he is saved by God.

Dispensations.—There never has been any other or any different programme of redemption since the fall of man. The scheme of grace has had different dispensations, or modifications, which differ not in substance, but only in form. One of these is historically called the *Patriarchal Dispensation*, (from Adam to Moses), in which the patriarch, or head of the family and tribe, was the minister of religion employed by the Spirit of God in leading men into the covenant of grace. A second is called the *Mosaic Dispensation*, (from Moses to Pentecost), in which the people of Israel were employed by the Spirit of God as his instrumentality in leading sinful men into the covenant of grace. And the third is called the *Christian Dispensation*, (from Pentecost to the end of the world), in which the Spirit of God employs the Church with its ministers as the agency through which he leads sinful men into the covenant of grace. The Millennium, (if there is to be one), is but a signal and distinguished period within the Christian Dispensation. God has not had, and will at no time have, any other method of saving sinful men but the Covenant of Grace, which sinners enter, legally by election, and consciously by conversion, showing itself in faith, repentance and evangelical obedience.

CHAPTER III.

Predestination

Purpose.—The Westminster Catechism defines the decrees of God as his “eternal purpose, according to the counsel of his will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.”

While the decrees of God are many they are all articulated into one purpose, plan, or programme, having the divine glory as the chief of the whole scheme. The items in the universe may be broadly classified as, (1) Things and (2) Persons. As the decree of God terminates upon Things it is called *Foreordination* and as it terminates upon Persons it is called *Predestination*.

Foreordination.—The Westminster Confession states the doctrine of foreordination in this language:

“God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.”

The Calvinistic theology holds that God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass in all the amplitudes of space, in all the range of universal history, so that there is nothing that can be excepted from its sweep and scope; yet all this has been done in such a manner:

1. That God is not the author of sin.
2. That no violence is done to free agency.
3. That the efficiency of second causes is not set aside.
4. But in such a way that these three things are established.

How can this be? How can our theologians devise some method by which they can hold the universality of the divine foreordination and yet save the sinlessness of God, the free-

dom of man and the efficiency of second causes? There are many who think the feat impossible. But Calvinists seek to show the reconciliation by drawing a distinction between (1) efficacious decrees and (2) permissive decrees.

Efficacious Decrees are those decisions of the divine mind in which God determines that the thing decreed shall come to pass and he is the direct or indirect cause of the eventuation of the thing concerned. For example, the creation of Adam.

Permissive Decrees, on the other hand, are those decisions of the divine mind in which God determines to permit or suffer the thing decreed to come to pass and for the eventuation of which some other agent or agency is the responsible cause. For example, the sin of Adam.

Now, when we understand that God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass—some things efficaciously and some things permissively—it is apparent that there is no inconsistency between the doctrine of universal foreordination and the sinlessness of God, the freedom of men and the efficiency of second causes. In other words, foreordination necessitates some things and suffers some other things. The divine causality is with respect to some things efficient and in respect to some other things permissive.

Predestination is a technical term for the decree of God as it terminates upon persons—men and angels. It is stated by the Westminster Confession in this language:

“By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death.”

Our theologians, for the sake of clear explication, divide predestination also into (1) efficacious predestination and (2) permissive predestination. That is, God effectively does some things for men and angels, and some other things he permits men and angels to do for themselves. For some items in the history of these persons God is the efficacious cause, but for some other items he is only the permissive cause—the cause which does not prevent, but suffers them to follow

the listings of their own minds and the desires of their own hearts.

Election and Reprobation.—Predestination is divided into (1) Election and (2) Reprobation. One—Election—is an efficacious decree, in which God determines to save its objects, and the other—Reprobation—is a permissive decree, in which God decides to preterit or pass by the objects of this decree and leave them to follow the listings of their own minds and the desires of their own hearts. He is the causal agent in redemption; he is the permissive agent in damnation. He saves men; he allows or suffers men to destroy themselves. In the one case he is agent and they are patients; in the other they are agents and he is patient. He saves; they destroy. He is the author of their salvation; they are the authors of their damnation. Election is efficacious; damnation is permissive.

Proof.—That there is some sort of doctrine of Predestination in the Scriptures cannot be gainsaid. Expositors may disagree about the nature of it, but they cannot deny the fact. The word itself, the idea, equivalent expressions and phrases and representations, are here, there, yonder, and everywhere on the sacred pages.

Proorizo (to predestinate) occurs seven times. *prognosko* (to foreknow) and *prognosis* (foreknowledge) occur nine times. *Eklego* (to select) and *eklektos* (the elect) and *ekloge* (election) are used forty-nine times. Besides there are such other words as *diatasso* (to order), *Kathistemi* (to arrange), *Kataskeuazo* to (prepare), *Krino* (to decree), *orizo* (to determine). The Redeemer speaks of those who were “given to him,” and that act of donation was pre-temporal; the apostles speak of those who were “called according to God’s purpose” and that before the foundation of the world.

It would seem to be impossible for those who read the Christian Scriptures not to see and feel that there is some doctrine of predestination set forth in them which as a loyal expositor he must interpret and as a faithful theologian he must co-ordinate somehow in his system of Christian doc-

trine. As a matter of fact, all the evangelical theologies do recognize the existence of this doctrine while they disagree in the construction of it and the place which they assign it in their soteriologies. There are few attempts at complete evasion of it. Few minds can be content until they have made some satisfactory disposition of this tenet. If any have come to look upon it as a distinctively Calvinistic article, and then throw all the obliquy associated with it upon this party, it is not because it is his exclusive dogma but rather because he has the courage or the hardihood to attempt to interpret it and place it in his soteriology as one of the items of divine revelation.

CHAPTER IV.

Election

Predestination is divided into (1) Election and (2) Reprobation. These are to be considered separately.

Function.—The function or office of Election in the scheme of grace is to give to its subjects a *status* under the Covenant of Grace—to confer a title and right to the benefits and privileges of God's redemptive programme. How are sinful men made partakers of a covenant made about them between the three persons of the Godhead? The Calvinistic soteriology gives a threefold answer to this momentous question: (1) by the election of the Father, (2) by the atonement of the Son, (3) by the conversion of the Spirit. All three are necessary to the introduction of any sinful person into the scheme of salvation. Analyzed, they are but the three-thirds of the complete plan of redemption.

Election gives him the status or standing of a Christian: makes him a nominal Christian. *Atonement* removes his guilt and makes him an eligible Christian: makes him a formal Christian. *Conversion* gives him a new nature, by which he performs the acts of a Christian: makes him an actual and conscious Christian. Faith brings out, in consciousness and life, what the Father and the Son and the Spirit have done for him.

To illustrate: Election by the people gives to a particular citizen the *right* to be President of the United States. If, however, this particular citizen were resting under some civil disability which bars him from the office, some action would have to be taken to remove such disability and make him eligible to this high office: something analogous to, or serving the purpose of, an atonement. If, however, he were elected and eligible but was personally utterly indisposed and disinclined and unwilling to accept this office, some change would have to be wrought in his temper and disposition and

inclination before he would become the actual and conscious President of the United States: some change analogous to, or resembling, conversion.

The divine election gives a sinful man a title to heaven. But his guilt constitutes a legal disability, or moral bar, to his admission to those holy precincts: the atonement of Christ takes away that disability, that barrier, and makes him eligible. But he is disinclined and unwilling to pursue the course which leads to this heavenly destiny: the conversion of the Spirit gives him a new heart, changes his unwillingness, and causes him to enter upon the actual joys and experiences of a Christian life.

Election gives a title. It gives nothing but a title. But a title is a necessary factor in his salvation.

Definition.—Election is an eternal act of God in which, according to his sovereign grace and not on account of any foreseen qualities, he chooses not all but an indefinite number of sinful men to be the beneficiaries of the atonement of Christ, the subjects of the converting operations of the Spirit and the heirs at last of heavenly blessedness.

Exposition.—But let us cross-question this doctrine and bring out its meaning by question and answer.

1. Who elects? *God.*
2. Who are the elect? *An indefinite number of sinners.*
3. When were they elected? *Before the foundation of the world.*
4. Why were they elected? *Not for any foreseen conduct or character, but for reasons which God has not revealed.*
5. To what were they elected? *To all the blessings of Christ's atonement and to the conversion of the Spirit.*
6. How is their election made known? *By faith and repentance.*
7. What is the instrumentality of producing these certificates of election—faith and repentance? *Preaching.*

Proofs.—The proofs of Election fall into three classes: (1) biblical, (2) rational, (3) historical.

1. **Biblical Proofs.**—I do not propose to give a tithe of the Scriptures which support the fact of Election, for indeed the doctrine threads the entire revelation of God and is interwoven in the whole redemptive story. I shall give only a few specimen proof-texts.

Christ said, "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me" (Jno. 6:37). There is a portion of the sinful world which is referred to as "those given to Christ by his Father." This idea is elaborated by that contrast which runs through the Scriptures between "my people" and "those who are not my people," and by the figurative classification of mankind into "sheep and goats," which distinction runs to the day of final judgment.—"Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained you, that ye should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain" (Jno. 15:16).

When the Gentiles heard the gospel, the record is, "as many as were ordained to eternal life, believed" (Acts 13:48). They believed because they were ordained; they were not ordained because they believed. Their election was causative and their believing was consequential. We reverse the Scripture when we reverse this order.

In his great epistle to the Romans, Paul asserts and illustrates the doctrine in many places and phrases. His *ordo salutis* is, "whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified" (Rom. 8:30). Predestination is in order to calling; calling is in order to justification; justification is in order to sanctification; and sanctification is in order to glorification. They are links in a chain: all of them are necessary to its full length and completeness.

He outlines the way the Ephesians and himself became Christians in this language: "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ; according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of

the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the beloved" (Eph. 1:3-6). This language declares that the whole Christian output at Ephesus was the product of election and predestination. We are not authorized in making the case at Ephesus exceptional and unique.

The following exhortation was given to the Colossian Christians: "Put on therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, longsuffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any have a quarrel against any." (Col. 3: 12, 13). These disciples were enjoined to illustrate a Christian life and exemplify the graces of godliness because they were "the elect of God." It was not their Christian character and conduct which made them elect; it was their antecedent election that made it logical and necessary that they should lead godly lives. It is not life that makes election, but election that makes life.

When he bursts out into thanksgiving for the Thessalonian Christians, he says he does so "because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth; whereunto he called you by our gospel" (2 Thess. 2:13, 14). Here he declares that they were chosen unto salvation, and that salvation is *via* faith and sanctification. They were not chosen because they believed and were sanctified, but they believe and are sanctified because they were first chosen. They were elected to be saved through faith and sanctification.

When we turn to Peter, writing to the Christians scattered throughout Northwestern Asia, he describes them as "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ" (1 Pet. 1:2). These disciples were elect; but they were not elected because of their

evangelical obedience and blood-sprinkling: they were, on the contrary, elected that they might obey and be sprinkled with atoning blood.

When we look into the last book of revelation we read in the apocalyptic account of the end of all human story on the earth: "and whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire" (Rev. 20:15). God knows the end from the beginning. The catalogue of the redeemed was decretively made up in the counsels of eternity. The final judgment will respect the register, the lists, census enumeration, found in the Book of Life.

The Scriptures teach us that regeneration is by the Spirit: "Born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (Jno. 1:13); that faith is the gift of God: "the fruit of the Spirit is . . . faith" (Gal. 5:22); that repentance is the gift of God: "then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life" (Acts 11:18); and all good works and graces of character are also the gifts of God (Eph. 2:10; Gal. 5:22, 23). If election, therefore, be predicated upon foreseen faith and repentance and regeneration and sanctification and good works and Christian graces—upon Christian character and conduct—it is grounded upon those qualities which God alone can give. He conditions a man's election upon something which God does.

2. **Rational Proofs.**—Not only, however, do the Christian Scriptures categorically assert the doctrine of Election, but there are certain rational arguments which would compel sound and consistent thinking to hypothecate it, even if it were not so much as hinted in the Bible. These rational arguments for Election I am pleased to name, (1) the logical, (2) the scientific, (3) the philosophical and (4) the theological.

(1) **Logical Argument.**—This may be stated in the form of the logician's disjunctive conditional, as follows: Either God elects no sinful man; or he elects every sinful man; or he elects some sinful men. None, all, some—these are exhaustive categories. We are shut up to making our choice between them. *First*, if God elects no sinner, then all the

race are non-elect. If he choses to save nobody, then universal damnation is the logical consequence. But there is a multitude saved which no man can number; consequently the hypothesis that God elects nobody is shockingly incorrect. *Second*, if God elects every sinner, and passes by no person in the dispensation of his saving mercy, then universal salvation is the result. Universalists so hold and joyfully declare. But at least some are lost—the man who has committed “the unpardonable sin,” if no one else. Consequently this second proposition must be dismissed as untenable by any others than uiversalists. *Third*, the only proposition of the original three left is that God elects some sinners—chooses to save some men. We are, therefore, shut up to holding either, universal damnation, or universal salvation, or partial salvation. Election is like heaven—it includes a multitude which no man can number, but it does not include the whole human race.

(2) **Scientific Argument.**—A second rational argument for election founds itself upon the scientific doctrine of “natural selection.” If natural philosophy is confident and assured about anything to-day it is this dogma. We are told that nature has selected the forms which it would produce, the types which it would perpetuate, the species which it would destroy and those which it would preserve, and all the individual variations which it would make permanent or transient. So it has gone on exercising this elective and selective prerogative until it has differentiated the original homogeneous universe into the present heterogeneous world of minerals, plants, and animals and human beings. How can any theist who is enamoured of the doctrine of “natural selection” revile at the doctrine of “divine election”? If the divine method in nature is selective, the divine method in redemption would analogically be elective. “Selective” and “elective” are words too close akin in meaning for most people to see any difference at all between them. This is, at least, an argument *ad hominem* to all those who believe in evolution and its pro-

cesses. Call to mind evolution's graveyards of creatures whose carcasses have been reprobated; the forms and creatures which have been reprobated far outnumber those which have been selected for perpetuation. The reprobations of the God of nature are simply appalling; and yet there are those who are simply horrified that there should be any moral reprobates among the countless millions of sinful men who have utterly failed in the moral struggle for the higher spiritual life!

(3) **Theological Argument.**—A third argument for election is founded upon the theological conception of the nature of God as an infinite being. If he is infinite and perfect, he must foreknow all things; he must foreknow all men as sinful and immoral; and in the light of that knowledge he must foreknow his own mind and intentions concerning them; he must foreknow how unable they are to save themselves; he must foreknow that he alone can save any of them; and, in the light of this knowledge, he must foreknow his intentions concerning them; he must foreknow that he will be gracious and pardon none of them, or all of them, or some of them. He cannot have such an act of foreknowledge without having a predetermining will concerning them. He certainly foreknows who will be saved; he certainly foreknows whom he will save; and he certainly intended to do all he does do; else he is subject to blunders and surprises. All such conclusions are perfectly unthinkable if God is such a being as theology teaches him to be.

3. **Historical Proof.**—Not only is election proved by Scripture and reason; it is also proved by the whole course of history and providence.

If we go back to earliest times, Cain was rejected and Abel was accepted.

If we come down a step further in biblical history, Noah and his household were accepted and the rest of the antediluvian world was rejected and their carcasses were scattered on

the wild waste of waters in testimony of the divine reprobation of them on account of their wickedness.

When we cross the Flood, Abraham was called and the remainder of the world was left in heathen darkness and death.

From among all the nations of the earth Israel was chosen and the others were left outside the pale of God's covenanted mercies.

If we look at God's providential dealings with the world we see distinctions made by his hand among races and peoples and nations and individuals. Some men are better endowed by nature and more favourably conditioned by providence than others. These observed inequalities in the story and life of races, peoples, nations and individuals is the cause of much bitter pessimism and human complainings at the ways of providence and at the methods of grace.

This is not the place for a theodicy—the vindication of the ways of God with men. These facts are cited to ground a rational expectation of parallel or similar distinctions in the realm of redemption—in the dispensations of the blessings of redemption. Any one at all familiar with the discriminations in providence ought to be prepared to find analogous distinctions in the course and conduct of the scheme of grace.

Efficacious.—Election is an efficacious decree—a decree in which God has determined that the result shall be, and not one in which he has decided merely to permit the result to occur.

This proposition brings the Calvinistic and Presbyterian parties into sharp collision with some other interpreters—with all those, for example, who think election is conditioned upon a foresight of repentance, faith and evangelical obedience. They think salvation is only permissively decreed—that as God permitted men to sin so he permits them to save themselves. In other words, God has made a provision for the redemption of men even as he made provision for their sin and fall, and has issued a proclamation of his willingness for every one to avail himself of these gracious and saving opportunities.

Which is correct? Is election an efficacious or a permissive decree? Does God save, or does he merely permit men to save themselves? Calvinists believe that this saving decree is efficacious and support their belief by the following considerations:

I. By the Psychological Effects of Sin.—The Scriptures represent sinful and unconverted men as “blind” and “deaf” and “dumb” and “paralyzed” and “dead.” These and other figures they employ to represent man’s spiritual inability and moral self-helplessness. If there is a shred of truth in them—if they are not a gross misrepresentation of his religious condition—if there is any foundation for them in the psychological state which has resulted from sinning—of what earthly use can a mere permissive decree be to such a person? Lazarus, four days dead, needs something else than a permit to come out of his grave. Bartimeus, stone blind, needs something else than a bare permit to see. The paralytic, helpless on his couch, needs something else than a simple permit to take up his bed and go to his house. The sinner’s condition is such that a divine permission to correct it cannot possibly be effective for his salvation. It was all that he needed to fall—for God to stand aside and take no hand in the matter, a mere onlooker and non-preventer of the affair—because man had power. But now that he is fallen and is spiritually self-helpless, it can do him no good if God only opens a door of redemption, and then stands by without interfering, a mere sufferer and onlooker. The poor fellow at the pool of Bethesda had the permission of God, angels and men to get into the waters when disturbed. It was not permission which he needed; it was for some one to put him into the pool. A live man may take advantage of a permission, or non-prevention, to commit suicide, but, having taken his life, how can a permission to raise himself from the dead be of any practical consequence to him? If election, therefore, is of any value to the sinner, it must be efficacious and not merely permissive.

2. Because of Grace.—The Scriptures persistently and consistently represent all sinful persons as being saved by grace. Grace proceeds from God—it is specifically that power by which he saves sinful men. If it is divine grace which converts, regenerates and saves, how can the gospel be a mere divine permit to this wicked world to come back into the divine favour? Grace is something forceful and efficacious and is not something permissive and optional.

3. Because God is Agent.—God is always the agent in human redemption. He takes the initiative. “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you” (Jno. 15:16). “We love him because he first loved us” (1 John 4:19), “Whom he did predestinate, them he also . . . glorified” (Rom. 8:30). “According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world” (Eph. 1:4). All such expressions, abounding in Scripture, are inconsistent with the idea that God’s attitude towards the salvation of sinners is one of bare permission. They indicate that God has set out upon this task with the intention of effecting it.

For such reasons the Calvinist cannot believe that the gospel is nothing more than a mere permit issued by God to this world in which he suffers men to avail themselves of the benefits of the covenant of grace if they are so minded. He believes that God is a real *Saviour* and not a bare *permitter*—that God efficaciously chooses, that Christ efficaciously atones, that the Spirit efficaciously calls and converts. In short, the saving programme is not merely advisory and recommendatory but one which the Deity undertakes to effect. In Eden God was a mere spectator and onlooker, observing without prevention or interference as our first parents ate the forbidden fruit, but in the gospel he is not thus a mere spectator, watching men as they save themselves as he looked on as they destroyed themselves—wishing them well, but exerting no efficiency upon the result. The redeeming action of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost is not exhausted in the idea that

God submitted a redemptive proposition to this world to be accepted or rejected as sinful men might elect.

He set out with the serious purpose to save—to save some, none, or all, of the human race. He did not undertake the salvation of all, but he did undertake to make a multitude which no man can count the heirs of the covenant of grace. This is the decree of election, and it is efficacious in its character and not merely permissive.

CHAPTER V

Reprobation

One hemisphere of Predestination is Election and the other is Reprobation.

Definition.—Reprobation is a Latin compound, made up of *re* (again) and *probo* (to try). A reprobate is one who has been tested and abandoned—a hopeless moral failure. In civil procedure, a court may *probate* a will, and then subsequently re-open the matter, and *re-probate* it by re-affirming the original decision. A criminal court may try a case, and then review its decision and re-affirm its judgment. Words rarely ever lose the aroma of their derivation.

Reprobation, in theology, is that act of God in which, after reviewing the case of certain sinful men, he decides to pass them by with his saving grace and re-affirms his judgment of condemnation upon them. It is a literal re-probation, a re-trial, resulting in the re-affirmation of the original sentence of condemnation. Their case is analogous to that of the criminal whose sentence in the lower court is reviewed and re-affirmed by the last court of appeal.

Statement.—The Westminster Confession states this doctrine in this language:

“The rest of mankind (the non-elect), God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.”

Analysis.—There are consequently two elements or factors in Reprobation: (1) Preterition and (2) Condemnation.

Preterition.—All those whom God does not incorporate in the covenant of grace he passes by in the distribution of

his pardoning mercies. Preterition is derived from *praeter* (beyond) and *eo* (to go). God either includes all persons in his plan of salvation; or he does not include them all. Those not included are passed by. He either gives all men to Christ, or he does not. Those whom he does not give are passed by. He either saves all men; or he does not. Those whom he does not save he passes by.

Sovereign.—Why does he pass them by? Preterition is a sovereign act. He has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Why does he not save all men? Do you say, Because they all do not believe? Then why does he not enable and persuade all to believe and obey the gospel? Do you say it is because he cannot? If he can convert one, why cannot he convert another, why can he not convert all? If he can open the blind eyes of Bartimaeus, why can he not open all or any blind eyes? If he can raise Lazarus from the dead, why does he not raise all men from the dead? The only rational explanation is his sovereignty.

Condemnation.—But this action of God is not a *bare* passing by. He does something more than merely go by with the blessings of his grace. He leaves these persons under the sentence of condemnation which he originally passed upon them. He does more than that. He reviews their case, and re-affirms that sentence. He finds it was right and proper in the first instance, and so re-condemns them for their sin.

Judicial.—This aspect of reprobation is not sovereign but judicial. His withholding his mercy is sovereign; he may give that to whom he pleases. But his condemnation is judicial; it is predicated upon the guilt and sin of those who are affected by it. “Ordains them to dishonor and wrath *for their sin*,” says the Confession. God never condemns the sinless; he never re-condemns the sinless. It is analogous to the action of a governor who examines the cases of a number of prisoners and pardons some and leaves others under their condemnation. His leaving them under condemnation is

equivalent to his re-condemning them, or approving of their penal condition. It would be an outrage if he found them guiltless and yet declined to give the relief which was in his power. Or it faintly resembles the action of a supreme court which reviews a number of cases, reverses some of the decisions and delivers those affected by it; and declines to reverse, but re-affirms, other decisions and establishes the judgment of the court below.

Permissive Decree.—While election is an efficacious decree, reprobation is a permissive decree. It is negative and not positive; God exercises no casual efficiency to prevent any one from accepting the overtures of his mercy; he only declines to put forth any causal power to constrain them to accept his gospel. He constrains the elect to faith and repentance, but he leaves the non-elect to the listings of their own minds and the desires of their own hearts. He changes the natures of the elect, so that they will to believe, but he does not alter the hearts of the non-elect, and so leaves them to pursue their own course in sin and ruin. Election is an efficacious decree, but reprobation is a permissive decree.

If I lift up a stone with my hand, I am the efficient cause of its uplift. But if I let go the stone, it is not I, but gravity which is the efficient cause of its downfall. If two men fall into the river and I rescue one of them from drowning, I am the efficient cause of his rescue. But if the other perishes, it is not I, but the water, which drowns him. If God saves John, he is the efficient cause of his salvation; but if Judas perishes, it is his sinfulness which carried him to his own place. My attitude towards the falling stone is one of permission or sufferance; I do not prevent it from falling; I am only the permissive cause of its falling. My attitude towards the drowning man is one of permission or sufferance; I do not prevent him from drowning; I am the permissive cause of his death. My relation to both events is one of permission, of allowance, of sufferance, of non-prevention. So if God lifts one sinful being to heaven, he is the efficient cause of that man's

salvation; he is his Saviour. But if another sinful man goes to perdition, it is not God who destroys him; it is the gravity of his own sinfulness which carries him down. God's relation to this event is one of permission, of allowance, of sufferance, of non-prevention. You may blame me for letting the stone fall, or for letting the man drown; or you may blame God for letting Adam eat of the forbidden fruit, or for not preventing Judas from betraying his Lord, or for not causing all sinners to repent and believe; but you cannot say that I was the cause of the falling of the stone or of the drowning of the man, or that God was the cause of the fall of Adam or of Judas going to his own place.

In the parable, the priest and the Levite passed by the man who had fallen among thieves, while the good Samaritan ministered to his needs. We censure the priest and the Levite for their conduct because they were under a humanitarian and moral obligation to be kind to the unfortunate man. But the Presbyterian does not believe that sinful men are simply moral unfortunates, like the man who had fallen among the thieves, but that they are sinners and criminal transgressors of moral law. He does not believe that God passes the reprobate by as mere unfortunates who appeal for mercy, but as moral criminals who have been disobedient to his righteous and rightful requirements. He does not believe that it is a violation of the law of good neighborhood for God to pass by some criminals and show saving favours to others any more than it is brutal in a governor to pass by some convicts and show executive clemency to others. Reprobation is predicated upon the sinfulness and ill-desert of those who are not made the beneficiaries of God's saving grace.

Apparent Contradictions.—There are many passages in Scripture which apparently contradict the proposition that reprobation is a permissive decree—such as those which represent God as “blinding the understanding,” “hardening the heart,” “stopping the ears,” and otherwise conditioning some persons so that they cannot see and believe, cannot repent

and be converted. Presbyterians believe that all such passages may be fairly interpreted by construing the divine action in them as permissive—as the result of his non-interference with the moral and spiritual condition of the persons referred to. We are told that God hardened Pharaoh's heart, and also that Pharaoh hardened his own heart. It is a common and satisfactory explanation that God hardened the heart of the Egyptian king by letting him alone and leaving him to follow the judgments of his own mind and the desires of his own heart. We are told that God blinded the mind of Israel, and that Israel blinded his own mind. It is a common and satisfying explanation that God blinded the mind of the chosen people by leaving them to their own self-willed sin and folly. We are told that God shut up Pilate and Herod, the Gentiles and the Jews, to the crucifixion of Jesus, and yet that it was the Romans and the Jews who perpetrated this most atrocious of all murders. It is an old explanation that God left the persons concerned in the crucifixion of Christ to follow their own will and desires in this dreadful matter and so brought it about by his non-action, his non-prevention. So with Judas. His betrayal of Christ was predicted; and it came about by God's not interfering with his evil heart. It is a commonplace observation that whatever is let alone deteriorates—the field, the animal, the child, all require care and culture for life and well-being. It looks, therefore, as if preterition is a decision on God's part to let some persons alone, and leave them, in the language of the proverb, "To eat the fruit of their own way, and to be filled with their own device" (Prov. 1:31).

Criticism.—The Presbyterian has suffered much censorious criticism by his opponents, and misrepresentation by his own friends because this distinction between the efficacious and permissive decree has been overlooked. He does believe that "God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass"—some things efficaciously and some things permissively—that God has determined from all eternity to do some things himself and to permit his free creatures to do some other

things. He believes that election is an efficacious decree, in consequence of which God works, through the gospel, within his people "both to will and to do of his good pleasure"—thus becoming their efficacious Saviour. But he also believes that "the rest of mankind," other than those who are saved, God passes by and leaves them to follow the listings of their own minds and the desires of their own hearts, and "for their sins," because they are wicked and impenitent, ordains them to "wrath." He prevents no man from accepting the gospel. He invites and urges all to do so. He constrains some to accept it, and leaves the rest to do as they please. He invites all men to his gospel feast; he compels some to come, he prevents none. The reprobate have a divine permit to do as they please about it. The elect he graciously compels to accept it—to hear it and obey the gospel call. Election is efficacious; reprobation is permissive.

CHAPTER VI.

Jesus of Nazareth

Who was Jesus of Nazareth?

This is the most momentous question over which this world has ever held awful and anxious debate with itself.

When he was born, Herod the king was "troubled, and all Jerusalem with him." The monarch assembled the "Priests and scribes," all the ecclesiastics, and diligently inquired about the time, the place, and the meaning of the advent of this Child into this world, and set to work to destroy him, by issuing that decree which slaughtered all the "innocents" in Israel. (Matt. 2).

When John the Baptist, the rugged forerunner, was in Herod's dungeon waiting for his execution, in a solemn moment of discouragement he sent two of his disciples to Jesus, and asked him, "Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another?" (Matt. 11:3).

Jesus himself recognized the reasonableness of this great question, and showed his own solicitude about the answer which it was receiving. "Whom say the people that I am?" (Luke 9:8). "Whom say ye that I am?" (Matt. 16:15).

On the early morning of a Jewish Sabbath Jesus and his twelve apostles set out from Bethany for Jerusalem. Their company was soon swelled by a great multitude, pouring into the city to celebrate the paschal feast. In their jubilation the crowd carpeted the roadway with their garments and scattered branches before him. As they drew near to the city of ten thousand sacred associations and hallowed memories, the multitude, waving the evergreen fronds of the palm, shouted, "Hosanna to the Son of David! Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord! Hosanna in the highest!" "And when he was come into Jerusalem, all the city was moved, saying, Who is this?" (Matt. 21:10).

This same great question beats at the heart and trembles upon the lip of the world to this day. Called the Messiah and Saviour by all the Christian world; obviously the dynamic center of all modern history; clearly the most potent and potential factor in all civilization; the one who has created more change and stir in this earth than all other persons combined; his person unique, his teaching original, his conduct exceptional, his character unblemished; demanding the discipleship of men upon the pain of eternal sanctions: men will ask, men must ask, Who is He?

If we admit his pretensions and submit to his demands upon any other grounds than those that are solid and rational, we show small respect for our own intelligence and a trifling regard for our own welfare. The Creator has given us our faculties to protect us against the charlatan and the pretender. In no matter are we under a more sacred obligation to use our best reason than in matters of religion.

Jesus wrote no autobiography and left no memorandum concerning himself. It is not known that he ever wrote a single line with his own hand about anything. But eight of his contemporaries, associates and friends, after his death, wrote about him. Not many characters in the olden days had so many narrators of their story, so many to write appreciations of their persons and services. These eight tell the world substantially all that we know about Jesus of Nazareth. If any other contemporaries wrote anything about him the world has not treasured these accounts and they have been lost. On the principle that it is wise to select the witnesses for important events and not leave them to be reported by the indiscriminate multitude, the Christian Church believes that these eight were divinely chosen and guided in the report which they made of Jesus, that the world might have an accurate account of the Messiah and Saviour and that the account might not have any extraneous matter in it and that it might not be confused by irresponsible reports made by other persons, more or less incompetent and prejudiced. The Christian Church believes that these eight writ-

ers did not make, either of them or all of them, a complete and detailed biography of Jesus, but they set down so many things as were necessary to give the world a correct knowledge of him as the Messiah and Saviour. Hence we have no biography of Jesus, strictly speaking, but only such memoranda as are necessary for redemptive purposes.

These eight writers about Jesus were Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Paul, Peter, James and Jude. They were all different types of men with various occupations.

Matthew was a Galilean by birth, a Jew by religion, a publican in society, a tax-collector by occupation, an apostle by appointment. He was also called Levi, was a son of Alphaeus, and resided at Capernaum. He wrote his account somewhere between A. D. 37 and 64—that is within thirty-five years after the death of Jesus.

Mark was the son of Mary, the sister of Barnabas, a native of Jerusalem, his occupation unknown, a convert and assistant of the apostle Peter. He wrote his account A. D. 63-70—that is, within thirty-seven years of the death of Jesus.

Luke was supposed to be a native of Antioch, and was a physician. He wrote his Gospel A. D. 50-58—about twenty-five years after the death of Jesus, and the Acts about A. D. 63.

John was probably a native of Bethsaida, a son of Zebedee, a well-to-do man, and a fisherman. He wrote his Gospel between A. D. 70-85, and his Revelation about A. D. 96; but the time of his three Epistles is altogether uncertain.

Paul was a native of Tarsus, a Jew by race, a Roman by adoption, a Pharisee by sect, and highly educated in Jewish and Greek learning. He wrote fourteen Epistles concerning Jesus. They range in date from A. D. 52-70.

Peter was a son of Jonas, a native of Bethsaida, a fisherman by occupation, and surnamed a *rock* because of the firmness of his character. He wrote two Epistles about Jesus about A. D. 63.

James wrote an Epistle about Jesus about A. D. 69. His exact identity is difficult to determine. There was James, the brother of John, and James, the brother of the Lord, and

James the Just. It is quite commonly supposed that this latter is the author of this Epistle.

Finally there is Jude, or Judas, called Thaddaeus and also Lebbaeus, who wrote an Epistle at an uncertain date, probably about A. D. 65.

These eight men wrote altogether twenty-seven different booklets about Jesus. They are the only sources to which we can carry our question, Who was Jesus of Nazareth?

It is true that the archaeologist and antiquarian occasionally report the discovery of some small fact confirmatory of the Christian Scriptures, and have not yet reported the finding of anything which is contradictory. Still our main dependence for all information about Jesus must be upon the writings of these eight men, for if we were to lay much stress upon the few corroborative facts, as soon as their force begins to be felt the principles of higher criticism would be applied to discredit them.

I. The Historicalness of Jesus.

Was Jesus an historical person? Or was he the product of the imagination of these eight writers and of the Christian community with which they were identified? This, of course, is the most primary question for the student who is asking himself, Who was Jesus? Until recent years there was no doubt within the Christian circle that Jesus of Nazareth was a real historic person. But since the attack of criticism upon the general trustworthiness of the Christian records, upon the miracles of the Old Testament and upon the miracles of Jesus recorded in the New Testament, they are beginning to tell us that no such person as Jesus of Nazareth ever actually lived in the world—that he is altogether a subjective illusion of the Christian mind, hypothecated as the object of pious faith to repose upon. Such a conclusion is supported by three considerations:

1. By the silence of contemporary historians, notably Josephus and Philo. If there ever was such a person of such

marked characteristics, doing such wonderful things and stirring up the world in so pronounced a manner as is alleged by these eight writers, it is unreasonable to think that every other writer of the times would not have made reference to him. Christian apologists undertake to explain this silence of other contemporaries than the eight by saying that both the Jewish and Roman worlds had taken up such an attitude of hostility to Jesus and his friends, crucifying the one and persecuting the others, that it was dangerous for any contemporary not bound to him by love and devotion to make any reference to him, lest they be construed as his friends and themselves become the objects of suspicion and persecution. When we recall this attitude of the world-powers of the day, it is nothing less than remarkable that as many as eight men undertook to tell the world his story, with love and sympathy, in the face of all possibilities.

2. The second consideration, and the main one upon which criticism relies to discount the historicalness of Jesus, is the fact that these eight writers represent him as a miraculous person doing all sorts of miraculous deeds. Now their philosophy and their canons are certain that nothing supernatural nor miraculous can possibly be true; everything so represented is obviously fictitious and imaginary in some way. Hence Jesus cannot be real, as these eight represent him, because on a priori grounds there could not be such a person. The Christian apologist replies to this by saying that the premises of the criticism are not historical, but philosophical—a man must himself first be supernatural in order to affirm that nothing supernatural can be true. It is such a predication as requires an omniscient mind to make.

3. The third consideration depended upon by criticism to invalidate the historicalness of Jesus is the pious one that the Christian does not need a historical and real person as the object of his faith and devotion. All true religion, we are told, is mere spirit, a mere posture of soul, and so it makes no difference whether the ideal has any corresponding objective reality or not. A man can trust a subjective Saviour

and lean upon the Christ-idea as truly and as earnestly as upon a real historic Saviour, and at bottom it is the attitude and posture of the human spirit that counts. To this the Christian apologist replies that a faith which leans upon a fiction is just as certain of disappointment as a man who trusts himself to the shadow of a log across a stream, or as a merchant who trusts himself to the shadow of money to pay his accounts, or as a Christian Scientist who undertakes to think sickness and death out of existence. Men are real beings and it takes real objects to support them both physically and religiously. Besides, the Christian apologist challenges the critic to explain how the Christian religion and the Christian Church which are certainly real today came to rise out of a fiction and an imagination. How could an imaginary Saviour originate a real Church and a real religion?

I think these and other things compel us to believe that the world has not been the victim of delusion and imagination for 2,000 years. We are, therefore, safe in giving as our first answer to the question, Who was Jesus? that he was a genuine historic person, real and not ideal, historic and not fictitious.

II. A Divine-Human Person.

Then if historic, what was he? What sort of a person was Jesus? What do these eight writers say about him? It would require indefinite time to mention all the names and titles and characteristics and deeds and sayings and offices of this person as reported by these writers. Moreover, thousands of painstaking students have been collating and generalizing the representations of these writers about Jesus. The great orthodox party in Christendom have long ago reached the conclusion that these writers portray him as a *Divine-Human Person*, and all down these Christian ages students and scholars have been testing and verifying this judgment.

These writers tell us that Jesus was born of a virgin; that he did such works as no other man ever did; that he spake

as never a man spake; that he died and rose from the dead and ascended into heaven whence he had come; and that he lived and died absolutely without sinning in the least matter. If any one of these representations can be accepted, it proves that these men thought he was a Divine-Human Person. Then either he was as represented or their reports must be set aside as undependable for some reason. But we cannot set aside their reports on historical grounds, because there is not a scrap of contemporary writing in existence which contradicts the narrative and representation of these eight writers. If, therefore, we dismiss their narrative and their contemporaneous account of Jesus, we must do so for the a priori reason that nothing supernatural and miraculous can be true. But we cannot set aside these accounts on such philosophical grounds, because as many sound-minded men tell us the miraculous is possible as tell us that it is impossible.

III. The Divinity of Jesus.

There are those, however—the Unitarian, for example—who do not sweep away the account of Jesus given by these eight contemporaries, but who deny that they ever taught that he was divine in any true and proper sense. That Jesus was truly God, the orthodox Christologist gathers together and sums up what these eight writers say about him under the following heads:

1. They give him the names and titles of God.
2. They ascribe to him the attributes and qualities of God.
3. They impute to him the words and sayings of God.
4. They ascribe to him the works and doings of God.
5. They demand for him the worship and reverence of God.

If they call him God; if they impute to him the attributes of God; if they put the words of God in his mouth; if they credit to him the works of God; if they claimed that he is entitled to the worship and reverence of God; how can we stay

our minds from the conclusion that they at least thought he was God, and intended to so represent him?

It is a long task to collate all that they say upon each of these heads. I can only give a few conspicuous illustrations of each of these propositions.

1. God.

In all their writings—Gospels, Acts and Epistles—these eight contemporaries call him *God*, and the *Son of God*, more than forty times. They do this often in a set, deliberate and purposeful way. For example: “The Word was God” (Jno. 1:1). “Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever” (Heb. 1:8). “My Lord and my God” (Jno. 20:28). “God my Saviour” (Lk. 1:47). “Over all, God blessed for ever” (Rom. 9:5). “God manifest in the flesh” (1 Tim. 3:16). “The great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ” (Tit. 2:13). “Emmanuel, God with us” (Matt. 1:23). “The Son of God” (Jno. 1:34). “The Son of the living God” (Matt. 16:16). “The only begotten of the Father” (Jno. 1:14). “My beloved Son” (Matt. 17:5). “I am the Son of God” (Jno. 10:36). “Jesus Christ is the Son of God” (Acts 8:37). “Truly this was the Son of God” (Mark 15:39). And so on, forty times over, they repeatedly call him God and the Son of God, in various connections and getting the words out of many different mouths.

Jehovah.—But not only is Jesus so very often plainly called God, but he is also many times over called *Jehovah*, which is commonly regarded as the personal and proper name of the Deity. The Jews regarded this name as too holy and sacred to be even pronounced by human lips; how much more abhorrent to be bestowed upon any mere creature? “Lord” in the New Testament Greek is the synonym of “Jehovah” in the Old Testament Hebrew. Any casual reader knows that this name is applied to Jesus a great many times in the writings of the eight New Testament reporters. Here are a few examples. “Lord, is it I” (Matt 26:22). “Lord of the Sabbath” (Mark 2:28). “The Lord is risen indeed” (Lk. 24:

34). "Ye call me Master and Lord; and ye say well; for so I am" (Jno. 13:13). "Jesus Christ, he is Lord of all" (Acts 10:36). "Who art thou, Lord?" (Acts 26:15). "The same Lord over all" (Rom. 10:12). "Lord of lords and King of kings" (1 Tim. 6:15; Rev. 17:14). "Lord of dead and living" (Rom. 14:9). "Lord of glory" (1 Cor. 2:8). "These things saith Esaias when he saw his glory and spake of him" (Jno. 12:41). Now what did Isaiah say of him? We look back into the prophecy and read, "I saw also the Lord (Jehovah), sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up" (Isa. 6:1). When the New Testament is translated into Hebrew, the word Lord is translated by Jehovah, and when the Old Testament was translated into Greek by the Seventy, making the Septuagint version, the word Jehovah was turned into Lord.

So we find both the names for the Deity—Elohim (God) and Jehovah in the Hebrew, and Theos (God) and Kurios (Lord) in the Greek—applied many times over to Jesus by the eight New Testament writers.

2. Divine Attributes.

But nothing is commoner than for names to be used in a metaphorical and accommodated sense. Even the Scriptures sometimes so use the names of God. We know that the names of persons are often given to things. May not the divine names of Jesus be given to him in some lesser and borrowed sense? So we must go behind the names and inquire if the characteristics of God are ascribed to Jesus as well as the names of God. Are the qualities connoted by the names also predicated of Jesus? The attributes of a thing tell us what the thing is, regardless of the name by which it may be called. Now these contemporary writers ascribed to Jesus the *attributes of God* as well as the names and titles of God.

I cannot begin to enumerate these divine perfections imputed to Jesus. Among them are *life*—"In him was life" (Jno. 1:4); "I am....the life" (Jno. 14:6); *self-existence*—

"Have life in himself" (Jno. 5:26); *immutability*—"Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever" (Heb. 13:8); "Before Abraham was I am" (Jno. 8:58); *truth*—"I am . . . the truth" (Jno. 14:6); "He that is true" (Rev. 3:7); *holiness*—"That which is to be born of thee shall be called holy, the Son of God" (Lk. 1:33), "Thou art the holy one of God" (Jno. 6:69); *eternity*—"In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God" (Jno. 1:1), "He is before all things" (Col. 1:17), "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end" (Rev. 21:6); *omnipresence*—"The fullness of him that filleth all in all" (Eph. 1:23); *omniscience*—"Thou knowest all things" (Jno. 16:30) *almightiness*—"The Lord God, which is and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty" (Rev. 1:8).

And so I might go on almost indefinitely picking out the phrases here and there which predicate the characters and qualities of God, of Jesus. It is not so much the individual statement which impresses us, as the total picture of his character which impresses us, that the writers are making divine assertions and allegations concerning him.

3. Divine Works

But I grant that both these names and predications may be artfully explained away so as not to shut us up to the necessity of believing that these writers represented Jesus as truly divine. The case, however, does not rest here. These writers not only call him God, and ascribe to him the attributes of God, but they impute to him the *works* of God. The great works of the Deity are classified by students as four—Creation, Providence, Miracles, Redemption. Jesus is said to have done all these things.

Creation.—"All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made" (Jno. 1:3). "For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him" (Col. 1:16).

Providence.—"He is before all things, and by him all things consist" (Col. 1:17). "Upholding all things by the word of his power" (Heb. 1:3).

Miracles.—Of these special works, Jesus is reported to have wrought thirty-five. He worked them in his own name and by his own power. They are:

Water turned into wine.
Nobleman's son healed.
Draught of fishes (first).
Cure of demoniac in the synagogue.
Healing of Peter's wife's mother and others.
Cleansing a leper.
Stilling a storm.
Legion of demons cast out.
Woman with issue of blood healed.
Daughter of Jairus raised to life.
Two blind men given sight.
Dumb demoniac cured.
Paralytic healed.
Impotent man at Bethesda healed.
Withered hand cured.
Centurion's servant healed.
Widow's son at Nain raised.
Blind and dumb demoniac cured.
Feeding 5000.
Jesus walking on the sea.
Daughter of the Syrophenician woman healed.
A deaf and dumb man cured.
Feeding the 4000.
Blind man at Bethesda gradually restored.
Curing a demoniac child.
Tax coin found in the fish's mouth.
Man born blind given sight.
An infirm woman restored.
A man with dropsy cured.
Ten lepers cleansed.

Blind Bartimaeus given sight.

Resurrection of Lazarus.

Barren fig-tree cured.

Ear of Malthus restored.

Draught of fishes (second).

These are the miracles of which a detailed account is given. There are allusions to a great many more in the Gospels. This makes the impression upon the reader that the writers regarded Jesus as a *miracle-worker*, one who could do a supernatural act at his pleasure.

Redemption.—But perhaps the divinest of all works is that of Redemption. Who can forgive an offense but the person against whom it has been committed? It would be absurd and silly for me to assume to pardon an insult which has been given to you. But Jesus assumed the prerogative of forgiving offenses committed against God. He said to the paralytic, "Thy sins be forgiven thee." The Jews said it was blasphemy, "for none can forgive sin but God only." Jesus admitted the reasoning, but retorted, "That ye may know that the Son of Man hath power to forgive sins, he saith to the sick of the palsy, Arise, take up thy bed, and go to thine house." And he did it. (Matt. 9).

4. Divine Worship.

These eight contemporaries of Jesus not only gave him the names of God; and the attributes of God; and ascribed to him the works of God; but they also demanded for him the *worship* of God. When John was about to fall down and worship the apocalyptic angel, the angel said to him, "Do it not; worship God." These Scriptures everywhere forbid any creature to worship any being but God only. When God brought his First Begotten into the world, he said, "Let all the angels of God worship him" (Heb. 1:6). Thomas cried out, "My Lord and my God" and he did not rebuke him (Jno. 20:28). He said it was right and proper "that all men

should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father which sent him" (Jno. 5:23). Paul said that at "the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father" (Phil. 2:10). And we are told that "ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands," in heaven cry, "Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing" (Rev. 5:12). And in baptism and benediction the name of Jesus is associated co-ordinately and co-equally with that of the Father and the Spirit.

What is the total impression of all this upon the reader's mind? What picture of the person is thus made to rise up before us? These contemporaries called him God, and gave him all the titles which they give the Deity. They ascribed to him all the attributes and perfections of God which the Scriptures give to the Deity. They credit him with all the works which the Bible represents God as performing. They call for the same honor and respect and worship for him which they demand for the Deity. They say he is God; they give him the attributes of God; they ascribe to him the works of God; they demand for him the worship of God. We are bound to believe that they thought he was God, or that they tried to represent him as God. To them he was divine in every true and proper sense. They may have been mistaken, but this is certainly the way in which they represented him.

If they thought he was born of a virgin—that he entered the world in this supernatural and miraculous manner. If they thought he filled all the interim of his earthly life with miraculous deeds and words and actions. If they thought he died and rose from the dead, and that too by his own power. If they thought he laid down his life, and that he took it again. If they thought he ascended into heaven after rising from the dead. If they thought he would come again into this world at some future time. If they set down any or all of these

things in their account of him, must we not believe that they believed that he was veritably divine—a truly supernatural person? If we believe anything which they believed, must we not also believe that Jesus was supernatural and divine—very God in deed and truth?

There is another impressive way to state the argument for the divinity of Jesus.

He knew the unknowable: the human heart and all things

He loved the unlovable: the human sinner.

He did the impossible: died and rose again.

He was the impossible: a sinless character.

If any of these predictions are true, Jesus was a superhuman, a supernatural person. These contemporary writers so represented him. They therefore must have believed that he was superhuman and supernatural. They may have been lying outright. They may have been pitifully deceived. They may have wrought themselves up into this wildness of belief. They may have come by it any way you can imagine, or in some mode you cannot even dream of. But it is utterly impossible for the reader not to see and feel that they did so set him forth in the account which they gave of him to the world. We are shut up to the alternative of rejecting what they say about him, the representation they make of him, in some mode or upon some ground, or to accepting the doctrine of his true and genuine divinity. If Josephus and Philo and other contemporaries than the eight had made the same representations about him, their record would have been in the same condition as that of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, Paul and others, who did have the courage and temerity and devotion to set down an account of him. If we cannot believe eight, neither could we believe the other two. If we can explain away what eight said, we could explain away what ten said about him. A record made by contemporaries, and guarded down the ages, and defended with blood and treasure, is all the record we have.

IV. The Humanity of Jesus.

These eight contemporary writers were just as emphatic in representing Jesus as genuinely human. They report that as he called himself the Son of God, so he called himself the *Son of Man*.

1. They give him human names and titles.
2. They impute to him human attributes and qualities.
3. They ascribe to him human words and works.
4. They demand for him human reverence and respect.

They portray him as one who was born like a man; lived like a man; acted like a man; hungered and thirsted like a man; suffered and died like a man. They are just as clear in representing him as a man as they are in setting him forth as divine. They said not one syllable that denied his true humanity, or evaporated it away in some mystical manner. To them he had a human body and a reasonable soul. To them he had a true physical form and all the faculties and powers of a genuine man. There are those who think his contemporaries were mistaken in representing him as a man, even as there are those who think they were somehow mistaken in representing him as God. Maybe so. But the record which they left behind them, the things which they wrote about him unmistakably set him forth as genuinely human. The one school does just what the other does. They both decline to accept the face meaning of the story as told by the eight contemporaries. The Unitarian sets it aside in one direction; the Nestorian sets it aside in the other direction.

But the portrait drawn by the eight contemporaries, the account which they have set down about Jesus, whatever it may be worth, is that of a Divine-Human Person—one who was both God and Man, in two distinct natures but one Person. You may say it is all very unnatural. And so it is; there is nothing like him in the annals of time or records of eternity—in the archives of history or in the gallery of fiction. You may say it is all very inscrutable. And so it is; no man com-

prehends the union of his own body and soul—matter and spirit in his own personal make-up—much less can he comprehend the union of God and Man in the Person of Jesus Christ. But whatever a man may think about it, whoever puts together what these eight contemporary writers say about Jesus has put together the concept of a Divine-Human Person.

Conclusion.

I come now to the conclusion of this discussion. Every essential fact in the Christian Religion depends upon the trustworthiness of the writings of eight of his contemporaries. If they are not dependable, the historic basis of our faith is swept away.

But I remind you of Greenleaf's four rules of documentary evidence. That any writing (1) which is more than thirty years old, (2) that has been in proper custody, (3) that is without suspicious appearance, and (4) that is supported by corroborative evidence—that any writing that is thus conditioned, no jury could respect its oath, no lawyer his intelligence, and no judge his conscience, and reject. The application of these canons of historical evidence to the writings of the eighth contemporaries of Jesus, show them to be historical.

If historical and genuine, both Testaments set forth a Saviour—the Old Testament a Messiah, and the New Testament, Christ. It is this person as a Saviour that they historically set forth.

If historical and genuine, they report a class of facts—miracles—which, if accepted as facts, prove the Scriptures to be the divine Word of God.

If historical and genuine, Christ himself commits himself to the Scriptures, and represents them as the Word of God.

If historical and genuine, they set forth Christ as a Divine-Human Person, whose word and work are supernaturally weighty and dependable.

CHAPTER VII.

The Messiah

The story of Christ, as told in the Christian Scriptures, is the most unique narrative in all the literature of the world. It was told before he was born and re-told after he was dead. It was told in the future tense and then it was told in the past tense. It was first a Prophecy, and then it was a History. The prophecy was written in the Hebrew language, and the history was written in the Greek tongue. The subject of the prophetic sketch was called the *Messiah*, and the subject of the historical sketch was called *Christ*. These two names are synonyms in different languages.

It is this feature which renders the story of our Lord, as a story, so singular and original. The biographical materials are first given in prophetic form in the Old Testament and then given in historical form in the New Testament. These two accounts stand over against each other, and verify each other. There is no other character in all the world's catalogue of names whose story is thus told. It suggests the importance and uniqueness of the subject and renders the identification of the person more certain than any other in human annals.

This fact not only makes the subject of this twin biography so prominent and exceptional, but it also shows a special providential care to certify to the world the material facts of this story. The prophetic account attests the facts of the historical narrative and the historical narrative also supports the prophetic description. As men set props opposite to brace the post, so the Old Testament and the New Testament—prophecy and history—lean towards each other to sustain the story of the Saviour of the world.

To show that the Scriptures do teach the true and proper Divinity of Christ, I shall (1) present the biographical facts of the Messiah as they are outlined in the Old Testament and (2) the biographical facts of Christ as they are reported in the

New Testament. We may look first upon this picture, and then upon that—upon the portrait which hangs in the gallery of Prophecy, and then upon the portrait which hangs in the gallery of History—and draw our inferences from the comparison.

I am assuming the genuineness and authenticity and credibility of both Testaments. If these sources are untrustworthy, then the whole subject dwindles to one of mere curiosity and speculation—a mere effort to delineate the character of a creation of legendary and romantic literature of an ancient day. I have no such literary interest in the topic.

I. The Humanity of the Messiah.

It defies the wit of man to deny that some Person looks out of the pages of the Old Testament as a face looks out of a window. It is equally impossible for man to read from Genesis to Malachi and not see that this Person is future, and yet to come, down to the close of the Old Testament canon. It is equally impossible for any one to read this literature and not see that this Prophetical Person came to be known as the *Messiah*. I shall continually refer to him by that name instead of employing longer descriptive phrases. And no man can read these ancient books of Israel without seeing that the Messiah is outlined both as Man and as God and at the end of the Old Testament Revelation these two lines of description converge upon one and the same Person and identify the Messiah as a divine-human Person.

I shall first of all outline the salient things which are said about the Messiah as a Man.

1. **Seed of the Woman.**—Going back to earliest times, the first star that was hung in the firmament of a sinful and fallen world was the prophecy that the Seed of the Woman should bruise the Serpent's head (Gen. 3:15). Such a promise created a great expectation. It was the birth-day of hope for those offenders who had been expelled from Eden. It assigned to the Coming One the task of breaking the head of

the Tempter who had seduced our first parents from their fidelity to God. It proclaimed the truth that the Messiah was to be a member of the human race.

2. **Seed of Abraham.**—Later in patriarchal history, this Deliverer is more closely defined as the Seed of Abraham (Gen. 17:7). This prediction informs us that the Messiah is to be of Abrahamic lineage and instructs us to look for him among the descendants of this particular patriarch.

3. **Seed of Isaac.**—But Abraham had more sons than one, and was the progenitor of Ishmaelites, and Israelites, and Midianites. So we are told that the coming Messiah is to be derived from Isaac, the son of promise (Gen. 21:12). So as the race widens and multiplies, the prophecy is careful to define and restrict the Messianic line of descent.

4. **Seed of Jacob.**—Isaac, however, had two sons, Esau and Jacob. But the prophecy does not leave us to surmise and speculation, but now defines the Messiah as the Seed of Jacob (Gen. 35:12).

5. **Seed of Judah.**—But Jacob had twelve sons, who became the progenitors of the twelve tribes of Israel. From these to which shall we look for the expected Messiah? The royal tribe of Judah is chosen, and the hope of the world is centered in this group (Gen. 49:10). Thus is prophecy faithfully guiding the expectation and guarding the hope of the world.

6. **Seed of David.**—But there are many families in Judah, and the house of David is specified as the one in which the predicted Messiah shall be born (1 Kings 8:25; Ps. 132:11).

7. **Seed of the Virgin.**—But the race is multiplying too rapidly and the possible sources of the Messiah are becoming too numerous. Unless some more economical method can be discovered, all prophecy will become scarcely more than a genealogical table of the Messiah. There are a great many other important things which must be said about him besides his lineage. So prophecy gives us one final omnibus descrip-

tion of the Messiah which identifies him for all times and generations: "Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign, Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel" (Isa. 7:14). Then, as if to "make assurance doubly sure," the prophecy specifies the place where this virgin is to bring forth the Messianic Child: "But thou, Bethlehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting" (Micah 5:2).

Nothing more can be said. Nothing more needs to be said. The prophecy has defined his mother to be a virgin and named the place where the Mesiah is to be born. The world can only wait until a virgin bears a child in Bethlehem of Judah. This completely safeguards the promise and protects an expectant world from deception and mistake. The place must be Bethlehem in Judah. His mother must be a virgin, who can be impregnated only by supernatural power. The virgin must belong to the house of David, to the tribe of Judah, to the line of Jacob, to the lineage of Isaac, to the family of Abraham, to the daughters of Eve. Could the Messianic expectation have been more carefully guarded? Could the eye of mankind have been more surely directed? Could the possibility of mistake have been more nearly reduced to zero? Was there one chance in a million that the world, with such minute instructions, could be the victim of mistaken identity?

The Seed of the Woman must be the Seed of Abraham; the Seed of Isaac; the Seed of Jacob; the Seed of Judah; the Seed of David; the Seed of the Virgin; in Bethlehem of Judah! As time moved on and generations came and went, the index finger of prophecy continued to point out the lineage of the Messiah until it rested steady and unmoving upon the virgin in Bethlehem! And this for 4000 years before the star did stand over Bethlehem and the angels celebrated the birth of the Child of the Virgin! The prediction was a miracle and demonstrates that the Old Testament writers were supernaturally guided in the way in which they picked out the

lineage and descent of the Messiah from among all the possible origins which he might have had during this long period of time.

II. The Divinity of the Messiah.

There is, however, another line of prophetic description which gives us an entirely different conception of the Messiah. It will show us that he was to be not only human but divine also.

Angel of Jehovah.—In the patriarchal dispensation he is set forth as the Angel of Jehovah. When Abraham was about to sacrifice Isaac, it was the Angel of the Lord who arrested him, and represented himself as the Lord or Jehovah (Gen. 22:15). Again it was the Angel of the Lord who spake to Jacob at Bethel, and said to him, "I am the God of Bethel" (Gen. 31:11, 13). It was the Angel of the Lord who spake to poor outcast Hagar, and "she called the name of the Lord that spake to her, Thou God seest me" (Gen. 16:9, 13), and he received the title without dissent. Jacob in pronouncing his farewell benediction upon his sons, spoke of "the God..... the Angel which redeemed me from the evil" (Gen. 48:15, 16). When Moses was commissioned in the desert to deliver Israel from Egyptian bondage, it was the "Angel of the Lord" who appeared unto him in the burning bush, and "God called to him out of the midst of the bush" (Ex. 3:2-7). During the period of the Judges it was the Angel of the Lord who repeatedly appeared and devised deliverance for his people (Judges 13). And so the story goes on. This Angel appears from time to time, and on sundry occasions, in subsequent Old Testament story, until we come to Malachi, the last of the Old Testament prophets, who quotes God as saying, "I will send my Messenger (Angel).....the Lord (Jehovah) whom ye seek" (Mal. 3:1).

Who was this Angel who so frequently appeared in Israel's history? He cannot be Jehovah himself, because he is always designated as the Angel or Messenger of Jehovah,

and one cannot be properly described as the angel or messenger of himself. The very form of the descriptive phraseology excludes the idea of identity. And besides this impropriety of speech, the Angel and Jehovah are sometimes presented in the same theophany in such connections and actions as show that they were distinct persons.

Neither can this Angel be a created angel, because he is frequently called God, and Jehovah, and Lord, which titles cannot be applied to any man or angel. Moreover, some of the things which this Angel does, surpass the powers of a created angel or man.

Expositors have prevailingly looked upon this Angel as the Messiah, making pre-incarnate manifestations of himself in the interest of his people. If there is any truth in this view, the Messiah, as the Angel of the Lord, must be divine, not only because he is specifically and directly called God, but also to be able to make such pre-manifestations of himself.

Types.—Moreover, I think no one can read the Old Testament literature without feeling that it is typical in all that it sets forth; that it was not written for its own sake but always as promissory of something to come. In all its details, as well in its broad outlines, it was futuristic and prefatory.

(1) The *Prophet* in Israel—the person who was the medium of the divine communication under the old economy—was but a type of a Prophet to come, who would not only be the medium of the divine revelation but the very impersonation of that Revelation—the Wisdom, the Truth, the Mind of God (Deut. 18:15, 18).

(2) The *priest* in Israel, who officiated at the altar and made sacrifices for sin according to the ritual, was but a type of the great High Priest to come, who would himself be at once the Priest and the Victim, offering himself as a sacrifice for sin (1 Sam. 2:35; Ps. 110:4; Ps. 40:6).

(3) The *king* in Israel, who wore the crown and administered the government, was supremely significant only as he shadowed forth another King, who would in the future take

the throne of David and reign for ever (Ps. 2:6; Ps. 110:1; Isa. 9:7; Jer. 30:9; Ezek. 34:24; Dan. 7:13; etc.).

All such consistent and persistent representations compelled God's ancient people to look out, and look forward, for a Messiah who would be at once the Revealer and Redeemer and Ruler of the Church of God—one who would be Prophet, Priest and King. As a matter of fact, they allowed the royal character of the Messiah to bulk so large in their vision and to so overshadow his other predicted offices as to pervert their hope into the expectation of an earthly King who would give world-wide dominion to literal Israel and universal sovereignty to literal Jerusalem. After the voice of prophecy had ceased to remind the people by reiterated description of the true nature of the Messiah their faith waned, their patience gave way and their eye lost sight of the spiritual and typical character of their literature, and their conception of the Messiah dwindled to a mere earthly potentate.

Divinity of Messiah.—The canon of Old Testament Scripture was closed with Malachi and then God left Israel for 400 years to rest by faith upon what had been revealed and promised concerning the Messiah. It was a period in which faith underwent trial and discipline. But as it was in the story of the wilderness, so was it in the interval between the Testaments—faith did not stand the strain, and the glowing hope of prophecy faded into the dream of an earthly monarchy. Before, however, the voice of prophecy had become silent, the psalmist had addressed the Messiah in these words, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever" (Ps. 45:6). And Isaiah had written it upon the face of the sky, "Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The Mighty God, The Everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace" (Isa. 9:6). And Jeremiah had said concerning this Messiah, "This is his name whereby he shall be called, THE LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS" (Jer. 23:6). And Ezekiel had put these words into the mouth of the Messianic Shepherd, "I the Lord will be their God" (Ezek.

34:24). With many other glowing descriptions of the divinity of the Messiah did the prophets star the pages of Israel's hope. "Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel (God-with-us)" (Isa. 7:14).

Summary.—To sum up the case: When we follow out one line of the prophetic description, the Messiah is seen to be genuinely human. He is introduced at the beginning as "The Seed of the Woman" and at the end of the prophetic story he is "The Child of the Virgin." He is set forth, therefore, as genuinely human. When, however, we trace the other line of prophetic description, this Messiah is introduced as the "Angel of Jehovah." And when the prophetic account comes to its end, he is called "The Mighty God." So he is genuinely divine. When, however, the prophecy gives him a name which combines both these characters, the Messiah is called "Immanuel," which means *God-with-us*. We must conclude, therefore, that the Messiah of biblical prophecy is a *divine-human Person*.

III. Jesus The Messiah.

But was Jesus of Nazareth the Messiah that was predicted? Can we identify, beyond reasonable doubt, the historic Christ and the prophetic Messiah? Is there any solid ground for the Jewish contention? Is it perfectly certain that the Christian Church has made no blunder upon this important point?

Genealogy.—The simplest and most satisfactory way of identifying any particular person in this world is to appeal to his genealogical record. If it were the inheritance of valuable property that was at stake, or the hereditary rights of the claimant to a throne that is in issue, the family history of the claimant, if complete and unimpeached, would go a long way towards settling the matter. Records are made of marriages and births and deaths to minify such confusions and prevent such disputes.

Now Jesus of Nazareth has a complete and unclouded lineage, running back to the beginning of the race. This was the primary purpose of those genealogical lists which we find set down, from time to time, in the pages of sacred Scripture—to preserve and show the ancestral history of the claimant to the Messianic office whenever he should arise and assert himself among the children of men. There is but one person in human history who could have such a lineage: if a particular person has that particular record, all others are excluded and his identity is certified beyond every reasonable doubt.

He was born in Bethlehem. He was born of a Virgin. Mary was the only virgin in that town who gave birth to a child and he was the only child in that village who was so born. This starts us according to the Messianic prophecy, because the prophecy said to the world, "Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel" (Isa. 7:14), and the record of the birth of Jesus is that he was born in Bethlehem of the virgin Mary, and that he was named Immanuel (Mat. 1:18). And the star stood still, and the magi wondered, and the angels burst forth from the gallery of the skies! Then we have "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham" (Mat. 1:1). So the Child of Mary of Bethlehem is the Child of the Virgin of Prophecy; the Child of the house of David; the Child of the tribe of Judah; the Child of Jacob; the Child of Isaac; the Child of Abraham; the Child or Seed of the Woman. The pedigree is complete and the identification is perfect.

The only way the Messiahship of Jesus can be questioned is by impeaching the family record of the Son of Mary. Many are the attempts to assail that record and invalidate it, for it is clear that if its correctness be once admitted it proves Jesus divine and the Messiah of all prophecy and promise.

The Evangelists give two genealogies of Jesus—one by Matthew and the other by Luke. These two lists vary in

several particulars, and the critics make a point against their accuracy on this account.

(1) The first variation is in the spelling of the names as given in the Old Testament and repeated in the New Testament. For example, "Uzziah" in the Old is "Ozias" in the New. This is explained by remembering two things: (1) that at the time of the writing of the New Testament the Hebrew tongue had changed into the Aramaic dialect, even as it has changed today into the "Yiddish," and (2) that the New Testament was written in Greek and that names vary when they are translated from one language into another.

(2) The second variation is in the antithetical method of Matthew and Luke in making up their respective lists of names. Matthew begins with Abraham, and descends from father to son, through David, to Jesus. Luke, on the other hand, begins with Jesus, and ascends from son to father, through David, until he reaches Adam. These opposite ways of making up the genealogy would tend to check each other and insure greater accuracy.

(3) A third variation is found in the fact that Matthew mentions males only while Luke mentions three females in the ancestry of Jesus. This fact naturally suggests that the two evangelists are tracing different lines of descent.

(4) A fourth variation is found in the fact that there are more names in the list of Luke than there are in the list of Matthew. In Matthew *Jesus* is the 60th name from Abraham, while in Luke his is the 76th name from Adam. Such a difference as this would again suggest that the two chroniclers had traced the lineage of Jesus along different ancestral lines, for we well know that no man's family history runs back into the past along a single ancestral line.

(5) But the most serious discrepancy between these two family records of Jesus is the fact that all the names given by Matthew from David down are totally different from the names given by Luke. Either one or the other is incorrect, or Matthew is tracing the lineage of Jesus through Joseph,

the husband of Mary, while Luke is tracing his lineage through Mary, the mother of Jesus.

Matthew says the father of Joseph, the husband of Mary, was *Jacob*. Luke, on the other hand, says he was the son of *Heli*. How can the same man be the son of two different men? Only on the supposition that he is the *born* son of one and the *law* son of the other. Now Matthew says that "Jacob begat Joseph," which can only mean that Joseph was the natural, born son of Jacob. Luke, on the other hand, says simply, "Joseph the son of Heli," and this would be correct if Joseph was the *son-in-law* of Heli. It can be true upon no other supposition. Hence, while the genealogy does not explicitly assert it, we are shut up to inferring that Mary, the mother of Jesus, was the daughter of Heli, and Joseph, the husband of Mary, was the son-in-law of Heli. This is the historic explanation of conservative commentators. It is perfectly reasonable and completely explains the matter.

Then Matthew, taking the Old Testament lists and beginning with Abraham, follows the line of descent from father to son, through David, until he reaches Joseph, the husband of Mary, the mother of Jesus. He thus gives us the lineage of Joseph, who stood to Jesus *in loco patris*—in law and public opinion as the father of Jesus. Luke, on the other hand, begins with Mary, the mother of Jesus, and by inference the daughter of Heli, and traces the blood ascent of Jesus up through his natural and real ancestors through David and Abraham and on back to Adam. It is, therefore, a noteworthy fact that, whether the lineage of Jesus be traced *legally* through Joseph or *literally* through Mary, both lines go back through David and Jacob and Isaac and Abraham to Adam and Eve, and thus fulfill, to the letter and syllable, the Messianic description of human parentage.

Christ.—But a matter so fundamental to the Christian faith is not left to depend alone upon his genealogy, however perfect and complete that may be. Providence foresaw that the very genealogy would be questioned by the world, and

so the family register is supported by many direct and assertive statements that Jesus of Nazareth was the real and true Messiah. "Christ" in the Greek is the synonym for "Messiah" in the Hebrew, and our New Testament Scriptures call Jesus of Nazareth *Christ* more than 500 times from the beginning to the end of the New Testament canon. And this designation is in every one of the entire 27 books of the New Testament. Consequently, if the authenticity and historicalness and trustworthiness of any one of these New Testament writings be admitted, that single genuine writing tells us that he was the Messiah. We cannot, therefore, void Jesus' claim to the Messiahship by setting aside any one particular portion of the New Testament; we shall have to impeach and destroy the historicity of every part of it. The early disciples began by saying, "We have found the Messiah, which is, being interpreted, the Christ" (Jno. 1:41), and they adhered to that story till the last contemporary voice was hushed in death. The identification of Jesus and the Messiah is as complete as apostle and disciple could make it by repeated and persistent assertion.

But there are some who find it very hard to accept the evidence of any records, or the testimony of any persons, upon a question so serious as the Messiahship of Jesus; yet they profess such reverence and respect for the intelligence and character of Christ himself that they can never quite deny anything for which he vouches. When John the Baptist, a forerunner of Jesus, a kinsman according to the flesh and a man whom Christ greatly admired, was in Herod's prison, awaiting his own execution, he sent two of his disciples to Christ, and asked him the categorical question, "Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another" (Matt. 11:3). In reply, Jesus said to them, "Go and show John again those things which ye do hear and see." The things which they had seen and heard were many miracles, which were calculated to confirm the faith of the depressed prisoner. It was the strongest sort of an affirmative answer. When the woman of Samaria said to him, "I know that Messias cometh, which

is called Christ; when he is come, he will tell us all things;" Jesus saith unto her "I that speak unto thee am he" (Jno. 4:25, 26). When the Jews said to him, "How long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ (Messiah), tell us plainly;" Jesus answered them, "I told you, and ye believed not" (Jno. 10:24, 25). He thus said to them, "If you cannot take my word for it, then you will have to judge me by my works and reach your own conclusion".

On one occasion our Lord had an extended dispute with the Jews in the treasury of the temple. He said to them, "If ye believe not that I am he (the Messiah), ye shall die in your sins" (Jno. 8:24). By this he told them that faith in a Messiah yet to come would not be effective; that he was that Messiah, and that their faith must rest upon himself, Jesus of Nazareth, in order to save their souls from death. Still the Jews pressed their question upon him, "Who art thou?" And again he answered, 'Even the same that I said to you from the beginning' (Jno. 8:25). Finally he said to them, "When ye have lifted up the Son of man, then shall ye know that I am he" (Jno. 8:28). Now that they did lift him up, is it too daring for one who believes his words to say that before the end of all things, before Messiah closes his dealings with the Jews, they will yet see that he is in deed and in truth the Messiah which was to have come and that in rejecting him they have crucified the very Lord of all life? It looks like this people is segregated by the providence of God among all the nations of the earth, and held unmixed and unmerged, that they may yet see and confess that he was the Christ and the Messiah.

The very accusation which was brought against him and which led to his crucifixion was that he claimed to be the Messiah. When he was on his last trial, the chief priests and the scribes led him into their council chamber and asked him, "Art thou the Christ (the Messiah)? tell us." And he said unto them, "If I tell you, ye will not believe" (Luke 22:67). He means to say, "I have told you over and over again, and you will not believe; why should I keep on wasting breath

in asserting it? Hereafter you will see the Son of man on the right hand of the power of God, and then you will be convinced." After his resurrection and prior to his ascension he said to his disciples, "O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Ought not Christ (the Messiah) to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself" (Luke 24:25-27). Finally John closed the whole gospel narrative with these words, "These are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ (the Messiah), the Son of God; and that, believing, ye might have life through his name" (Jno. 20:31).

Jews.—Why did not the Jews admit the Messiahship of Jesus if his claims were as clear as they seem to be? This question is often propounded to the followers of Christ and it is thought by many to seriously cripple the confidence of the Christian Church in him. There is, however, an explanation which is perfectly rational and adequately accounts for this fact. For 400 years prior to the advent of Christ the Jews had been without any prophet, and God had left the faith of the people to be tried and disciplined. During that time they cherished the hope of the coming of the Messiah, but their rabbis and ecclesiastics had defined to themselves the sort of Messiah he would be when he did come and had taught their conception to the people with such dogmatism and authority that the nation had come to look upon the description as absolutely accurate. The complaint of the Messiah when he did come was that they had overlaid the truth about him with "the traditions of men." The conception of the Messiah as an earthly potentate who would give to Israel and Jerusalem great earthly glory and power was accepted as a matter of certainty. When, however, Jesus came in his lowly state, and eschewed every vestige of earthly power, the disappointment was tremendous, and prejudice could not be easily set aside. They adopted the theory that

he was a pretender because he was not what they confidently thought he would be.

But another factor enters into the explanation of Israel's rejection of the Messiahship of Christ. It is mentioned and argued by Paul, that great and learned Israelite who became the most thorough and zealous apostle of Christ. It was the result of a divine judgment upon this people, who had been so signally under the distinguished tuition and instruction of God. Long ago Isaiah had quoted God as complaining, "All day long have I stretched out my hands to a disobedient and gainsaying people" (Rom. 10:21). Then after all these centuries of instruction and patience, when he sent them the Messiah, they crucified him, as the servants in the parable of the vineyard slew the son of the lord of the vineyard. For this consummate offence the apostle says Israel was cut off, because they became "wise in their own conceits." Hence "blindness in part has happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in." Nevertheless, in due time, "all Israel shall be saved; as it is written, There shall come out of Sion the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob" (Rom. 11). Israel's blindness in rejecting the Messiahship of Jesus is judicial and disciplinary. It is more the result of God's displeasure with them than it is the inadequacy of the evidence of Christ's Messianic claims.

CHAPTER VIII

Christological Problems

In Christology there are certain problems, created by the Incarnation. Their solutions challenge the interest and effort of the student, not only because their high nature tempts the daring spirit, but because their solutions have been made the premises of many radical and reconstructive conclusions in soteriology. Of these problems the following are the chiefest: (1) How was the Incarnation possible? (2) What was the chief end of the Incarnation? (3) What was the mode of the Incarnation? (4) Did the Incarnation render the Redeemer peccable? (5) How was the Incarnation affected by the glorification of the Redeemer?

1. **Possibility of the Incarnation.**—How could the son of God become man without at the same time ceasing to be the Son of God? How could the Infinite become the finite without ceasing to be the Infinite? Is not the very conception of the God-man self-contradictory, imposing upon the believer the necessity of denying one or more of the fundamental laws of thought? Are not divinity and humanity intrinsically incommensurate forms of existence? When theology writes of the union of the divine and the human in a single personality, is it not dealing with words rather than with apprehensible facts? These are the questions which Unitarian and Rationalistic thinkers regard as unanswerable by orthodox Christologists. The concept of a divine-human being is held to be intrinsically absurd and unthinkable.

To these questions two answers are given, and to these problems two solutions are proposed—the one traditional and orthodox, and the other heterodox and pantheistical. The orthodox party grounds the possibility of the Incarnation (1) in the *trinitarian* constitution of the Godhead, while the pantheizing party grounds it (2) in the *metaphysical kinship* of divinity and humanity.

1. To the trinitarian mind the incarnation was possible because there were *three* persons in the Godhead. God is one in substance, but he is three in personality; were he a personal unit even as he is a substantive monad, then it would be clear that incarnation would, in a sense, humanitize the Deity; but if there are the three persons in the Godhead, then it is clear that the Second Person could take to himself a human nature without incarnating the entire Godhead. If there are three sons in the same family, the marriage of one does not, *ipso facto*, unite the whole family to the new wife. The incarnation of the Second Person in the Godhead does require us to think of that Person as incarnate, but the Father and the Spirit abide as unincarnate Deity. Thus a sound Christology reacts upon and makes necessary a sound trinitarianism. Without this conception of the Godhead there is no rational interpretation of Christ, and those who have begun with a denial of the Trinity have ended in the denial of Christ. The Second Person in the Trinity assumed to himself a human nature, did not incorporate it into himself, nor fuse it with his divine nature, and these two natures abide in him unmerged and unmixed, after a manner analogous to that in which a physical and bodily nature is united with a spiritual and mental nature in the constitution of man himself. There is no more inherent impossibility of two natures—the human and the divine—being grasped into unity in the constitution of the person of Christ than there is of two natures—the physical and the psychical—being grasped into unity in the constitution of man. In a sense humanity and divinity are no more metaphysical opposites than are body and spirit. Man does not cease to be a spirit because his soul is embodied; neither does Christ cease to be God because his divine person is incarnated. When we speak of the physico-psychological man we are no more using words without meaning than when we speak of a divine-human being. It is, therefore, the trinitarian conception of God that renders rational and consistent and uncontradictory the conception of a divine-human Redeemer.

2. But pantheizing speculators seek to give a rational explanation of the possibility of the Incarnation by predicating a *metaphysical kinship* between divinity and humanity. It denies the current doctrine of the antithesis between the infinite and the finite and affirms that they are the same in kind, differing only in degree. It is denied that God and man are differentiated from each other by any substantive fact and affirms that they are different from each other only in degree; man is held to be a little divinity and God is held to be a big man. The infinite and the finite are held to be the same in kind and metaphysically identical; God is immanent in the world and the world is immanent in God; God unfolded is the universe and the universe infolded is God; the universe, *ab initio*, is God, and God in the process of evolution or becoming is the universe, and the universe again, *ab eventu*, is God; all evolution describes a circle—out of God, through the universe, back to God as the final termination; the terminus *a quo* is deity, the historical process is the universe, and the terminus *ad quem* is God; all life is circular. Primal deity is unconscious, formless substance; he must, in the immanent evolutions of his own life, come to self-consciousness, which occurs when man appears; and the ascensive evolution of man must be upwards in the scale of being until he emerges, through the development, back into deity. Instead, therefore, of the finite being substantively different from the Infinite, we are told that the Infinite interpenetrates the finite, and the relation between the two is only and merely formal. Deity is immanent in the mineral, the flora, the fauna, but superlatively in the humana. Consequently, we are assured, there is no difficulty in God's becoming man; he must become man; it is the natural and normal goal of the development; humanity and divinity do not differ substantively, because they are but stages in the development of the same metaphysical nature. Divinity yearns for humanity and humanity yearns for divinity; the ideal can never be realized until divinity becomes humanity; the incarnation, therefore, is not only metaphysically possible, but it is metaphysically necessary.

Many able speculators have adopted this as the only tenable rationale of the Incarnation and exhibited it with philosophical skill and with rhetorical charmingness; and many orthodox writers have been captured by, and enamored of, this interpretation; and, all unconscious of the destructive consequences implicated in it, have set it forth in sermon and essay to the fascination of those hearers whose ears itch for novel and fresh and unusual expositions of sacred truth. But the explanation raises more difficulties, and difficulties more serious, than it relieves.

(1) It bottoms itself upon Pantheism as its first premise, and starts out in the field of Christology with all the objections to this visionary philosophy hung around its neck; the explanation of the incarnation which it makes cannot be any more acceptable than the philosophy with which it works. It must prove, to start with, that God's relation to the world is one of immanence and not of transcendence—that God is an intramundane, and not an extramundane, being. If the philosophy is false, the special conclusion concerning the incarnation which is founded upon it must be likewise untenable.

(2) If God is thus immanent in all men, in order for it to be possible for him to be incarnate in Christ Jesus, a particular person, it follows, logically and unavoidably, that every man is an incarnate deity; the argument proves too much; it proves that Christ was incarnate deity by proving that all men are incarnate deities. The inferences from such a generalization are at once absurd and abhorrent.

(3) If it were true that the incarnation were made possible by the metaphysical yearning of divinity for humanity, it is equally true that it became a fact in this mode; then it must necessarily follow that the entire divinity, being indivisible and indiscerptible, entered into union with humanity, and there is now no pure, or incarnate, deity. In other words, the entire problem is shifted from the question, How can the

Son of God become man? to the question, How can the entire Godhead become human? That is, this school of thinkers resolve the problem by changing it into one entirely different. If, therefore, the doctrine of the Trinity be held, it follows that all three persons of the Godhead—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost—became incarnate, which is not the question in debate and which in itself is an absurdity. If it be denied that there are three persons in the Godhead, then it is sought to explain the doctrine of the incarnation by first denying the doctrine of the Trinity, which, again, is not the question. If divinity united with humanity, metaphysically, then it was the union of the whole divinity with the whole humanity, and there is, and, from these premises, there can be, no other than incarnate deity in existence, unless the incarnate deity has evolved himself again out of the incarnate state into the unincarnate state.

(4) But this explanation explains nothing in debate. The question is, How can the Son of God become man without incarnating the Godhead? The answer which the pantheizers give to this question is, The thing supposed is possible because divinity is like humanity and is immanent in humanity. Then, if under the reciprocal impulse of the two to come together the union is actually effected, does not the Infinite become the finite? How can any theory as to the mode of the union, or as to the metaphysical nature of divinity on the one hand and of humanity on the other, serve to show how the Son of God can become man without the divinity in him becoming compressed, finite, limited?

(5) The pantheizers miss the whole question when they ask, How can divinity become humanity without ceasing to be divinity? It would be impossible, without a verbal and obvious contradiction, for divinity to become humanity without ceasing to be divinity and becoming humanity. If divinity becomes humanity, then it becomes humanity and is as unlike divinity as humanity is unlike divinity. It would be equal to the absurdity, How can a circle become a triangle and yet

remain a circle? How can divinity become humanity and yet remain divinity? It is a verbal contradiction. Theology raises and debates no such childish absurdity. Its question is, How can the Son of God so become man as to be a God-man? In talking about divinity and humanity, the pantheizers have left the concrete person and given themselves to abstractions. They have made the question foolish and absurd on its face. The incarnation is a possibility only on the supposition that there are three persons in the Godhead. Deny that proposition, and it is impossible for there to be any incarnation of the Son of God. A sound Christology depends upon a sound Trinitarianism.

II. Object of the Incarnation.—A second Christological problem arises out of an attempt to define the reason, or object, or end of the Incarnation. *Why* did the Son of God become man? To this question there are two answers given—the one traditional and orthodox and the other speculative and heterodox: (1) for redemptive ends only, and (2) for metaphysical reasons.

1. Would the Son of God have become flesh if it had not been for sin and the purposes of redemption? The traditional answer to this question has been in the negative. Anselm, in his *Cur Deus Homo*, gave this answer long years ago, and the vast majority of Christian interpreters have concurred with him. Had Adam stood his probation successfully, and had there been no advent of sin into human history, then there had been no incarnation, because there would have been no reason for the Son of God becoming the son of man. The reason for the incarnation is in the fact of sin and the divine purpose to redeem. The angel of annunciation said to Joseph, "Thou shalt call his name JESUS; for he shall save his people from their sins" (Matt. 1:21). "When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons" (Gal. 4:4, 5). Why did God send forth his Son, and why was he made of a woman

and under law? The answer is explicit and direct—"to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons." This seems to leave no room to debate the purpose of the Redeemer's advent in human flesh. "This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners" (1 Tim. 1:15). Had there been no sinners to be saved, then there had been no meaning and no sense in his coming into the world. "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them, who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage" (Heb. 2:14, 15). Why did he partake of human nature? The answer is again explicit—to destroy the devil and to deliver his people. The Scriptures seem, therefore, to answer this question, and to define the mission of Christ into this world to be the salvation of sinners.

2. On the other hand, it is held by those theologians who work with pantheistic concepts that the chief end of the incarnation was the metaphysical union of humanity and divinity. That is, the incarnation instead of being a means to an end was an end in itself. Consequently, the incarnation would have taken place even if there had been no sin. The ideal of divinity is union with humanity and the ideal of humanity is union with divinity; the union must become historic, else each would forever be incomplete and less than the ideal. Divinity is perfected when it unites with humanity and humanity is perfected when it unites with divinity; a theanthropic unit is the goal of the whole divine-human conation and evolutionary struggle.

This was the view of Martensen and Dorner. They teach that the race was created for the God-man, and it must have a God-man, not only to redeem it, but to make it metaphysically perfect. Such a being is the head of the race; and without him mankind would be incomplete in its evolution and ideal. Had Adam remained holy, the Son of God must

still become incarnate to fill out to roundness and perfection the metaphysical concept of humanity—to sum up all things in himself, whether they be things in heaven or things in earth. Mary would have borne the child she did bear even if the race had been saintly and morally ideal. The profoundest necessity for the incarnation was first metaphysical and secondarily moral and evangelical.

This view of the incarnation is commonly held in connection with a larger view of soteriology, an ampler schedule of doctrine. God's relation to the world has from the first been one of self-communication and self-revelation and self-expression—made so by immanent and uncreated impulses from the very center of his own being. Creation was the beginning of the unfolding, the starting point of the evolution of Deity; the incarnation was the culmination of the process; and the consummation of the kingdom of glory is the completion of the evolution. God first communicates himself to the material world, which is a true but inadequate expression of his life. Then in man, his likeness and image, he finds a yet truer and higher expression of himself. But the race continues to move on from lower to higher stages of human life and development, each being but a higher and more transcendent development of the Deity. The progress is ever ascensive and the approximations to the ideal are ever drawing nearer and nearer. However splendid the human specimens, they are still but approximations and adumbrations of the perfect specimen which has been the goal of all the evolution. In Jesus of Nazareth, the child of Mary, the evolution culminated and God found himself embodied and adequately expressed incarnate—the metaphysical Perfecter of the race on the one hand, and of deity on the other hand. Looked at from humanity's side, Jesus is the Ideal Man; looked at from the side of divinity, Jesus is the Ideal God. The Ideal Man is one whose human nature has united with divinity; and the Ideal God is one whose divine nature has united with humanity. This great junction occurred when the evolutionary process brought forth the Child of Mary. The theory attempts to ex-

plain the incarnation by using the hypothesis of evolution as explanatory of the becoming of that divine-human being whom we call Christ. It is another splendid illustration of the sad havoc this miserable hypothesis is making of common sense and sane doctrines. The beauty of the speculation, for minds that love speculation for its own sake, is not to be denied; but there are several considerations which render so romantic a theory utterly fallacious and untenable.

(1) This hypothesis assumes that divinity is metaphysically imperfect, and that it must be complemented with humanity in order to become ideal. It denies that the reason for the incarnation was ethical or evangelical and affirms that the reason was metaphysical and constitutional. God must unite with man, whether man be sinner or saint; he must unite with him in order to perfect and render ideal the life of deity. The necessity of the incarnation is thus held to be subjective to the inherent and intrinsic nature of divinity; divinity without humanity is ideally imperfect. No theory is tenable which starts out with the hypothesis that God, even as man, must grow and become full-grown by uniting with humanity. The hypothesis fails because it applies the idea of the imperfect to the Deity in order to put him through some evolutionary process which will ultimately perfect his life by joining him to man.

(2) The hypothesis equally assumes that the defect in human nature is metaphysical and constitutional as well as moral. Christ did come into the world, it is held, to cure a moral infirmity in the race; all the same, he would have come anyhow to cure a metaphysical defect in the very make-up of man! It is hard enough for the Calvinistic system to maintain the doctrine, in the face of a vain and egotistical race, that human nature is morally blemished and needs regeneration in its fundamental appetencies; how much more difficult must it be for this hypothesis to maintain the proposition that human nature is not only morally defective, but that it is also constitutionally deficient?

(3) It is obvious, therefore, that the hypothesis changes the question of human salvation from a moral question to a metaphysical question. The moral question is, *How can a sinner be just with God?* The metaphysical question which this school raises is, *How can a man be united to God?* The atonement then must be made for the incidental purpose of cleansing human nature that it may have a metaphysical union with divinity. The gospel is thus transmuted into a mere system of metaphysics!

(4) This hypothesis directly contradicts the answer which the Scriptures give to the question, Why did the Son of God become man? Christ says he came to save the world (Jno. 12:47). He defined his mission, and said it was to seek and to save the lost (Luke 19:10). There is not so much as a hint that he came into the world to unite divinity and humanity, in order that he might perfect the ideal by presenting to the universe a theanthropic being as the realization of the divine-human ideal. If not positively unscriptural this hypothesis, to say the least of it, is extra-scriptural and purely speculative. The incarnation, therefore, was a means to an end—a means to the end of saving sinners; it was not an end in itself—that divinity and humanity might be joined for the sake of completing a metaphysical ideal. The purpose of the incarnation was ethical and evangelical, and not metaphysical and speculative.

III. Mode of the Incarnation.—Still another problem is that of the mode of the incarnation. *How* did the son of God become man? Upon this mooted question we have the two answers from the same sources, the one traditional and orthodox, and the other speculative and pantheistic. (1) According to the evangelical view the incarnation was *voluntary*; (2) according to the speculative view it was *evolutionary*.

1. "The Son of God became man by *taking* to himself a true body and a reasonable soul." His assumption of human nature was voluntary and in no sense evolutionary, or a necessity of nature. It was an act of his divine will and not the

outcome of any constitutional or metaphysical yearnings. In the orthodox Christology there was no depotentiation of divinity downwards to the dimensions of humanity nor was there any impotentiation of humanity upwards to the proportions of divinity; the Second Person in the Trinity took to himself a true body and a reasonable soul without affecting or modifying or changing his essential divine nature. As a babe in Bethlehem he was the Son of God with a divine nature in no wise reduced from the fulness of divinity. The boy Jesus grew in stature and knowledge, but there was no addition to his perfect divine nature either in the way of an increase of knowledge or enlargement of stature. If at his baptism his human nature was made fully conscious of the divine, then, as all the while previous, his divine mind had been fully self-conscious of his consubstantial unity with the Godhead. Whatever revelations may have been made during his ministry and on the cross, they were not revelations to his divine nature but only and solely to his human nature; he was always divine and fully conscious of his divinity. By an act of his will, he took to himself a human nature; the mode of the incarnation was voluntary.

2. According to the pantheizers, on the other hand, the incarnation was not voluntary but *evolutionary*. The union of divinity and humanity came about not by the voluntary assumption of human nature by the divine will of the Son of God, but by an immanent and reciprocal yearning of the two natures for union with each other. As oxygen has a chemical affinity for hydrogen, or as the acid has a chemical affinity for the alkali, so divinity has a kind of chemical affinity for humanity and humanity has a kind of chemical affinity for divinity, and under this reciprocal impulse for each other the two came together, met and amalgamated in Jesus of Nazareth. The union was by process, and the process was from within the natures and not by personal and voluntary assumption. "The fulness of time" connotes that hour when in the general development everything was ripe for the merging of the two natures. As there was a moment when the vegetable

rose into the animal and the animal rose into the man, so there was a moment when the Son of God by a naturalistic process rose into the son of man.

The disciples of this way of thinking divide, among themselves, into two special classes, each giving his own account of the specific process by which the union was effected. There are (1) the Kenotists, (2) the Crypsistics.

(1) According to the Kenotists the Son of God gradually depotentiated himself of the forms of deity downwards to the dimensions of the babe of Bethlehem—and the incarnation took place by a mode of self-emptying. Paul tells us that Christ Jesus who was “in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men” (Phil. 2:6, 7). Here, then, was a being whose primary “form” was the “form of God”; then this being “emptied himself” of the “form of God,” and presented a secondary “form,” which was “the likeness of men”; such a transformation, we are told, could have been effected only by a process of self-emptying—a denudation of the form of deity to the form of a baby in a mother’s arms. Accordingly the Son of God became man by degrading himself from a divine “form” down to a human “form.” To do it in this mode, the perfections and attributes of deity must be laid aside and the body and attributes of a man must be assumed instead at the lowest initial point of manhood—at infancy. His size was diminished from infinitude to that of a human baby; his knowledge was reduced from omniscience to infantile ignorance; all his divine perfections underwent a similar denudation. Deityhood was poured out until manhood was reached.

(2) The Crypsistics account for the matter in an entirely different mode. To their thought, humanity is germinal divinity, and consequently the problem only requires that what is intrinsically embryonic divinity shall be raised to the height and proportion of true deity. The oak is infolded in the acorn; divinity is infolded in humanity; the only desideratum is to bring out what is thus inwrapped and enswathed. The infant

in Bethlehem was an infant deity; the boy in the temple was nothing else but a boy-God on his way to maturity; the man Christ Jesus was an infant God come of age; the glorified Saviour was the babe of Bethlehem now grown into the fullness of Divinity. The process is *crypsistic*, or hidden, because it consisted, not in the depotentiation of divinity down to the grade of humanity, but in the reimpotentiation of humanity from an embryo up to the dimension of the infinite God. This wing founded their interpretation mainly upon the text, "And the child grew, and waxed strong in spirit" (Luke 1:80). "And the child grew and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom; and the grace of God was upon him" (Luke 2:40). "And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man" (Luke 2:52). How, it is triumphantly asked, could there be growth if he were, as the orthodox teach, always God? The "child" of the New Testament grew, and grew, and grew—and what was the final limit of the growth? We are told that he never ceased to grow until he reached the dimensions of deity. According to Kenosis, that "child" was a depotentiated divinity; according to Crypsis, that "child" was an embryonic divinity. The one party starts his life in heaven and degrades him to the proportions and form of a man; the other party starts his life on the earth and impotentates it until he is raised to the infinite degree of life. With the one, Christ was a humanized deity; with the other, he was a deitized human. For the one, the movement was down to humiliation; according to the other, the evolution was from humiliation upwards to exaltation. Christ "grew" to be divine.

Both these hypotheses as to the mode of the incarnation are rendered untenable by several effective considerations.

(1) They equally miss the question in debate. That question is: How can the Son of God become man so as to continue to be God and man in two distinct natures and one person? The question these speculators raise is: How can the Son of God become man so as to continue to be one person with one nature? The Kenotists answer this question by

saying that he emptied himself of the form of God and took upon himself the form of man; that is, he was really God in the incarnation, but phenomenally man; or truly God and apparently man. The Crypsistics tell us that he was germinally God, while apparently a human infant, who grew more and more into the likeness of the deity. But the phenomena of Christ's life are twofold—partly divine and partly human, and both divine and human at the same time; and the question awakened by the Scripture representation of him is, How can he be both divine and human at one and the same time? These pantheizers, holding to the fundamental premise of the pantheistic philosophy, namely, that God and man are substantively one, raise and seek to answer the question, How can a being who at first had only the appearance of God subsequently come to have the appearance and exhibit the phenomena of man? Denying the true duality of the natures in Christ, they endeavor to show how the facts of his life as set out in the gospels can be squared with their fundamental contention that there is and can be but one nature in the Redeemer. The Kenotists answer by saying that he is substantively God, but phenomenally man; and the Cryptics answer that the human embryo is really but a divine embryo and must develop into full-fledged deity. Both parties miss the question which the gospels create concerning the life of the sinner's Redeemer.

(2) This hypothesis, either in its Kenotic or Cryptic form, truly limits and conditions the infinite. If the deity lays off his divine attributes and depotentiates himself to a man, then, though he may not have humanized his substance, he has practised self-limitation until he has cramped infinite perfections into finite forms; this is, and can be, nothing short of self-destruction, for what is a God worth who has only the attributes of a man? If the deity be held to be a babe in Bethlehem, still the mighty God has become, somehow, compressed into the limits of an infant, and is, at most, only potentially divine. In his life as set forth in the gospels, there is one set of attributes which are divine and another set of per-

fections which are human; they coexist in him at the same time; and the fundamental law—like attributes, like substance—requires us to predicate concerning him, (a) not that he is a God become man, nor (b) that he is a man on his way to become a God, but (c) that he is a true and proper God-man. According to the Cryptic view, Jesus is a man who will ultimately deitize himself; and according to the Kenotic view, he is a deity who has humanized himself; but according to the gospels, he is a divine-human being.

(3) This hypothesis as to the mode of the incarnation not only misconstrues the Christ of the gospels, but it also misinterprets God. Once admit that God is a necessary and immutable form of being, and at once it becomes impossible for us to conceive of him as giving up his divine mode of being for a human mode of life or to imagine him as being in a condensed infantile form to be expanded into a full infinite form. The hypothesis is contradictory of the very metaphysical nature of deity. What is God must always be God, because divinity is a necessary and unchangeable mode of being; the hypothesis denies fundamental predications concerning the nature of deity.

(4) The hypothesis misinterprets the texts of Scripture upon which it chiefly relies for support. It is true the gospels tell us that "the Word *became* flesh" (Jno. 1:14); but there is not a syllable here which explains the *mode* in which the Word *became* flesh. We must learn that, if at all, from some other place. When we go to the classic passage of Kenotics (Phil. 2:6-11), we are distinctly told in the text that there was a giving up of "the form of God," but it is unwarranted to assume that he gave up the *substance* of the Godhead, as some claim, or that he gave up the *attributes* of deity, as others insist; because we find him after the incarnation still exercising the attributes which he is said to have surrendered; so that something else must be found for him to surrender in order to satisfy the statement. What was it? What was the "form of God" which he laid aside that he might assume the

form of a man? Not the substance, not the attributes, but the *glory* of God; it was that which was surrendered for the life of humiliation on the earth in the performance of his mediatorial functions—the glory which he had in the beginning with the Father and which he won back when he triumphantly executed the scheme of redemption which had been entrusted to him. Then it is to be further noted that, in laying aside this primal glory of deity for the humiliation of manhood and servitude, instead of this change being engendered by any immanent motions or yearnings of the divine nature for the human, the text explicitly says that he “took” the form of a servant and the likeness of a man; that is, the exchange of heavenly glory for earthly humiliation and servitude was not the result of any evolutionary impulses of nature, but it was voluntarily assumed. Then when we turn to the texts of the Cryptics about the child Jesus “increasing in wisdom and stature,” and waxing strong in spirit and knowledge, the text is abundantly satisfied, and clearly interpreted, when we remember that he assumed an infant body and an infant mind, which developed normally according to the laws of human life and growth, and we are instantly freed from all the absurdities about deity growing into man, or man growing into deity. These texts do not therefore require these metaphysical speculations, in either their Kenotic or Cryptic forms, to interpret them truly and rationally.

IV. Impeccability of Christ.—Was the incarnate Redeemer peccable or impeccable? Hodge argues that he was peccable; Shedd robustly and strenuously contends that he was impeccable. The question is not, Was Christ as a matter of fact sinless? All Christologists hold that he never committed the least sin; but the question is the academic one, Could he have sinned? I hold, in a sense, with both parties, and attempt to resolve the problem by drawing a distinction. I hold, (1) that he was *metaphysically* peccable, but (2) that he was *morally* impeccable.

1. Christ was metaphysically peccable. By this I mean that the constitution of the incarnate Saviour was such that

the commission of sin was, to him, an abstract possibility. A tree is metaphysically impeccable; that is, a tree is such a thing as does not possess the faculties or organs required to commit a sin. So a horse is metaphysically impeccable because it is impersonal; that is, a horse does not possess the attributes and faculties which make it possible for the horse to transgress the moral law. But Christ is not a tree, nor is he a horse; he is a free person, with all the attributes and endowments of personality; that is, he has the powers and capacities and faculties needed in the possible commission of sin. Hence I say he was metaphysically peccable.

(1) He must have been metaphysically peccable in order to a true and proper humanity. We know nothing about a human nature which does not possess the *potestas peccare*. Adam, as created and sinless, possessed this power, and exercised it in the garden of Eden to the undoing of himself and all his posterity. Men, fallen and as seen to-day, possess it, and are perpetually displaying the fact by manifold and multi-form transgressions of the law of God. Christians, who have undergone regeneration, and are in the process of sanctification, possess it, and are daily illustrations of the proposition that converted men can do the things that are forbidden. Saints in glory are infallible, not because they do not possess the *potestas peccare*, not because they have been so changed in their metaphysics as to render their falling an impossibility, but because they are kept in their integrity by the power of God. The final perseverance of the saints does not rest on the fact that the *potestas peccare* has been deleted from their personal equipment, but upon the fact that they are so morally renovated that the motions of their souls will never be in the direction of evil; they are kept for ever by the power which converts, namely, the grace of God. God, however, does not possess the *potestas peccare*, because he is an eternal and necessary being; he cannot deny himself. The immortal standing of God in righteousness and holiness is not due to his will, but to the metaphysics of his nature; it is not that he will not sin; it is true that he cannot sin. But any created

free agent must possess the power to sin; it is an implicate in the very description and predication of free agency; it is only the holiness of an uncreated and self-existent being which is itself uncontingent and self-existent. For Christ, therefore, to be a partaker in deed and in truth of human nature, he must, metaphysically speaking, possess the abstract power of sinning. He was no tree; he was no horse; he was a true and *bona fide* man, with all the attributes and endowments of created human nature.

(2) He must have been metaphysically peccable in order to a true and proper *temptability*. A tree is intemptable; there is nothing in its constitution to which an inducement to do morally wrong can appeal. A horse is intemptable, because there is nothing in his nature upon which anything unethical can attach itself. But Jesus possessed a genuine human sensibility, with all its complex appetencies and desires; he possessed a true human conscience, with all the functions of perception and moral powers. He was, therefore, metaphysically temptable; and as a matter of historical fact, he was tempted as no other human being was ever tempted. The glory of his mediatorial righteousness was not due to the fact that he was such a being, in the make-up of his nature, as could not possibly respond to temptation, but it was due to the fact that he was both temptable and tempted, resisted even unto blood and wrought out his obedience without falling where he metaphysically could have fallen. The temptation in the wilderness would be inscrutable on the supposition that Jesus was such a person as could not have yielded.

(3) He must have been metaphysically peccable in order to be a true and proper *Second Adam*. That he was a Second Adam the Scriptures categorically affirm; and they run the parallel between the two Adams, saying, "As in Adam so in Christ." The parallelism would promptly and effectually break down on the assumption that the Redeemer did not possess the *potestas peccare*. His Adamism would be seriously and truly vitiated if it be held that while the first

could have sinned the second was so constituted that he could not have sinned. To preserve his true Adamic type he must have had, metaphysically speaking, the ability to have sinned. The first Adam was "a figure of him which was to come"; but had he been so made that sin was a sheer impossibility for him he would not have been in a true and genuine sense like the Adam of Eden. To preserve the Adamic principle, so fundamental in soteriology, Christ must have been metaphysically peccable.

(4) He must have been metaphysically peccable in order to a true and proper *probation*. A moral probation is a moral trial in which an issue is involved and which must be settled by the action of the probationer. If the probationer be metaphysically such a being as could not fall, how can there be any jeopardy of the issue? A reward is held out on condition that the probationer successfully endure a prescribed test; but the probationer is so constituted that it is impossible for him to do otherwise than comply with the condition imposed; where would be the reality of such a testing? Our Lord came into the world to perform a certain task—to obey both the precept and the penalty of God's law; but according to the hypothesis he was by his very nature unable to do anything else; then his mediation must be held to have been necessitated in all its issues, and so the work of Christ to have been without merit. Jesus purchased the redemption of his people; he earned his mediatorial reward; it is perfectly proper and strictly true that his work was meritorious. The first Adam was a true and proper probationer; an issue was involved; a task was imposed; his fate, and that of all whom he represented, hung upon his conduct; he failed, and his doom was sealed. No natural descendant of his is a probationer; we are all born with trial over and judgment rendered and destiny settled. Christ, as a Second Adam, was a true and proper probationer; an issue was involved in his life; a task was imposed; upon his action hangs the fate of himself and all those whom he represents. No true Christian is a probationer; the moral issues involved in his case were tried

in Christ, and in him settled; he is a saved man, and there is no sort of possibility of his being condemned. But Christ was a real probationer, and was subjected to a real moral test, which he triumphantly stood. But how can we conceive of true probation and a true issue where the probationer does not possess the *potestas peccare*? The glory of the Redeemer's triumph consists in the fact that he succeeded where he could have failed.

(5) I have now argued that Christ must have been metaphysically peccable, in order, (a) to be a man like unto other men, (b) to be truly tempted, (c) to be a Second Adam, (d) to be a real probationer; but I have not made the fallacious argument, (e) that he had to be peccable in order to be a free agent. The *potestas peccare*—the ability to sin—is not of the essence of free agency. If it were, there could be no free agent who did not possess such ability. The Arminian contention is that ability to the contrary is of the essence of free agency, so that any and every free agent *ipso facto* possesses the power to sin. Free agency is the power to do as the person pleases; it does not implicate power to the contrary. God is a free agent; there are none bold enough to deny it; yet the Deity does not possess the power to sin; "he cannot deny himself"; the thing is a sheer impossibility; and therefore the ability to sin is not essential to the concept of free agency. A sinner is a free agent; but he does not possess the power to the contrary, for, in every instance, he must be converted by a power other than himself, namely, the Holy Spirit; therefore ability to the contrary is not of the essence of free agency. A glorified saint in heaven is a free agent, with abounding liberty to do whatsoever he pleases; yet he does not possess the power to the contrary—the *potestas peccare*; therefore it is not of the essence of free agency. A free agent is one who follows the listings of his own mind; that does not mean that he must necessarily have a dual appetency—appetencies in opposite directions in order to be free. If he has but a single desire, and follows that desire to its end, he is clearly free. It is impossible for God to sin because it is impossible for

him to have any such desire; it is impossible for a glorified saint to fall out of heaven, because his appetencies have been so renovated that it is impossible for him to have such a desire as would ultimate in sin should he follow it into execution. The *potestas peccare*—ability to sin—is essential to human nature, essential to temptation, essential to the concept of a second Adam, essential to probation, but it is not essential to free agency. He is a free agent who has the metaphysical power to follow his desires; but it is not true to say that in order to be free he must have the power to desire sin. The Arminian theology can be cleared of many difficulties and absurdities when it can be taught that the *potestas peccare* does not constitute the central nature of free agency.

2. But while Christ was metaphysically peccable, he was *morally impeccable*. In other words, he was sustained in his mediatorial probation not by his metaphysical constitution but by his moral energy. His triumph was ethical. His moral resources were such as to sustain him.

(1) Christ was rendered morally impeccable by his *divine-human constitution*. It is a familiar fact that, because of the duality of his natures, whatever is predicable of one nature, or of either nature, is predicable of his person. Because his human nature grew in stature and increased in wisdom, it is correct to say that Christ grew in stature and increased in wisdom; but, because his divine nature was infinite and omniscient, it is correct to say that Christ was infinite and omniscient. Because he suffered in his human nature, it is correct to say that Christ suffered and died; but because he could not suffer in his divine nature but was always fully and perfectly blessed, it is correct to say that Christ never suffered but was always fully blessed and happy. These, and similarly apparent opposite predications are properly made of him upon the well-accepted proposition that whatsoever is predicable of either nature is predicable of the person. While, then, it is correct that Christ through his human nature was peccable, it is, upon the principle already announced, true that his human nature, by reason of its union

with the divine nature, was morally impeccable; that is, it is morally certain that a being so constituted as was the Redeemer could not sin. Whenever he expresses himself humanly, he expresses himself through his human nature; and whenever he expresses himself divinely, he expresses himself through his divine nature; but in either case, and in both cases, it is Christ who expresses himself, and the action is properly predicable of him. If, therefore, the Redeemer has sinned through his human nature, it would have been Christ who did the sinning, and the divine nature would have been involved in the transgression; such a result is unthinkable; hence I say it is morally impossible for Christ to exercise the *potestas peccare* which was an endowment of his human nature. The very metaphysics of his constitution creates a moral impossibility of his sinning, though the metaphysics of his human nature renders it possible from a metaphysical point of view for him to do so. Because he is a divine-human being it is *morally* impossible for him to exercise the *potestas peccare*.

(2) Christ was morally impeccable because of the *covenant* which his Father made with him when he sent him into the world upon his redemptive mission. It was a part of the engagement of the Father at that time to keep him and support him in all of his arduous task of atonement. He did not make the advent and enter upon this mission without a prearrangement with his Father and without distinct stipulations of divine support in all the enterprise. The Father, it is absolutely certain, will fulfill every engagement and sustain him throughout the entire probation and in all the temptations and bring him off triumphant. In his constitution his human nature is so related to his divine nature that it is absolutely certain that he will not morally fail in his task, and then in addition thereto he is so related to the Father in the task he has undertaken as to make it morally impossible for him to break down. His Father has promised to hold him up, and he is able to make the promise good and will in no case fail to keep his plighted word.

(3) He was morally impeccable because his human nature was *entirely sanctified*. The Spirit was given him without measure; grace was poured into his lips; he was always under the leadings of the Holy Ghost; it was impossible for him to go wrong when under that leading. A sanctified Christian—entirely sanctified—is morally impeccable because he is under the entire and complete control of an unerring guide directing from within outwards. This is the very meaning and ground of the final perseverance of the saints; they are kept by the grace of God; it is his power which holds and directs and insures. In the same way, it is the same Spirit which leads and sanctifies the Redeemer's human nature wholly and insures him against the possibility of apostacy. Put any being under the sway of this inerrant Spirit, and the issue is assured. So was Christ rendered morally impeccable.

V. **The Glorified Redeemer.**—There still remains the problem as to the Glorified Redeemer. What effect did the ascension have upon the constitution of the person of Christ? Is he to-day, on the throne of his glory, incarnate or unincarnate? Has he been divested of his humanity, or is he still clothed with a genuine human nature? Has the human been exalted into the divine, or is it still subject to the limitations which belong to a man? Has there been either a transformation, or a transubstantiation, as the result of his exaltation and glorification?

I. Orthodox and Reformed Christologists answer that the glorified Redeemer is, in heaven as he was on earth, a genuine *theanthropic being*. There has been no denudation, no transformation, no transubstantiation, no fusion, no transfer of divine perfections to the human nature of the encrowned Saviour. He is "God and man, in two distinct natures, but one person forever." His exaltation to glory was not final impotentiation of the human to the divine but a crowning of the triumphant Saviour of sinners with the honor and dignity and glory which he won for himself in his successful performance of the mediatorial task. It is the Theanthropos, the

God-man, who occupies the mediatorial throne, wears the mediatorial prerogatives and dispenses the mediatorial rewards. He is described in the Hebrews as "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." John in the Apocalypse was granted a vision of the enthroned Redeemer, and saw one "as it had been a Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" sitting upon the throne and receiving the worship of every creature which treads the gorgeous mosaic of the skies. He promised his disciples as he took his departure from the hills of Judea "that they should see him descending in like manner as they saw him ascend into heaven." They saw him leave the earth with a veritable human nature, a true body and a reasonable soul, changed in its dignity and glory but not substantially transmuted into something else; what they saw ascend into heaven, the earth will see descend therefrom. The everlasting King of the heavenly kingdom of the saints will be the divine-human Saviour of sinners. As the Second Person in the adorable Godhead he is a coequal sharer with the Father and the Spirit of the glory and power of the absolute kingdom of the Trinity; but as the head of the mediatorial and redemptive kingdom, the kingdom of ransomed sinners, finally set up in heaven, he is a divine-human Head, wearing the glories of the mediatorial dominion as a sub-kingdom under the government of the Triune God.

2. But the pantheizers and those theologians who may be described as afflicted with a theological "wanderlust" tell us that the glorified Redeemer has somehow become transformed from all resemblance to a real man into some sort of divinity. After the Son of God had depotentiated himself downwards to the proportions of a man, then he reimpotentiated himself upwards to the proportions of divinity and the evolution became perfected at the moment of Christ's ascension to heaven. Consequently his human limitations have now disappeared and his human nature can be held to be ubiquitous in such sense that it can be truthfully said that his human body and soul are present in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper and wherever the people of God are assembled

for worship. "Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world." He can keep such a promise, we are told, only on the supposition that his human nature has lost its natural limitations in the glorification of his person. That is, the Saviour has been exalted out of all semblance of a man. The whole vagary springs out of the fact that these teachers are, consciously or unconsciously, plowing with the pantheistic heifer.

CHAPTER IX.

Mediation

The Son of God became incarnate in order to be a Mediator. The idea of salvation by mediation is thoroughly Biblical. In the Old Testament ritual the priest mediated between God and Israel, going into the shekinah of the divine presence with the blood of the victim and returning to the outer door with the absolution and benediction for the people. In the New Testament the title is repeatedly applied to the Redeemer. "For there is one God, and one mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus" (1 Tim. 2:5). "He is the mediator of a better covenant" (Heb. 8:6). "For this cause he is the mediator of the new testament" (Heb. 9:15). "Jesus the mediator of the new covenant" (Heb. 12:24). The redemptive programme is clearly mediatorial in its nature and God is now approachable only through a go-between.

I. The Mediatorial Problem.—The problem of the Mediator is the reconciliation of two estranged parties—God and man. Each is at enmity with the other; both must be placated, that there may be a pact of reciprocal and hearty friendship. A something must be done that will satisfy God on the one hand and that will satisfy man on the other. Whatever is done must be genuine and not supposititious, conserving all the rights of justice, truth, and honor, and compromising to neither.

1. God is angry with the sinner, and for cause. It is no make-believe temper, no superficial display of a wrath which will subside under its own weight, no bluster and "bluff" of passion. It is righteous indignation which swells his bosom. His displeasure is ethical, and the whole moral nature of the Deity is stirred against the sinner.

That primal saying in the Garden of Eden—"in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die"—pledges the divine

Being to an attitude of hostility to man in case he disobeys; the immediate expulsion of the first pair from the garden, under the curse of the divine displeasure, and the subsequent evils which have tracked the race from that day to the present time prove to the world that God did assume the hostile relation towards the transgressing members of Adam's family—the attitude which the sinful situation logically and judicially required him to assume towards these creatures. In his revelation we find that "wrath" and its cognates and synonyms occur a very large number of times in describing God's attitude towards sinful men; and it is always represented that a serious something has to be done to change that attitude into one of affection.

"God is angry with the wicked every day" (Ps. 7:11). That is a categorical assertion of his displacency, and there is no sophistry which can convert this text into a declaration of the divine affection for the wicked. "Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated" (Rom. 9:13). Soften the word "hate" in this place as much as you will, and still the word represents God as displeased with Esau. "All their wickedness is in Gilgal; for there I hated them; for the wickedness of their doings I will drive them out of mine house, I will love them no more" (Hos. 9:15). On account of their wickedness, God "hated" these Ephraimites, and drove them out of his house. It would indeed be a marvellous alchemy which could transmute these expressions and actions into manifestations of love and goodwill. "The foolish shall not stand in thy sight; thou hatest all workers of iniquity. Thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing; the Lord will abhor the bloody and deceitful man" (Ps. 5:5, 6). "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them" (Gal. 3:10).

If God's attitude towards sinful men is one of complacency and affection, what reason can there be for the incarnation and crucifixion of his only begotten and well-beloved Son? Upon such a premise there could be no real necessity for the atonement. But upon the supposition that God is

displeased with sinful men and feels righteously indignant towards them and ethically offended at them, then something as great and as radical as atonement must be done in order to create an ethical and righteous basis upon which he may clasp hands with them and be reconciled to them.

Moral love and moral wrath are opposites. What the one opposes the other must smite. The one is awakened by righteousness, the other by sin. Whatever is holy must give the Deity pleasure; and for the same reason whatever is unholy must give him displeasure. To hold otherwise would be to represent the divine character as untrue in its energizings. That character is not only weak, but sadly blemished and utterly worthless, which is indiscriminate in its admirations and incapable of feeling moral wrath at the guilty and hateful.

The entire gospel is predicated upon the fact that God is angry with the wicked and stands in need of being placated. Why preach to sinners to flee the wrath to come if the Deity is already complacent towards them? Why should sinners repent if God is already on good terms with them? The hypothesis would vacate the gospel of all its force and effectiveness.

These things, heretofore regarded as obvious, must be emphasized because the sentimental theology is to-day representing God as being in a friendly attitude towards sinful men and stigmatizing the doctrine that God must be propitiated with atoning blood as barbaric in its conceptions and as a slanderous caricature of the character of man's Creator. The world is being taught that God is placent towards the race, and that the only need now is for the sinner to become placent toward God. The world is being taught that the only need of mediation is to persuade sinners to recognize the fact that God is himself placent and that the only desideratum is for them to repent. We are being told that there is in deed and truth but one party to this controversy, namely, man. We are told in the Revised Westminster Confession of the Presbyterian Church, U. S. A., that, "In the gospel God

declares his love for the world and his desire that all men should be saved." That Church, in formal credal statement, asserts that God's attitude towards the whole world is one of Love. It has come to be quite popular to represent God as the Father of all men, and all men as the children of God; and then to draw the swift and logical inference that the Deity stands in need of no bloody offering in order to appease his wrath and that no child of God need fear future endless punishment. If this were true—if God is not displeased—if he loves all men and desires their salvation—if he is the Father of all men and all men are his children—if this were the attitude of the divine Being towards his sinful creatures the problem of mediation would be fundamentally so changed that the Mediator would have no other task imposed upon him but to placate sinners and induce them to turn to God for peace and acceptance. In other words, there would be but one offended party—man; and there would be but one desideratum—the pacification of the estranged human creature. Then the whole of the gospel would consist in mere moral suasions exerted on the sinful mind.

Any scheme of mediation, therefore, which proposes to meet the issues involved, ethically and fully and settle the controversy amicably and righteously must proceed upon the supposition that God has a true cause of complaint against his human creatures and that his character, and honor, and self-respect, and all his precious and manifold interests, must be adequately and genuinely protected. There can be no mediation which contemplates the least discrediting of Deity.

(1) The divine *justice* must be satisfied. There is that in the divine character which insures that the "Judge of all the earth will do right." Could he, for one brief moment and in one single case, perpetrate an act of injustice at any point in all his moral universe he would forfeit his own self-respect and at the same time discharge all his creatures from the last obligation to honor and glorify him. It would be such a moral calamity as would wreck the moral administration of the uni-

verse. God must first be just, even if the heavens fall in consequence.

It was but the dictate of common justice to declare, "the soul that sinneth, it shall die." God's anger is righteous indignation; in truth and honor, the Deity ought to be offended; it had been a moral weakness, a blasting blemish of character, had he not been; there is an ethical ground for his wrath, a moral "needs be"; the sinner literally and truly deserves to be punished; God ought to do what ought to be done. Not to inflict the penalty incurred would be to cheat justice and dishonor law. This God cannot do and yet be consistent with himself. The supreme problem for the wisdom of the Mediator is, "How can God be just, and yet the justifier of the ungodly?" The human judge who dares justify the criminal in his earthly court is plastered with obloquy by all right-minded men. If God fails to be righteous, all the moral interests of the vast universe collapse. The law—"the soul that sinneth, it shall die"—is founded in correct ethics and must be respected and enforced by any being who has a correct moral sense.

(2) But the divine *holiness* must likewise be conserved by any proposition for reconciliation which can be respected by the Divine Being. There is in the heart of God a purity which renders any polluted creature disgusting in his sight. It must be so; it ought to be so; he would be unfit for his throne, and unworthy of creature-respect, were he incapable of feeling genuine aversion to the impure and unholy. It is one of the most praiseworthy and commanding attributes of his nature that "he cannot look upon sin with the least degree of allowance." Should he take to his bosom an unwashed creature, he would soil his own cleanliness and sully his own pure hands. Moreover the Deity cherishes his own purity and esteems it as the crowning perfection of his life and character; before this attribute is soiled the universe ought to perish for ever. The moral world must have a spotless God, or no God at all. A tainted God would be alike intolerable to his own throne and to all his right-thinking people. Any

proposition that God be reconciled to sinners by some slight or great compromising of his holiness is absolutely unthinkable; and any mediator coming into his presence with such a proposition of temporizing with this attribute would be hurled out of his sight with infinite contempt and loathing.

(3) It is equally obvious that any acceptable scheme of mediation must conserve the divine *truthfulness*. Jehovah cannot become a liar in order to save from hell any man who justly deserves such a fate. Truth is fundamental and basal in all human moral character; it is infinitely more fundamental in the Supreme Ruler of this universe. He repeatedly describes himself as the "Faithful and True God," and promises a lake of brimstone and fire for all who love and make lies. But this "true God," with all seriousness and formal solemnity, looked his human creatures in the face and said, "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die"; and long years afterwards, when the world was reeking with iniquity, he calmly and earnestly repeated it, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." His word has gone forth out of his mouth; he has sworn by his own awful and uncreated self; and his word cannot be broken. No proposition of reconciliation at the expense of his truth and honor can be tolerated by him until he is prepared to vacate his throne and retire from the common respect of his intelligent creatures. Of course he will not, cannot, ought not, to sacrifice his truthfulness in order to save a man from hell who truly deserves that awful fate.

(4) Any scheme of mediation, to be acceptable to the Ruler of this universe, must adequately and truly conserve the *law* of the kingdom. It is the sound judgment of men that the dignity and majesty of human law must be preserved at any and every expense, otherwise the whole attempt at government must prove a dismal failure. But the law of God's kingdom, of which man is a transgressor, is an exponent of his will and a transcript of his moral nature—the formal expression of the divine conscience. To treat lightly the infractions of this law; to overslaugh its just claims for penalty; to set it aside to allow the guilty to go unsmitten; would be

for God to perpetrate a compound outrage, (1) in himself violating and dishonoring his own law, and (2) in violating his own conscience. He would thus put a premium upon crime and challenge his intelligent universe to rebellion. He would make his own law the lever by which he would overthrow his own government.

(5) Nor must we forget that God is the *Moral Ruler* of the created universe and must be jealous of his royal prerogatives and the guardian of the stability and honor of his throne, not only for his own sake, but chiefly and especially for the sake of the welfare of his creatures. Any proposed scheme of reconciliation must keep in mind that the supreme interests of the moral universe are involved in any settlement of the issues which may be had. To save one sinner, or a thousand sinners, the divine administration cannot be jeopardized; else must the divine government itself perish, bringing into being all the imaginable horrors of a morally wrecked universe. "Righteousness must be laid for a line, and judgment for a plummet." The Deity owes it to himself, and in a sense to his subject creatures, to protect the universe from so awful a calamity. The Mediator must take care of the dignity, the majesty, the honor, the stability, the supremacy, the integrity, of the divine government for the sake of universal moral order. If the Judge of all the earth proves immoral or incompetent, the cause of righteousness for all the universe is finally and hopelessly lost.

Any proposition, therefore, looking to the reconciliation of Jehovah and his disobedient human servants, must conserve, (1) the divine justice, (2) the divine holiness, (3) the divine truthfulness, (4) the divine law, and (5) the divine government. If wisdom cannot devise some method for protecting interests so vast and so fundamental, the whole project must be abandoned as impracticable and the sinner be left to his fate. The Mediator's first problem is to find an ethical platform upon which the Deity can stand and, in perfect consistency with his dignity and conscience and self-respect, clasp hands with the offending sinner.

2. A second class of difficulties which confront any proposed scheme of mediation spring out of man's relation to this controversy between himself and his Maker. He is the party of the second part to this religious quarrel; he is truly offended at his Maker, and must be placated before he can be induced to enter into friendship and fellowship with his God. Any Mediator, therefore, has not completed his task of reconciliation when he has made it possible for God to honorably clasp hands with the sinner; the "enmity of the carnal mind" must also be eradicated. The obstacles to the human side of the controversy are, (1) objective, and (2) subjective.

(1) Objectively considered, the sinner has lost his *right* to come into the divine presence. He is a proscribed citizen, and has forfeited all his standing and privileges in the kingdom of God; he is a disinherited and discarded son, and has lost his privileges in the house and family of God. He is a dismissed servant, and has not now the privilege of resuming his services, even if he had a heart and a desire to resume labor in his Lord's employment. The conscience-smitten Adam fled from the Garden of Eden after his transgression, and a revolving sword of flame guarded the gateway to prevent his return to his Maker's paradise. If he is ever to be restored freely and cheerfully to his Maker, his biting conscience must be pacified, so that he will return of his own accord with joy and thanksgiving. Something must be done to the moral faculty of the refugee from justice before he can be expected to return to the court room of the Judge, which he has offended, and to the law which he has broken. Let the sinner's conscience remain unpurged of the sense of guilt and he will fly forever from the presence of his Maker; he is the last being in the universe into whose presence he desires to come. Any effective scheme of mediation must, therefore, provide for the rectification and pacification of the guilty conscience, which makes the sinner a cowardly but bitter hater of the Almighty. "I remembered God," says the Psalmist, "and was troubled." The thought of God ought to cheer

and attract the human creature which was created to know and worship; it has the reverse effect. The Mediator, to be effective, must do something to bring about a change of attitude on the part of the sinner towards his Maker from one of fear and hostility to one of trust and love. The *right* to come back must first of all be secured to him.

(2) But certain subjective changes must also be wrought in the sinful man before he will desire to be reconciled to God. He is repelled by fear; and that must be taken out of his heart. He is repelled by his appetences and ruling desires; he has no pleasure in the ways and precepts and ideals of his God; but, on the contrary, he loves the things that are opposite, His moral judgment is so perverted that he "puts bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter." Towards God, he is like the Ethiopian which cannot change his skin, or like the leopard which cannot change his spots, and has no desire to change them. The sinner loves and delights in his attitude of hostility to his Maker. Any Mediator, therefore, to be effective, must provide, in his programme of reconciliation, for the turning of the estranged human heart back to God. The sinner must be given the *heart* to return.

If God alone were angry with the sinner, then the only problem of mediation would be to appease the divine Being; and if man alone were displacent towards God, then the only problem of mediation would be to placate the sinner towards his God. But if both parties are offended each with the other, then the mediatorial problem calls for some action which will propitiate each towards the other. This is the gigantic and complex task which confronted the incarnate Redeemer; he must do the thing which will render both parties to this religious controversy reciprocally complacent and so bring them into fellowship with each other by a kind of spiritual affinity or gravitation. The problem is not one-sided.

II. *The Mediatorial Method.*—But what mode of procedure does the very nature of the mediatorial problem define for the Mediator to pursue in any effective attempt to solve

it? Generically considered, there are but two ways in which enemies can be brought into peaceful and sympathetic fellowship with each other: (1) by intercession and (2) by expiation.

(1) When it is sought to reconcile estranged persons by *intercession*, the peace-maker must negotiate until he can devise and present articles of agreement mutually acceptable to the parties affected. This method of effecting reconciliations devolves it upon the arbitrator to draw up acceptable terms of peace, as when a *cartel* is arranged between warring states. If this were the method of Christ's mediation, all that would be required of him would be to negotiate an acceptable gospel and make public proclamation of the same for the acceptance of it by estranged parties—God and man. His whole mediatorial duty would be that of a prophet, announcing to this world the terms upon which God is willing to restore the sinner to his friendship. He would then have accomplished his entire mediatorial function when he had made the revelation of the divine mind to this world. By preaching, he would meet all the requirements of the case.

Such a mode of mediation would not solve the problem for two reasons: (a) because the moral nature of God, as has been just shown above, demands that the cause of the estrangement shall be wiped out of existence as the precondition of God's being reconciled to the sinner without compromising his moral nature; and (b) because the sinner's moral nature has been so perverted, and rendered so averse to the Deity, that he will, if his nature be not fundamentally changed, infallibly reject any proposition of reconciliation which can be presented to him. No proposition can be made to the Deity, which could be acceptable to him, which did not provide for the true and perfect erasure of the offence which has caused him to expel man from his heart and love; and no proposition of reconciliation could command the assent of the sinner so long as his present views and feelings remain unchanged and unsanctified. The mediatorial problem, therefore, is such that mediation cannot be effective by intercession; no

degree or sort of mere entreaty can avail to placate God towards the sinner or placate the sinner towards God.

(2) A second mode of mediating between estranged parties is by *expiation*. This course devolves it upon the mediator to make peace between the estranged parties by doing the thing which blots out of existence the offending fact; *bona fide* reparation must be made for the injury done and for the offence given. Two warring states may come to peace with each other because the *casus belli* has become a zero; two men, at outs with each other over money, may become friends by virtue of the fact that the money, about which they quarreled, has been paid, and the debt no longer exists to divide them; two friends, parted because of the injury done to the honor of one by the other, may become restored to each other by virtue of the fact that ample and true reparation, in the form of apology, has been made for the offence. The distinction between mediation by way of intercession and mediation by a mode of expiation and reparation is perfectly true and apprehensible.

It is quite obvious that this is the only mode in which the mediation of Christ in the controversy between God and man can be made effective. The separating thing must be annihilated before these two will ever clasp hands. God will be placated only when the offending thing—sin—has been truly put out of his field of vision; and the sinner will be placated only when the offending thing—sin—has been put entirely out of his heart and life. But bring about this condition—a condition in which there is in the sinner nothing offensive to God and nothing in God offensive to the sinner, but, on the contrary, there is something in the sinner which makes him altogether attractive to God and something in God which makes him gloriously attractive to the sinner—bring about this condition of view and feeling between these two parties, and then God will embrace the sinner with delight and the sinner will embrace his God in a transport of ineffable joy. To accomplish this, no bare intercession, no mere revelation of gospel terms, is adequate; mediation must be by a

mode of expiation. The Mediator must crucify and bury the offence itself. "And you, being dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him, having forgiven you all trespasses; blotting out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, and took it out of the way, nailing it to his cross; and having spoiled principalities and powers, he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it" (Col. 2:13-15). The sufferings, death and crucifixion of our Lord cannot be interpreted as a mere incident in his mediation, but they must be construed as the central feature and fundamental fact in all his mediatorial work. To construe his advent and mission into this world as chiefly and rulingly revelatory, and to the minimizing of his sacrificial death, is to disembowel his entire mediatorial undertaking.

The atonement which the Redeemer made in the exercise of his mediatorial office does three things: (1) it propitiates an angry God; (2) it expiates the guilt of human sin; (3) it impetrates the Holy Spirit, who unburdens the human conscience, regenerates the human heart, and sanctifies the human life and transforms it into something lovely in the eyes of the Deity. This no mere negotiation could effect.

III. Mediatorial Qualifications.—To mediate in the capacity of an expiationist, whoever undertakes this office must be peculiarly qualified; he must be some unique being in his constitution, in order that he may perform functions apparently the most contradictory. He must be so qualified that he can do three things at once: (1) die, (2) live, (3) yet unify both.

(1) He must be human in order to die—human in order to die at all—human in order to die a human death, the sort demanded of the offender. "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them, who through fear of death were all their lifetime sub-

ject to bondage. For verily he took not on him the nature of angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a faithful and merciful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people. For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted." (Heb. 2:14-18). He must be flesh and blood, in order to lay his life on the altar of sacrifice to satisfy the divine justice and turn away the wrath of God. Through all the Old Testament dispensation the place of Jehovah's worship had run red with blood—the typical blood of bulls and goats. The mediator must be human to furnish the blood for which outraged justice and violated law ceaselessly called. He must be human in order to die.

(2) But he must be equally divine in order to live. No mere human being could lay down his life under the sentence of violated law and then take it up again. "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father" (Jno. 10:17-18). If he must be human to go down into the penal grave, he must be divine to come forth out of the grave. If he must be human in order to give up life, he must be divine in order to take up life again. If he must be human in order to go under the law, he must be divine in order to come back from under the law. If he must be human in order to go under the law, he must be divine in order to be above law and not himself under obligation to that law. He must be human in order to suffer the penalty of sin and bring in the righteous obedience which the first Adam ought to have brought in but failed to do; he must be divine in order not to perish eternally in the undertaking but triumph over death, hell and the grave.

(3) But he must also be one person in order to unify his mediatorial task. A mere man could have died a human

death and a mere divinity could have lived in spite of death; but the redemptive problem required to be unified—the same person must both live and die at one and the same time. None but a divine-human person, therefore, in his metaphysical constitution was equal to the solution of the mediatorial problem by way of atonement and expiation. He must be human to pay the penalty in *kind*; he must be divine in order to pay the penalty in *degree*; he must be unipersonal in order to do *both* in the same act. It would take a mere finite being all eternity to pay the penalty in finite instalments; it would take an infinite being a limited period of time to pay that penalty in full; it would take a unipersonal being to pay that penalty at once. For a man who could pay but one cent a century to cancel a hundred billion dollar debt it would require incalculable time; but for a man possessed of a thousand billions of dollars to cancel the debt it would require but a brief moment of time for him to draw and sign an adequate check. For the sinner to pay his debt to broken law and at the same time pay his debt to unbroken law would require more time than in all eternity; but to satisfy both the penal and preceptive aspects of the moral law, Jesus, a divine-human person has only to cry, "It is finished, and yield up the ghost," and then take up his life and rise from the dead, and the transaction is completed. The very nature of the mediatorial problem, therefore, calls for a divine-human person to fill the mediatorial office successfully.

The Mediator, then, must be, (1) human in order to die a human death, the sort of death demanded by the divine justice, and (2) he must be divine in order to impart to that death an infinite value, and so make it worthy of being accepted as a *bona fide* payment of the debt, and (3) he must be unipersonal in order that the transaction may have unity and effectiveness. It is obvious, therefore, that the mediatorial problem defines the constitution and nature of the Mediator.

IV. **Mediatorial Offices.**—The mediatorial duties as defined by the mediatorial problem require that the Mediator

between God and man shall exercise three offices: (1) that of prophet, (2) that of priest, and (3) that of king.

(1) He must be a *prophet*, in order to reveal the plan of reconciliation agreed upon in the council of eternity when the covenant of grace was entered into between the Father and the Son; to teach the world what would otherwise have remained an undiscovered and impenetrable mystery; to declare to the world the redemptive programme.

(2) He must be a *priest*, in order, by his atonement, to bring into being the essential facts—the evangelical contents—of the prearranged plan of reconciliation; for the effectiveness of the schedule depended upon its provisions being executed at the altar of sacrifice; he must exercise the priest's office in order to wait upon the altar of redemption, because the things provided for therein could not be brought into existence by mere revelation. Revelation shows what was to be done in order to save sinners; atonement accomplishes the prescribed things and translates the programme into historic fact.

(3) He must likewise be a *king*, in order to administer the executed plan, giving it concrete application in the lives and experiences of its beneficiaries; in order to send the Spirit and through him carry the project to completion in the consummated kingdom of glory. As a Prophet, Christ must reveal the plan of reconciliation; as a Priest, he must execute that plan at the altar of sacrifice, substituting his obedience and death for the obedience and death of those whom he represented; and as a King, he must administer and give practical efficacy to the revealed and executed plan of mediation.

V. Mediatorial Estates.—To execute such a programme of mediation, it devolves upon him who undertakes it to undergo two experiences: (1) a series of experiences which are deeply humiliating to him and (2) a series of subsequent experiences which greatly exalt him and honor him.

(1) In the execution of his task, he must submit first to a period of humiliation, in which his person must be degraded and afflicted with many indignities, in order that he may make of himself a vicarious sacrifice for the expiation of the human offence and the honorable propitiation of the anger of the Deity. This our Redeemer did. "Being in the form of God, he thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." (Phil. 2:6-8). If the Saviour could have been spared this excruciating degradation and at the same time have carried out the programme of mediation and reconciliation he would have been exempted from the humiliation. But the road to the goal lay along this valley of shame and misery, and he did not decline to walk it.

(2) But this period of humiliation must logically and necessarily be succeeded by a period of surpassing exaltation, in order for the Mediator to be successful and triumphant. "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." (Phil. 2:9-11). It was a tremendous stoop from un-incarnate deity down to incarnate deity; it was a tremendous ascent from earth to heaven.

CHAPTER X.

Christ: The Prophet

I. Definition.—The word prophet etymologically signifies a spokesman, a message-bearer. He does not represent himself and deliver his own ideas; he is, on the other hand, but the mouth-piece of another. In religious literature a prophet is a person whom God uses as a medium of communicating with the world. He may be inspired by the Holy Spirit when he is the infallible organ for delivering the divine revelation to the human race; or he may be uninspired when he is the repeater and interpreter of that infallible revelation, a preacher of the Holy Scriptures. He may be the bearer of a message concerning future events when he is the foreteller of things which are to come to pass. He may be gifted with extraordinary powers of insight and foresight when he is a seer with penetration and vision and intuition—a prophet by accommodation and metaphor, because he can see beyond the majority of his fellow-men. But however used the word never loses entirely the aroma of its etymology. A prophet is always a message-bearer; pre-eminently, God's message-bearer; and generally God thinks enough of his message to have it truly delivered to those for whom it was intended. The whole Bible is the product of prophecy, and the secondary prophets of religion, the preachers, are without excuse for blundering in repeating this message to the world. Thorough preparation for the office, diligent and conscientious study of the text of the message, profound reflection upon its import, coupled with the promised illumination of the Holy Spirit, is enough to secure substantial accuracy in its delivery to this world. These secondary prophets of the gospel are always second-hand message-bearers.

II. Purpose.—Ours is a sinful world, morally blind and religiously stupid: its superlative need is for a redemptive

revelation, a message of salvation from God to the blind leaders of the blind. Had the race continued in its pristine purity each man would have had unobscured vision and could have been his own informant about God, about man, about the world, about duty, about religion, about all things, and would not have stood in need of any prophet-teacher to bear messages from God for the edification of his life: every man would have been in direct personal communication with the Deity. But being a fallen creature, and judicially excluded from intercourse with his Maker, he now needs a prophet, sent from God, to tell him about God, about sin, about the Saviour, about the plan of redemption, about grace and the sanctifying Spirit—to give him the information necessary for a sinful being to find his way back into the fellowship and communion of his Creator and Lord. The mission of the primary prophets was to make this gospel communication, speaking in God's name and upon God's authority, and the mission of these secondary prophets (the preachers) is to tell over and over again to each generation the old story of God's purposes and plans and provisions for the restoration of banished sinners to his fellowship and love. In the heavenly consummation of this scheme of grace, the saints will no longer stand in need of the prophets' services, for they will then "see as they are seen, and know as they are known": once more like God, they will enjoy the beatific vision. But now and here, under these obscurations and perversions of sin and sinners, they need a gospel message, and the prophet is the divinely ordained bearer of that saving message.

III. Christ, the Prophet.—Throughout the Old Testament dispensation, God from time to time raised up prophets like Moses and Samuel, and David and Isaiah, and other greater and lesser men, whom he made the inspired organs of communicating his saving messages to this sinful world. But these were all but forerunners of the Angel of the Covenant, the Chief Messenger of them all. In the fullness of time, in the ripeness of the hour, God sent his only begotten Son into the world as the Prophet of Redemption. "This is

of a truth that Prophet that should come into the world" (Jno. 6:14). "Jesus of Nazareth, which was a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people" (Luke 24:19).

IV. **Characteristics.**—As a Prophet Christ is absolutely original and unique. His didactic attributes lift him to a topless mount of vision, whence he has an intuition of the whole mind of God and a perception of all the contents of space and time—a seership which is at once perfect and unapproachable.

1. He possessed the *consciousness* of God. He came out of the bosom of the Godhead, and "in him dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. 2:9). "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (Jno. 1:1). "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father), full of grace and truth" (Jno. 1:14). "His dear Son . . . who is the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:13,15). "The glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God" (2 Cor. 4:4). "I and my Father are one" (Jno. 10:30). Such utterances show the complete and intimate familiarity of the Message-bearer with the Message-sender: their minds coincide: this Prophet possesses the thought of God by virtue of the fact that he is Incarnate God. "No man knows the mind of the Father but the Son, and no one knows the Son but the Father" (Matt. 11:27). To all other prophets the prophecy must be revealed; but this Prophet apprehends the whole mind of God by *scientia visionis*, by direct and immediate intuition.

2. Christ was the *Revelation of God*. He was not simply the medium of that revelation as was Moses and other human prophets, but he was himself that revelation: the relation between the two, between Christ and the revelation, was the relation of absolute identity. If the gospel be translated into a person, that person would be Christ; and if Christ were transformed into a book, that book would be the gospel: Christ is the personal Word of God, and the gospel is the

impersonal Word of God. The Prophet and the Prophecy coincide. He was "the Word" (Jno. 1:1); he was "the Truth" (Jno. 14:6); "Wisdom" (Prov. 8); "the Light" (Jno. 1:4; 9:5; 1:9; Luke 2:32). "Christ in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Col. 2:3). Christ was not simply the bearer of God's message to a sinful world, but he was himself the very message: he was not merely the Preacher, but he was the Sermon itself; he was not only the Instrumentality of divine Revelation, but he was the concrete Illustration of that Revelation: he was not merely the Teacher, but he was the very Lesson itself; the relation between him and the Gospel is the relation of identity—he is the gospel. To preach the gospel is to preach Christ and to preach Christ is to preach the gospel. He was not only a Prophet, but he was also the Prophecy itself.

3. As a Prophet, Christ was *infallible*. He could not make a mistake in delivering the mind of God to this sinful world, because his mind was the mind of God; he could not blunder, because he himself was the message, and any utterance he might make, any deed he might perform, would be but an exponent of what he was. Human prophets like Isaiah (Isa. 6) were abashed in the presence of deity when receiving communications and commissions from him whose glory was insufferable: Moses veiled his face, and the people quaked at Sinai, and the earth trembled at the voice of the Lord; angels put their faces in the dust, and the cherubim throw their wings before their eyes; but Christ never shows the least trepidation or embarrassment of feeling in the presence of God. This remarkable phenomenon can be rationally accounted for only on the supposition that he was co-equal with the Father in his knowledge of the secrets of the adorable and unapproachable Trinity. "All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him" (Matt. 11:27). "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father" (Jno. 10:15). "Now we are sure that thou knowest

all things, and needest not that any man should ask thee: by this we believe that thou camest forth from God" (Jno. 16:30). "Lord, thou knowest all things" (Jno. 21:17). "He knew all men, and needed not that any should testify of man; for he knew what was in man" (Jno. 2:24, 25). "The word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father's which sent me" (Jno. 14:24). Thus do the Scriptures present Christ to the world as an omniscient and inerrant Prophet, who never bungles his message, but always sees truly and speaks correctly as the Spokesman for God.

4. As a Prophet Christ spake with *dogmatic authority*. He did not utter himself as a private person; he delivered himself as the official spokesman of deity; he did not argue; he asserted; he did not debate; he pronounced. Upon all questions of faith and duty he quietly, but firmly, assumed to himself the prerogative and the intelligence and the authority to speak with dogmatic positiveness and command acceptance and obedience upon the pain of eternal death. Above him there was no higher source of truth; beyond him there was no superior court of appeal. The last reason why anything was true was the fact that it rested upon his authority; the superlative reason why anything was right was the fact that he so declared. He promulgated a scheme of doctrine which rested upon no other basis than his word and he prescribed a course of conduct which was founded upon no other law but his will. "Verily, verily, I say unto you"—and that ends all debate, and settles all controversy. "Thus saith the Lord"—and man's highest privilege is to believe and his supremest duty is to obey. He must commit his present and eternal interests into the hands of this Prophet and believe that they will be cared for with efficiency and fidelity, simply upon his naked word. When he finished his matchless Sermon on the Mount, "the people were astonished at his doctrine: for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes" (Matt. 7:29). When he spake in the synagogue at Capernaum, "they were astonished at his doc-

trine: for he taught them as one that had authority, and not as the scribes" (Mark 1:22).

5. As a Prophet Christ was *supernaturally accredited*. He did not come before a world of rational and intelligent human beings, making the irrational and absurd demand upon them that they should receive him as an inspired, infallible and dogmatic authority upon all questions of faith and duty, without a shred of proof to support such a pretense and demand; but, on the contrary, recognizing that it is a law of mind that evidence is the measure of belief, he produced his credentials, and asked that he be accepted upon the ground that his credentials were sound and adequate to support his pretension. He was a Prophet "mighty in word and deed": his "deeds" stood related to his "words" as the proof stands related to the cause. Nicodemus said to him, "Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him" (Jno. 3:2). "Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing" (Jno. 9:32, 33). Jesus himself concurred in these judgments, for he said, "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works; that ye may know, and believe, that the Father is in me, and I in him" (Jno. 10:37, 38). "But I have greater witness than that of John; for the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me. And the Father himself, which hath sent me, hath borne witness of me" (Jno. 5:36). "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? the words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works. Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me: or else believe me for the very works sake" (Jno. 14:10, 11). "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sinned; but now hath they both seen and hated both me and the Father" (Jno. 15:24). Thus

this Prophet came into the world with miracles strung around his neck as the credentials of his supernatural commission and as constituting a competent and credible basis upon which men could stand and rationally and intelligently accept him and his teachings. Pretending to more than any other Prophet, he offered a higher testimony than any other: he felt the need of such superior proof, and he satisfied it.

V. **Mode.**—"Christ executeth the office of a prophet in revealing to the Church, in all ages, by his Spirit and word, the whole will of God in all things concerning edification and salvation" (*Larger Catechism*, Q. 43). As a Prophet Christ has employed two agencies in communicating his message as God's Spokesman to this world: (a) the Spirit and (b) the Bible. These two are related to each other as the power and the form—the power is the Spirit and the form is the Bible. To bring out this matter in larger detail, the prophetic life of Christ must be divided into four periods: (1) the Pre-incarnate Period, (2) the Incarnate Period, (3) the Post-incarnate Period, and (4) the Heavenly Period.

I. **Pre-incarnate Period.**—From the creation of the world to the advent of the Redeemer there were, dispersed throughout the Old Testament, sundry visions and dreams and visible manifestations of God, making communications to the world. These appearances of Jehovah to individuals before the flood, to the patriarchs and to Moses after the flood, to the prophets of the United Kingdom of Israel and to those of the divided kingdoms of Judah and Israel, were a true discharge of the prophetic office by the Mediator. They were harbingers of the incarnation, adumbrations of the clearer exercise of that office when he should stand upon the earth clothed in human flesh, anticipatory temporary manifestations of the Saviour: all Old Testament theophanies were but preliminary epiphanies. But throughout the Old Testament period Christ principally exercised his prophetic function not directly and personally, but indirectly through the agency of that class of religious persons who were well-known as "prophets." They

were his spokesmen, and the medium through whom he taught the mind of his Father. "The Spirit of Christ" was in these persons, "who prophesied of the grace that should come," and "who testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ" (1 Pet. 1:10-12). It was by this Spirit that Christ "preached unto those that were disobedient in the days of Noah;" and it was Noah who was "the preacher of righteousness" who was in that day employed as the vehicle of Christ's prophetical office; and as result of the rejection of that prophecy, so delivered by the Spirit through Noah, the ante-diluvian world was at the moment Peter wrote, and will be forever more, "spirits in prison" (1 Pet. 3:19, 20). During this period Christ exercised his prophetical office partly directly and personally, but chiefly indirectly and mediately through "the prophets," who had authority and significance only as they were his mouthpieces.

2. **Incarnate Period.**—In the fulness of time, when the Son of God became man, he exercised his prophetical function directly, teaching the will of God by the words of his own mouth, showing it by the deeds of his hands and illustrating it by his own example. To the "disciples" and the "apostles" and those who heard him teaching in the synagogues and by the seaside and in other places he delivered his divine messages with his own lips. He was then in his own person the "Counsellor" (Isa. 9:6); the "Witness" (Isa. 55:4); the "Interpreter" (Job 33:23); the "Apostle" (Heb. 3:1); the "Word" (Jno. 1:1); the "Truth" (Jno. 14:6); the "Light" (Jno. 1:4). "We know that thou art true, and teachest the way of God in truth" (Matt. 22:16). "Jesus went about Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the gospel" (Matt. 4:23). "I sat daily with you, teaching in the temple" (Matt. 26:55). But in all his prophesyings and teachings and preachings he was under the influence of that Spirit which descended upon him at his baptism, and abode upon him throughout all his earthly ministry, leading and directing him in all the exercise of his prophetical office. The especial peculiarity about this period was that he was both the teacher

and the incarnation and illustration of the lesson at the same time.

3. **Post-incarnate Period.**—After his ascension into glory, and session on the right hand of God, Christ continues to exercise his prophetic office: he is still teaching the world the will of God. He first employed certain apostles who were inspired by his Spirit and caused to write down God's communications to men with full and infallible accuracy. He then instituted a Church and entrusted to that Church this Revelation to be preserved in its integrity, and over this Church, with its precious treasure, he exercises a constant providential oversight and care. He also calls into his service ministers, whom he especially commissions to expound and teach the contents of this revelation to all mankind. From his throne in glory our Redeemer is exercising his prophetic function today not directly and personally, but by the ministry of his Church. "Go ye, and teach all nations" (Matt. 28:19, 20). "The Spirit of truth will guide you into all truth; he shall glorify me, for he shall take of mine and show it unto you" (Jno. 15:13, 14). Having ascended up into heaven after launching his Church, and being seated upon his mediatorial throne, the Mediator "gave some to be apostles, and some to be prophets, and some to be evangelists, and some to be pastors and teachers: for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ" (Eph. 4:11, 12). By his Spirit and word, through the instrumentality of the Church, is the mode in which the ascended and reigning Lord is today teaching the will of God to this world in the discharge of his prophetic office. None are now directly taught of Christ; none are directly taught of the Holy Ghost: the whole revelation is in the Bible: we may invoke the Spirit's illumination, but not his inspiration.

4. **Heavenly Period.**—Out before the Church is heaven and the state of perfect glory: there Christ is still the teacher of all the glorified saints, and will, to the end of eternity, be

their religious instructor and informant. No man will ever get independent of the instruction and guidance of his Saviour. But in heaven the people of God will be granted a heavenly vision, in which they will see much immediately which they get here only mediately and in some second-hand, though perfectly trustworthy, manner. The last stage in the exercise of the Lord's didactic office in behalf of his saints will be the granting to them of the "beatific vision," in which they "shall see him face to face," shall "see him as he is," "shall know even as they are known," when "faith shall be swallowed up in sight." "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is" (1 Jno. 3:2). "And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God: whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another" (Job. 19:26, 27). "Thou wilt show me the path of life: in thy presence is fulness of joy; at thy right hand there are pleasures for ever more" (Ps. 16:11). "Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God" (Matt. 5:8). "For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as I am known" (1 Cor. 13:12).

VI. **Product.**—The product of the prophetic office of Christ is technically called the *Gospel*, the evangel, the good news of salvation, that scheme of saving and sanctifying truth which is recorded in the sacred Scriptures.

The old contrast—*The Law* and *The Gospel*—is a valid distinction. The law was primarily revealed in the moral constitution of man, so that, at the first, he had but interpret his own conscience and follow the promptings of his own moral nature. The purpose of that law was to reveal human Duty; to give to man a Rule and Standard of moral conduct and behaviour. It was an adequate rule of life for man in innocency, for man as he was created. But the effect of the fall was to so upset his moral nature that he could not see

clearly his Duty and to leave him utterly without heart and disposition to do his Duty.

In the exercise of his prophetic function Christ republished this Moral Law, summarizing it in the Ten Commandments. The purpose of this republication was to show man his sin, to uncover to the human creature the wide chasm between the *is* and the *ought to be* of his life. It was a "schoolmaster to bring us to Christ." It was, therefore, prefatory to, propaedeutic of, the gospel. It was the moral promise, the moral situation, to which the gospel was to be addressed. It was the logical and natural introduction of the gospel.

The purpose of the Gospel is not to disclose human Duty and human Sin—that has been done by the Law. But the design of the Gospel is to show sinful men how they can yet become obedient to the Law and fulfill duty and destiny—not to void the Law, but to magnify it and make it honorable. The Gospel is remedial and corrective. The law is for innocent men; the Gospel is for sinful men. The Law is for capable persons; the gospel is for incapable persons. The law is for human beings predisposed to obedience; the Gospel is for men indisposed to obedience. "We are not under law, but under grace."

The chief end, then, of the prophetic office of Christ was to reveal the Gospel; the republication of the law by the Redeemer was to "prepare the case"—to show the appropriate "setting" for the Gospel.

CHAPTER XI.

Christ: The Priest

The Scriptures dogmatically declare that Christ was a Priest. "Consider the Apostle and High Priest of our profession, Christ Jesus" (Heb. 3:1). "Seeing then that we have a great high priest that is passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God" (Heb. 4:14). "Thou art a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec" (Heb. 5:6). "We have such a high priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens" (Heb. 8:1). "Christ being come an high priest of good things to come" (Heb. 9:11). "A high priest over the house of God" (Heb. 10:21). The entire Epistle to the Hebrews is a treatise upon, and an interpretation of, the priesthood of Christ; but in addition to the specific teachings of this particular book, priestly terms, as descriptive of one aspect of his work of mediation, are diffused everywhere throughout both the Old and the New Testaments, rendering it impossible for any one to deny the fact of his priesthood without tearing out of the Bible terms and phrases and figures which are interwoven in the very warp and woof of divine revelation. The language of the Old Testament is everywhere the language of the altar; the figure of the New Testament is everywhere the figure of the "Lamb slain." The priestly concepts are everywhere and throughout embroidered in the very texture of revelation.

I. Definition.—A priest is that minister of religion who offers worship through the medium of sacrifice. He must have an altar, a victim, and a ritual. The Apostle gives an ample definition of a priest in this language: "For every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins: who can have compassion on the ignorant, and on them that are out of the way; for that he himself also

is compassed with infirmities" (Heb. 5:1, 2). A priest then is, (a) taken from among men, (b) ordained for men in things pertaining to God, (c) that he may offer for sins, (d) with compassion for the wayward." "For every high priest is ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices; wherefore it is of necessity that this man have somewhat also to offer" (Heb. 8:3). "Wherefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people" (Heb. 2:17). "Every priest standeth daily ministering and offering oftentimes the sacrifices" (Heb. 10:11). *Generically* a priest is a minister of religion; but *specifically* he is that minister of religion who offers sacrifices for sin: this is his differentiating and definitive mark. A priest without a victim is an empty-handed minister of religion; a priest without an altar is a minister without the necessary tool of his office; a priest without a ritual is a minister of religion without a formula for his services. The peculiar, distinguishing, and segregating characteristic of the priest is his *sacrifice for sin*.

II. **Purpose.**—The function of the priest is distinctly different from the function of the prophet. There is a need for them both in any system of religion. The prophet is that intermediary through whom God declares his will to the world; the priest is that intermediary between God and man who atones for the offence of man, and renders him acceptable to God. Unfallen man stood in need of some sort of prophet, but, in addition, sinful man stands in need of a priest to make atonement for his offence. The need of a Prophet is grounded in human *ignorance*; the need of a Priest is grounded in human *sinfulness*; the need of a King is grounded in human *dependence*. The function of the priest, since the fact of sin is a cardinal fact of man's history, is chiefly and necessarily that of expiation and propitiation—the propitiation of the deity by expiating the offence committed. Since "every high priest is ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices, it is of necessity that Jesus Christ have somewhat to offer"

(Heb. 8:3). If man had remained holy and unfallen there would have been no place for a priest in his history: but now that he is estranged from God and morally offensive to his Maker, the superlative need of his soul is not, primarily, a doctrine but an atonement—a something which will extinguish his offence and reinstate him in the favour of his Maker. Something must be done for a sinner that will appease divine wrath and reconcile the offended deity. The purpose and office of the priest and the sacrifice in religion is piacular.

(1) From the dawn of sacred history, the first and everywhere prevailing mode of access and acceptability to God was through the priest and his sacrifice. Cain and Abel in the beginning of the race's history offered sacrifices to God—the one, fruits of his fields and the other, the firstling of his flock; God accepted the bloody offering and rejected the unbloody sacrifice. At the assuagement of the deluge, "Noah builded an altar unto the Lord; and took of every clean beast, and of every clean fowl, and offered burnt offerings on the altar. And Jehovah smelled a sweet savour" (Gen. 8:20). The first thing Abraham did on entering the land of Canaan was to "build an altar and call upon the name of the Lord" (Gen. 12:7, 8). The other patriarchs, and that isolated character known as Melchisedek, imitated his example. Job, a patriarch somewhere between the deluge and Abraham, as the head of his family "offered burnt offerings according to the number of them all" (Job. 1:5). Then the Mosaic dispensation had an elaborate sacrificial system for the expiation of the greater and lesser offences of the Israelite.

(2) That the sacrifice was a *poena vicaria* is proved by the ritual of the altar-service prescribed under the Mosaic economy. The essential parts in the formula for the bloody animal sacrifices were, (a) the presentation of some regulation victim at the altar by the worshipper, (b) the imposition of hands upon the victim, symbolically imputing to it the sin of the worshipper, (c) the slaughter of the sin-bearing victim, in token of the surrender of the worshipper's life for his offence against God (d) the disposition of the blood ac-

ording to the ritual so as to indicate that the blood of the victim had been accepted in lieu of the blood of the worshipper, and then (e) the burning of the flesh according to a prescription, to show that the whole offence had been typically wiped out and extinguished from the sight of God. The elaborate and minute Mosaic ritual becomes almost childish upon any other theory than the traditional view, namely, that it symbolically expiated the guilt of the offender and placated an angry deity. A prophet is necessary to teach the world the will of God, but a priest is required to atone for the sin of the world which has already offended against God.

(3) That the teleology of sacrifices as given is the true import of all such offerings is proved by a reference to all heathen religions. These heathen religions, however gross or however refined and elevated they may be, are but collapsed and perverted forms of the true religion which God primarily revealed to our fallen race: and all these heathen forms construe the deity as angry and in need of placation; and sacrifices and offerings are made, in all sorts of crude forms and with all sorts of absurd and superstitious and offensive rituals, for the purpose of appeasing his wrath and propitiating his favour. The blood of a thousand victims pouring from heathen basins and the countless ablutions made by heathen priests are but so many testimonies derived from the traditional history of the fallen race in proof of the proposition that the religion of sacrifice is the religion of a sinful world: man cannot think of approaching into the divine presence except he bring the blood of some atoning sacrifice with him. It is not the prophet, but the priest, which officiates at the altars of the earth, executing the ritual of atonement victims, real and effective or imaginary and worthless, for the purpose for which they are bound to the horns of the altar and have their life-blood drawn from their veins. All these things but point to Jesus who was at once the High Priest and the Victim of the true religion of salvation: the Mosaic system being a true and correct typification of this

saving sacrifice of Christ and all the heathen abortions and abominations being vain and despairing illustrations of the world's crying need of the true sacrifices of Christ and of its silly, pitiful and monstrosly absurd efforts to find him whom their souls need without the guidance of divine revelation. Revelation teaches and the frantic efforts of a foolish heathendom teach that the only effective religion for a *sinful* man is the religion of the priest and the sacrifice.

(4) That the priestly oblation is a genuine *poena vicaria*—a substituted penalty, designed to satisfy offended holiness, and reset the offender in the divine favour by expiating his transgression—is further proved by the utter inadequacy of all other theories of explanation which have been advanced. Strenuous effort has been made, with all the adroitness of special pleading and with all the skill of expert learning, to give another significance to sacrifices in order to eliminate the argument for the “blood theology” which lies in the bosom of this interpretation of these religious offerings: the inference from this interpretation, the peculiar Calvinistic theory of the atonement which it yields logically and necessarily, is the cause of this zeal to find some other than the traditional piacular nature of the religious sacrifice. They have been called “fines” imposed upon offenders; “gifts” made to God in recognition of his pardoning kindness; “feasts” made in honor of the lovingkindness of God; “symbols” of renewed profession of obedience made under the sense of restoration to the divine favour; “expressions of gratitude” for the special and general benefactions of God upon the whole life of the offerer; “types” of the fellowship restored between God and the offender; “metaphors” borrowed from the heathen and the Jews as convenient and familiar terms in which to set forth religious ideas;—anything and everything, to avoid the idea that these sacrifices imply the idea of the expiation of guilt and the placation of deity. But none of these conceptions can account for the fact that the effective and acceptable sacrifice was a *bloody*

offering. Why *bloody* the fine, the feast, the symbol, the type, the metaphor? Grant for one swift moment the biblical doctrine that "without shedding of blood there is no remission," and at once the reason for the bloody sacrifice becomes patent. Why must the fine, the feast, the symbol, the type, the metaphor, or the what-not, be provided always by a *priest*? Why could not any other minister of religion serve just as appropriately? The attempts to void the historic meaning and purpose of religious sacrifices are obviously but evasions; they are the *poena vicaria* which release the original from his obligation to bear the penalty in his own conscious person.

(5) The gospel throws the accent upon the *priestly mediation* of Christ, with such varying modes and with such persistent force as to preclude the reduction of this phase of his saving work to any secondary or subordinate place in the scheme of religion which it interprets. The terminology of the altar abounds throughout the gospel and its most familiar expressions are borrowed from the ritual of sacrifice: there must be some basis for the figures, some profound reason for these special symbols. (a) One group of passages throw the emphasis upon his sacrificial blood: "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us" (Heb. 9:12). (b) Another group represent him as the Lamb which was slain and offered on the altar: "Behold, the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world" (Jno. 1:29). (c) Another group represent him as the propitiation of God: "And he is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world" (1 Jno. 2:2). (e) Another group represent him in sacrificing himself as distinctly acting as a substitute for his people: "The good shepherd layeth down his life for the sheep" (Jno. 10:11). These and similar texts forbid all attempts to explain away the expiatory character of that priestly sacrifice which Christ made of himself in the

redemption of sinners. His case alone would prove that the sacrifice of the priest at the altar is of the nature of a *poena vicaria*.

III. **Necessity.**—There is something which makes the priest and his atoning sacrifice an absolute necessity in the Christian system in order thereby to save a sinner. The sacrifice of the Son by the Father is the sublimest sacrifice in the annals of time or records of eternity: when God “spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all” there was nothing more nor greater which he could sacrifice in order to save his transgressing creature: it would be most painfully irrelevant, an ugly reflection upon his fatherly affection, if that sacrifice were anything less than absolutely necessary in order to obtain the end proposed: if divine wisdom could have devised, if divine power could have executed, any other scheme capable of achieving the end designed, every consideration rises up to demand that such a substitute plan be adopted in order to spare the Father the sacrifice of his only begotten and well beloved Son. It would be shocking to think that it was done by the execution of his own Son, when it might have been done in some other mode. “If righteousness came by the law, then Christ is dead in vain” (Gal. 2:21). The sacrifice of Christ is misplaced, is to all intents and purposes in vain, if any other means could have attained the redemptive end. “If a law had been given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law” (Gal. 3:21). If salvation could have been in any other way, it would have been in that other way: it was by the sacrifice of Christ for the reason that it could not be achieved in any other mode. What is all this but the assertion of the deep and indispensable necessity for the priest and his sacrifice in order to save guilty men? And where is the ground of this awful necessity? Not in the exigencies of government, not in the moral condition of the sinner, but in the essential nature of God.

(1) Holiness is the dynamic center of the divine character, the *fons et origo* of all God’s life and activity; sin is

the moral opposite of holiness and antagonizes God at the very center of his moral being: before he could receive a being affected with such a moral malady into his bosom and fellowship and life, without self-contamination and debasement: the sinful creature must be purged of his sinfulness: sacrificial blood, as it secures the grace of the Holy Spirit, is the only expurgating element, the only abstrurgent which can effectively reach and remove the offensive and repulsive moral malady; hence the necessity of a priestly sacrifice grounded upon that holiness which is central and determinative of all God's life: in dealing with sin and the sinner, the divine sense of purity must be preserved. "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin" (1 Jno. 1:7).

(2) Justice is God's sense of righteousness, his conscience: sin is wrong, and puts the creature affected by it in opposition to the divine sense of righteousness: it ought to be punished, it deserves to be punished: not to punish it is to do wrong, is to be sinful and expose the person so overlooking it to just censure and render him truly liable in his own person for the punishment which he would not inflict upon the sinner who deserved it: the divine sense of what is right and proper, the eternal and spontaneous and necessary deliverances of the divine conscience, cannot be satisfied except the thing which ought to be done be done, except the deserved penalty be inflicted: the only possible mode of ethical relief for the divine conscience is the infliction of the *poena vicaria*; if the matter cannot be reached in this mode it cannot be reached at all: nothing but the sacrificial blood of Christ as the Lamb of God can satisfy the divine conscience and enable God to dismiss a guilty sinner out of his court with his benediction and love, and yet keep within his bosom a "good conscience, void of offence." The necessity for the priest and his sacrifice is grounded in the very conscience of God, that moral sense which renders it impossible for him to do the thing which ought not to be done, which makes him the immutable standard of rectitude. "Jesus Christ . . . in whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgive-

ness of sins, according to the riches of his grace" (Eph. 1:7). "How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" (Heb. 9:14). "With the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot" (1 Pet. 1:19).

(3) God is a true Being; every expression of himself conforms to fact with perfect precision and exactitude; he never over-expresses himself; he never under-expresses himself; he never misrepresents in any matter nor to the minutest degree; to proclaim a guilty sinner just, when as a matter of fact he is unjust, would be to perpetrate a falsehood; to treat one who deserves condemnation and expulsion from his presence as his beloved, would be to be untrue, to make an incorrect representation of himself; to justify the ungodly, as God does do, in consistency with his own truth and frankness and transparency of moral character, demands some expiation of the guilt, some *poena vicaria*, which shall truly and fully and honorably satisfy his spoken word and that love of truth which lies deeper than any mere expression of it in words. Were he to overlook sin as a governmental expediency; were he to pass it by with a mere moral reprimand; were he to use it merely as an occasion for pointing a moral lesson to this world; were he to deal with it upon the grounds of mere expediency and pardon it without atonement; he would not be true to himself nor true to the moral universe whose ideals find their eternal norms and standards in him. The necessity for an expiatory priest and sacrifice is grounded in God's immanent and necessary love of the truth: he is an honest God, and cannot perpetrate the semblance of a fraud. "God . . . which keepeth truth for ever" (Ps. 146:6). "As God is true" (2 Cor. 1:18). "O Lord, holy and true" (Rev. 6:10).

(4) As a God of love he must administer penalty, where deserved, in the interest of happiness, for love is the impulse to bless: but sin brings misery, even by the force of its own gravitation and when it is not thought of as a punitive inflic-

tion; the race would be more wretched in the absence of all penalty, in the non-infliction of judicial censures upon evil-doers, than it is in the rigid enforcement of law and good behaviour by the imposition of due and proper penalties for offences committed; the only ground for the surrender of penalty and the omission of the suffering due for transgression which even the divine goodness could suggest, must be found in some vicarious measure which would adequately and truly protect human happiness and welfare: not to punish evil is to doom the world to wretchedness, as the non-infliction of penalties in the State upon criminals would wreck all civic peace and happiness; the very goodness of God demands, in case the penalty be non-imputed to the sinner, some *poena vicaria* shall be employed as the justifying reason. "God is love; and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him" (1 Jno. 4:16).

The love of holiness—the love of righteousness—the love of truth—the love of goodness; these are four normative motives of the divine heart, the central principles of God's moral life. It is the love of holiness which gives him infinite self-respect and makes him the standard of all virtue; consequently he must hate and smite all that opposes itself to him as unworthy. It is his love of righteousness which immanently causes "the judge of all the earth to do right" and insures the world that God can do no wrong, consequently the transgressor must suffer the punishment due to him for his sin. It is his love of truth which makes him invariably express himself fully and accurately, judging things as they are and treating them always as they ought to be; consequently he feels truly towards sin and inflicts it as it ought to be, in order to be true to himself. It is his love of goodness which makes him concerned in the happiness of himself and his created universe and guarantees that he will always do the thing which will promote true happiness; consequently this very love of goodness necessitates his punishment of the wicked, in order that the suffering which ought to be inflicted may be so inflicted as to prevent the misery which ought not to come

upon his creatures or upon himself. The atoning priest and expiatory sacrifice, in a scheme of salvation provided for sinful men, are thus made necessary by (1) God's love of holiness, (2) his love of justice, (3) his love of truth, (4) his love of goodness. If there be any salvation, it is possible only by the infliction of some *poena vicaria* which adequately and truly satisfies these eternal and immanent affections of the divine nature. They cannot be ignored. They cannot be slighted. They cannot be cheated. It would be an outrage upon Deity, a cruelty to his creatures, to throttle them in any way. It would violate the essential nature of God. To save, the priest must atone for the sin, the sacrifice must expiate the guilt. The prophet may declare, but the priest must placate the holy, the ethical, the truthful, the loving nature of God; otherwise there can be no redemption.

IV. **The Only Priest.**—The onliness of the priesthood of Christ follows directly from its nature and necessity; he alone can take into the sinner's place of Jehovah's slaughter an acceptable Victim, and there in the court of atoning blood perform upon it the ritual of the saving sacrifice. The Melchisedecan, or Patriarchal, priesthood, and the Aaronic, or Mosaic, priesthood, were but prefigurations of the priesthood of Christ, drawing all their significance and efficacy from the sacrifice on the cross; otherwise, except as types of that better sacrifice, they had been but the impotent slaughter of animals, attended by the vainest of ceremonials. As the tabernacle was but a provisional temple, made necessary by the exigencies of the sojourn of Israel in the wilderness, prior to the time when the permanent house could be built according to the pattern shown to Moses in the Mount; so the Patriarchal and Mosaic priesthoods were temporary expedients, anticipatory of the priesthood of Christ and drawing all their prerogatives and power from him by a reach forward to his incarnation; they were but the shadows of which he was the reality; the blood of bulls and goats could not take away sin; they were effective only as faith looked through and beyond them to the Priest and the Lamb of Calvary. "Into the second went

the high priest alone once every year, not without blood, which he offered for himself, and for the errors of the people; the Holy Ghost this signifying, that the way into the holiest of all was not yet made manifest, while as the first tabernacle was yet standing, which was a figure for the time then present, in which were offered both gifts and sacrifices, that could not make him that did the service perfect, as pertaining to the conscience, which stood only in meats and drinks, and divers washings, and carnal ordinances, imposed on them until the time of reformation. But Christ being come an high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands; that is to say, not of this building; neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. For if the bloods of bulls and goats, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your consciences from dead works to serve the living God? And for this cause he is the mediator of the new testament, that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament, they which were called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance. . . . And almost all things are by the law purged with blood, and without shedding of blood is no remission. It was therefore necessary that the pattern of things in the heavens should be purified with these; but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true; but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us; nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high priest entereth into the holy place every year with the blood of others; for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world; but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. And as it is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment; so Christ

was once offered to bear the sins of many; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation" (Heb. 9:7-28).

Look over this long quotation and mark the points which it makes concerning the onliness of the priesthood of the Redeemer:

(1) All the priests of the Patriarchal and Jewish dispensations which preceded him were not real priests but only "figures" of him which was to come.

(2) All the victims that were slain on ancient altars were not effective in themselves but derived all their efficacy as types of that sacrifice which was "better" than they.

(3) There was no need, as there could be no repetition, of the priestly ministrations of human types and figures, for "Christ was once offered to put away sin," and that was the *finale* of the sacerdotal service of the religion of the Redeemer.

All human priests are now usurpers of the function; empty handed, they have no victim to slaughter; without an altar, they can only officiate by the side of their own handiwork; without a ritual, they can only put on the priest's frock and mumble an unintelligible jargon; without divine ordination, they thrust themselves into the priest's office, as useless as they are offensive. As a Prophet Christ has no successor in the publication of the will of God to men; and as a Priest he has no successor to his vestments and his service; for, like Melchisedek, king of Salem and priest of the most high God, the Redeemer is "without father, without mother, having neither beginning of days, nor end of life," having neither predecessor nor successor, in the priest's office—he abideth a priest after the order of Melchisedek for ever, the first and the last and the only occupant of the priest's office in the house of God.

V. **Mode.**—"Christ executeth the office of a priest, in his once offering up of himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice, and reconcile us to God, and in making continual intercession

for us." To satisfy the divine justice in its claims upon sinners; to reconcile offenders to God; to create a ground upon which continual intercession for sinners may be based; this Priest offered himself upon the altar of sacrifice. The Priest and the Victim coincided in the same person. As the High Priest of the Christian religion, clad in the sacerdotal vestments of his office, he led himself as a Lamb into the outer court of this world, the bloody place of sacrificial slaughter; laid his hand upon his own devoted head, confessing thereupon the sins of those for whom he officiated, thus making himself their scape-goat and vicarious sin-bearer; then he drew forth the sacrificial knife, amid the astonished gaze of the angelic hosts gathered as spectators of the scene upon the battlements of high heaven, who veiled their faces in the flash of the blade, while the stars stood back out of the sweep of his arm, and sheathed it in his own heart, pouring out his own life in lieu of the justly forfeited life of the human offerer; he bound his human nature to the horns of the altar which had been kindled with the fires of the divine wrath against sin, that it might be consumed to ashes with the sins of his people; he caught the precious blood in the basin, and passed into the holy place of the heavenly sanctuary, and pushing aside the veil of partition went into the shekinah of God's presence and sprinkled the blood upon the ark and upon the mercy-seat and upon all the floor round about as the evidence of his fulfilment of his mediatorial engagement; and then returned to the threshold of the sanctuary with absolution and benediction for all for whom he made the sacrifice. The Old Testament ritual and the Epistle to the Hebrews justify this imagery. "He made himself an offering for sin." As a priest, he laid down his life as a sacrifice for sinners; no man took it from him; he laid it down himself as a voluntary offering; none dragged him to the altar and place of slaughter; he came of his own accord and freely laid down his own precious life: he was the priest and the victim in the same person, in the same moment, in the same service.

It was the sublimest act of worship in the annals of time

or records of eternity! As a priest Christ, clad in priestly robes and carrying sacrificial implements in his hand, stands beside the altar of God, ready to lay an offering thereon: with that conception of the divine holiness and justice which filled his mind, with that sense of profound respect and reverence for God which characterized his spirit, with that awful devotion and religious fervor which swelled his bosom in that tense priestly moment, with his perception and estimate of the exceeding sinfulness of the sin for which he is about to offer, with a mind fully understanding and with a heart fully appreciating the meaning and solemnity of the crucial moment, what victim does devout priestly instinct permit him to lay upon the altar as a worthy offering to his God? Shall the expression of his religion as he stands at the altar-base be made with the slaughter of thousands of rams or in the libation of ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall he climb the altar-stairs bearing to death in his arms the first-born among the sons of men or the tallest archangel that treads the gorgeous mosaic of the skies? What offering shall the Son of God, who came out from the bosom of God and who understands God and appreciates and reverences and respects and loves and adores God—what offering shall this priest make which he shall deem worthy of his Father's acceptance and upon which he can stand and base all his intercessions? This priest, in his quest for something worthy to bind upon the altar of his Father, climbed in through the window in to the holy circle of the Godhead and laid his sacerdotal hand upon the second person of that Trinitarian household, the only begotten and well-beloved Son of God, and sacrificed him as a victim worthy to be laid on the altar of God! Did ever devotion and piety go beyond that which was exhibited on Calvary, when the Son of God, acting as a priest at his Father's altar, offered himself as a sacrifice to placate his Father's wrath and ransom his Father's people? "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I might take it again" (Jno. 10:17). The transaction on Calvary's top was the climax of priestly worship!

That the innocent should suffer for the guilty, that even the animal which did no harm should, under the typical system, be required to bleed and die to exculpate the human being who did do the wrong; that the place of Jehovah's worship be a place of slaughter and blood and death; has ever appeared, more or less, harsh and shocking to human sensibilities: it is next to impossible to prevent the human mind from reflecting upon the character of the God who makes such inexorable demands even in the name of the nakedest justice. Theologians are accustomed to seek for relief from this repulsive aspect of the gospel system by drawing attention to the fact that the substitute which gets in the place of the guilty must bear all the judicial and moral consequences of his position, however shocking and repulsive to the sensibilities of the beholder: it is but violated law collecting its due out of the voluntary substitute, and the *poena vicaria* can be no more attractive to the aesthetic sensibilities than the *poena persona*. If the disclosures of revelation stopped here; if the death of Christ were represented as the bare result of his legal substitution in the place of the guilty sinner; then we would have, by the sheer force of divine revelation, to believe that it came about solely by the operation of naked justice, that it was a death inflicted by law, exacted of him as a substitute just as it would have been exacted of the original criminal. Faith could so receive it, and our corrected sense of justice could approve it, while the heart smothered its own cry and the face turns away from the scene.

But there is something which keeps the Christian from bleeding internally as he looks upon his innocent Lord hanging in agony on the tree: what is it that keeps him from swooning at the horror? What is it that makes the spectacle the most charming sight to his soul in all the range of vision? What is it that makes him stand in the presence of that terrible tragedy, from which the moon hid her face and the earth rent its bowels, and sing songs and shout hallelujahs? Is it because he is the beneficiary of the scene? Does his selfishness so assert itself at the cross that he can joy and rejoice in

the death of the guiltless Redeemer? Why, any natural man would profoundly sympathise with and deplore the sufferings and death of his friend even though he himself became an enormous beneficiary of those sufferings and death. Is the Christian so unnatural, so beastly, as to drown his sympathies in the sense of his gain? If so it is a terrible *expose* of the selfishness of the creature which is born again and made a new creature in Christ Jesus. There must be some other, some more consistent reason, why the beneficiary of the cross can be complacent in the contemplation of the Saviour while the woes of wrath are being poured out upon him. The cause is not only mitigated but absolutely cleared by reflecting that Christ died not merely as a legal substitute under the operation of justice but that in dying "he made his soul an offering for sin." In it all he was a priest performing a religious rite upon himself, engaged in performing a sublime act of worship, an heroic and exalted act of pious devotion at the altar of the God he loved and adored, conscious that he was doing the very thing which would make his Father love him and crown him. He was not forcibly crucified: he voluntarily, as a priest, went to the altar, and in the sublimity of his devotion and in the intensity of his religion laid himself as offering upon the altar of God, doing the thing which delighted him most, making the highest expression of his religious devotion and fervor. "Therefore doth my Father love me." He was not a simple legal substitute dying under broken law for the original sinners; he was a *priestly* substitute, officiating at the altar of God in sublimest worship.

Thornwell eloquently emphasises this point. He tells us that the Epistle to the Romans shows us *what* Christ did to save his people—died in their room and stead; while the Epistle to the Hebrews informs us *how* he did what he did—died on the altar at his own hands as an offering made by himself as the High Priest of our religion. He laments that the full force of this truth is too seldom felt by the Christian mind.

"When we contemplate the death of Christ as simply the death of a substitute, we see it in nothing more than the full

satisfaction to the claim of justice. The sponsor pays the debt, and pays it cheerfully; the legal representative endures the curse which others had incurred, and falls beneath the sword which the guilt of others had drawn from its scabbard. It is a transaction of law and government, the infliction of a judicial sentence. Though it is implied that the substitute approves the equity of the law under which he suffers, and is prepared to vindicate the divine conduct from the charge of unreasonable rigour,—though the justice of the whole transaction is assumed, yet when it is represented simply as the operation of justice, much of its moral grandeur and impressiveness is lost. We see in the substitute a victim to his own generosity, and considering him exclusively in this light, there are probably few men who have not had occasion to fortify their minds against a momentary impression of unrelenting severity when regarding those awful attributes of God which make atonement the exclusive channel of mercy to the guilty. We must go beyond the event to its principle before we can be at ease when we survey the sufferings of Jesus of Nazareth. He is felt to be a passive victim of Divine wrath. He bares His bosom to the stroke, He receives the storm which beats in violence and fury: He simply, in other words, stands and endures, while God, and God in His most terrible forms of manifestation, is the sole agent in the case.

“Widely different is the impression which is made when the transaction is contemplated in its true light. There is no room for the remotest suspicion of inexorable rigour when Jesus is seen to be a priest, His death a sacrifice, and the whole transaction an august and glorious act of worship. The position of Jesus is sublime when, standing before the altar, He confesses the guilt of His brethren, adores the justice which dooms them to woe, and almost exacts from God as the condition of His own love that justice should not slacken nor abate. The prayer of confession, that assumption of guilt, that clear acknowledgement of what truth and righteousness demand, make us feel that God *must* strike, that the edict must go forth, Awake, O sword, against my shepherd and the

man that is my fellow, saith the Lord of Hosts. Still sublimer is His position when with profound adoration of the Divine character, by His own proper act, His own spontaneous movement, He lays His life upon the altar, virtually saying, Take it, it ought to be taken; let the fire of justice consume it; better, ten thousand times better, that this should be than the throne of the Eternal should be tarnished by an effeminate pity! We feel that death is not so much a penalty inflicted as an offering accepted. We feel that God is glorious, that the law is glorious in the whole transaction, because Christ glorifies them. He lays down His life of Himself; it is His own choice to die rather than that men should perish or the Divine government be insulted with impunity; and although in accepting the offering Justice inflicted upon Him the full penalty of the law, although the fire which consumed the victim was the curse in its whole extent, yet it was an act of worship to provide it, and especially as that victim was Himself, every groan and pang, every exclamation of agony, amazement and horror, was an homage to God which, in itself considered, the Priest felt it glorious to render. And if Jesus in all the extremity of His passion proclaimed to the universe what from the nature of priesthood He must have proclaimed, that the whole transaction was a ground on which God was adored by Him, and ought to be adored by all, that His Father was never dearer, never more truly God in His sight, than when He accepted the sacrifice of Himself, the sublimity of the principles involved, and the interest of Jesus in them, are a perfect vindication from every illiberal suspicion. There is something, to our minds, inexpressibly sublime when we contemplate the scheme of redemption as accomplished by an act of worship—when we look upon Jesus not as a passive recipient of woes, the unresisting victim of law, but as a minister of religion, conducting its services in the presence of angels and men, upon an emergency which seemed to cover the earth with darkness. Our world becomes the outer court of the sanctuary, where a sacrifice is to be offered in which the Priest and the Victim are alike the wonder of the universe—

in which the worship rendered leaves it doubtful whether the Deity is more glorious in His justice or His grace. In this aspect the satisfaction of Jesus is not merely the ground upon which others are at liberty to approach and adore the Divine perfections, it is itself a prayer uttered by the lips of one whose deeds were words—a hymn of praise chanted by Him whose songs were the inspiration of holiness and truth. Every proud imagination is rebuked, every insinuation against the character of God is felt to be a shame to us, every disposition to cavil or condemn is consigned to infamy, when we remember that the whole work of Jesus was a solemn service of religion, as well that by which He descended into the grave as that by which He passed through the heavens into the holiest of all. He was a priest in His death, a priest in His resurrection, a priest in His ascension. He worshiped God in laying His life upon the altar, He worshiped Him in taking it again, and it was an act of worship by which He entered with His blood into the very presence of the Highest to intercede for the saints. It was religion in Jesus to die, to rise, to reign, as it is religion in us to believe in these great events of His history.”—*Collected Writings, Vol. II., p. 278.*

This sublime and biblical conception of the death of Christ relieves it of all apparent ruthlessness and severity by transforming it into the highest form of priestly worship. He died, not as the felon dies who perishes in the merciless grasp of broken law, which cannot stay its afflictive hand until it has crushed the life out of the criminal; he died, not as the unfortunate dies who, coming too near the revolving wheels of this world's machinery, is caught by bands and pulleys and cruelly torn asunder; he died, not as the invalid dies whose life-tides run out gradually until the beach is dry; but he died as the sacrificial lamb dies, upon whose devoted head is laid the sin of the worshipper and then is sacredly bound upon the altar; he died as only Christ could die, himself the sin-bearing Victim ready for the sacrifice and himself the Priest who sacredly offers himself upon the altar as the sublimest expression which the filial piety of a devoted Son could make to

the Father whom he loved and adored. No wonder the holiest angel puts his golden wings before his face when he compares his loftiest act of devotion to that worship which was rendered on Calvary by him who was prevented by the nails in his hands from clasping the heart which was breaking in filial love and devotion for his adorable Father! No wonder the sacramental host can gather around the base of Golgotha, with uncovered head and unshod foot, moved, not by the selfish profit which accrues to the saints out of all that awful tragedy of suffering and death, but with transfigured wonder and admiration at such a spectacle of affection and reverence and loyalty and devotion to God, the mighty Maker and Judge of us all! No wonder the devil, and all the enemies of God, groaned in defeat and despair when they saw him whom they had sought to traduce and alienate from the service of the Deity, in that last consummate act of piety offering up his life to God as a testimony of his love and devotion! No wonder death and the grave could not hold him in their dominion, for the almighty arms of his heavenly Father stretched down for him, who as a priest had offered himself in the loftiness of his adoration and in the exuberance of his piety, that he might send up to heaven a savour which would be fragrant in the nostrils of his Father! No wonder Jehovah acclaimed him the "Saviour of the world!" No wonder he said, "Let all the angels of God worship him!" No wonder he cried out from his seat on the flaming circles of the heavens, "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased!" "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I might take it again."

If the world could see the death of Christ in this light; if they could see the grandeur and glory of this self-immolation out of sheer love for his Father and devotion to his person and his honor; if those who cavil at the "theology of blood" and condemn what they call the "theology of the shambles" and the "religion of the slaughter pen," could grasp the doctrine of the priesthood of Christ and catch some faint glimpse of that religious fervor and devotion which led him to

offer up himself to God; they would see the utter poverty and inadequacy of those views which can find in the death of Christ nothing but a martyrdom to truth, or the accident of a good man becoming involved in the miseries of this life, or a mere stroke of divine statecraft to preserve the throne and dominion of God on the earth. "Therefore doth my Father love me": therefore, much more, infinitely more, the sinful and miserable worms of this world ought to pay him homage, and pray to be bathed in his sacrificial blood.

VI. Departments.—There are two distinct departments in the priestly work of Christ: (1) Atonement and (2) Intercession.

1. Atonement is a technicality for that aspect of the sacrifice of Christ by which he expiates the guilt of sin and propitiates God: as a result God and the beneficiary of the atonement are reconciled to each other. The work of the atonement is just the work of reconciliation: it treats of that thing which Christ has done to restore the favour of God to those whom the Redeemer represented when he laid their sins on the head of himself as the Lamb and then offered himself on the altar of God.

2. Intercession is that other technicality for the second half of the priestly work of Christ which consists in his appearing before God as an advocate and pleading the cause of his people, using his bloody sacrifice as the argument with which he urges their cause, which is also his cause. "Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world" (Jno. 17:24). When the priest presented the blood, he plead for the benefits for the worshipper upon the ground of what he brought before God in the priestly basin. In intercession Christ seeks for the fruits of his sacrifice in the conversion and sanctification and glorification of all the saints.

CHAPTER XII.

The Atonement: Its Necessity

A Summary Statement.

The Presbyterian believes that the Atonement is the most fundamental doctrine of the Gospel. As he understands it, there is a moral obstacle in the mind of God in the way of an unconditional pardon and restoration of the offending sinner. Then as he understands the case, the sinner is at enmity against God, and does not desire to be reconciled to him. If, therefore, the mediation of Christ is to be effective he must do two things: (1) propitiate God, and (2) placate man. The necessity of the Atonement is grounded, first in the moral nature of God, and second in the moral nature of man.

1. If we take the shoes off of our feet, and with the Scriptures in our hands we go into the nature of God, we can see five reasons why the Deity cannot unconditionally pardon the offending sinner.

(1) His *truth*. He has solemnly said, "The soul that sinneth it shall die.' In any scheme of reconciliation his veracity must be taken care of. Truth is a fundamental moral virtue.

(2) His *justice*. "The Judge of all the earth must do right," and give reward to whom reward is due, and punishment to whom punishment is due. Justice is also a fundamental moral attribute of character. Without a sense of righteousness, the Divine Being would be morally incompetent for the throne of the universe.

(3) His *holiness*. The Scriptures abundantly portray the Deity as morally clean, and pure, and uncontaminated. He cannot take an impure being to his heart without sullyng his own virtue.

(4) His *government*. God is not a private person, with only his own personal concerns to consider. He is the Governor and Ruler of the universe. If he pardons without adequate reasons; if he deals with transgression in a feeble and namby-pamby manner; he would put a premium upon disobedience and jeopardize his whole administration.

(5) His *word*. If these reasons do not satisfy, the Scriptures plainly tell us that "without shedding of blood is no remission." The offending subject must accept the declaration of his sovereign, whether it looks reasonable to him or not.

For these reasons the Presbyterian believes that any scheme of redemption must propitiate the Divine Being—must genuinely and truly satisfy the moral nature of God, so that he could feel that he was doing himself no wrong in forgiving and restoring the sinner. He cannot sacrifice his moral self-respect to save an offender.

2. But if only God be propitiated and nothing be done to placate the sinner, the Presbyterian believes that reconciliation would be an entirely one-sided affair. So it is the task of Christ also to change the attitude and Spirit of man towards God. The human *mind* must be changed, so that man shall entertain different opinions about his God and Ruler. The human *heart* must be changed, so that the sinner can feel differently towards his Maker. The human *conscience* must be changed, so that the moralizings of the human being shall be different. And the human *will* must be changed, so that there shall be a different course of conduct of the subject of the divine government. To effect such a revolution in the human being the Presbyterian believes that Christ by his Atonement purchased the Holy Spirit's grace, by which the mind, heart, conscience, will and conduct of the sinner duplicates that which was in Christ Jesus.

CHAPTER XIII.

The Atonement : The Theory of Satisfaction

Atonement is an English formation from *at-one-ment*. It connotes that work which Christ has done in reconciling God and his people—the thing which Christ has done in order to bring God and his estranged people into a state of *at-one-ment*.

It occurs in the Old Testament, but it is not a New Testament technicality. That, however, constitutes no valid ground of criticism, for a sound bibliologist had just as soon have a term from one Testament as from the other, inasmuch as he regards both as co-ordinate parts of divine revelation, of equal dogmatic value. The term is not the historic technicality for the saving work of Christ and is of relatively modern origin. It is not a happy appellation for the reason that while it signifies the fact that Christ did something which brought God and his people into a state of at-one-ment with each other the technicality does not itself hint anything as to the nature of the reconciling work which Christ did perform for this purpose. It would manifestly have been better, and a distinct advantage, had such a technicality been chosen which would have indicated not only the fact but also the mode of the fact. How did Christ reconcile the estranged people of God to their Maker? This term throws not a shred of light upon this point; it goes no further than assert the fact of the reconciliation. But the term has come into general use, because of its colorlessness, and it is a waste of time to attempt to expel it from the theological vocabulary. We had as well admit it, and then set to work to lay the various theories as to the nature of the atonement by the side of each other with a view to showing which one truly and correctly represents the biblical mode of the Redeemer's saving work.

Different theological writers enumerate a large number of theories of the atonement; but I am of the opinion that they can all be reduced to four ground forms: (1) The Satisfaction Theory; (2) The Moral Influence Theory; (3) The Governmental Theory; (4) The Mystical Theory. The exposition and criticism of these four leading theories of the atonement of Christ will result in a complete exhibition of the saving work of the Redeemer.

I. The Theory of Satisfaction.

This particular explanation of the mode in which Christ saves his people holds a prominent place in soteriology. Its advocates freely call it the catholic doctrine, and claim for it that it has been the prevailing view among evangelical theologians throughout the entire history of dogmatics. It is referred to in doctrinal histories as the Pauline, the Augustine, the Anselmic, the Calvinistic, the Reformed, interpretation of the saving work of Christ. It has found its central place and full expression in the "Federal Theology." It is stated in the Westminster Confession of Faith in these words: "The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he, through the eternal Spirit, once offered unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father, and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven for all those whom the Father had given unto him." In this statement the thing to be satisfied was "the justice of his Father"; the result of satisfying that justice was the purchase of "reconciliation and an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven," and the means of thus satisfying the justice of his Father with the saving results mentioned was his "obedience and sacrifice of himself," and the beneficiaries of the satisfaction were "all those whom the Father had given unto him." With this statement all the Reformed creeds agree. But the fundamental nature of the subject and the elaborate debate which was waged furiously about it demand a careful and articulate statement of the essential points in this conception of Christ's saving work.

I. The accent is thrown, first of all, upon the idea of *satisfaction*. The being who has been offended, and who needs to be satisfied, is God; and that in God which must be satisfied is his sense of justice, his ethical idea of righteousness, and that which satisfies this idea of justice is the sacrificial and penal death of the Lord Jesus. To appease the moral wrath of God, and satisfy his moral sense of justice, the sinner must die a penal death, or the Redeemer must die a penal death in his room and stead. It is the attitude of the divine being towards the sinner which makes it necessary that Christ, if he is to save the offender, die a penal death.

But Grotius excogitated, and the Remonstrants and high Arminians adopted, a scheme for a fictitious satisfaction of the divine sense of justice. It was called the *acceptilatio* theory. It was held that Christ's obedience and death were not of such an inherent and intrinsic value as to *ipso facto* satisfy the divine sense of justice, but that God, by sovereign decree, raised it to that value—determined by fiat to accept his death in lieu of the sinner's death. In other words, he required his justice to be satisfied with what did not truly and literally satisfy the divine sense of righteousness; that is, the death of Christ was not a substituted penalty but a substitute *for* penalty. Hence it became early necessary for the Reformers to emphasize the fact that the work of Christ was a *bona fide* satisfaction, as distinguished from a *supposititious* satisfaction, of the divine sense of justice awakened by his perception of human guilt. If God by decree could raise the sacrificial blood of Christ to a value sufficient to satisfy his sense of justice when as a matter of fact that blood did not possess that intrinsic worthfulness, it would look as if he could arbitrarily raise anything to any value. Why then did he not, by sheer governmental fiat, exalt the blood of bulls and goats to this degree of moral worth and so placate his conscience without sacrificing his Son? It is clear that if redemption could have been secured in this factitious way it would have been secured in this manner. So the Reformers accentuate the fact that the satisfaction made by the Redeemer was a real, *bona fide* and

genuine satisfaction, which involved the divine conscience in no compromise in accepting it as fully satisfying his entire moral nature as it had been offended by human transgression. It cannot be held that the Deity perpetrated, and imposed upon himself, any sort of legal fiction for the salvation of those who merited eternal death. His moral sense was truly and really satisfied and his conscience was not practiced upon. He had perception and a true moral sense as to the real desert of sin when he threatened it in Eden; he never could trifle either with the sinner or with himself. Having pronounced the death-sentence, he must seriously execute it, or confess that he over-reached justice when he imposed it. The atonement, to be effective, must, really and truly, and not in some fictitious and make-believe fashion, be a satisfaction of God's offended conscience and sense of righteousness.

II. Satisfactionists next throw the emphasis, in stating their theory of the atonement, upon the idea of *vicariousness*. They contend for a vicarious atonement as contradistinguished from a personal atonement. In making this distinction, Calvinists are brought into sharp opposition to Socinians, Unitarians and all the advocates of the moral influence theory. It is contended on the one side that atonement for sin must be made by some other than the offender; and on the other side it is held that each sinner must make reparation for his own evil life and conduct. The one party holds to the scheme of vicarious satisfaction; and the other contends for a personal satisfaction. This is the great antithesis between Calvinists and the ethicalists upon the nature of the satisfaction required of sinners; it is the antithesis between an evangelical gospel and an ethical gospel. It is vitally important to mark this difference between personal and vicarious atonement.

(a) Personal atonement is made by the offending party; vicarious atonement is made by the offended party. If a man commits an offence, then either he must atone for the

offence himself or some one must make the atonement for him. If he makes the atonement directly for himself, then he renders personal satisfaction for his offence; but if another makes satisfaction for him, then a vicarious atonement is made in the expiation of his evil doing. If the citizen pays the fine assessed by the court upon him, then he personally satisfies the claims of justice by his own civil action. If a murderer is executed, then he personally atones for his crime according to the forms of civil law. If a sinner against God's moral government suffers eternal punishment for his offence, he would personally atone for his transgression and disobedience. But if another pays the assessed fine, or suffers execution (assuming that it were allowable under human constitutions), or endures the punishment of hell, then the atonement of these offences would be vicariously made. Personal and vicarious atonement differ from each other as to the atoning agent.

(b) Personal atonement is made *by* the criminal; vicarious atonement is made *for* the criminal. In the one case he is the agent satisfying law in his own person and expiating his offence by his own act; in the other he is the beneficiary, receiving the results of another's action. If a sinner made a personal atonement of his sin against God, he would be the agent satisfying for his own offence; but if a vicarious atonement were made for his sin, he would be a passive beneficiary of what God had provided for him through his Son.

(c) Personal atonement is incompatible with mercy; but vicarious atonement is the highest exhibition of grace. When a citizen pays his fine, he satisfies law and justice and receives his discharge as a matter of right; when a friend pays his fine for him, justice and law are satisfied by another than the offender and the offender receives his discharge as a matter of grace shown him on account of his friend's kindness. When the sinner satisfies the broken law of God in his own eternal death, he receives justice without mercy; when God in the person of his Son satisfies law and justice for him, he receives

mercy without justice; that is, it is justice to Christ to discharge the sinner, but it is grace to the sinner to remit his penalty.

(d) Personal atonement cannot secure eternal life for the sinner, because it takes his eternal death to satisfy the law; but vicarious atonement can convey eternal life, because the Son of God can do, in a limited period of time, what it would take a sinner an eternity to accomplish.

In stating their doctrine of the atonement of Christ, Calvinists are careful to emphasize the point that it is of the nature of a *vicarious satisfaction*. It is genuine, and not supposititious; it is vicarious, and not personal. Christ is represented as the substitute of the offender, standing in his room and tracks and doing the things which the sinner ought to do in order to propitiate God and expiate his sin. A great exchange is made; the sinner's guilt is imputed to Christ and the righteousness of Christ is imputed to the sinner. On account of this putative guilt, Christ is crucified; on account of this imputed righteousness, the sinner is justified. Atonement is made by the offended party, to the offended party, and for the offending party, and so grace is magnified upon grace. *Substitution* and *imputation* are the Jachin and Boaz—the twin pillars—of the scheme of atonement by satisfaction.

III. The atonement is *sacrificial*, as opposed to *didactic*. The Redeemer made a genuine satisfaction of the moral nature of God in its demands upon sinful men, not by lesson and example, but by laying himself upon the altar of God a veritable sacrifice in lieu of the sinner who ought to have been consumed thereon. It is the office of a prophet to teach; and Christ in the exercise of his prophetic function made the revelation of the gospel, setting out therein the terms and mode of God's reconciliation with offending sinners. But it is the office of a priest to offer sacrifices upon an altar to expiate the offence and placate the offended deity; and Christ in the exercise of his priestly function laid himself upon the altar, and with sacrificial knife drew the blood, and made it an offering for atonement. It was in his priestly capacity,

and not in his prophetic office, that he made the atonement. Consequently the essence of the atonement is in *suffering*—in blood-letting. It is everywhere exhibited in the gospel in the language of the priest, the altar, and the sacrifice. It is perpetually set forth as that which expiates sin and propitiates the Deity. The moral influence theory, on the other hand, finds the essence of Christ's saving work to consist in the lessons which he taught the world, in the example which he set mankind, in the moral leadership which he assumed before the race; that is, it is didactic in its nature. Its animus is to get rid of the "bloody theology," and give such an interpretation of the saving work of the Redeemer as will relieve us from thinking of God as a being who can be propitiated only with blood. But the Calvinistic theory of atonement is careful to assert and stress the point that the satisfaction which Christ made to justice was in the mode of a sacrifice—the substitution of one victim for another. Redemption, then, was not achieved by an exercise of almighty power, forcibly lifting the guilty sinner from under his doom into the security and blessedness of heaven; not by a course of moral instruction, with the words and example and life of Christ as the textbook, thereby training and cultivating men out of a sinful into a holy and heavenly life; but by the application of the *lex talionis*, in taking the life of the substitute instead of the life of the person whom he represented. There was no cheating or tricking of justice. Jesus paid the penalty both in *kind* and *degree*. As to *kind*, the penalty laid upon the sinner was a capital punishment—death; Jesus died in deed and in truth that very human death, and so satisfied the law as to the kind of penalty exacted. As to *degree*, the law demanded an infinite death as the only degree of penalty adequate to the offence which had been committed against the glory and honor of an infinite being; for a finite being to pay an infinite penalty, he must be eternally at it—it would take him an eternity to cancel the debt by making finite instalments upon it; but Jesus, being divine as well as human, is able to pay infinite penalty in a moment of time. (If a

man could pay but one penny a year on a billion dollar debt, it would require an indefinite time for him to liquidate his obligation. The sinner's obligations are infinite in magnitude; his resources are finite and limited; it would take eternity for him to liquidate his obligation; but Christ having infinite resources, could cancel the obligation in limited time). Hence, I say, the Redeemer paid the penalty both in degree and kind when he offered himself as a sacrifice on the altar of God's displeasure. The atonement was effected under an application of the *lex talionis*, and justice was truly and genuinely satisfied in the vicarious sacrifice of the Redeemer.

IV. As to results, Satisfactionists hold that the atoning death of Christ terminated: (1) upon the guilt of the offender and expiated it, wiping it out of existence; (2) upon the Father, representing the Trinity, and propitiated him, turning his moral wrath into moral love by satisfying his sense of justice and righteousness; (3) upon the Spirit, and impetrated his services for the subjective cleansing and sanctification of all the beneficiaries of the atoning transaction; (4) and so *ipso facto* secures the eternal salvation of all those for whom the atonement was made. Consequently, all the benefits of redemption, all the items of Christian experience—regeneration, faith, repentance, justification, adoption, sanctification, glorification—are but the translation into consciousness of the things which were secured by the atonement of Christ.

Gathering together the points in the foregoing exposition, the orthodox doctrine of the atonement may be succinctly described, as *that work of Christ which was, in its nature, a vicarious sacrificial satisfaction of the moral nature of God as it had been offended by human transgression; and resulted in the extinction of guilt, the placation of Deity, the impetration of the Spirit, and the final glorification of all those persons for whom it was made.*

II. PROOFS.

To present the argument for the Satisfaction Theory in all amplitudes of its detail would subsidize the entire Bible; and the teachings of the Scriptures on the subject must be gathered up and generalized under a few strong and effective arguments.

I. The sacrificial system of the Jewish dispensation, which was typical of the saving work of the Redeemer, proves that the atonement was, in its nature, a vicarious, sacrificial satisfaction of the offended justice of God.

Israel having committed a trespass, the problem created by his offence is: How can the offender go into the shekinah of God's presence, and return with absolution and benediction? The elaborate ceremonial system prescribed, with great detail, for offences of different kinds and different grades, but all the fundamental features were the same. In the effort to answer the great question which touches the very heart of atonement, let us go to the ritual of the "Day of Atonement," and seek therefrom an account of the things which had to be done in order to reconcile God to the offender. The regulations for this service are recorded in Lev. 16. The following are the essential features of the programme which was to be executed in making the atonement:

1. The offenders could not go in person into the Most Holy Place, behind the veil, and present themselves before the shekinah and seek immediately their forgiveness and reconciliation; they must go in the person of the High Priest as their representative. An attempt by them to make a personal atonement for their transgression would have added to their sinfulness, and called down upon them the displeasure of the very Being whom they were seeking to placate: such a course would have been an impudent intrusion which would have challenged the wrath of their God. The offenders themselves were rigidly barred from all attempt to make atonement for

themselves, and their disbarment was rational and proper, for a sinner is one who has been ordered out of God's sight, and forbidden to come into his presence, because of his insulting and offensive conduct: Deity can hold no audiences with him; he can have no access to God in order to make any representations of case, or enter any pleas in his behalf; he has no right and no privilege to draw nigh before his insulted Maker. He must obtain access through another and make all intercessions through a mediator who has the privilege of being heard. In Israel's case the High Priest was provided and designated as the one person in all the nation to whom it was permitted to draw nigh to God and open his mouth with petition and plea. He must act as vicar, substitute, mediator, representative. There is no other mode of access for offending Israel. In other words, the ritual emphasized the vicariousness of the atoning transaction and inhibited the whole idea of a *personal* action looking to the reconciliation of God to himself.

2. The ritual also accented the idea that the priest, the vicar and substitute and agent of the sinning people, could not go into God's presence with impunity except he carried the *blood*, which had been shed according to the prescription. The substitute must be a *priest*, and the priest must have a *victim*, and the victim must be offered on the altar according to ritualistic provision, and its blood carried behind the veil and sprinkled upon the mercy-seat. On the great annual day of national atonement, Aaron laid his hands upon the head of one goat and symbolically imposed upon him, or imputed to him, the sins of the people, and this goat was sent into the wilderness to signify the bearing away of the sins of the children of Israel; and he also laid his hands upon the other goat and symbolically imposed upon him, or imputed to him, the sins of offending Israel, and this goat was slaughtered and offered in sacrifice according to the ritual, to signify the atoning expiation of the offence which had been thus made, and its blood was sprinkled before the mercy-seat, and the High Priest returned with absolution and blessing. There

were two goats in this ritual, because two were necessary to carry out the symbolism; the dead goat signified the expiation of guilt and the scape-goat signified that the sins of Israel were carried away into the wilderness of forgetfulness, to be called up against them no more for ever. This feature of the atoning service accentuates the idea of *expiation* and, further, the idea of expiation by *sacrifice*. It was not the didactics of the symbolism which made the transaction effective, but it was distinctly the *sacrificial blood* which secured Israel's ceremonial discharge. These sacrifices made the place of Jehovah's worship reek with blood, because blood was the effective atoning agency in the ceremonial. The offerings of the ritual were divided into two kinds—bloody and unbloody sacrifices. The bloody offerings were effective for atonement; the unbloody offerings were expressions of thanksgiving and gratitude and were acceptable only when they were predicated upon the bloody sacrifices. All this makes it obvious that the Jewish system was truly piacular in its nature—essentially a sacrificial system of making an atonement for sin.

3. The Jewish ritual of atonement makes it plain that the attitude of God towards trespassing Israel, while not one of implacability, was one of moral wrath. The sin which had been committed had awakened his sense of justice into opposition and provoked his righteous indignation. His attitude was not that of a teacher provoked at dullards and block-heads; nor was it that of a governor concerned for his administration and the public welfare of his subjects; but it was that of a representative of morality and justice and truth; he had a sense of a wrong which had been perpetrated, and as the standard of all rectitude he must defend righteousness and law and exact a true and proper reparation for the offence which had been committed. He ethically demanded the sacrifice. These typical sacrifices were not made before the people as spectators, for the sake of the dramatic impression which might be made upon the beholders; they terminated upon the offence which had been committed and expiated it

and upon the conscience of the Deity and satisfied it. The ritual of atonement clearly shows that this priestly transaction propitiated God towards offending Israel; when the High Priest returned to the outer court of the sanctuary, he brought back with him absolution and divine benediction—the favour and good will and love of a reconciled God. The ritual reveals the fact that that atonement was a genuine *satisfaction* of the offended justice of God.

Assembling, then, these points which are gathered from the ritual of the day of atonement, it is clear that that transaction was a *vicarious, sacrificial, satisfaction of the justice of God*. All the essential points in the Satisfaction Theory are made good. If, therefore, it can be shown that these Jewish schemes of reconciliation were typical of that reconciliation which is effected by the work of Christ, the argument for this conception of the saving work of the Redeemer will be complete. Were these Jewish procedures symbolical of the atonement of the Redeemer?

(1) Our Lord himself gathered up the whole Old Testament Scripture, in all its divisions of Law and Prophets and Psalms, and converged it upon himself, as deriving all its meaning and significance from its bearing upon him and from its typifying of him. That is, without Christ, all Old Testament ritual and symbolism and teaching would have been empty shells without any real kernels. This was his avowed interpretation: "To him give all the prophets witness, that through his name, whosoever believeth in him, shall receive remission of sins." (Acts 10:43). "And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself." (Luke 24:27). "These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled, which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning me." (Luke 24:44). "Search the Scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me." (Jno. 5:39). Nathaniel said, "We have found him, of whom Moses in the

law, and the prophets did write, Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph." (Jno. 1:45). At his crucifixion it was said, "These things were done, that the Scripture should be fulfilled." (Jno. 19:36). "Even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us." (1 Cor. 5:7). Consequently our Lord and his interpreters focus all the Old Testament upon Christ in such a manner that it must be held that, in their opinion, all its rites and ceremonies, especially its elaborate ritual sacrifice, had significance and meaning only as they were types and symbols of his own atoning work. There must be some correspondence between the sign and the thing signified, between the type and the antitype; in other words, the Old Testament sacrificial system was a sign of the sacrifice of the Redeemer in the execution of his mediatorial work in saving his people.

(2) That the Mosaic sacrificial system was not only symbolic of divine truth in connection with the contemporaneous dispensation, but that it also looked forward through its types to the better and more realistic things of the gospel, is proved by the fact that the sacrificial language of the Old Testament is so embroidered throughout the representations of the work of Christ in the New Testament as to warrant the induction and generalization that the New was hidden in the Old and the Old was revealed in the New. John the Baptist, standing on the threshold of the New Dispensation, pointing an index-finger to the Redeemer, said, "Behold the lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world" (Jno. 1:29). Paul describes the saving work of the Redeemer in this language: "He gave himself for us an offering and sacrifice to God for a sweet smelling savour" (Eph. 5:2); and it is a significant point in this text that it so plainly teaches one phase of the Satisfaction Theory which some are zealous to deny, namely, that the sacrifice was made *to God* for the sake of its influence upon the Deity, and not for the purpose of influencing the offending sinner, nor for its general impression upon the moral universe. Again this apostle says: "Now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself . . . having been once offered to

bear the sins of many" (Heb. 9:26). It must here be noted that the Redeemer "put away sin," or *expiated* it; and that the mode of "putting it away" was by "the sacrifice of himself." . . . which scores two points in favour of the Satisfaction Theory, namely, (a) that his atonement was expiatory and (b) that it was sacrificial in its nature. Again: "We were redeemed with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot" (1 Pet. 1:19). The atoning element was "blood," and not only blood, but specifically and emphatically "the blood of a lamb." "This man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down on the right hand of God. . . . By one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified" (Heb. 10:12-14). These are but a few specimen passages which illustrate how the sacrificial phraseology of the Mosaic economy intertwines, interlaces and threads the New Testament description of the saving work of Christ and compels us to reason back to the conclusion that the old ritual was typical and symbolic of the saving atonement of our Lord, and not only justifies our representing it as a vicarious sacrificial satisfaction of sin, but requires us to so interpret the atonement if we would be faithful to teachings of both or either Testament.

(3) That the Jewish sacrifices were anti-typical of the saving sacrifice of Christ is distinctly and categorically asserted in the New Testament. Paul declares that they were the "shadow" of which Christ was the "body"; the Redeemer of the New Testament cast his shadow upon the Old Testament, and the likeness was that of the Jewish altar with its ritual. They "are a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ" (Col. 2:17). The Epistle to the Hebrews is a translation of the sacrificial system of Judaism and an application of it to Christ as explanatory of his saving work. "A shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things" (Heb. 10:1). The tabernacle and its services are set forth as the "pattern" of Christ's work in saving sinners: "It was therefore necessary that the patterns of the things in the heavens should be purified with these (blood of bulls

and goats); but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true; but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us" (Heb. 9:23, 24). The Mosaic things were "figures" of the true heavenly things. "For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" (Heb. 9:13, 14). If the one sacrifice can avail to effect the lower end, how much more shall the higher sacrifice avail to effect the higher end? Then the sacrificial system of the Jewish system was a "shadow," a "figure," a "pattern," of the things which Christ did to save his people. There must be some correspondence of the sign to the thing signified; some resemblance between the "shadow" and the "substance" which casts it; some resemblance between the "figure" and the thing prefigured; some resemblance between the "pattern" and the thing copied from it.

If, therefore, the method of saving trespassers under the ceremonial system of the Jewish economy was by a vicarious sacrificial satisfaction, which propitiated God and expiated the offence; and if the Jewish method was but prototypical of the saving scheme of the gospel; it follows, logically and necessarily, from the principle that the type must figure the antitype, that the atonement under the New Testament must also be a vicarious sacrificial satisfaction of the justice of God, placating his wrath by expiating the sinner's guilt. In other words, the Jewish sacrificial system proves the Satisfaction Theory as to the nature of the atonement of Christ.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Atonement: Its Extent

Upon this subject theologians divide into two classes—Limitationists and Universalists.

Limitationists are those who hold that Christ died for some men; Universalists are those who hold that Christ died for all men.

Universalists are of three kinds or grades: 1. True and proper Universalists, who hold that Christ so died for all men as to secure the salvation of absolutely every member of the Adamic family; 2. Hypothetical Universalists, who hold that Christ died to make the salvation of all men possible but hypothecated the result upon certain specified action of man; and 3. Conditional Universalism, in which it is held that Christ died for all men upon condition of repentance and faith and evangelical obedience. According to the first school, the Atonement made the salvation of all men fact; according to the second, it made the salvation of all men an hypothetical fact; according to the third, it made the salvation of all men possible. The first is the position of Universalists proper; the second is the position of New School Presbyterians; the third is the position of Arminians and Methodists.

The doctrine of Universalists is perfectly plain: Christ came into the world to save all men and did what he came to do. But the difference between Hypothetical Universalists and Arminians is not so patent. The New Schoolman holds that God made the salvation of all men possible so far as there was reason against them on his side of the controversy, but he did not remove, by the work of Christ, the obstacles to their salvation which lay in the depravity of their own minds and in the disinclination of their own hearts. He cleared away all obstacles on the divine side, and so far forth made the salvation of all possible, but inasmuch as the Atonement did not regenerate any mind where all were dead

in trespasses and sins, the death of Christ did not have the effect of subjectively empowering the fallen will, and consequently made the salvation of no man possible. The Atonement made the salvation of all men divinely possible, but left it humanly impossible. To put the same doctrine in another way, God first in the order of thought decreed the salvation of all men, but foreseeing that none would believe because all were depraved decreed the salvation of the elect, in which he determined to remove the disabilities of a depraved will and efficaciously apply the Atonement to them.

The Arminian, on the contrary, construes the atonement itself as removing all divine and human obstacles to the salvation of the world, and so clearly teaches the possible salvation of all mankind. The Arminian's universality is one of mere possibility and not one of fact. Thus is he clearly differentiated from the strict universalist. And so also does it appear from even a superficial examination that the Arminian universalism is in pretense only.

Throwing out the scheme of Hypothetical Universalism, which confesses itself to be a failure as a matter of fact, there are but two schemes of Universalism, Universalism proper and Arminianism. One is the Universalism of fact and the other is the Universalism of mere possibility. According to the one Christ died to save all men; according to the other he died to make all men salvable.

Christ died *efficaciter pro omnibus*—that is the formula of Universalism.

Christ died *sufficenter pro omnibus*—that is the formula of Arminianism.

Christ died *sufficenter pro omnibus, sed efficienter tantum pro electis*—that is the formula of Calvinism.

The Universalist is an extremist in saying that the death of Christ saves all men; the Arminian is an extremist in saying that the death of Christ saves no man; the Calvinist gives the truest and safest statement when he says the Atonement is intrinsically sufficient for all men but efficaciously applied to only some men. As a matter of fact, all men are not saved

by the death of Christ but some men are really and truly saved by that death. The formula interpretative of the Atonement ought to be in accord with facts. "Sufficiently for all, efficiently for some"—that is the formula which will now be defended.

I. Proofs of Limitationism.

Since the formula of Calvinistic Limitationists is, "Sufficiently for all, efficiently for some," let us take up its two qualifying adverbs and expound the meaning of the interpretative phrase. In what sense did Christ die "sufficiently" for all men? What is meant when it is said that he died "efficiently" for some men? A clear statement of the meaning of Calvinism will greatly assist the defence of this point, perhaps the most offensive tenet in all its system.

1. A Sufficient Atonement.—Sufficiency is a quantitative term. It signifies that the supply of whatever is under consideration is abundant for all purposes in question. To say that the air is sufficient for all men means that there is an abundance of this necessary of life. To say that there is water enough in the Mississippi river for all the world means that all the world could draw all their supplies from this source without exhausting it; of course it does not mean that the water in this particular river on the North American continent is available to all the inhabitants of the globe. To say that there is gold enough in the world to pay all the debts of all men means that the supply of this precious metal is great enough to meet all such demands; of course it does not mean that every debtor has access to all this wealth. So sufficient Atonement is one whose intrinsic value is equal to the payment of all the debts of all sinners, that its worthfulness is so great that God's government would not be cheated if the death of Christ were accepted in lieu of the death of all men. Our soteriology teaches that the Atonement of Christ possesses an infinite value and of course has an intrinsic purchasing power great enough to purchase redemption for every

individual in this world, or ten thousand worlds like it. The meritoriousness of it is simply inexhaustible. This is but another way of saying that Christ has done enough to save the whole world of sinners. Or to drop into a Scripture figure: Christ by his death has opened up a way into the holy place of God's presence; the way is wide enough for every son of Adam; and yet, if there had been a purpose in the divine mind to save but one soul, if there were but one man to walk that new and living way, it would have been, and necessarily, just as wide as it is now. A sufficient way is one wide enough to permit every man to walk therein. A bridge from earth to heaven sufficient for all men would be one wide enough and strong enough to accommodate the entire human race. An intrinsic sufficiency is what a thing is in its own capability. The ship of Zion is large enough and strong enough to carry the entire race as a cargo from earth to heaven.

This is what Calvinists mean by a sufficient Atonement. Here there is no limitation, no restriction. It is not simply universal, it is infinite. They use the largest, most unbounded word in all the vocabulary with which to express the idea.

2. An Efficient Atonement.—But manifestly there is a deep distinction between an "efficient" Atonement and one which is merely "sufficient." That is efficient which does something, produces an effect. That army is efficient which wins the victory. That water is efficient which slakes the thirst. That money is efficient which pays the debt. A ton of dynamite is sufficient to blow up a thousand buildings, but it is only efficient for the destruction of the particular building in which it was exploded. The death of Christ is sufficient for the salvation of the entire race, but it is effective only in the salvation of a portion of the race. To say that Christ is a sufficient Saviour of the world is to say that he is a capable Redeemer; but to say that he is an efficient Saviour of the world is to say that he is the actual Redeemer of the whole world. In order, then, for a sufficient Saviour to become an efficient Saviour the merits of his atoning death must be applied; and if they are applied to all men,

all will be saved, and if they are applied to some men some will be saved, and if they are applied to no man, no man will be saved. A sufficient Saviour has an abundant saving power, but an efficient Saviour is one who applies his saving power to the actual salvation of men.

Our Calvinism, then, teaches that Christ is a sufficient Saviour for all men, but that he is an efficient Saviour for only some men. He died *sufficienter pro omnibus, sed efficienter tantum pro electis*. What difference can it make by what name you call the some for whom he died efficiently? Called by any name, or by no name, the fact remains the same, that he died efficiently for them.

The issue between the three leading schools of soteriologists may be restated, for there is an argument in getting the matter in debate clearly defined. The Universalist teaches that Christ died efficiently for all men—that he applied the saving merits of his atoning death, not to its exhaustion, for it is infinite, but just as long as there was a member of the human family seen in fact or in the decree of God. The Arminian tells us that this is a mistake; that Christ did not die efficiently for any person, but only sufficiently for all; that the atonement makes all men salvable, but actually saves no man; that it devolves upon the will of the sinner to translate a sufficient atonement into an efficient atonement, to convert salvability into salvation. The Calvinist plants himself between these two extremists and teaches what seems so obvious, that Christ made a sufficient atonement for the whole world but an effective atonement for only a part of the world. So Christ does save somebody, but he does not save everybody.

The same issue between these ruling theories of redemption may be stated from another point of view. All are agreed that the Atonement of our Lord is of infinite intrinsic value, and that consequently God has the resources at hand with which to save the entire race. Why are not all saved under the circumstances? God has the power, both the *dunamis* and the *exousia*; he certainly is good hearted, and desires the death of no man. The Universalist squares himself and affirms that absolutely all will

surely be saved, because God has both the heart and the power to do it. He prefers to address himself to the explanation of those portions of Scripture which seem to teach that some are lost than to combat those difficulties which confront the limitationists. Either God, since the Atonement of our Lord, could save all men, but will not; or he would save all men but cannot. If he would do so but is limited in his power he is not almighty and the atonement is not infinite in its subjective extent. If, on the contrary, he could save all men but will not, then he is not supremely good. The Universalist says both dilemmas involve God in serious criticism, and so he declines to take either horn and escapes by boldly affirming that he can, will, and does save all men. The Calvinist holds that God can save all men, because the Atonement of Christ is infinite and inexhaustible; God's saving power is without limit; consequently it must be because, for unrevealed reasons, he will not apply it to all men. The Arminian takes the horn of the dilemma and tells us that God does not apply the atonement at all to any man, because he cannot; he is hedged and limited by the free will of the sinner. They prefer to deny the divine independence, and teach that God is conditioned and hedged in his actions by his creatures. In other words, rather than teach a doctrine of limited atonement, they prefer to teach a doctrine of a limited and constrained God.

Sufficiency is intensive; efficiency is extensive; a sufficient atonement is so described with reference to the intrinsic depth of the saving power contained in it and an efficient atonement is so described with reference to the width of the application of the saving power which it contains. Sufficiency is subjective; efficiency is objective; a sufficient atonement is so described because of the subjective meritoriousness which it contains; an efficient atonement is so called because of the objective effects which it produces in the persons upon which it terminates. The atonement of our Lord in extent is limited; in intent it is unlimited. Subjectively it is unlimited; objectively it is limited. The Calvinistic formula is "Sufficient for all, efficient for some."

3. Proofs of Limited Efficient Atonement.—The purpose, then, of the following arguments is not to prove that the sub-

jective and intrinsic value of the atonement is limited, but to establish the fact that it is limited in its effectiveness—to show that it saves some, but not all.

(1) A limited salvation necessarily implies a limited atonement. Salvation is effect; atonement is cause. We are saved by and through and on account of the atonement. If I sin against my neighbor, and then offer him a fair and full atonement for my offence, and he accept my offering, he is in honor bound to declare himself satisfied, and be at one with me. Atonement means at-one-ment, and my offering to him is the means by which I am made at one with him, the means by which the at-one-ment is brought about. If I make the offering not for myself alone, but for my ten associates in the sin which I committed and the offering is accepted as a satisfactory atonement for the entire party, the offended party is bound to be reconciled to us all. Christ made himself an offering to God against whom man had sinned; by that offering of himself he sought to make an atonement; it was accepted as such, and God is bound by his word and covenant to be satisfied, to be reconciled, to be propitiated, to be placated. If Christ made that offering for himself alone, the effect was to bring him and God into harmonious and happy relations; if he made it for himself and for ten other men, and it was accepted, God must be reconciled to the ten; if he made it for fifty, then fifty are reconciled; if he made it for all men, then all men are necessarily reconciled to God. This argument is leveled especially at the Arminian, and is designed as an *argumentum ad hominem* to show that he cannot be a limitationist in salvation unless he is first a limitationist as to the atonement. If Christ, in offering himself as a sacrifice to God, which God joyfully accepted as fully adequate, represented all men, then God must declare himself satisfied with respect to all men, and that ends the matter; they must all be saved. The Arminian seeks to evade the argument, by saying that God's acceptance of Christ is conditional; that he agrees to accept the offering of Christ as a satisfactory atonement, provided each sinner will repent and believe and persevere in evangelical obedience unto the end; that is, God will accept the death of Christ

as a satisfactory atonement for Judas if Judas will accept it also, but if Judas rejects it, God will reject it also. So God's acceptance of the offering of Christ as a satisfactory atonement is made to depend upon Judas and all sinners; if they reject Jesus, so will God; if his death is unsatisfactory to them, so will it be to him. This is monstrous; God judges the death of Christ as a satisfactory atonement, irrespective of what Judas and other sinners may think about it. Christ offers himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice; either it satisfies it, or it does not. If it satisfies his justice, of which God is the sole judge, why then it satisfies him, and that is the end of the controversy. And if it does not satisfy him, then the offering is rejected as unsatisfactory. There is no escape from it; the atonement is limited in its effectiveness or universalism is the logical result.

To clear and strengthen the argument, some figures of speech may be employed. Atonement-making is debt-paying; if Christ paid the debt of all men, then all are freed from debt; and if he paid the debt of some men, then the debts of that some are extinguished; but if he paid the debts of no man, then no man's debt is cancelled, and the greatest effect of the death of Christ is to make the debts of some or of all payable. If this Arminian representation of the case is correct, a sound use of language requires us to cease speaking of the death of Christ as an atonement and compels us to think of it and to treat it as merely provisory of atonement; that is, the death of Christ really atones for no man's sin, but renders every man's sin atonable, which is the same thing as saying that the death of Christ really and truly pays the debt of no man but has the effect of rendering the debts of all men payable.

Again: Atonement-making is but the reconciling of estranged persons. If Christ made an Atonement, he reconciled God and the sinners for whom he transacted and did not merely render them reconcilable. If therefore the Atonement was made for all men, all are reconciled to God; if for some men, then some are reconciled to God. Atonement is reconciliation, not reconcilableness.

Again: Atonement-making is the propitiation of God; it propitiates, and does not simply render propitiationable. If the Atonement were made for all men, then God is propitiated towards all men. Atonement is propitiation; not propitiationableness.

Again: Atonement-making is but another name for the mode of salvation; it is salvation, not salvability; it is fact, not mere possibility; redemption, not redemptibility. Consequently if the atonement is universal, salvation, redemption, is universal. Salvation is as wide as the efficiency of the atonement.

I come back then to repeat that limited salvation implies a limited atonement—limited in its efficiency, limited in its effectiveness, limited in its application, however unlimited it may be in its subjective and intrinsic nature. Sufficient for all, efficient for some. An Atonement which is merely sufficient effects nothing; an Atonement which is merely efficient, saves all men; an atonement which is sufficient for all but efficient for some, is one that is able to save all men, but actually saves some men.

This is the argument of limitationists founded upon the nature and meaning of the Atonement.

(2) But this argument from the very idea and meaning of the word atonement does not safeguard the limitationist against the pure and proper Universalist, because he heartily subscribes to the Calvinist's interpretation of the nature of the Atonement as a *bona fide* satisfaction of justice, law, and all the claims of God against the sinner. Atonement has been made for all; therefore all must be saved upon precisely the same principles upon which some are saved according to the Calvinist. So the next argument parolled by Limitationists is the argument from Election. That doctrine has already been proved, and the argument must not be reproduced in this place; but accepting it as a fact it defines the beneficiaries of the Atonement. The Atonement actually saves all those for whom it was efficaciously made; the reason it does not save all men is because God has not designated all men. Consequently an Atonement which in itself is sufficient for all men, is efficacious for only some men, by divine destination. This is but saying that if God had appointed all

men as the constituents of Christ under the covenant of grace, he would have been faithful to his promise and saved them all. The Atonement is as wide as the covenant of grace. It cannot be wider. The Atonement is a means for accomplishing what is engaged in the covenant of redemption; Christ died to fulfill his pactional obligations under that covenant; the effectiveness of his death is co-extensive with the limits of the covenant. The sufficiency of the Atonement is due to its infinite value; the efficiency of the Atonement is due to its application, and it is applied by the will of God, and it is applied to the elect only. The Atonement is as wide as God's electing love, as wide as the boundaries of his covenant of grace. The limitation and particularism in the Atonement is but the logical outcropping of a limitation which began in the purpose of God. The reason that the plan does not ultmate in the salvation of all men is because it was not pitched upon that scale. The house is built according to the plans of the architect; if there is not a chamber in it for every person, it is because the number of apartments in the sketch which Christ received from his Father contained directions for a limited number of chambers. Universalism at the end implies universalism in the beginning, and limitationism in the end implies limitationism in the beginng. This is true upon the indisputable principle that what is last in execution was first in intention.

If we look at the end of God's plan of redemption we find that only a portion of the race is actually saved in heaven; if we look back at the beginning of God's plan, we find that he elected as the beneficiaries of his covenant of grace only a portion of mankind. So interpreted, the end is as the beginning and the beginning is as the end. The intention matches the execution, and the execution is as the intention. Salvation is as big at the Day of Judgment as it was in the Council of eternity. It is as wide at one end as it is at the other. It is not like a cone, wide in the heart of God and narrow in its consummation at the Judgment; it is like a perfect cube, the same size at its beginning in the mind of God as it is at the end of human history. If, therefore, it is universalism in the begin-

ning, it must be universalism at the day of Judgment; if it is limitationism at the finish it must have been limitationism at the start.

Looking at the end, the Arminian sees that the scheme is limited in its consummation but predicates that it began as unlimited and got contracted in its execution. The Universalist looking at the beginning sees the scheme drawn in the thought of God as race-wide, and insists that it terminates upon the same scale upon which it began, and so all men are somehow saved in spite of all that the Scriptures may say to the contrary. The Calvinist looking at the end of the Plan, sees that it is limited in its final execution and reasons that it ends as it started; limited election, limited atonement; as wide at one end as it is at the other; as limited in conception as it is in execution and as universal in execution as it was in conception.

(3) The first argument of limitationists stands by the end of the completed scheme of salvation and finds as a matter of historic fact that only a part of our race are actually saved and from that fact reasons backward to the conclusion that the Atonement was limited in its design. The second argument plants itself at the very beginning of the scheme as it took its rise in the divine mind and finds that God elected some and not all and reasons forward to the conclusion of a limited Atonement. The third argument plants itself in the bosom of God and affirms that the Atonement is as wide as the Love of God, and denies that it is any wider. The boundaries of Jehovah's heart are the boundaries of Calvary's efficiency. But the love of God for sinners is not indiscriminate and universal; that very love is elective, discriminative and particular; consequently to affirm that the Atonement is universal and indiscriminate is to affirm that the gift of love is larger than love itself. A limited love necessitates a limited Atonement and a universal love necessitates a universal atonement. No man can demand a largeness larger than the heart of God, and no Calvinist contends for a narrowness narrower than his love.

Is the divine love for sinners general, indefinite, universal? Does he love all the race with an equal heart? Does he give

his heart alike to the godly and the ungodly, to the holy and the unholy, to the lovely and the unlovely, to the saint and the sinner, to the elect and non-elect, to the men in heaven as to the men in hell? Does he give the same quantity and quality of affection to the members of this race universally without distinction? Or are there some members of the race which he, for reasons, loves more and differently from others? Are there some Christians whom he loves more than other Christians? Are there some sinners whom he loves more than he does other sinners? Are there some sinners whom he does not love at all? Are there some sinners whom he hates with righteous indignation? In time is his love universal and indiscriminate? In eternity was it similarly indeterminate, undefined, irrational, blind, ubiquitous? I have asked this running series of questions to show that a universal and indiscriminate and indefinite love is a weakness and not a virtue, a blemish and not a perfection of character. The love that has absolutely no limits, cannot appreciate the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly, between right and wrong, between goodness and badness. Such a love is color-blind and its subject is maudlin.

There are two fundamental forms of feeling in God—love and wrath '*agape*' and '*orge*'. These emotions are real and essential in God. The existence of the one necessitates the existence of the other; so that if there be in him a love of righteousness there must be in him the hatred of unrighteousness. If there be in him no power to be angry at sin, there is no power to be pleased at obedience. "He who loves the good by this very fact hates the evil; and he who does not hate the evil does not love the good; because the love of goodness issues directly out of the hatred of evil, and the hatred of evil issues directly out of the love of goodness. No one can love life without abhorring death; and no one can have an appetency for light without an antipathy to darkness.* This principle is affirmed categorically by the Scriptures. "All they that hate me love death;" "Ye that love the Lord, hate evil."

**Shedd*, Vol. I., p. 174.

Dr. Shedd beautifully says, "Complacency towards righteousness and displacency towards sin are not contraries, but opposites, or antitheses. . . . The relation of opposites or antitheses is that of polarity. Moral love and moral wrath are like two poles, north and south, of the same magnet, or the two manifestations, positive and negative, of the same electricity. Boreal magnetism is as really magnetism as austral; and positive electricity is as really electricity as negative. So, also, moral wrath is as truly holiness as moral love. . . . Accordingly, the two feelings of love of holiness and hatred of evil coexist in the character of God, the most perfect of beings, and in that of angels and redeemed men. Human character is worthless, in proportion as abhorrence of sin is lacking in it."

Moral love and moral wrath are but the two sides of the same attribute, the obverse and the reverse; but the two hemispheres of the same spherical perfection. The one is awakened by righteousness, the other by sin. They are essential aspects of the divine character; they are not optional properties of his heart. Whatever is holy must give pleasure, and whatever is wicked must cause indignation, just because he is God.

The Scriptures support this interpretation of the divine character. An examination of any large concordance will show the student that the "anger" and "wrath" of God and their various cognates and synonyms occur as often and as emphatically as do "love" and "mercy" and the whole group of his amiable perfections. "Wrath is gone out from the Lord;" "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven"; "God is angry with the wicked every day." Of course there are a number of familiar texts which teach us "God is love." When, therefore, we think of the "fierceness of his anger" we must think of the tenderness of his love, for these are but the two sides of his moral emotion.

Time was when God's love was universal; it was when he foresaw all men as creatures in his image and likeness, holy as he was holy; then he loved all without distinction of person because all were good and lovely. Time was again when his wrath was universal; it was when all sinned in Adam and fell with him in his first transgression; then his anger was against

every man because all were guilty and polluted before him. He could not hate any when all were holy; and he could not love any when all were sinful. Time was again when he foresees the entire race divided into two classes—the elect and the non-elect. These two classes, while their constituent members remain the same, are variously designated in the Scriptures; friends and enemies; sheep and goats; children of God and children of the Devil; servants of Christ and servants of sin; freemen in Christ Jesus and bondmen to Satan; spiritual men and natural men; Church and world; believers and unbelievers; penitents and impenitents; Israelites and Gentiles; circumcised and uncircumcised; citizens of the kingdom of God and foreigners; God's people and aliens. Many are the appellations given to the two classes, but the same persons are unchangeably designated. One of these classes is the unchanging object of God's love and the other class is immutably the object of his wrath. It must be so because he sees truly and feels accurately. When the race had a common state in holiness as in Eden, his love was universal; when the same race had a common state in sin as in the fall antecedently to election, his wrath was universal, and when the race is divided into two classes, saints and sinners, his love and his wrath both become particular and limited; he loves one section of the race, and is angry with the other section. One section is seen as in Christ Jesus, and so is lovely, while the other section is seen out of Christ and in opposition to him, and they are unlovely and the objects of his displacency.

God's pity is universal, because all men are miserable, but his love is sectional, because only a portion of the race is lovely. These are lovely because they are seen in Christ Jesus. But pity does not help; pity sheds tears, but it does not rescue; pity says, "I am sorry for you, but it is not my prerogative to make you spiritually beautiful." Love on the other hand, when it has the power, saves all that it loves. God does not save all that he pities, but he saves every man whom he loves. God saves absolutely every person and thing in this world which he loves and destroys all that he hates. The Atonement gives him the legal right, and through the Holy Spirit he has the dynamic

power to save all on this fallen globe which he loves, and there are no trophies of his affection in hell; nothing which he wants is in that waste-heap. The Atonement is as wide as God's love; but his love is limited and so his Atonement is limited to the very same boundaries.

I know that many theologians affirm the universality of God's love in the most unlimited language, and that much preaching taxes both prose and poetry for rhetorical terms and figures with which to declare the unlimited wideness of that love. I have searched the Scriptures and the pages of this class of writers for proof-texts of the universality of God's love. I do not find the texts. Dr. Miley says, "God is Creator and Father of all men. There is, therefore, no difference of divine relationship which could be a reason for limitation in the atonement." He grounds the universal love of God in his common Creatorship and common Fatherhood of men; he loves all men for two reasons, first because he made them, and second because he is the Father of all. But God is the Creator of the Devil, and our Lord expressly said of some men, "Ye are of your father, the Devil."

This same distinguished Arminian, when pressed still further to show the universality of God's love in order to ground the universality of the atonement therein, says, "It is really voiced in the sublime words, 'God is love.' A God of love must prefer the happiness of all men." But love turned towards the guilty and sinful is anger, and would not a God of wrath and anger prefer the death of those whom he cannot abide in his sight? At any rate the text, "God is love," does not prove that he loves every sinful man, for he distinctly says that he is angry with the wicked every day.

The passage of Scripture which comes nearest to asserting the universality of God's love is the famous one, "God so loved the world." If the word "world" here means all mankind indiscriminately, then the Scriptures do teach that God loves all men; but I shall presently take up this passage in another connection and will there show that it does not mean mankind. We

are then shut up to a single proof-text for the universality of God's love, and that text, when taken in connection with the context, does not teach what is claimed.

Here then is the staggering difficulty: If God loves all men, and has the right through the atonement to save all men, and through the Spirit the power to do so, why does he yet send some whom he loves to hell? This position will make him forever a mourner at the gates of hell for his lost loved ones; he could never be happy again, but would always be standing by the prison-house of despair filled with regret and disconsolateness. How would men feel if the object of their love were in misery, and they had the right and the power to rescue? If he has both the right and the power to rescue the object of his love, we know he would do it. Now God has the right to rescue, and he has the power also, because the atonement is sufficient for all and the Spirit is Almighty; but then he does not love all men; he saves all whom he loves, and withholds his mercy from all whom he righteously hates. Nothing that God loves is in hell, or ever will be there.

Universal love logically leads to a universal atonement; but many who hold to the universality of love deny the universality of the atonement and endeavor to save their logic by drawing the distinction that God loves the sinner but hates his sin. Sin and holiness separated from persons are mere abstractions and as such are the objects of neither hate or love. Persons are the only objects of moral affections; the attributes of those persons make them the objects of moral love or moral wrath. The saint is loved because of his goodness; his person is the object of the love, and his goodness is the ground or reason for the love. The sinner is hated on account of his sin: his person is the object of the wrath, and his wickedness is the ground or reason for it. God is angry with the sinner every day: he is angry with the sinner, the person, not with the sin; he is angry with the sinner on account of his sin. "Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated"—the objects of these two emotions are two distinct persons: God loved one of them and hated the other. God

blesses what he loves and punishes what he hates; he blesses saints and punishes sinners; which proves that he loves saints and hates sinners.

“Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” Christ laid down his life for his friends because he loved them and in this way gave to them the greatest possible testimony of his affection; it follows that he did not lay down his life for his enemies, because he did not love them.

The atonement is as wide as God’s love; and through it God saves absolutely every man whom he loves. “The question, then, respecting the pleasure of the Son has its answer from his love. That answer must be decisive. Nor is it in any doubt. The Son of God, who in pitying love to sinners parted with his glory and humbled himself to the deepest suffering and shame was not wanting in redeeming love to all men. And it was his good pleasure that his atonement should be for all men. His cross so affirms. How does the cross of Christ show the universality of Christ’s love? There were two thieves crucified with him and to one of them he expressed his love most exuberantly, but to the other he uttered not one syllable of affection. If he loved both alike there is absolutely no proof of it on Calvary.

The statement of some theologians that love is optional and not necessary needs restatement and clarification. “Love,” says Dr. Strong, “is an attribute, which, like omnipotence, God may exercise or not exercise, as he will.” Dr. F. L. Patton says, “God is bound to be just; he is not bound to be generous. The measure of God’s benevolence is a matter of option.” These statements are not superficially true. Love, and its counterpart wrath, are not voluntary attributes of the divine nature, subject to the beck and call of the will, else God could command himself to love what is hateful and hate what is lovely. Whatever is lovely God must love, and whatever is hateful God must hate. He is immutable. He cannot be quiescent and inactive when the good and the holy are before his eyes: he may not view these qualities with absolute passivity. Nor can he contemplate sin and wickedness with passivity of heart: wherever he sees guilt and evil he must, by the very constitution of his own nature, be

indignant and wrathful towards it. God cannot make himself morally colorless by the decrees of his will. He impulsively loves the lovely and hates the hateful: otherwise he would not be true to himself. If these determinations are true, then since love is the impulse to bless and wrath is the impulse to hurt, the object of love must be blessed and the object of wrath must be cursed. If God loves all men, then all men are blessed: love casts no object of its affection to hell. The atonement is coextensive with the love of God; love being limited as to its objects, so is the atonement limited as to its beneficiaries. All who are "in Christ" are the objects of divine complacency; they are "in Christ" by sovereign election; and all who are "out of Christ" are the objects of divine displacency, and they are "out of Christ" because of his preterition. To be "in Christ" is to be lovely, to be an object of divine delight, an object of divine blessing. Relations to Jesus must be decretively established before there can be love in the heart of God for sinners; some only are elected in Christ Jesus, and consequently some only are the objects of God's love. "Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated;" atonement was made for Jacob, but not for Esau; atonement can not be wider than love; the gift can not be larger than the heart of the giver.

(4) The Limitationist next takes his stand by the side of his Lord and affirms that the atonement cannot be wider than the Intercession of Christ. The argument is *a fortiori*; If Jesus did the greater act of dying for the world of mankind, why should he decline to perform the lesser service of praying for them? What would be thought of the man who would lay down his life for his friend that he might rescue him but who would not pray for his deliverance? If we can so interpret Christ, then we have no assurance that he who died for us will finally save us; though he has made the supreme gift of himself he may yet withhold the lesser gift of heaven. "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not also freely give us all things?" The gift of Christ carries every lesser blessing of redemption with it. If we have the sun we have his rays; if we have the fountain we have all the stream; if Christ is ours all things are ours. All things are yours, and ye are Christ's

and Christ is God's. If Jesus died for me he will certainly pray for me.

Then does he pray for all men or does he exclude some men from his petitions? We have a distinct pronouncement on this subject from the lips of our Lord, given under the most impressive circumstances. "I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine." And what is the prayer which he offers for those who had been given him? "Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world." He denies that he prays for the world; he affirms that he prays for that portion of the world which had been given to him. The circumstances are most solemn: it is our Lord's last night on the earth: he recognizes that his hour has come and that before the morrow's sun has set he will be dead. When we approach the grave our hearts soften and include in our last wishes the largest possible number of friends and acquaintances. Few men are willing to die in anger with their fellows. But Christ distinctly shuts the world out of his prayers. If the "world" here meant all men, then none would have a place in his intercession; so it here stands for the world of non-elect sinners.

It does not modify this interpretation to be told that Christ on the succeeding afternoon prayed for the very men who were nailing him on the cross: "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do." If this was more than a mere wish of his human tenderness, and I believe it was a mediatorial official petition, all that is proved is that these very murderers were among the number "given" to Christ and so are the beneficiaries of his atoning grace. These executioners did what they did by the "determinate counsel and foreordination" of God; now if it turns out that they were themselves the elect of God, then the crucifixion took place at the hands of the very men who were to be its greatest beneficiaries: those selected by divine decree to be the instruments of the crucifixion were themselves elected to be the supremest beneficiaries of their own act. What greater trophy of grace than the red-handed murderers of our Lord around the throne

of glory! What a commentary upon the love of God! And cannot grace rescue these as well as any other murderers and sinners? Because, then, he prayed on the cross for his executioners is no proof that he prays for the "world" as contrasted with those "given" to him. He does not repent of his narrowness of Thursday night when he hung on the cross on the following Friday afternoon. The prayer on the cross rather classifies his executioners among "those given to him" than contracts his dogmatic declaration the day before in which he said he did not pray for the world.

There is no better accepted tenet of our theology than that the intercessions of Christ are always prevalent. He never prayed, and never can, pray, an unanswerable prayer. "Ye ask and receive not because ye ask amiss": Christ cannot ask "amiss." He is too wise; he is too much in sympathy with God to misunderstand; he cannot blunder. "Him the Father heareth always." If Christ prays for the whole world of mankind, and if his prayers are always successful in obtaining what they seek, then salvation must be universal. So the Limitationist puts no other restrictions upon the atonement of Christ than our Lord himself put upon his own prayers. Calvinists are limitationists as to the Atonement because Christ is a limitationist as to his prayers.

(5) The fifth argument seeks to ascertain the scope of the Atonement by studying the ritual of sacrifice in the Old Testament. The form under which God sought to acquaint men with his scheme of salvation at the first was the clear and simple method of illustration, of symbol, picture, type, significant action. It was a method of dramatizing the the plan that men might the more clearly understand it by seeing it enacted before their eyes. Consequently, in so debated a matter as the extent of the Atonement, we ought to return to the very simplest and most elementary form of its revelation with the hope of finding the question there determined. So Limitationists feel strong in their interpretation when they carry the debate to the ritual of Old Testament sacrifice, for therein the scope and efficaciousness of the Atonement is made to appear particular and not general, restricted

and not universal. Let us take as an illustration the ritual of the Great Day of Atonement.

On that day Aaron was to take two goats of the congregation of Israel and perform upon them a certain significant ritual. "The sacrifice consisted of two, merely from the natural impossibility of otherwise giving a full representation of what was to be done; the one being designed more especially to exhibit the means, the other the effect, of the atonement." One was to be killed in order to get blood to typify the sprinkling of the blood of the Lamb of God and to teach the New Testament doctrine that "without shedding of blood is no remission"; the other was to symbolize the bearing away of the sins of those who were represented by him into the land of forgetfulness. The death of the first goat secured for the high priest the right to send the living goat away into the wilderness. "Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat . . . And the goat shall bear upon him all the iniquities unto a land not inhabited." The slaughtered goat typified the means of atonement and the "scape goat" the effects of atonement.

Now what was the scope of this transaction? Whose sins were carried into the wilderness? The same law which prescribed the ritual defines its beneficiaries: "and this shall be an everlasting statute unto you, to make an atonement for the children of Israel, for all their sins, once a year." In the ritual Aaron "put" all the sins and iniquities of "the children of Israel" upon the head of the "scape goat," and their sins and theirs alone were carried into oblivion. The Canaanites and the Amalekites, the Philistines and the Egyptians, were not represented in the transaction, except insofar as they had become through proselytism members of the congregation of Israel, and consequently the atonement was not made for them. The blood of the slaughtered goat was sufficient for the Gentiles as well as for the Jews and the "scape goat" was able to carry all the sins of all the Gentiles as well as of all Israel. The transaction did not avail for the Gentiles, not because it was insufficient, but because Aaron did not

“put” their sins upon the head of the “scape goat”; and Aaron did not “put” their sins upon him because he was not authorized to make atonement for any other portion of the world than that known as the “congregation of the children of Israel.” That transaction was sufficient for Jews and Gentiles, but it was efficient for Jews only.

All this is a lesson in picture of the atonement of our Lord. Christ persistently declares that all the Old Testament Scriptures, in all their parts—Law, Prophets, Psalms—“witness” concerning him; all the sacrificial language of the Old Testament is constantly employed by the New Testament to exhibit the nature of Christ’s work in saving sinners; Paul expressly says that these Old Testament usages “are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ.” The New Testament is hidden in the Old and the Old Testament is revealed in the New. The Old Testament is the gospel in figure and the New is the same gospel in prose. So of all the Old Testament sacrifices and rituals.

Now the argument is that the atonement of the New Testament is no wider than the atonement of the Old Testament. In the former economy the scope of the atonement was limited to the congregation of the children of Israel; Aaron “put” the sins of those so designated on the head of the “scape goat” and those sins were carried away into the wilderness, and the sins of the remainder of mankind were left upon their own heads untransferred. The “congregation of the children of Israel” was typical of the true Church of God. The lesson is that the sins, all the sins, of the people of God were “put” upon the head of the “scape goat,” which is Christ, and by him borne out of the sight of God. As the goats did for literal Israel, so does Christ do for the spiritual Israel.

But there is no need to prolong the reasoning; it is conceded that the redemptive provisions of the Old Testament were restricted; the contention of all grades of universalists is that the God of the New Testament is a broader God than the God of the Old Testament. But those who can receive the doctrine of the immutability of God, and who can believe that the Old is but a figure and pattern of the New, are compelled to accept the con-

clusion that the atonement of the New, like the atonement of the Old Testament, is limited in its efficaciousness while it is unlimited and all-sufficient in its worthfulness. This is but saying that, as the "scape goat" had the strength to carry the sins of the Gentiles as well as those of the Jews, so Christ has the power to bear the sins of all men as well as those of the elect; and, as a matter of fact, the "scape goat" actually bore the sins of Israel only, so Christ as a matter of fact bore the sins of his spiritual Israel, otherwise called the elect. "Sufficient for all, efficient for some"—is alike the doctrine of the atonement in both the Old and the New Testaments: one is the shadow of the other: they differ only in form.

(6). The sixth argument of the Limitationists as against all Universalists rests upon specific Scripture texts. I quote them from that master of Calvinism, one of Geneva's illustrious teachers, Francis Turretin: "The mission and death of Christ are restricted to a limited number, delineated under the character of the people of Christ, the sheep of Christ, his friends, the Church, his body, etc., but it is nowhere extended to all men severally or collectively. Thus Christ 'is called Jesus, because he shall save his people from their sins.' He is called the 'Saviour of his body'; 'The good shepherd who lays down his life for the sheep,' and 'for his friends.' He is said 'to die—that he might gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad.' It is said that Christ hath 'purchased the church, or his flock with his own blood.' If Christ died for every one of Adam's posterity, why should the scriptures so often restrict the object of his death to a few? How could it with propriety be said absolutely that Christ is the Saviour of his people and of his body if he is the Saviour of others also? How could it be said in the same way that he laid down his life for his sheep, for the sons of God, and for the Church if according to the will and purpose of God he died for others also? Would this be a greater proof of his love and a firmer ground of consolation?"

While Shedd and the two Hodges and most of our Calvinistic writers esteem this argument highly, Dr. Dabney does not think any great deal of it. He says, "the proof of a proposition

does not disprove its converse." This logical dictum of Dr. Dabney is not universally true. He himself holds that the proof of the spirituality of God disproves his materiality, that the proof of the immortality of the soul is the disproof of its mortality. It depends upon the nature of the case, therefore, whether the disproof of one proposition is the proof of its converse. In this particular matter before us the Scriptures prove that Christ died for a certain class of men and the circumstances go to show that the assertion that he died for some is the assertion that he did not die for all. In both Testaments we have the human race invariably divided into two sections; the division line is not national nor ethnic, it is not a color nor a social line, but a spiritual line. Men's relation to God is the principle of classification. Throughout the whole revelation there are those who are designated "My People" and those who are "Not My People." To claim that God treats all alike is to draw a distinction and then to wipe it out. The gift of his Son is the supremest testimonial of affection which it is possible for God to make; and to prove that he gave that gift to the class called "My People" is to prove the converse, namely, that he did not give that gift to those known as "Not My People." The distinctions among men are made by God according to their relations to Christ; if all men possess Christ in the same way, if all have an equal legal title to the atonement, where is there any difference? How could they then be distributed into those who are Christ's and those who are not Christ's? They are, according to the hypothesis, all Christ's. How can John say, "Christ is mine," in any different sense from that in which Judas could say it? Is he not a gift to Judas, upon the hypothesis, just as much as and to precisely the same extent that he is a gift to John? How then can John claim a proprietorship in him which may not be equally set up by Judas? John's title is created by the deed of gift of God; and according to the hypothesis the same deed that conveyed him to John conveyed him in the same manner and to the same extent to Judas. It follows, therefore, that if Christ is the wedge of cleavage in the human race, and that he is on the side of one party, that he is not on the side of the other party. He is not on all sides; he is on

one side or the other; if you prove that he is on the side of his friends you certainly prove the converse, that he is not on the side of his enemies. If he is the partisan of the righteous he is not the partisan of the wicked. If he is on the side of neither the righteous nor the wicked, then he is neutral: he is neither the friend of the righteous nor the foe of the wicked. If he is on both sides, then he is the helper and partisan of both the wicked and the righteous and is divided against himself. If he is on the side of the righteous he is partisan, and the supremest act of his effort, his death, was on the side of the righteous and not on the side of the wicked. If he is the partisan of the sheep he is against the goats. If he is the friend of his friends he is the enemy of his enemies. He died on his own side and not on every side. He sacrificed himself, not in the cause of both sin and righteousness, but for the cause of righteousness only; and he did not die for abstract righteousness but for righteous men; and those who are righteous are in the divine foresight eternally righteous and are called the "elect" when they are looked at as having existence in the mind of God, and they are called believers when they are viewed in time, and they are called glorified saints when they are viewed in their heavenly triumph. Christ is on the side of the righteous; that proves the converse, he is not on the side of the wicked; and he died on the side where his heart was.

The Arminian does not seek to void the argument by the use of the logical formula, that the proof of one proposition is not the disproof of its converse, but he seeks to evade it by calling attention to the fact that while the Scriptures say that Christ laid down his life for the "sheep" they also say that he laid down his life for "all men." This objection is more specious than solid. It cannot be that Christ laid down his life for the "goats" in the same sense in which he laid down his life for the "sheep." To do so is to make Christ do as much for one class as for the other; to make him love the "goats" just as much as he loves the "sheep." Then, *cui bono*, what is the advantage of being a "sheep?" No, the universality that is taught in the class of Scripture referred to is a limited universality, or more accurately, it is a relative and not an absolute universality. This will be shown at large, for I

shall in another section of this discussion take up each of these texts and show by exposition exactly the scope of each one, and the exposition will vindicate our Lord from the gross and insulting and shameful charge of being on the side of everything that hath breath, whether it be a God-hating sinner or a glorified saint. He has never been on the side of both heaven and hell; he has never been on the side of the population of both heaven and hell; the population of both regions have been eternally known to him; and he has been eternally against the one and on the side of the other; he did not die in his effort to save those who he knew were and would always be against God, against heaven, against all that was good; he did not plant his cross between them and their doom, but on the contrary is himself the Judge who shall dismiss these goats from his left hand; he knew them from the beginning and has not been beguiled into dying for them; he has always known that they would not submit to his rule and authority but would be steadfastly opposed to him and all that he represented; and yet some men tell us that he went in the face of this knowledge which he has always possessed and died for them! These same men think God is perilously near to insincerity when he preaches the gospel to those who he foreknows will reject it; then what ought they to think of that Lord who dies for men who he foreknows will not accept him? The alleged universalism is apparent only. The truth of the matter is that Christ neither provided salvation for his enemies, nor does he cause it to be offered to them. The whole scheme of redemption, from its conception throughout all the stages of its execution, is limited to his people; for them it is provided and to them only is it to be offered. But these points can be better handled in the exposition of those texts which are quoted by Arminians and Universalists, which will form a section of this discussion.

4. Resume.—This closes the aggressive argument for Limitationism. We have stood at the end of God's redemptive plan and seen that the actual outcome was limited in the salvation of only a portion of the race; we have then gone back to the beginning and seen that the plan as it lay in the divine thought was limited by a sovereign election and preterition; we have then

dropped down to the center of the motive of the scheme which is his love, and found limitation there in the heart of God; then we have stood by the side of Jesus in the holy hour of prayer and found him asking for only a limited application of his death; then we turned to God's first revelation of his purpose of salvation in the Old Testament pictures, symbols and types and there found limitation in the very picture of salvation which he draws; and finally we have interrogated the New Testament scriptures and heard them say that Christ laid down his life for "the sheep." So far, then, we have no universal principle in the scheme; but, on the contrary, every principle has been definite, particular, limited. All the universalism we have encountered so far in this study has been in language only. Perhaps this universalism in form is apparent only. The defensive part of the argument now to be taken up will consider carefully these texts which use the dialect of universalism and we shall find that God has not said that that was universal every principle of which he has taught us was restricted.

CHAPTER XV.

The Atonement: Disproofs of Universalism

The Universalist takes his stand at the consummation of the scheme of redemption and denies the first argument which has been made in this discussion, namely, that as a matter of fact only a part of the human family are at last saved. The Limitationist and the Universalist are in sharpest collision with each other as to the extent of the actual salvation by Christ. Believing that all mankind are eventually saved, Universalists necessarily believe that the Atonement was unlimited.

The most plausible and popular form of Universalism is the doctrine of Restorationism, or as it was known in its earlier days, the doctrine of Apokatastasis. It is believed by this school that the Scriptures in teaching the "restitution of all things" includes in the all things the human race. Death does not end the human probation and fix the final destinies of men. They may repent in the disembodied state sooner and more earnestly than any do in the embodied state. These notions are held by the Universalists and Dunkers in this country and many of the Rationalists in Germany.

The grounds of all varieties of true and proper Universalism are the following:

(1) Love is not an attribute of God but his very essence. The text, "God is love," is interpreted as defining the inner nature of the Deity and not one of his many perfections. Consequently, since God is only and exclusively love, all men must be eventually saved through the salutary chastisement and discipline of men either in this life or in the disembodied state. Hell cannot be the product of love; and love is God, and God is love.

(2) Universalism rises out of its peculiar doctrine of anthropology. Man is endowed with a will that has autocratic power of his life; nothing is sin but the transgressing acts of this will; an act disappears with the doing of it and has no con-

tinuity in history or in character; the obligation to punish exists only so long as man continues to sin; the moment he ceases to transgress the law of God, that instant every reason for penalty disappears; death does not destroy the will, nor change its nature; the experiences of the disembodied state are more conducive to a cessation of sin than are the conditions of life on the earth; but whenever man stops transgressing he ceases to suffer; he may stop before death, he may stop at death, he may stop ten years after death or one hundred years after, but God will afflict his person until he does discontinue sin; then will he be glorified. So shall it come to pass that sooner or later every member of Adam's race shall be restored to God's favour.

(3) The third argument for Universalism rises out of a peculiar doctrine of the Atonement. As to the nature of the Atonement the views of Universalists coincide with those of Calvinists; they hold that the atonement is a *bona fide* satisfaction for sin and actually expiates guilt and propitiates God; that the work of Christ is truly and strictly vicarious; that its effect is not salvability but salvation; but they depart from Calvinists in holding that in all these atoning transactions Christ was the vicar and substitute, not of some men, but of all men. In other words, the Universalist takes the satisfaction theory of the Atonement and makes it race-wide in its efficacy; Jesus died *efficaciter pro omnibus*. His work is in no sense a failure; it is not a partial success; he came to save all men, not in an instant of time, but eventually, and he actually accomplishes his purpose; all will be saved through the atonement of Christ. He sings,

"I can but trust that good shall fall
At last—far off—at last, to all,
And every winter change to spring."

(4) The fourth argument of Universalists rests upon certain express Scripture texts which they claim dogmatically teach that all the race will be ultimately saved. Of these citations the following are the strongest. "And, having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto him-

self; by him, I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven" (Col. 1:20). The sweep of the assertion is absolutely all inclusive. The death of Christ brought forth universal peace, and all in earth and all in heaven have been reconciled to God; and so shall it come to pass that every member of the human family shall sooner or later take up his position in the white-robed throng that circles the Saviour's throne night and day with hymns of gladness and songs of praise. "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. 15:22). Here the blessing of Christ is said to be coextensive with the blight of Adam. The same "all" that fell in Eden is the "all" that live on Calvary.—"If one died for all, then were all dead" (2 Cor. 5:14). God does not desire to put a man to death even once, but it would be neither kind nor just to put the same man to death twice. All sinned, and all died in Christ for that sin; every principle of love and fairness protests against any of them being put to death in their own persons. Every man's penalty, then, has been paid; it is in the past tense; there remains no more of penalty for him to bear.—"I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me" (Jno. 12:32). The condition was fulfilled; he was lifted up; the promise must now be made good, else there is something untrustworthy about his word. He did not say he would make all men *drawable*, nor that he would draw some men, but he said he would draw all men. "All" means *all*, and Christ meant what he said. Universalism alone honors Christ fully, putting no limitations upon his heart, nor upon his word, nor upon his work.—"That in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth, even in him" (Eph. 1:10). Christ was not incarnated in the beginning but in the "fulness of time," when the hour ripened. So all men may not go straight from earth to heaven, but there is a predicted hour, a "fulness of the times," when all in heaven and in earth shall be united in him.—So the argument concludes with the strong declaration of Paul: "Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men unto condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all

men unto justification of life" (Rom. 5:18). The judgment of justification is just as wide as the judgment of condemnation. Justification is by the Apostle put on top of condemnation, and their edges are exactly even; the condemnation is not the fraction of an inch larger than the justification.

2. Counter Proofs.—Now what counterstroke can be delivered to reasoning so plausible and apparently so Scriptural; reasoning, moreover, which accords so delightfully with the natural desires of us all?

(1) The first premise of Universalism must be disposed of on the field of theology proper, by giving a sounder interpretation of God, by showing that love is one of his attributes and is not the essence of his character.

(2) The second premise of Universalism must be disposed of by reinterpreting the nature of man and correcting its fallacies as to the nature of sin. Sin is a character as well as an act; then the acts of sin make impressions on character; and then the acts of sin live in the history of individuals and cannot be thought of as ending in the commission; they must be dealt with as historic facts. Finally the point must be recalled that the sinner cannot, according to a sound psychology, discontinue his acts of sin at will. All that Scripture which teaches that death fixes destiny and puts an end to all possible change in character and conduct must be brought in array against this second tenet of Universalism.

(3) The third premise of Universalism cannot be overturned by denying that it has rightly stated the doctrine of the nature of the Atonement but by showing that it has unduly widened the representative character of Christ. The doctrines of election and the covenant of grace must be used to checkmate this premise.

Then it must be borne in mind that a sufficient atonement can become an efficient atonement only by an act of faith in the sinner. Vicarious atonement without faith is powerless to save, because that is the divinely prescribed condition upon which it

is efficacious to any man. "It is not the *making* of the atonement, but the *trusting* in it, that saves the sinner." A loaf of bread does not save from starvation the man who does not eat it. There may be gold enough in the world to pay all debts, but it pays the debt of no man who does not accept it as it is tendered to him.

Then it must be remembered also that a sufficient atonement does not become an efficient atonement by the mere act of the discontinuance of sin, even if that were possible by the unaided will either in this state or in the disembodied state. The efficacy of the atonement is not conditioned upon a negative act but upon a positive act of the acceptance of the sacrifice of Christ.

Then it is to be remembered that Christ did not die for the expiation of sin and guilt in the general, but for the expiation of the particular guilt of particular men.

It follows therefore that a sufficient satisfaction is not *ipso facto* an unconditional satisfaction; nor is this conditional satisfaction appropriable by a negative act, the cessation of sinning, but by the positive act of believing, which is itself the gift of God. A sufficient atonement is not necessarily an efficient atonement.

(4) The fourth argument of Universalists which quotes specific Scripture must be overthrown in two ways: first by showing that there are other specific texts of Scripture that just as dogmatically teach limitationism in the final result of the scheme of grace; and second, by showing that the specific texts of the Universalist can be harmonized with the specific texts of the Limitationists, but that the texts of the Limitationists cannot be squared with the interpretation of Universalists.

Over against the specific text of the Universalist, the Limitationist sets the following Scriptures: "Whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come" (Matt. 12:32). Here, then is one class of sinners, at least, which it is said by our Lord are unpardonable either here or hereafter. No

doctrine of final restoration can be constructed which will put this class within the pale of forgiveness.—Here is another class, a wider and more numerous class, for whom there is no hope either here or hereafter: “Then shall he say also to them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was an hungered, and ye gave me no meat, etc.” (Matt. 25:41-42). All those who did not minister meat and drink and comfort and consolation to Christ in the person of his disciples must go away into everlasting fire; fire which lasts for ever. Those who do not live according to the principles of our Lord while here on the earth are sent away into endless fire. There is no universalism here; there is no restorationism held out to these hereafter.—There is another specification by our Lord; this time he calls names: “It had been good for that man if he had not been born” (Matt. 26:24). But if Judas finally reaches heaven, though it be a long time after death, though it be through indescribable suffering, it would be better for him to have been born. Heaven, if rightly appraised, is worth any thing that might be exacted to gain it. But if Judas did not carry the act of betrayal into the eternal world with him; if the responsibility for an act ceases with the commission; then Judas is restorable to the favour of God whenever he ceases to betray his Lord, and the last we saw of him on the earth he seemed to be satisfied with that form of sinning, to be filled with self-loathing and disgust. Having the power to discontinue betraying his Lord at any moment, do we know from what we last saw of him that he gave up betraying at the first possible moment? Upon these premises where is there any reason to believe that it took any long time in torment to bring Judas to repentance? And if he quit sinning early in his post-mortem career, where is there any real truth in saying he would have been better off if he had never been born?—And here is still another class whose fate our Lord represents as hopeless; those who live in self-indulgence, who will not lop off the right foot, or pluck out the right eye which is offensive to God. Concerning them the prophecy is that they shall be cast into “hell-fire, where their worm dieth not, and the fire is

not quenched" (Mark 9:48). These awful negatives of Scripture cannot be explained away.—These are all explicit texts, asserting in most emphatic terms that all will not be saved, and there is no hope for those who go down in death. These are but a few of many. The whole Bible is delivered upon the supposition that men are in a real danger of hell. God seems to be in earnest, and does not appear to be frightening us with what is not likely ever to happen to any of us.

But Paul must be brought into harmony with Christ; it will be noticed that all the texts which have just been cited to show that salvation is limited in its results were quoted from our Lord, while all the texts for universalism were taken from the epistles of Paul. Did Paul misrepresent the Saviour?

The most difficult passages to explain are Col. 1:20 and Eph. 1:10. In one of these places Paul tells us that "*all things*" *ta panta* in heaven and in earth were reconciled to God, and in the other passage he tells us that "*all things*" are to be gathered together in Christ, both the things in heaven and the things in earth. These are splendid assertions of the final triumph of Christ over all opposition. Do they involve the ultimate conversion and restoration to divide favour of all fallen angels and fallen men? If the language of these verses might be taken by itself, such would be their most natural interpretation. The terms are the broadest and the assertion is the most positive. The passages seem to say that everything in heaven and in earth is gathered together into a unity under Christ, and then the whole lump reconciled to God by his atonement. "But two courses seem open to the interpreter—either to hold the terms of these passages subject, in concrete application, to those modifications which are required by the conditions of salvation that the Apostle elsewhere regards as not fulfilled in all; or to assert, with Pfeiderer, an insoluble contradiction between that harmonious outcome of human history which accords with Paul's 'religious speculation' respecting the principle of grace and the dualism which corresponds to his legal standpoint of moral reflection."* Olshausen and others are sure that these

**Pauline Theology*, Stevens, p. 366.

passages teach nothing but the widest and most universal restorationism, but such an interpretation cannot be brought into agreement with Paul's own doctrine of man, of salvation, and of judgment; much less can it be made to harmonize with the teachings of his Lord.

"Before the entrance of sin all created beings and things were undividedly united under God's government; all things in the world were normally combined into organic unity for God's ends and in his service. But through sin this original union and harmony was broken, first of all in heaven, where a part of the angels sinned and fell away from God; these formed under Satan the kingdom antagonistic to God, and upon earth brought about the fall of man, extended their sway farther and farther, and were even worshipped in the heathen idols. . . . The redeeming work of Jesus Christ was designed to annul again this divided state in the universe, which had arisen through sin in heaven and upon earth, and to re-establish the unity of the kingdom of God in heaven and on earth; so that this gathering together again should rest on, and have its foundation in, Christ as the central point of union and support, without which it could not emerge."* These passages then may be taken to teach the centralization of the entire universe in Christ, and through him the harmonizing of the entire disturbed order in the universal dominion of God. Suppose a great military leader rises up when the affairs of the country are in confusion and law and order are in contempt and there is a general reign of anarchy and confusion; this leader assembles an army and by the sacrifice of many lives re-unites the land, restores universal order and brings in a reign of peace and happiness; men say, "He gathered all together, and reconciled all the discordant elements, saved the whole country and made it happy." Yet many lives were lost in order to restore universal order. This is what our Lord has done; restored order throughout the universe and reconciled an estranged and hostile world to God. But the passages do not warrant the conclusion, in the light of

**Meyer*, Eph. 1:10.

other portions of the Scriptures, that in making such a universal restoration no sinful life was lost. The man who would not be pacified had to be destroyed, and is destroyed.

I do not think the other proof-texts of Universalism so difficult of harmonizing with the eschatology of our Lord. "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." The meaning of this oft-quoted and much-abused text can be made clear by simply transposing the order of the words, which the original Greek allows: "As all in Adam die, even so shall all in Christ be made alive." Who then died in Adam? "All who were in him." Who are made alive in Christ? "All who are in him." The parallelism is thus exact.

The same key unlocks the text, "If one died for all, then were all dead." If Christ died for all those whom he represented in the covenant of grace, then all for whom he died are dead and do not have to die again. Such is the ordinary and regular interpretation of the Calvinists by which they seek to square the universalism of Paul with the limitationism of Christ. As by the disobedience of one man, Adam, the judgment of condemnation came upon all the men whom he represented, namely, the entire race, so by the obedience of one, Christ, the judgment of justification came upon all the men whom he represented, namely, the elect, or the designated beneficiaries of the covenant of grace.

Christ said he would draw "all men unto him." Did he so draw Judas to himself as to save him? Does he so draw those who have committed the "unpardonable sin" as to pardon them? Does he draw those to his saving arms whom he dismisses from his left hand on the day of judgment? In zeal for a theological dogma shall we make our Lord contradict himself? Our Lord had just said, "Now is the judgment or condemnation of this world; now shall the prince of this world be cast out." Then he adds, "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me." Those whom he is to draw are contrasted with the condemned world, with those who are not the subjects of the prince of this world. The "world" and those who belong to it as contrasted with the Church and those who belong to it are condemned,

and the prince of the world and those who are his subjects are to be cast out; then those whom Christ will draw to himself are those who are not part of the condemned world and not subjects to the cast out prince. He will draw, then, all unworldly men to himself; and they are worldly men who belong to this fallen system, who have no place in the redemptive plan of God, whose life and destiny is bound up in this present sinful world. Christ will condemn and cast out all the "worldly" and draw to his own heart all who are "unworldly." A "worldly" man is a lawful subject of the Prince of this world and an "unworldly" man is one whose Lord and Master is Christ. The one class he will cast out; the other class he will draw to himself.

The Arminian has as much interest in the interpretation of these Universalist texts as has the Calvinist, because he is also a limitationist as to the actual results of the atonement. In the text "I will draw all men," the Arminian interprets "all men" as all believers; in the text, "As in Adam all die," even so in Christ shall all be made alive," the Arminian understands the word "all" in the first clause to be unlimited, and the "all" who are made alive he understands to be believers; so in his mouth, when contending against the Universalist, "all" does not mean all absolutely, but it means all relatively. Let him remember that and be consistent when he is contending against the Calvinist and insisting that "all" means absolutely all. Both Calvinists and Arminians limit the texts quoted by Universalists and hold that the universality is only on the surface. They disagree as to the precise limitation, yet both refuse to concede the Universalist his claim that "all" is used in an absolute sense.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Atonement: Disproofs of Arminian Universalism

“Arminianism and Calvinism, the two leading evangelical systems, inevitably join issue on the extent of the atonement. The former by its principles of moral government, its doctrine of sin, and the cardinal facts of its soteriology, is determined to a theory of universalism. The latter, by its doctrine of divine decrees, its principles of soteriology, and the nature of the atonement which it maintains, is determined to a theory of limitation.”

1. **The Issue Defined.**—Nothing is more important than that the issue between these two schools of theology should be clearly defined. The formula for the Arminian conception of the extent of the atonement is *sufficenter pro omnibus*; and the formula for the Calvinistic view is *sufficenter pro omnibus; sed efficaciter tantum pro electis*. The universalism of Arminianism is a universalism of sufficiency only. All that he means to claim is that Christ died sufficiently for all men; he agrees with the Calvinist in maintaining that all men are not actually saved. His universality is in name only; when his scheme is analyzed it means that the death of Christ brought merely the possibility of salvation to every man's door—it is the universality of possibility.

Both the Calvinist and the Arminian hold that the atonement is unlimited in its sufficiency; do they both mean the same thing by sufficiency? If so then the difference between the two schemes is only one of degree; the Calvinist would have to be thought of as holding all that the Arminian does and so much more as is signified by the additional words in his formula, *sed tantum pro electis*. But the difference between the schools over the idea of a sufficient atonement is not thus formal, but is deeply radical. What is the Arminian definition of sufficiency?

"We may distinguish between a mere intrinsic and an actual sufficiency. There is reason for the distinction. Satisfactionists fully recognize it, especially in application to the redemptive work of Christ. An intrinsic sufficiency is what a thing is in its own capability. An actual sufficiency is from its appropriation. A life-boat may have capacity for the rescue of twenty shipwrecked mariners, but if appropriated, and limited by the appropriation, to the rescue of only ten, the actual and available sufficiency is only so much. One man has money enough for the liberation of twenty prisoners from debt; but whether it shall be available, and so actually sufficient, depends upon his use or appropriation of it. Even if he should appropriate the whole sum, but at the same time restrict it to the benefit of a fixed number—ten of the twenty—then, while intrinsically sufficient for the liberation of all, it would be actually sufficient and available for only the designated ten. The atonement of satisfaction must yield to such a consequence. The redemptive mediation of Christ, in just what he did and suffered, has intrinsic sufficiency for the salvation of all men, but there is a limiting divine destination. Such are the facts as given by satisfactionists themselves. The sufficiency for all is only potential, not actual from a universal destination."

What then is the Arminian definition of a sufficient atonement? Let the figures in the quotation be employed to show the answer. By the sufficiency of the boat to rescue twenty shipwrecked mariners is not meant its capacity but its availability. The sufficiency of the sum of money necessary to redeem twenty prisoners means, not the liberating power of the money but the availability of the money. If the boat, sent to rescue the twenty mariners was not available to ten of them because they were dead before its arrival, then we are to say that the boat was not sufficient to save but the ten, when as a matter of fact there was room enough on her decks for twenty thousand and more. If that hypothecated sum of money was set aside to the discharge of twenty prisoners but was not appropriated by those who had the enpending of it to but ten, and so was available to but the ten, then we must say that the money was sufficient for

but ten. This shows the ridiculousness of the contention that sufficiency does not mean capacity but availability. The distinction between an "intrinsic" and an "actual" sufficiency is absurd. The sufficiency of the boat is measured by its capacity; the efficiency of the boat is measured by the number it actually carried to shore. The sufficiency of the money is measured by its redemptive power; the efficiency of the money is measured by the number of prisoners it actually redeemed. The sufficiency of the atonement is measured by the number of persons it has the power of saving, assuming that it was applied to them; the efficiency of the atonement is measured by the number of sinners it actually saves. The true distinction is between a sufficient and an efficient atonement; and the distinction between an intrinsic and an actual sufficiency is a mere play upon words for an apparent theological advantage.

The real issue then between Calvinism and Arminianism is over the nature of the atonement. Does it save, or render salvable; does it expiate sin, or simply make sin expiable; does it really ransom, or only make ransomable; does it propitiate God, or merely render him propitious; does it redeem, or merely make men redeemable? The atonement is held to be merely provisory, providing for salvation, but not saving. It creates a universal possibility and makes a universal probation, but it does not actually save any one. God, through the atonement, creates universal salvability; the sinner converts salvability into actual salvation. Watson puts it, "By the death of Christ, the sins of every man are rendered remissible, and salvation is consequently attainable by every man." Christ died to make sins remissible; then what remits them? He died to make salvation attainable; then how is it attained? It is attained, according to the system, by faith, a mere human act, and it is remitted on the ground of faith as a supposititious righteousness.

Watson, one of the ablest, most evangelical and highly respected authorities on the Arminian side of this great controversy, thus states the question: "The question before us, put into its simplest form, is, whether our Lord Jesus Christ did so die for all men, as to make salvation attainable by all men; and

the affirmative of this question is, we think, the doctrine of the Scripture." Did Christ so die as to make salvation "attainable?" That, according to the Arminians, was the design, scope, and result of the atonement—to make salvation attainable by all men.

2. Arminian Proof-Texts.—While Arminians bring forward some principles of God's moral government and some tenets of its anthropology and hamartiology in support of its contention for the universal possibility of salvation, yet their main reliance is upon certain Scripture texts, the interpretation of which is the real cause of all that is peculiar in the Arminian conception of God, of man and of sin. Their system is essentially soteriological; whatsoever is peculiar in their theology, whatsoever is peculiar in their anthropology, whatsoever is peculiar in their hamartiology, is due to whatsoever is peculiar in their soteriology. The theory of salvation was first determined and then the other departments of theology were squared with it. This is particularly true of Wesleyan Arminianism. It planted itself, first of all, by the side of the proof-texts of universalism and from that center it radiated, determined that everything should be ruled by these passages, which seemed so plain.

Arminian writers group these texts under the following heads:

(1) Those texts which declare that Christ died for "all" and for "every" man. "The man Christ Jesus; who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time" (1 Tim. 2:5, 6). "We trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, specially of those that believe" (1 Tim. 4:10). "But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor; that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man" (Heb. 2:9).

(2) Those texts which represent Christ as dying for the "world." "The Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world" (Jno. 1:29). "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world" (1 Jno. 2:2). "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that

whosoever believeth should not perish, but have everlasting life; for God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved" (John 3:16, 17).

(3) A third group of texts are assembled under the caption that the effects of the death of Christ are co-extensive with the effects of the fall of Adam. "As by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life" (Rom. 5:18). "If one died for all, then were all dead" (2 Cor. 5:14, 15).

(4) A fourth group of texts are those which represent Christ as dying for those who finally perish. "And through thy knowledge shall thy weak brother perish, for whom Christ died?" (1 Cor. 8:11). "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died" (Rom. 14:15). "False teachers, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon them swift destruction" (2 Pet. 2:1). "Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he is sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace?" (Heb. 10:29).

(5) A fifth grouping of texts is made in order to show that it is the duty of the Church and the ministry to offer salvation to all men indiscriminately. "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned" (Mark 16:15, 16).

(6) A sixth assemblage of texts is made so as to show that it is the duty of all men to believe the gospel that is to be universally offered and that the rejection of the gospel offer is the greatest possible enhancement of condemnation and guilt. "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him" (John 3:36). "But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name" (John

30:31). "The Lord shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ" (2 Thess. 1:7, 8). "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men love darkness rather than light" (John 3:19).

This is a stiff array of Scripture; and if these texts were taken as the starting-point for a system of soteriology, and if it were decided that these texts should bear their face meaning, it is undeniable that they would lead the theologian into some form of universalism and he would have the task of harmonizing the general statements of Scripture with the specific instead of squaring the general by the specific.

3. **Explanation of Arminian Proof-Texts.**—But would it be Arminian universalism, the universalism of mere opportunity? The supremest difficulty is to show that all these texts do not teach true and proper universalism, a conclusion as abhorrent to the Arminian as to the Calvinist. "The Saviour of the world"—looks very much as if it meant precisely what it says. But both Calvinists and Arminians deny its face meaning, but in different ways. The Calvinist puts his limitations upon the "world" while the Arminian puts his restrictions upon the notion of salvation. Both the Arminian and the Calvinist are limitationists in spite of the popular pose of the Arminian as a species of universalist. The Arminian maintains his conclusion that the atonement is only sufficient by limiting the active verbs, while Calvinists maintain their position that the atonement is efficient for only some by limiting the objects of the verb. Take, for illustration, that text which defines the purpose of our Lord's coming into the world—"Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners." As it stands, isolated from all the remainder of Scripture, these words mean the salvation of all men, because *sinners* is unlimited and to save means to *save*. But the Calvinist contracts it to fit the facts of an actual limited salvation by interpreting it, Christ Jesus came into the world to save elect sinners; and Arminians contract the meaning by altering "to save" into to make salvation possible. In interpreting

these universal passages Arminians change the nature of the atonement in order to get a limited redemption, while Calvinists limit the objects of atonement.

But let us take up these texts, group by group, and examine them with the patience their importance demands.

(1) The first class are those which use the universal terms "all" and "every."

"Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all." The Universalist true and proper has no sort of amendment to make to the text; Christ is a true and proper ransom who delivers absolutely all men. The Arminian has his difficulty with the idea of a "ransom" and imports a meaning into it which enables him to see how the ransom does not avail for all men; so he interprets the death of Christ as that which makes all men *ransomable*. The Calvinist, finding that absolutely all men are not ransomed by the death of Christ, concludes that the "all" in the text is taken in some relative sense; a ransom for all classes and conditions of men. Now let us set the whole context of the passage before us, for it is one of the most difficult for limitationists in all the Scriptures.

"I exhort, therefore, that first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks, be made for all men; for kings, and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour; who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time" (1 Tim. 2:1-6).

This passage looks like it teaches the universal salvation of all men and that that is the fact which will be evidenced in due time. But we are barred from accepting this as its true meaning because it would throw this utterance of Paul out of line of the declarations of our Lord already referred to.

The Arminian interpretation of the passage cannot be accepted because the word here is *antilutron*, the very strongest possible word for vicarious ransom, *lutron* properly de-

notes a ransom paid in order to deliver any one from death, or prison, or captivity; and *anti* conveys the idea that the ransom is vicarious, that the payment is made instead of the victim by somebody else. Money deposited as a ransom actually releases and does not merely provide for release; if accepted, the prisoner or captive must be discharged from custody. Now this ransom which Christ made of himself was not given to the sinner, but was given to God, and is, consequently, for his acceptance or rejection.

But the Calvinistic interpretation is acceptable because it keeps the passage in harmony with the wider context of the whole Scripture and stoutly maintains the true meaning of "ransom." Then the passage is an instruction to Timothy, a young minister, about the conduct of public worship. Paul charges him to make prayer and supplication for kings and all in authority, that is, for all classes and conditions of men, that we may lead peaceable lives. If the command is to pray for all men indiscriminately, then the passage is brought into conflict with that Scripture which forbids praying for the man who has committed "the unpardonable sin." So the opening of the passage puts the key to its universalism into the hands of the Calvinist.

"The Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe."—This text cannot teach an absolute universalism, not only because it would then be out of line with the limitationism of our Lord, but because it emphasizes the salvation of believers. Upon universalist principles the text means that Christ is the Saviour of all men, of those who do not believe as well as of those who do believe, but in some emphatic and especial sense he is the Saviour of those that believe. Wherein is the salvation of a believer different from and superior to the salvation of an unbeliever? The text teaches that Christ is a Saviour of believers in a sense or to a degree in which he is not a Saviour of unbelievers; what is this sense? Universalists cannot answer.

What answer can the Arminian give but this, He saves believers but he only renders the unbelievers salvable. Then, under such an interpretation, Christ would not be the Saviour of all men, but only the Saviour of so many men as believed; but

the text teaches that he is the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe.

Calvinistic interpreters make the second clause limit and define the first; the first is general and the second is specific. All hail Christ as the Saviour of sinners, as the *Salvator Hominum*, but they do not mean thereby to proclaim that every individual man is saved. Christ is the Saviour of all men, that, is of all men who believe. Believing defines the portion of the race which is actually saved.

"That he (Christ) by the grace of God should taste death for every man" (Heb. 2:9). To "taste death" is but a figure of speech for dying; and to taste death for every man is to die for every man. Did Christ die in the room and stead of every man? That would be universalism pure and absolute. Or did he die in behalf of every man? That would be to make the salvation of all provisory only. Did he die for every man who was represented in him, and for whose salvation he came into the world? Such is the Calvinistic interpretation of the text.

All this group of texts which represent Christ as dying for "all" and for "every" man must be squared with those which represent him as dying for the "sheep," for "his people," for "them that believe." The Arminian contention is that he died for all men equally and alike;* the Calvinist contends that he died for his people in a sense in which he did not die for those who were not his people. And what is this distinction? The answer is that he died *sufficiently* for all men and *efficaciously* for elect and believing men. With this formula he is able to interpret all these texts which say Christ died for "all" and "every" man and harmonize them with all those sharp and definite statements which represent Christ as having an interest in his own people and dying for them in a sense which he does not feel and which he did not do for the race in general.

"Christ Jesus; who gave himself a ransom for all."—Our formula resolves this in this way, A ransom sufficient for all and efficient for some. The Arminian renders it, A ransom sufficient

**Watson's Institutes*, Vol. II, p. 286.

for all. The Universalist construes it, A ransom efficient for all. Each of the parties has had to put in a definite word.

"The Saviour of all men, especially of those that believe."—Our formula interprets it thus, A sufficient Saviour of all men, and an efficient Saviour of those that believe. The Arminian construes it, A sufficient Saviour of all men and a sufficient Saviour of believers. The Universalist expounds it, An efficient Saviour of all men and especially efficient for those that believe.

"He by the grace of God tasted death for every man": this means in the mouth of the Calvinist that he tasted death sufficiently for every man while he tasted it efficiently for some men; in the mouth of an Arminian it means that Christ tasted death sufficiently for every man and in the mouth of the Universalist it means that Christ tasted death efficiently for every man. The formula of the Calvinist allows him to interpret both the general and specific passages, while the formulas of Universalists and Arminians enable them to expound only one class, namely, the general and universal class of texts. If Christ is the "Saviour of all men," equally, as is the contention of both Universalists and Arminians, how is he a Saviour "especially for those that believe?" They cannot answer; we can. He is the sufficient saviour of all men and he is the efficient Saviour of them that believe. Believing defines the actual beneficiaries of the atonement; and the believers in time were the "elect" in eternity, as they will be the "saints in glory." For them Christ died in some "especial" sense; Arminians and Universalists cannot show the meaning of "especial"; Calvinists can.

If Christ died equally and just as much for one man as he did for another, (and this is the contention of both Arminians and Universalists), then what has he done for believers which he has not done for unbelievers? The atonement stands for the entire work of Christ, stands for all that he did as a Saviour; if his atonement was equal for all men, then he did as much for unbelievers as he did for believers; his whole work was as much for the one class as for the other. Then we would have to think of Christ as the Saviour of the lost just as much as he is the Saviour of the saved. The Calvinist draws a distinction, and

holds that he is the sufficient Saviour of the lost while he is the efficient Saviour of the saved.

(2) The second class of Arminian proof-texts describe the beneficiary of Christ's atonement as the "world." Here the question is, What is the meaning of the word "world"? If it were employed always in one single sense the interpretation would not be difficult; but as a matter of fact the word "world" is used in the Scriptures in three senses. (a). Sometimes it stands for that which is redeemed; (b) sometimes for that which is not redeemed; (c), sometimes for a part of the world as distinguished from another part of the world.

As an example of the first sense, take the following: "The bread of God is he which giveth life to the world": the "world" here is that to which God feeds the bread of life.—Abraham is the "heir of the world": the "world" here is that thing which Abraham as the father of all believers heired, and he certainly did not heir all mankind. "If the fall of them be the riches of the world": here the "world" is that which is enriched by the fall of the Jews.—"If the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world"; here the "world" is that which is reconciled to God.—"The Son of man came not to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved": here the "world" is that which is not condemned, but that which is saved. These passages are sufficient to show that the word "world" frequently stands for the thing which Christ saves. He is called "the Saviour of the world."

Another class of texts shows that the word "world" sometimes stands for the thing which is not saved by Christ. For example: "The world knew him not": here the word world stands for that which did not know Christ as its Saviour.—"The world cannot hate you, but me it hateth": here it stands for that which hates Christ.—"The spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive": here the "world" is that which cannot be taught of the Spirit.—"Thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world": here it stands for that thing to which Christ refuses to manifest himself.—"Not as the world giveth, give I unto you": here is a sharp contrast between Christ and the "world."—"If the world hate you, ye know that it hated me before it hated you. If

ye were of the world, the world would love its own; but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you": here the word "world" stands for that out of which Christ has chosen his disciples.—"In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world": here the "world" stands for that which is hostile to the people of God, and which will be overthrown by our Lord.—"I pray not for the world": here it is that wicked thing which Christ will not even pray for.—"Now is the judgment of this world; now is the prince of this world judged": here it stands for that world which is condemned, whose prince is cast out.

Here then are two distinct "worlds" in the Scripture—a world that is saved and a world that is lost. Which "world" is it whose sins are "taken away" by the Lamb of God, and which "world" is it whose sins are not "taken away" by that Lamb? Which "world" is it that "God so loved as to give his only begotten Son to die for it"? Which "world" is it whose sins Christ "propitiated"? This is a matter which must be determined before Universalists and Arminians can dogmatize about a universal atonement from those texts that represent Christ as dying for the "world."

If the "world" for which he died is the same "world" which will be lost, then he died in vain. If the world for which he died is the "world" which will be saved, then the atonement is for one "world" and not for two; that is, it is limited and not universal.

Is not there a unity in the meaning; Are not the two "worlds" of John, for it is this Apostle who uses this idea, really the same world, viewed from two different points of observations?

The word translated "world" is *kosmos*. In the beginning the "world" was a physical chaos; but the Spirit of God brooded upon the face of this chaotic mass and it became a *Cosmos*, a physical world of order and beauty. When man sinned, the *Cosmos* became a moral Chaos, a world of moral disorder and anarchy. Sin is a disturbing, disuniting, disorganizing force in God's moral universe. Now this moral world, a spiritual Chaos, needs to be converted into a spiritual *Cosmos*, or God must wipe it out of existence. When we look forward to the end of reve-

lation, to see the finale of all this scheme of divine operation in this chaotic world, we see a "new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness"; we see the Paradise that was lost regained; we see that a spiritual Cosmos has arisen out of the moral Chaos. Standing by the tree on the banks of the river of life, and looking at the new world which surrounds us, the Cosmos which has superseded the spiritual Chaos of sin, we will be able to say of this new world, literally and truly, the Lamb of God has taken away every sin and every sinner; this is the world which God so loved as to give his Son to die for its reclamation; this is the "world" whose sins have all been propitiated by the death of Christ; this is the world which has been the object of his love, the theatre of his redemption; the world for which he was incarnated, the world for which he died; and on the topmost hill of the New Jerusalem shall all the ransomed people of God crown him the Saviour of the World.

The mission and work of Christ in the earth is not to be thought of as limited and narrowed to the salvation of a few men on the earth, but is to be widened until the idea of restoring this whole rebellious province to the glory of God is included within the scope of the Advent and Atonement of our Lord. In the fall of man the earth itself was cursed, and the men who live on the earth were cursed, and the relations between men and nature were disordered, so that physical nature became the foe of the man who was made to dress and care for the garden. Christ's redemption aims at a complete restoration of order, harmony, and happiness. This whole world order is the world which is to be redeemed. To save the "world" is to restore the throne and dominion and glory of God on the earth. This Christ will accomplish, for after the judgment we see the new heavens and the new earth raised out of the ashes of the final fire which consumed the old heavens and the old earth, and on this New World are all the ransomed people of God.

That dominion which is to be overthrown is the dominion of the "Prince of this World," and that world which is to be destroyed is the world which he rules, which he has traduced from the service and worship of God; and those men who perish

are the men who finally and perversely cleave to the old order of things and refuse to come out and be separate from the doomed world. In the fullness of time a lance of flame will be fastened into the heart of this sinful world and a shaft of fire will also be fixed in the heart of each tenant on this globe who makes common cause with this world and its prince. This is the "world" which will be destroyed, out of which he has chosen some and away from which he has warned all men.

The Old World and the New World—the one is the object of God's wrath and the other is the object of his love and redemption. The Old World now is; the New World is the one which comes after the renovation of all things. The inhabitants of the Old World are saints and sinners; the inhabitants of the New World are glorified saints. Those who perish are the citizens of the Old World; those who live are those whose citizenship is in heaven. The New World will be made out of the same materials that are in the Old World, but they will be reconstructed. The new world will whirl in the same orbit which was occupied by the Old World, but it will fill all its sphere with the praise of God while the Old World filled all its sphere with enmity and malediction of its Creator.

I take it, then, that Christ is "the Saviour of the world" in John's gospel in the same sense in which Paul conceives of him as the Saviour of "the all things in heaven and in earth." So shall it come to pass that "the meek shall inherit the earth," but in the day of their inheritance it will be the New Earth, one really worth having, for this present earth entails upon its inhabitants more of misery than of happiness, and, except as a theatre of redemption and a school of sanctification, is really not worth owning, is a burden rather than a blessing. As it stands it is a piece of property not worth owning.

(3) The third group of texts quoted by Arminians are those which represent sin and the atonement as co-extensive. The strongest of this class is the text which runs, "As by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life" (Rom. 5:18). But this text ought not

to be quoted by any Arminian, because he does not hold that the justification through Christ is actually as wide as the condemnation through Adam. He is interested, with the Calvinist, in finding some true way to limit this text so that it shall not be made to teach universalism. The Arminian doctrine is that all men are made salvable through Christ; and if this parallelism is to hold, then all men are only made condemnable through Adam. The Wesleyan Arminian holds that the guilt of original sin was carried away by Christ, so that the Atonement was efficacious in removing original guilt, by which all men are simply made salvable. Then the status of the entire race today is, All are condemnable and all are salvable. This is thoroughly in contradiction of that Scripture which represents men as "condemned" already. The Scriptures know nothing of condemnability and nothing of salvability. The very language is a foreign dialect. This entire group of texts destroy all forms of Arminianism as well as Calvinism, if taken literally. They are proof-texts for Universalism; and are proof-texts for neither Arminians nor Calvinists. This group, then, is to be thrown out as worth nothing to the cause of Arminianism.

(4) The fourth group of Arminian Proof-texts are those which represent Christ as dying for those who actually perish. But these quotations are not conclusive against Limitationists, because, (a), Christ did die *sufficienter* for those who perish; (b) the cases are all hypothetical; (c) all the texts contain but an *argumentum ad hominem*, designed to show the strong Christian how wicked it would be for him to disregard his weak brother, who, if he really be a brother as is professed, he is a man for whom Christ died. This explains these texts.

But there is an argument against any other interpretation. If Christ was incarnated, lived, suffered, wrought, and died and rose again and ascended to heaven for a man who was finally lost, then how was that other man saved who was saved? It could not have been by Christ, for he did all he could for the man who was lost and, as his work respects all alike, he did not and could not do any more for the man who was saved. Christ did all he could for the man that was lost, and he did all he could for the man who

was saved; then who saved the one and who destroyed the other? If Christ had been the saving power, then, inasmuch as his power, according to the contention is equally applied, it ought to have saved one just as well as the other. So the man who is saved has somebody else to thank for it besides Christ.

The Calvinist can explain so as to give all the glory to God. Christ died sufficiently for the man who perished but he died efficaciously for the man who is saved. That is the same thing as saying that Christ gives his Holy Spirit to all those for whom he died, so that in due time, and by due process of grace, they are regenerated, sanctified and finally glorified.

(5) The fifth group of Arminian texts are those which require that the gospel be universally preached. Emphasis is laid upon the "great commission" and upon the liberal concession of limitationists that the gospel ought to be preached every where.

If the Atonement, he argues, is not destined by its Maker for all men, why does he, through his ministers, offer it to all men? A universal offer implies a universal Atonement, else God makes a knave out of himself and a fool out of his preacher. Preach it to every creature; make it free like the air, make it wide like the sea; urge it with every argument of reason, with every figure of rhetoric, with all the pathos of passion; organize a Church on the amplest policy, put the doctrine of missions into its heart and send its ministry everywhere, over every difficulty; offer salvation through Christ to all the race of sinners. If that does not mean, argues the Universalist, unlimited Atonement, God is insincere, and his preacher is a laughing-stock.

Now let us carefully examine this charter which creates the duty and prerogative of preaching with a view, first of finding out what we are to preach, and second, why we are to preach.

What then is to be the substance of true evangelical preaching? The preacher is an official spokesman for God; what is he authorized to say to the world? He is a herald sent from God to the nations of the earth; what precisely and definitely is he to proclaim? Matthew treats him as a teacher and says he is sent forth to teach all nations "to observe all things what-

soever I (Christ) have commanded you." Mark specifies the substance of the preaching as "the gospel," and Luke tells us that the Apostles were commissioned to preach "that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem." These Apostles were instructed to tarry at Jerusalem before taking up their duties under this commission until they should be indued with power from on high. On the day of Pentecost in the city of Jerusalem that promise was fulfilled and the Holy Spirit came down upon them with supernatural power, and now what did these inspired Apostles preach? for we may infer that they did not misconstrue their commission, or go beyond its terms. On that day Peter preached what may be called the Inaugural Discourse of the New Testament and struck the key-note of all preaching. He simply told the story of Christ, reciting the salient facts in his career without defining the extent of his atoning work, either as limited or as universal. In this connection he and other New Testament writers describe all preachers as witnesses, and the duty of a witness is to recite facts, and recite them in the plainest and most effective manner. In this recital of facts he finds that Christ died to propitiate God, to expiate sin, to satisfy divine justice; he finds that the benefits which flow from the work of Christ to men are the objective blessings of justification and adoption and the subjective blessings of regeneration and sanctification; he finds that the beneficiaries of this Atonement, the heirs of these saving blessings, are never described as all mankind universally and indiscriminately, but that these human beneficiaries are always and invariably designated as that portion of the race which repents and believes. If he is a true witness he must tell the facts as they are; he has gone beyond his commission when he undertakes to say that the beneficiaries of the atonement are all men; all that he can truthfully say is that the atonement is for all who believe; he must be a limitationist. He is therefore not commissioned to go among all the nations to declare that Christ died for all individuals; he is not told to tell it that way; he is directed to go everywhere and say, that whosoever believes shall be saved, and he that believes not shall be

damned; he is instructed to qualify the beneficiaries of the atonement so as to represent not all men but certain men, namely, believers, as the beneficiaries of the Atonement. If he so preaches, he is a limitationist and not a universalist.

The preacher who proclaims that Christ has placated God for every individual man proclaims that God is well-pleased with everybody and if he preaches that Christ has expiated the guilt of every sinner, then he declares that there is today no guilty sinner on the earth; and if he announces that the law and justice have been satisfied with respect to every person, then he heralds that there is no just claim against any. If Christ made an atonement for Judas, he placated God towards him, expiated the guilt of Judas and satisfied justice in his behalf. If Christ died for Esau, then he made God to be pleased with Esau, wiped out the guilt of Esau and satisfied every legal demand which the government of heaven had against him. If there was an atonement which did less than this it was no atonement at all. Atonement is made to the offended party; atonement is made to God. Was it acceptable by him or not? If he accepted it, he is estopped from finding further fault; if he did not accept it, it was not in his judgment an atonement. If Christ atoned for all the sins of all men, why doth he yet find fault? Is he like one of us who today declares himself satisfied and tomorrow renews the quarrel? What does atonement mean? It means satisfaction, or nothing.

The gospel preacher who sets out to preach universal salvability has read into his commission in order to lower it; he is not sent forth to herald salvability but salvation. Then he ought to remember that he may be speaking to one who has committed "the unpardonable sin," or to one who has "sinned away" his day of grace, or to "some foolish virgin" who has let her lamp go out, or to some man who has trodden under foot the blood of the covenant wherewith he was sanctified, or to some man who has tasted the good word of life and then fallen away, whom it is impossible to renew again. If these cases do not deter him from preaching a universal salvability, he ought to remember that he is not made a judge of men by his commis-

sion to preach, and so decline to assume any more responsibility than is truly laid upon him. The burden of his preaching ought to be, Whosoever believes shall be saved, and whosoever does not believe shall be damned. But when any individual asks, "Did Jesus die for me?" or "Am I salvable?" Let him remember that his functions are ministerial and not judicial; and so make the sober safe reply, "If you believe, then Christ truly died for you, and if you believe, then you are not salvable, but you are saved."

Conceding that the substance of true preaching consists in the proclamation of the facts of the gospel in the clearest and most effective manner possible, the next question is, Why, if the gospel is not to be universally applied, it is to be preached universally?

(a) The gospel should be offered universally, because there is no other sort of preaching possible. If the minister were an inspired prophet, with the power to discern between the elect and the non-elect, he would have to be clothed with judicial functions also, for, under the circumstances, the offer of the gospel to one man and its withholdment from another would be the pronouncement of judgment upon them. In this state of things there is no alternative but to preach the Gospel to everybody, or to nobody.

(b) The gospel ought to be preached to everybody because the atonement is really and truly sufficient for everybody. This fact ought to be proclaimed because it is fact, most honoring God. The provisions of salvation are superabundant, enough for all, and there is no danger that the infinite supplies of grace will give out. Clearly it is the intrinsic sufficiency of the atonement that ought to regulate its offer and not any foreseen difficulties in the way. God has an inexhaustible supply of what he offers in the gospel.

(c) The gospel ought to be universally offered because God interposes no difficulty between the sinner and the offered salvation. He exerts no direct efficiency upon the will of the non-elect: the decree of preterition is permissive. It is not God's hand that holds back any man. It is not external circumstances

which compel the rejection of the offer. It is not the indirect influence of any special grace which he gives to believers which restrains unbelievers from accepting the offered salvation. God exerts himself neither directly nor indirectly against any sinner. On the contrary the entire cause, the whole reason, why any sinner is not saved is the refusal of his own free and unconstrained will to accept what is offered to him without money and without price. He ought to be told this; the gospel ought to be preached universally that every sinner might know that the causes of his damnation are in his own will while the causes of his salvation are in the will of God.

(d) The gospel ought to be preached universally because God really and truly desires that every sinner should accept what is offered to him. He is sincere who has what he offers, and who offers what he has with the honest desire that it be accepted. God asseverates upon his oath that he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked. I am not insincere in extending a helping hand to any enemy who I know will decline it out of pure hostility to me.

(e) The gospel ought to be preached universally because it is the sinner, not God, who prevents a sufficient atonement from becoming an efficient atonement. But for God's action, the atonement which is infinitely sufficient would be efficient for no man. It would fail through the perversity of the universal fallen will. God only makes a sufficient atonement an efficient one. The water in the river of life is superabundant; there is no barrier between man and that river; the way is open and unobstructed; he does not drink because he does not want to.

The parable of "the Great Supper" illustrates all these points. The provision which had been made for the guest with such royal ampleness represents the sufficiency of the atonement; the messengers sent out to invite the guests to the feast represent the ministers of God's word, and the parable shows that their chief function is to be invitation bearers; the refusal of those who were first invited shows how nothing but the sinner's own heart stands between him and the heavy-laden table of grace, and the compulsion of those who did finally come shows how a sufficient

feast becomes an efficient meal. If the divine host compelled some to the supper, he did not prevent anyone, but on the contrary invited all. Those who did not come, what reason can they give for not accepting the invitation? Can they plead that there was not enough for them, that the atonement was insufficient? Can they plead that they were not wanted, when an express messenger, the minister of the gospel, is sent to urge their attendance? Can they plead that they had no warrant to come, when the very object of sending an invitation was to put the right to come into their hands? Can they plead that they did not have the power to come, when all their inability was a disinclination of heart? It all resolves itself into this that those who did not come did not come for the sole reason that they did not want to come, and that those who did come came because they were compelled to come. And why did he not compel them all? We do not know: the question cannot be answered.

Here then is final reason for the universal proclamation of the atonement. To put into every sinner's hand the warrant, the right, the prerogative to believe.

(6) The sixth group of texts quoted by Arminians in support of a universal salvability are those which represent the rejection of the gospel as an enhancement of guilt. How can any man be held accountable for declining an atonement which was not made for him? Yet the Scriptures teach that this is "the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light." In reply to this difficulty these things may be said.

(a) The atonement is genuinely sufficient for all men. The quantity of water in the river of life is sufficient for the entire race, that all may have all he can possibly drink; the life-boat has capacity in her cabin and power in her engines sufficient to carry all the men on the earth as her passengers.

(b) The offer of this atonement to all men is genuine and sincere. God interposes no obstacle between any man and the water of life; he genuinely urges all to come aboard the life-boat which is tied up by the side of this sinking world.

(c) There is absolutely nothing that prevents the salvation of any man but his own will. It is not the decree of reprobation that prevents him; it is not the efficacious application of the atonement to some that prevents others from believing; the only and the entire efficient cause of the loss of any man is his own will.

When we analyze this disinclination of will, we find it very deep-seated; we do not find it to be a slight opposition, easily overcome by remonstrance and the entreaty and the scolding of friends and preachers; we find it to be an intense hatred of heart; so intense that the sinner cries out that he will perish of thirst before he will drink of that water; that he will go down with the world before he will go aboard that rescuing vessel. Such is the language of the apostate heart: I had rather die in hell than accept the atonement of Christ.

Those who were absent from the Great Supper were absent not because the quantity of provision was inadequate, not because they were not invited, not through any indirect action of the host, but they stayed away for the single and sole reason that they did not want to go to that Supper.

But it was the duty as well as the privilege of those men to go to the feast; they stayed away only because they had no heart for it, only because they did not want to go; hence their increased culpability. They could have gone to the feast so far as anything outside of themselves hindered; God did not hinder; man did not hinder; circumstances did not hinder; the compulsion of some did not hinder; their own hearts hindered; they hated the host; therefore they would not go to his feast.

Under these circumstances, a man is culpable for rejecting a sufficient atonement. When he says it was not efficient for him, the answer is that it was sufficient for him; and when he says it was not intended for him, the answer is that it was offered to him by one who had the right to offer it, and he declined it singly and solely because he did not want it.

CHAPTER XVII.

The Intercession of Christ

The second part of Christ's priestly work is his Intercession.

In it he performs the office of an advocate and pleads the merits of his atonement as the ground for the discharge and blessing of those offenders whom he represented at the altar. The ancient high priest of Israel, having offered the victim upon the altar according to the sacerdotal formula, bore the atoning blood into the most holy place of Jehovah's worship and, sprinkling it upon the mercy-seat, the ark of the covenant and the floor round about, there, upon the grounds of the shed blood of the sacrifice, sued for the absolution of the offender and for the blessing of God. So Christ, having made a sacrifice of himself, enters behind the veil, with his blood in the basin as the evidence of his fulfilment of the mediatorial engagement and discharge of the redemptional contract, and, upon the ground of the merits of his shed blood, entreats his Father for the application of the benefits of his atonement to those for whom it was made—pleads for the remission of their guilt, for the bestowment upon them of the blessing of his forgiveness and sues for the gift of the Holy Spirit for their entire subjective purgation from all the defilement and power of sin. Making the atonement, he becomes a priestly attorney in the presence of God to impetrate all the benefits of redemption for his people.

I. Terminology.—This intercessory function of the priestly office of Christ is expressed in Scripture by three terms.

(1) He "appears" before God in behalf of his people, in a manner analogous to that in which, as we say, a particular attorney appears in court in the interest of his client. "For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true; but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us . . . but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice

of himself" (Heb. 9:24-26). "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us" (Heb. 9:12). "And I beheld, and, lo, in the midst of the throne and of the four beasts, and in the midst of the elders, stood a Lamb as it had been slain" (Rev. 5:6).

(2) Christ "entreats" with God for his people, after the manner in which one person makes representations in behalf of another person. He is distinctively called an "intercessor." "It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us" (Rom. 8:34). "Wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them" (Heb. 7:25).

(3) Then he is represented as "an advocate," one who is called by the side of another to represent his cause, and counsel concerning his interests. He is thus exhibited as the saints' attorney at the bar of God. "And if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world" (1 John 11:1, 2).

II. Characteristics.—(1) Christ prays, not as a suppliant, but as a royal demandant. "Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me; for thou lovedest me before the foundation of the world" (Jno. 17:24).

(2) He bases his prayer upon the "blood" which he shed in making the atonement. "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us" (Heb. 9:12). This is the argument which he makes in urging his cause, the reason which he assigns in making his plea, the ground upon which he makes his priestly demands upon his Father.

(3) He restricts his pleading to those whom he represented in his atoning death, to those whom the Father had given him. "I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for them which

thou hast given me; for they are thine. And all mine are thine, and thine are mine; and I am glorified in them. . . . Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word; that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me" (Jno. 17:9-21). The reprobate world has no part nor lot in the prayers of the Redeemer.

(4) For those who were given to him, he prays that they may be kept from the evil that is in the world; that they may be sanctified; that they may all be spiritually unified in him as he and his Father are one; that they may all be made full sharers and copartners with him in his glory; that they may all have the fullest and most exuberant manifestation of his love and good will (Jno. 17).

(5) He is a sympathetic attorney. "Wherefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people. For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succour them that are tempted" (Heb. 2:17, 18). Sympathy is grounded in (a) community of nature and (b) community of experience. Because he was genuinely human and because he had a genuine human experience he was able to sympathize with his people, enter into all their varying experiences, and adapt his intercessions to the entire current of their shifting experiences. He does not plead in any mere *pro forma* manner, but heartily, as one who is a copartner with his client and himself personally interested in the suit which he conducts.

(6) The prayers of Christ are always prevalent; he never does, nor can, pray an unanswered prayer. "And Jesus lifted his eyes, and said, Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me. And I know that thou hearest me always" (Jno. 11:41, 42). His prayers must be all-prevalent, because he can never, through ignorance or badheartedness, ever ask amiss. He and his Father are one; they always see from the same point of view and have

a community of feeling about every matter; and consequently the Redeemer always reflects the Father's mind and can ask nothing which is not in accordance with the Father's will. He prayed for his murderers at the cross; and who can say that these very persons will not appear at last in heavenly glory saved by the very grace which saves any other sinner, themselves the beneficiaries of their own act and splendid trophies of divine grace and mercy? There is no presentation in Scripture of any unanswered prayer offered by the Redeemer.

III. **Two Intercessors.**—The sinner enjoys the royal honor and the lofty privilege and the distinguishing blessing of having two attorneys to plead his cause, both members of the adorable Godhead and each serving him without money and without price. One intercessor is the triumphant Redeemer and the other is the Holy Spirit. "The Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered" (Rom. 8:26). Both the Second and the Third Persons of the Trinity are thus said to be the advocates of the sinner.

(1) These two intercessions differ as to place. The Son pleads *in foro dei*, in the court-room of God; the Spirit pleads *in foro conscientiae*, in the court-room of the conscience. The one attends to the interests of the Christian in heaven; the other attends to his interests on the earth. One pleads in the higher court of the Lord; the other in the lower court of the human conscience.

(2) They differ again as to purpose. The object of the Son's pleading in the court-room of God is to secure the justification of his client and his discharge from the custody of law as a freeman in Christ Jesus; the object of the Spirit is to secure the condemnation of his client and his conviction under the law. "Nevertheless I tell you the truth; it is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter (Advocate) will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you. And when he is come, he will reprove (convict) the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment; of sin, because they believe not on me; of righteousness, because I go to my

Father, and ye see me no more; of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged" (Jno. 16:7-11). It was the office of the Father to plan redemption; of the Son to execute that plan, and of the Spirit to apply that plan. Hence it was expedient for Christ to finish his section of the redemptional schedule and go away and send the Spirit to take up his department of application; for the Father converts no sinner, and the Son converts no sinner, but only the Holy Spirit applies the benefits of the atonement to the life and experience of guilty men. It was expedient, therefore, that Christ should finish the work of atonement and turn it over to the Holy Ghost to be applied. When the Spirit should come, the Redeemer puts into his mouth the synopsis of the great argument which he would make in the court-room of the human conscience, in his effort to convict the world. He would first plead sin, that which the accused is but ought not to be, and, specifically, the sin of unbelief in Christ; he would then plead righteousness, that which the sinner ought to be but is not, and use the ascension and triumph of Christ as the proof of his charge; and then he would plead the judgment, that act which compares the *is* of a man's life with the *ought-to-be* of that life. The object of all this pleading at the bar of the conscience is to convict the soul and, as a wise adviser, persuade it to throw itself upon the mercy of God as it is in Christ Jesus and with humble confession of its sin cry out to him for forgiveness. Christ, on the other hand, pleading his merits in the sky, makes his client a defendant, who pleads not guilty for the reason of what his Saviour has done for him, and is justified before God. The one seeks the justification of his client *in foro dei*; the other seeks the conviction of his client *in foro conscientiae*. My Saviour is my legal adviser in heaven, and the Spirit is my legal counsellor on earth.

(3) These two advocacies differ as to the grounds of the respective pleadings. The Son pleads what has been done *for* his client; the Spirit pleads what has been done *in* his client. The one presents the objective, imputed righteousness of Christ as the reason why his client should be justified of the charges laid against him; and the other offers subjective and infused

righteousness of Christ as the reason why his client should confess himself a sinner and throw himself on the mercy of the court. Christ presents his mediatorial obedience before his Father; the Spirit works upon our minds and hearts, enlightening and quickening our conscience and moral perception so that we are able to see and appreciate our religious condition. The work of the one is complementary to the work of the other and together they make a complete whole; but for Christ in heaven, the sinner would lose his case; and but for the Spirit on the earth, the sinner would lose his case through his own perverse and foolhardy behavior. No man is competent to plead his own cause *in foro dei* or *in foro conscientiae*.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Christ: The King

The Scriptures glow with the regal character of Christ; his crown and throne, his scepter and dominion, look out from the pages of prophecy and poetry, out of history and the gospels, out of epistles and apocalypse. "Yet have I set my King upon my holy hill of Zion" (Ps. 2:6). "Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and justice from henceforth even for ever. The zeal of the Lord of hosts will perform this" (Is. 9:7). "I saw in the night visions, and, behold, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages, should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed" (Dan. 7:13, 14). "Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem; behold, thy King cometh unto thee; he is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass" (Zech. 19:9). Thus do the Old Testament prophecies throb with the royalty of the predicted Messiah.

Throughout the New Testament he is acclaimed the "Lord." After his baptism he went about preaching the "gospel of the kingdom." When he stood at Pilate's bar, the Roman asked him, "Art thou the King of the Jews? And he answering, said unto him, "Thou sayest it" (Mark 15:2). When they crucified him they placarded him, "This is the King of the Jews" (Matt. 27:37). "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and of things in earth, and of things under the earth, and that every

tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father" (Phil. 2:9-11). And when the apocalyptic angel opened heaven to the eye of John, he saw one who "hath on his vesture and on his thigh a name written, King of Kings, and Lord of Lords" (Rev. 19:16).

I. **Purpose.**—The idea of a kingdom was a central topic in all our Lord's conversations and parabolic instructions, and the realization of this royal dream, the establishment and perfection of this kingdom, was the chief end of all his labors. To gather a body of subjects out of the world, which would be intelligently loyal to his throne and zealous for the promotion of his glory; to administer over them a government which would be as beneficent to them as it was honoring to his Father; to subdue all his and their enemies by converting them into genuine friends and devoted adherents, or by incarcerating the incorrigibly pugnacious in the prison house of despair; to retrieve and restore the dominion of God upon the rebellious province of this earth; possessed for him superlative attractions.

"Patriots have toiled, and in their country's cause
Bled nobly; and their deeds, as they deserve,
Receive proud recompense. We give in charge
Their names to the sweet lyre. The historic Muse
Proud of the treasure, marches with it down
To latest times, and Sculpture, in her turn,
Gives bond in stone and ever-during brass
To guard them, and to immortalize her trust."

But earthly potentates have built their thrones out of other men's bones, gemmed their scepters with other men's tears, dyed their robes in other men's blood, and coined their plaudits out of other men's groans; but the Christian's Redeemer founded his Mediatorial Empire upon the ruin of himself, transmuted his own sufferings into the songs of the saints and made his own cross the means of crowning and glorifying them. The history of the establishment of this Kingdom of Grace is without a parallel amid all those events in human history which have caused

the hearts of men to throb with admiration or to stand still in applause. Through his own blood he waded to his own throne and exercises his royal powers and prerogatives in order to apply the benefits of his sacrificial atonement to his people and make the earth, now drunk with curses and maledictions, vocal with the praises of his heavenly Father. In the exercise of his prophetic function he declared the plan of salvation; in the exercise of his priestly office he executed that plan; and now in the exercise of his kingly power he, by his word and Spirit, effectually applies that plan and brings it into full fruition, displaying the unsullied glory of his Father and the ineffable bliss of his ransomed host. To conserve and perpetuate the results of his mediation he sits at the right hand of the Majesty on High and administers over the world the powers of a throne. "Wherefore, God hath highly exalted him;" his Mediatorial Kingdom is his reward for his fulfilment of the redemptive contract.

II. **Distinction.**—This Mediatorial Kingdom of Christ as a Theanthropos must be distinguished from that dominion which he shared co-equally with the Father and the Spirit, by virtue of the fact that he was the Second Person in the Godhead and consubstantial with the other two and equal to them in power and glory. In what may be denominated the *absolute* kingdom of the Trinity we are not warranted in making distinctions as to sovereignty; there, in the inner circle of the unapproachable Godhead, the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost are absolutely equal in power and honor and dominion and rulership. But beside this absolute kingdom of the Godhead, as different from it and yet subordinate to it, is the mediatorial kingdom of grace and redemption, which the Redeemer established by his incarnation, life and death; and in this kingdom he is the head and sovereign Lord. As God and man in two distinct natures but one person, he sits upon this throne, wears its crown and sways its scepter, the Lord of redemption, the King of grace on the holy hill of Zion. It is an *imperium in imperio*, a kingdom within a kingdom, a mediatorial kingdom included under and subordinate to the absolute kingdom of the Trinity. When God raised Christ from the dead, he "set him at his own right

hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come; and hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all" (Eph. 1:20-23). This special power and dominion were granted to him as a mediatorial reward for that sublime service which he rendered in his incarnation, life and death. When this kingdom is fully consummated, "he shall see of the travail of his soul, and be satisfied." It is "the recompense of reward" upon which he has had his eye ever since he became a party to the covenant of grace.

That he might realize this regal idea, that he might successfully erect this mediatorial kingdom, "all power (authority) in heaven and in earth was given into his hands" (Matt 28:18); the royal right and prerogative to make drafts upon the services and powers of every being in the universe—except one person—was bestowed upon him for redemptive purposes. "For he hath put all things under his feet. But when it is said all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted, which did put all things under him" (1 Cor. 15:27). To achieve this result, he could command the services of the Holy Spirit, the third person of the almighty and sovereign Godhead, and send him into the world to convince it of sin and righteousness and judgment; he could lay under tribute the mightiest archangel which flies with blazing wing across the heavens and send him as a flaming spirit to minister to the heirs of salvation; he could lay his lawful hand upon the choicest human spirits and ordain them to the ministry to promote this royal enterprise; he could put the noose of his authority about the necks of the mightiest potentates in the earth and make the kingdoms of this world do his bidding; he could harness all the impersonal forces of nature and make them his servants in executing his redemptive will; all things, but the Father, were put under his feet and bound to his service; he was made the head over all things to his church; as a Theanthropos, engaged in the establishment of the mediatorial kingdom, he had the lawful right, granted by his

Father, to conscript into his service all lower life of sublunary being, and to even impress the Holy Spirit himself and send him upon missions of regeneration and sanctification. But when he has achieved this sublime end, and the mediatorial kingdom of saints has been set up and consummated according to the primal archetype in the divine mind, then this special supernatural grant of prerogative and power will be, by him, surrendered back into the hands of his Father. "And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all and in all" (1 Cor. 15:28). It is not the sovereign headship of the mediatorial kingdom which will be surrendered in the end; for Christ will be the redemptive head of his people for ever and they will be dependent upon him for their life and bliss throughout all the enduring ages of eternity; but it is this special grant of power which was given to him as a means to the end of the establishment of the kingdom of saving grace which will be restored to the Father's hand, and then Christ as the head with all his saints as the body and citizenry of his redemptive dominion will go under the sovereignty of his Father—a kingdom under a kingdom, that God may be head over all. "The head of Christ is God" (1 Cor. 11:3). The sacramental host will ever circle the mediatorial throne of Christ, and Christ will ever be the head of all the glorified saints; and Christ with his heavenly train of redeemed men and women will ever circle around his Father's throne, offering his worship and the worship of his people who ever more must approach God through him, saying, "Behold me, and the children whom thou hast given me." This is but saying that the mediatorial throne is "an everlasting throne," as it is described in Scripture; and there can never be any conflict between the two thrones, the mediatorial of which Christ is the crowned occupant and the throne of God as the representative of the absolute Godhead, for the same mind is in Christ Jesus, which is in the Father and the same mind is in the saints of Christ which is in Christ himself; they are Christlike, and Christ is Godlike. So the praises which rise from the mediatorial kingdom will meet and merge with and

smell the harmonies which ever rise within the Trinitarian household itself; and God will be very happy in man, and man will be very happy in God, and heaven shall be and abound in the bliss which comes from Christ's harmonizing the kingdom of grace with the kingdom of God—the end for which he was born, suffered, and died.

III. **Names.**—From different points of view this Mediatorial Kingdom is given several names in the Scriptures, each indicating something important about its nature.

(1) It is called the "Kingdom of God," because it was set up by the divine decree, and comes under the universal sovereignty of the absolute throne of the Trinity. This appellation is given more than seventy-five times in the New Testament alone. Jesus began his ministry by "preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God" (Mark 1:14); during the forty days between resurrection and ascension, he "spake of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God" (Acts 1:3); the apostles, in the exercise of their ministry, "expounded and testified the kingdom of God" (Acts 28:23); and John in the apocalyptic vision of the consummation of things hears a loud voice in heaven proclaiming, "Now is come salvation, and strength, and the kingdom of God, and the power of his Christ" (Rev. 12:10). As it rises in the divine decree, has all its developmental process under the sovereign superintendence of Jehovah, and in its final and completed form is still a sub-kingdom under the universal and absolute dominion of the Godhead, it is designated most frequently and emphatically the *Kingdom of God*.

(2) It is called the "Kingdom of Christ," because the Redeemer, in his theanthropic constitution as a divine-human being, by his incarnation, sufferings and death, executed the decree for its erection and sits as its Lord upon its mediatorial throne and administers all its powers and government; the headship of Christ grounds the reality and appropriateness of this appellation. God "hath translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son" (Col. 1:13). "Verily I say unto you, There be some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom" (Matt. 16:28). "Jesus said,

my kingdom is not of this world; if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now is my kingdom not from hence" (Jno. 18:36). In many places the antecedent of the pronouns "his," "my" and "thy," when coupled with kingdom, is Christ. He is called a king throughout both Testaments, and the Apocalypse reveals him in the consummation of all things seated on a throne in glory, with a capital inscription upon his vesture and upon his thigh, "KING OF KINGS, AND LORD OF LORDS." Because of his occupancy in his theanthropic person of the seat of sovereign power and administration in this mediatorial kingdom, it is properly and truly called the *Kingdom of Christ*.

(3) It is called the "Kingdom of Grace," because the power, the force, the dynamics, of this mediatorial kingdom is the grace of the Holy Spirit; he is to this kingdom what the sheriff, the army and the navy are to human kingdoms—the power of application and execution, the energy of efficiency. All its decrees, laws, principles, ideals, are translated into glorious realities by the grace of the Spirit, the almightiness of his strength. Its throne is called a "throne of grace" (Heb. 4:16); its law is said to be the "law of grace" (Rom. 6:14); its power is set forth as the "power of grace" (2 Cor. 12:9; 1 Cor. 4:20); and its gospel is the "gospel of the kingdom" (Matt. 4:23). Hence this mediatorial kingdom is denominated the Kingdom of the Gospel, the Kingdom of the Spirit, or the *Kingdom of Grace*.

(4) It is called the "Kingdom of the Saints," because the citizens of this kingdom are the people of God, while all others are related to it as "strangers and foreigners." "Now, therefore ye are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God" (Eph. 2:19). "For our conversation (citizenship) is in heaven; from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ" (Phil 3:20). "Ye are come unto mount Sion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels, to the general assembly and church of the firstborn, which are written in heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect" (Heb. 12:22, 23).

Christians are made partakers "of the inheritance of the saints in light" (Col. 1:12). When therefore the mediatorial kingdom is designated from the population and citizenry of it, it is called the *Kingdom of the Saints*.

(5) It is called the "Kingdom of Heaven," because of the state of blessedness which characterizes the internal life of that kingdom, whether conceived as established in the individual heart of the believer or consummated in its final and perfected form. "The kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Matt. 3:2). "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 5:3). Certain ones shall be called "least in the kingdom of heaven," and others shall be called "great in the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 5:19). A multitude which no man can number shall come from all points of the compass, and "shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 8:11). A large number of parables were spoken by our Lord, beginning, "the kingdom of heaven is like" (Matt. 13). If therefore this mediatorial kingdom of Christ be denominated from the internal state of peace and felicity which characterizes it, it is designated the *Kingdom of Heaven*. This state of glory, begun here below, will not come to its full and perfect fruition of bliss until the final consummation of the whole mediatorial programme of the Redeemer.

IV. **Characteristics.**—The word kingdom *basileia* is used in two distinct senses; the one concrete and the other abstract. (a) *Concretely* the term connotes that entire composite organization, including the king on his throne, the government which he administers, the subjects over whom he bears rule, the domain which is under his dominion and all else which enters in to make up the concept of a royal state; (b) *abstractly* it signifies the royal government, the official administration of the monarchy. If one speaks of the Kingdom of Great Britain he may intend to mention in a phrase that entire royal state, including the king and his subjects and his territory and all other things belonging to and constituting a part of the public life of that particular government; or he may mean by his phrase to signify the abstract government which is administered over

the Islands and their colonies; he may be talking about only the kingship of the king. The expression is used both ways in Scripture concerning the mediatorial kingdom of Christ. When men are said to "enter into the kingdom," the first meaning is the concrete one, but when men are said to "receive the kingdom," which is the same thing as saying that the kingdom enters men, the second sense must be given to the word. Men "enter" the kingdom of Christ when they are introduced into the citizenship of that kingdom and are made units in that great composite idea, but men "receive" the kingdom of Christ when his Spirit enters their hearts and changes their subjective loyalty from devotion to Satan into allegiance to the Redeemer. We need to think of the king with his domain and people, on the one hand, and of the authority and rulership and government of the king dispensed from his throne, on the other hand. But besides these ideas, common generically to all conceptions of a royal state, there are certain characteristics which are especially predicable of the mediatorial kingdom of the Saviour of sinners.

(1) It is a spiritual kingdom. (a) Because the human spirit is the territory and domain of this kingdom: "Neither shall they say, Lo here, or lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you" (Luke 17:21). "For the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 14:17). (b) Because only those who are spiritually minded can become the citizens of this kingdom: "Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom as a little child, he shall not enter therein" (Mark 10:15). (c) Because the modes of its becoming, of its development and expansion in the world, are not visible and sensational: "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation" (Luke 17:20). (d) Because its instrumentality is the truth, and not the sword, by which it erects itself, defends and propagates itself, making none of its appeals to force but depending entirely upon what it addresses to the minds and hearts of men: "And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven" (Matt. 16:19). (e) Because

it is distinctly contrasted with the kingdoms of this world, and specifically declared to be not of it, while in it: "My kingdom is not of this world; if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now is my kingdom not from hence" (Jno. 18:36). "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's" (Matt. 22:21). (f) But chiefly because the Holy Spirit is the life and power, the energy and effective force of this kingdom: "He breathed on them, and saith, Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (Jno. 20:22). "For the kingdom of God is not in word, but in power" (1 Cor. 4:20). Spiritual in its sphere, spiritual in its subjects, spiritual in its modes, spiritual in its instrumentality, spiritual in its contrasts, spiritual in its life and power, it is thoroughly illegitimate to secularize it in any way or in any matter. It cannot be properly subjected to the civil state, as the Erastians would do; nor can it in any legitimate way be merged with the civil organization, so as to make it either subordinate to or superior to the commonwealth; the two kingdoms—the state and the church—are entirely separate and distinct entities, both having divine origins but separate spheres and functions, and can never be allied without degrading the divine ideal. The spirituality of the kingdom of Christ deeply and radically separates it from the kingdom of Caesar, and Caesarism in the church is as deplorable as ecclesiasticism in the state; the parson ought to stay out of politics and the politician ought to stay out of the church, on the principle that everything ought to stay in its own place and attend to its own business; only by the execution of this programme can the world have any peace or happiness.

(2) It was a progressive kingdom. It was a fresh and significant thought put forth by our Lord that his kingdom was to come to its fulness and perfection by a gradual growth, requiring a time and a process to come to the final stage of its development. Gradually it was to come to the fulness of its power and authority and prestige in the earth; gradually it was to gather its full complement of redeemed citizens; gradually it was to extend its borders until its domain should reach out to the edges

of the predetermined territory; gradually it was to emerge from small and unpretentious beginnings until it should, in the final consummation, fill all the "new heavens and new earth with righteousness." Christ began his ministry by proclaiming that his kingdom was "at hand," subsequently he declared that it was already present: "If I with the finger of God cast out devils, no doubt the kingdom of God is come upon you" (Luke 11:20). On the other hand he taught his disciples to pray, "Thy kingdom come" (Luke 11:2). The explanation of this apparent contradiction is not far to seek; the kingdom did not come fully at once with a great apocalypse of glory, but invisibly and secretly, like a grain of mustard seed or a little leaven (Mark 4:26-29). The full realization of the kingdom was a promise which girdled the future and had to wait, for its final and glorious form, the ripening of God's providential dealings with Jews and Gentiles.

(3) It was to become a universal kingdom. It was to spread from sea to sea, to progress from stage to stage, until the reign of Christ should be universal. The mustard seed must grow, until it becomes a great tree and fills the whole earth; the leaven must swell the dough, until the whole lump has been leavened. "I will overturn, overturn, overturn it; and it shall be no more, until he come whose right it is; and I will give it him" (Ezek. 21:27). And in the vision of the end there were great voices heard in heaven crying, "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord, and of his Christ; and he shall reign for ever and ever" (Rev. 11:15). The Redeemer will apply his royal power until he has fully and finally established his blessed mediatorial kingdom, with such a prerogative and prestige, with such a citizenry, with such a territorial domain, as becomes this King and the dignity of his Father who has ordained it.

(4) But in bringing all this dominion of his throne into its glorious reality Christ will employ his Church as an instrumentality. This defines for us the relation between the Church and the Kingdom, the *ecclesia* and the *basileia*. It is not the relation of identity; the Church is not the same thing as the

Kingdom; but the Church is an organization which Christ has formed, with certain officers, laws and institutions, and rights and prerogatives, as a *means* for the establishment of his Kingdom; the *ecclesia* exists for the sake of the *basileia*. To belong to the Church, therefore, is not necessarily to belong to the Kingdom; but to belong to the Church, is to belong to Christ's working corps, to his army militant, to that divine society which he has set up on the earth as the propaganda of his royal cause in the earth. His Church is the human organization upon which he relies, through his Spirit, for the triumph of his cause. The very meaning and purpose of the Church in the earth makes it a missionary institute and binds it to devote itself exclusively and industriously to the establishment, in an instrumentary way, of the mediatorial Kingdom of the Redeemer; and the sublimest motive which can play upon the Christian heart to urge it to aggressive enterprises is derived from the fact that the success of the Church's mission is the triumph of the Kingdom of the Redeemer.

CHAPTER XIX.

The Humiliation of Christ

"Christ's humiliation consisted in his being born, and that in a low condition, made under the law, undergoing the miseries of this life, the wrath of God, and the cursed death of the cross; in being buried, and continuing under the power of death for a time."

I. Incarnation.—The moment Christ consented to become incarnate, that instant he accepted a proposition to descend from a higher to a lower form of life; and the stoop was as great as finite humanity is an inferior form of being to infinite divinity. When he took to himself a true body and a reasonable soul, belonging to the grade of man's life, he degraded himself by so much as the level of man's life is below the grade of God's life; he came down from a higher peak of existence to a lower mode of existence. "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman" (Gal. 4:4). "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us" (Jno. 1:14). "Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men, and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross" (Phil 2:6-8). The humiliation of this descent to man's level was accentuated by several circumstances: (1) By the fact that he united with human nature at its bottom, being born of a lowly woman, whose ancestry had been spoiled of all its honors and position and wealth in earthly society; (2) by the fact that his birthplace was not some royal palace with all the furnishings and surroundings of pomp and elegance, but a stable for the housing of animals, with a manger for a cradle; and (3) by the fact that the human race and family to which he connected himself were the most dishonored and persecuted people of all the world. "And she brought forth her first born

son, and wrapped him in swaddling clothes, and laid him in a manger" (Luke 2:7). He had to flee for his life when yet an infant; he worked for a living in Nazareth; he had to go hungry, and unhoused, without money even for taxes, with few friends, and many enemies—all incident upon the fact that he became man by act of his will when he might have remained in glory in the form of God. These things emphasize the depth of the humiliation to which he subjected himself when he became incarnate.

While he thus truly humbled himself in becoming man, yet he did not pollute himself, for he united with sinless humanity. He had become defiled and unclean had not the nature which he took been first sanctified and purged of all taint of sin. Consequently his honor remained unsullied, and his character unsmirched, and his conscience unoffended, in all his incarnate, though humble, human life.

Those who hold exaggerated views as to the exalted nature of humanity intrinsically considered; who think humanity and divinity are in reality on the same metaphysical plane of being; who look upon humanity as close akin to divinity, so that it is improper to see any difference in the rank of being; cannot hold that Christ humiliated himself in becoming incarnate. There was no step downwards, when he became man, for the reason that humanity really ranks equal to divinity. But all those who hold that divine life lies upon a plateau infinitely higher than the most exalted station humanity can possibly attain unto, have no difficulty in seeing that the incarnation, while not a corrupting degradation, was yet a real and true humiliation, and would have been such even if he had taken humanity at the top instead of at the bottom.

II. **Law.**—When the Son of God became incarnate he brought himself under law as a subject and servant. There is nothing inherently humiliating in a moral person being under moral law, but the Redeemer was primarily the source of all law, and all rules and orders issued from him as from the *fons et origo* of all authority; but he put himself under precepts, commands and obligations and laid upon himself prohibitions and

injunctions. A law which was delivered to others and put them under bonds is now turned upon him and speaks to him in as mandatory tones as ever it spake to human creatures; he who was above law as a rule of obedience, is now distinctly subject to law, liable to its censures and able to command its blessings only as he complies with its letter and its spirit.

But there is a deeper element of humiliation in this phase of the descent of Christ; he assumed a position under a law already violated, which had obligations of suffering to be borne and incurred penalties to be endured. He not only went into the brick-yards of Egypt under an Egyptian task-master, who would use his flail upon his disobedient back did he fail, but he assumed the task at the moment when the Israelite had broken down and was now under the obligation to bring in the full and regular tale of bricks without straw, and he must also catch up the task which was behind-hand—Christ must obey the law both in its penal and in its preceptive demands. As a debtor he must at once pay the original amount of money, and the incurred debts besides. It is a humiliating position in which to find oneself who had heretofore been Lord of all and above all. To a sovereign, law originating from above him and being applied to him by a power superior to him is irksome; but to be a sovereign and then be brought to the knees and be required to pay fines and drink of the cup of penalty to its dregs is anything else but exalting and dignifying. To be under orders is humiliating; but to be in the grasp of violated law is a deeper degradation. "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under law" (Gal. 4:4). "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill" (Matt. 5:17).

The Redeemer went under the law as a rule of duty, as a covenant of life and as a broken covenant whose penalty was already impending. His voluntary assumption of such a position was a humiliation, for the law lays its claims not upon abstract natures, but upon persons; and this humiliation is deepened immeasurably by the fact that he voluntarily accepted the accrued curse of the broken covenant. "For it is written,

Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them. . . . Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree" (Gal. 3:10-13). It was a humiliation to Christ who was not a natural subject of law to be put under law; but it was a far intenser humiliation of him to put him under the curse and hang him on a tree.

In assuming these legal obligations the Redeemer did not contaminate himself, for the reason that he did fully all that was required of him, in keeping both the precept and the penalty of the law, and at last died with a conscience void of offence towards God and towards man. He was sinless in all the humiliation he endured.

III. Wrath of God.—As the Second Person in the adorable Trinity the Son was "the only begotten and well beloved Son" of the Father; and it is impossible to overstate the exuberance and wealth of that affection which his Father bestowed upon him. After his incarnation, in his own person, and absolutely considered, Christ was often declared by the Father to be his "beloved Son, in whom he was well pleased" (Matt. 3:17). "For he received from God the Father honour and glory, when there came such a voice to him from the excellent glory, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased" (2 Pet. 1:17). These expressions of affection and satisfaction were based not only upon what he was in himself, holy and harmless and separate from sinners as a mediator, but also upon what, in his official capacity, he did; he, as the mediatorial servant, always did that which pleased his heavenly Father: "For I do always those things that please him" (Jno. 8:29). "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work" (Jno. 4:34). No being, much less such a righteous and perfect being as God the Father, could fail to approve and applaud another person, such as Christ, who so faithfully and perfectly and intelligently pleased him in all things. But in his office as mediator the Redeemer had assumed the sinner's place, taken upon his shoulders the sinner's guilt, and on him was laid the

iniquity of all his people. In this federal character, as a Second Adam, he was obnoxious to the wrath of God; personally, God was delighted with him; but federally, he was angry with him. This wrath was based upon human guilt and poured out upon him because of human offence, but this displeasure of the deity terminated upon the person of Christ vicariously; a real deluge of wrath, albeit it was because of imputed guilt and not at all for personal sin.

This divine wrath beat upon him; it sent upon him all the miseries of this life, with which he was afflicted while a sojourner in our world; it bore upon him until it brought him to the cross on Calvary, and in the dying hour God averted his face, and forsook him. As he approached Gethsemane, he said, "My soul is exceeding sorrowful even unto death" (Matt. 26:38). In the moment of death, he cried aloud, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Matt. 27:46). (1) Either God fearfully afflicted a person who in no sense had ever displeased him, which would be an intolerable criticism upon the character of the Deity; (2) or Christ, who had habitually pleased him, had in the last days of his life committed some crime or terrible offence against his Father to provoke so awful a display of wrath, which would be a serious criticism upon the integrity and sinlessness of Christ; (3) or the Redeemer was federally guilty, the bearer of the iniquities of his people, and therefore the divine providence smote him to death, not as one personally offensive, but putatively and vicariously obnoxious to justice and law. For some reason, he who came out of the bosom of his Father and who was an object of infinite complacency and delight died an awful death under the divine frown. To thus expose himself, and thus endure the displeasure of the being whose good will he esteemed above all else, for the sake of the sinners whom he would save, was an act of amazing condescension and humiliation.

IV. Death.—Death is the most humiliating fact in human history. A corpse is but the consummate result of all those forces which seek to bring down man to the very bottom of degradation and shame. To see human strength dissolve into absolute impotence; to see human beauty decay into loathsome cor-

ruption; to see human greatness melt into the dust of the grave; to see the human body become food for worms, is one of the most repulsive visions the eye of man has to look upon. With flowers and music we seek to veil the hideousness of death; with poetry and art the world endeavors to idealize it and paint it so as to make it tolerable for those who have to look upon it with the sure consciousness that they too must presently experience it. I hate death; I hate it in all its forms; I hate it everywhere; it violates every noble thing in me; it strips me of every vestige of honor and respectability; I long for a world where there will be no dead thing but where every created thing will live and thrive and be happy for ever. But such is not this world of ours; for "death has reigned from Moses to Adam;" ridged the surface of the earth with human graves and pointed to the tomb as the goal to which all human paths surely lead. It is "the king of terrors," the "last enemy." The Bible does not introduce us to it as our "good friend death," but as that relentless enemy, which can be overcome and transformed only by the redeeming power of Christ.

The natural horror of death is accentuated by the cause which brings it upon the race. That cause is not the natural and automatic operation of nature pulling down the human organism, but its deepest cause is ethical. It was in the beginning attached to transgression as a judicial consequence (Gen. 2:17); "death came by sin" (Rom. 5:12); "the wages of sin is death" (Rom. 6:23); and "the sting of death is sin" (1 Cor. 15:56). Death is not only an abnormality, but it is a dishonorable event which attaches disgrace to the being who experiences it; its cause is ethical; it is the infliction of judicial displeasure. It smirches reputation, fame and honor, and stigmatizes all upon whom it lays its hand. Had there been no sin, no man had said "to corruption, Thou art my father; to the worm, Thou art my mother and my sister" (Job. 17:14).

But the Son of God drank of "this cup" of death; he died the painful and shameful death of the cross! It was a long step downwards from the blessed bosom of the Trinity to the bottom of the grave! It was an awful experience to exchange

the bliss of heaven for the agonies of Calvary! It was an amazing condescension to give up the plaudits of angels for the crown of thorns and disgraceful cross! And the sting of the humiliation to him was in the fact that, while conscious of his personal innocence, he was at the same time conscious of his federal guilt and that his death was, therefore, penal and not disciplinary!

As his hour approached, the evening before actual death in Gethsemane, he showed a strange hesitancy, an actual shrinking from the awful ordeal. This strangeness of our Lord's hesitation will be emphasized if we look at the primary attitude which he took concerning it. After Peter confessed that he was "the Christ, the Son of the living God," he began to speak definitely about his death: "From that time began Jesus to show unto his disciples, that he must go unto Jerusalem, and suffer many things of the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be killed, and the third day be raised up" (Matt. 16:21). The necessity of death was laid upon him; he *must* go up to Jerusalem, and there he *must* suffer many things. This necessity of death was not physical but moral, for he said, "I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it again." And our Lord clearly understood the meaning and significance of his death: "For the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" (Mark 10:45). Then why the Gethsemane hesitation, and shrinking from a death which he for a long time foresaw and which was, in a true sense, the purpose of his incarnation?

"My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me." One would naturally expect the Redeemer to approach his death with moral eagerness and to be congratulating himself that he was now on the eve of the final termination of all his humiliation and of the accomplishment of the very purpose of his incarnation. On the contrary, he seems to draw back and to cry to his Father, If it be possible let me off from this ordeal.

Some of his rationalistic critics tell us that in Gethsemane he was seized with a sudden fear and was temporarily overtaken with nervous collapse; and in his dread plead to be released from

his compact. But no one who truly respects his Lord and appreciates his character can for a moment entertain this thought. Many a criminal has met death without nervous prostration; how much more must have been the bravery of Christ, who understood the full beneficence of his death!

Others tell us that, while Jesus was willing to die when it was necessary, his soul was oppressed by the fact that men were so obtuse as make themselves criminals in his execution. The thing which he hated, which was so dreadfully oppressing him, was the fact that his death would be implicated with criminality on the part of the men whom he was dying to save. "From death as such he does not shrink, but from its mode and agencies, from death under the form and conditions which involved its authors in what appears inexplicable guilt, his whole nature recoils." This whole view is absolutely untenable, for Jesus long knew that he could not go hence except through the agency of wicked men. The view is redemptionally superficial and overlays the whole scene with mere sentimentality. It construes Christ as shrinking from the sort of hands at which he was to perish; he shrinks not at death, but at the executioners.

In Gethsemane our Lord was about to die, there and then. Sorrow had rolled in upon him until he was in a bloody sweat, while as yet not a hand of physical violence had been laid upon him. If he does; if he collapses in death in the garden, his death will be premature; his "hour" had not yet come. If he should there and then die in Gethsemane, the whole redemptional programme is a failure; prophecy will be falsified; his Father will be proved untruthful; his atonement will fall short. Hence he prays to his Father, begging that "this cup"—this cup of immediate and impending death—might pass. He is not praying for escape from death on tomorrow, but for release from death today. He really prays that he may live until tomorrow and come to the cross and be crucified according to the divine schedule. The "cup" was death in the garden, there and then; he was heard and answered; that cup did pass; his human nature was bolstered by angels from the sky and lived to be crucified the next day on the cross on Calvary. He did not shrink from the very death

he came to die, as terrible as was that death; there was not here any nervous weakness nor any repenting that he must go at the hands of wicked men; but his cry to God was to save him from death in the garden that he might die on the cross. The one, death in Gethsemane, would have nullified his mission; the other, death on the cross, would fulfill all prophecy and effectuate his redemptional plan; he prayed for life in Gethsemane that he might die on Calvary. The next day he was lifted upon the cross and he did not then cry for deliverance, but he did cry with a loud voice, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" He yielded up the ghost under his Father's wrath, and in the darkness of his Father's displeasure. Death in itself was awful; death at the hands of angry fellowmen was also more dreadful; but death under the wrath of God was unutterably awful; it broke the Redeemer's heart. What a humiliation for the Son of God to subject himself to!

There are three theories as to the physical cause of the death of Christ:

(1) It is held by some that he came to the cross emaciated in body and depleted in strength in consequence of the strenuous life which he had lived, so that a few hours of physical suffering were enough to complete the work of death; he died by nervous prostration. Under the hard life which he had lived, under the weary trial during the previous night, the scourging of the Roman soldier given under Pilate's order, under the exhaustion incident to carrying his heavy cross to Golgotha, there was left, we are told, but little physical force in him; a few hours of suffering were sufficient to cause the last tide of life to run out; and so he yielded up the ghost naturally as the result of sheer physical exhaustion. This is the view held and urged by all the humanitarian interpreters of life, who are zealous to eliminate every trace of the supernatural from the life of the Redeemer. But we must bear in mind that he was a young man in the hey-day of his manhood, in the very prime and flower of his strength, who had lived a sinless and correct moral life, who had not wasted his energies in the indulgence of vice and intemperance; that on the day of the crucifixion he was physically strong enough to

start with his cross to Calvary and that in the very hour of death he was strong enough to cry with a loud voice, which would not have been the case had he died by gradual exhaustion.

(2) The second theory takes the ground that Christ at the supreme moment sovereignly dismissed his human spirit from his body by a voluntary act of his will. This hypothesis rests principally upon that great saying of his: "No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father" (Jno. 10:18). His death was not a suicide, because he had received a "commandment of his Father" to lay down his own life. At the moment, therefore, when he had suffered to that degree necessary to complete his atonement, he cried, "It is finished," and voluntarily dismissed his spirit. He did not, therefore, truly and strictly perish at the hands of his enemies but was himself the active agent in laying down his life. His enemies then would be chargeable with the *intent* to put him to death, but not with the *fact* of his death.

(3) The third view takes the ground that the Redeemer died literally of heart-rupture. This is the view of Hanna and Geikie and Stroude, a Scotch physician, who reviewed the death of Christ from the point of view of a surgeon giving expert testimony before a coroner's jury. The following facts are pointed to as the chief supports of this hypothesis:

(a) On the evening before he died, in Gethsemane, his "soul was exceeding sorrowful even unto death," or almost unto death. At that time there was the physical phenomenon of the "bloody sweat," caused by mental sorrow, for as yet not a hand of violence and injury had been laid upon him; and this phenomenon indicates that some physical catastrophe was impending. The woes of his soul had brought him to the very verge of the grave, and he cried mightily to God to send him help that he might not perish there and then. "By reason of sorrow the heart is broken," and *post mortem* examinations do sometimes reveal the fact that some of the sorrowful children of men do actually die of a broken heart; how much more intense must have been the sorrow of Christ than that of any human being!

(b) The sorrow which was almost unto death in Gethsemane returned upon him the next day on Calvary and there received no surcease but deluged him in the darkness of his Father's hidden face. With a piercing cry, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" he bowed his head in death. That last cry, very loud, indicates that the Redeemer perished from some sort of stroke and not by the gradual ebbing of his life tides through physical exhaustion.

(c) The quickness with which he yielded up the ghost after being hung on the cross points to some sudden and abrupt termination of his life. The cross consisted of an upright piece, a transverse section for the arms and a peg upon which to straddle the body to prevent its weight from tearing out the nails. The only physical suffering inflicted was caused by the nails driven through the hands and the feet. It was consequently the slowest form of execution and was resorted to by the Roman government for the purpose of prolonging the tortures of death. At sunset, the law in mercy permitted the legs of crucified persons to be broken in order to hasten the termination of misery. There are instances on record where crucified wretches languished on the cross for seven mortal days. But in the afternoon when the officers came upon their mission of gruesome mercy to break the legs of Christ and the two criminals who were crucified with him, they found the Lord already dead—within three hours after he was lifted up. But the two thieves were yet alive, and were dispatched by the clubs of the soldiers. Why did this young man, Jesus of Nazareth, in the flower of health and vigor, perish so much more quickly than did the two thieves, whom we may readily believe had lived in a manner to seriously discount their ability to endure a long siege of suffering on the cross? There must have been at work in Christ, effecting the dissolution of his human soul and body, something which did not operate in the case of the two thieves. What was it, but the spiritual sorrow which in Gethsemane came so near putting him in his grave?

(d) But the soldier's spear served the purpose of a *post mortem* examination. When he thrust it into the side of the Redeemer, there gushed forth a stream of "water and blood."

Ordinarily in death by natural causes, that is, by gradual exhaustion, there is little or no liquid in the pericardium. The heart is a double conical shaped muscular bag, with two compartments divided from each other by a middle wall of partition, and hanging loosely in a membraneous sack, called the pericardium. In death by heart-rupture the blood is forced through the fissure into this pericardium, where the extravasated blood is quickly coagulated into the red cresementum and the colorless serum. When the pericardium is opened under these circumstances the phenomenon of "blood and water" makes its appearance. Assuming that Christ died of heart-rupture, and that the soldier's spear penetrated the pericardium, then the phenomenon of "blood and water" which John saw would be physically accounted for; otherwise it is difficult of explanation.

If this were the physical cause of the death of Christ, how pathetic! The "Man of Sorrows" had his heart literally broken by the woes of his people; there was the piercing cry following the deathstroke; but the cruel nails prevented him from throwing his hands across his breast and clasping his breaking heart! How sinful is sin! How sympathetic and loving was Jesus!

V. Power of Death.—From Friday evening to Sunday morning the Lord of Glory continued under the power of death; a subject of the kingdom of the last enemy. This is the final instalment of his humiliation. His body was sealed up in the tomb, separated from his human soul, but still united to his divine nature; but it did not see corruption, because, perhaps, it was still united to his divine nature, which acted as its preservative. His human spirit, we may infer from what he said to the penitent thief who died by his side on the cross, went to paradise and awaited the morning of his resurrection, the hour of the commencement of his exaltation. This item of his humiliation is expressed in the so-called Apostles' creed by the *descensus ad inferos* clause.

This creed was begun by Irenaeus in A. D., 200, and completed by Pirminius in A. D., 750. In A. D., 390, Rufinus added the clause, *descendit in inferna*. This clause has received different interpretations by different parties.

(a) The Romanists think that Christ, during the three days of death, went to the *Limbus Patrum*, that compartment of Hades, in which the Old Testament saints waited in confinement for the revelation and application to them of the salvation which he effected by his death on the cross. But the place is purely supposititious, the visit is supposititious and the mission is supposititious.

(b) Lutherans hold that his death was the last act in the drama of his humiliation, and that the *descensus* was the first act in his exaltation, and that his visit to the disembodied world was for the purpose of triumphing over Satan and the powers of darkness. This, again, is purely speculative and without any warrant in divine revelation.

(c) The Church of England, as interpreted by Bishop Pearson, thinks that Christ really went to the place of the damned to consummate the expiation of sin and to destroy the power of hell over the redeemed. In this view, Christ's humiliation did not stop short of his actual descent into hell, there to atone for the sins of his people and set them free from the dominion of Satan.

(d) Second Probationists think that the Redeemer went into the disembodied world to make an offer of salvation to those who had passed out of this world prior to his advent and who had had no opportunity to act upon the overtures of the gospel. But this too is purely speculative.

(e) The Westminster Confession of Faith interprets the phrase metaphorically, and affixes this explanatory clause, "continued in the state of the dead." That is, this famous and conservative document declines to dogmatize upon what Christ did, and where he went, during the three days of his death, and contents itself with the safe statement that he continued under the power of death until his resurrection.

The passage of Scripture most employed in connection with this phase of the humiliation is the following: "For Christ hath also once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit; by which also he went and preached unto the

spirits in prison; which sometime were disobedient, when once the longsuffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls were saved by water" (1 Pet. 3:18-20). Here a certain preaching, its mode and result are set forth. Who was the preacher? Christ. How did he preach? Not in person at all, but by his Spirit. To whom did he preach? To those antediluvians who are now at the writing of Peter "spirits in prison." When did he preach to these persons? In the days of Noah, while the ark was building. What human preacher did Christ employ through whom to preach to these persons by his Spirit? Noah, who was "a preacher of righteousness." What was the result of this preaching? Eight souls were saved. This simple exposition of this much litigated passage shows: (1) that Christ did not at any time preach the preaching here referred to in person, but that he did it by Noah through his Spirit; (2) that, however he may have done this preaching, he did not do it in the interim between his death and his resurrection, but in the days the ark was a preparing; (3) that the persons to whom he preached this gospel of the just dying for the unjust were not spirits in prison at the time of the preaching but that they were incarcerated at the moment Peter here refers to them and the preaching which was done to them. Consequently the text has no sort of bearing upon the *descensus ad inferos*.

We must leave the subject where the Scriptures leave it: Christ continued under the power of death for a part of three days; but what transpired or whither he went we can only conjecture and guess at best. "Christ's humiliation after his death consisted in his being buried, and continuing in the state of the dead, and under the power of death until the third day, which hath been otherwise expressed in these words, He descended into hell."

CHAPTER XX.

The Exaltation of Christ

I. **Possibility.**—As the second person in the Godhead the Son of God was of the same substance with the Father and co-equal to him in power and glory; it was consequently impossible for him, in his Trinitarian life, to experience any increase of honor or receive any fresh accretions of glory; his essential distinction was infinitely perfect. But his mediatorial glory was subject to the clouding of his humiliation and is susceptible of fresh instaurations of light and honor. By the union of his divine nature to a human nature, and particularly under the embarrassing conditions under which that union was actually effected, the outward manifestation of the glory of Christ's person had been veiled and compromised in the eyes of his creatures; in the acceptance of the mediatorial office he accepted a position of subordination to his Father and was subject to orders from his throne; accepting the position of sinners, he had voluntarily humiliated himself and made himself of no reputation; therefore as a Theanthropos it was possible to raise him in the rank of honor and add to the brightness of his praises. Drawing a distinction between the essential glory of Christ as the eternal Son of God and his mediatorial glory as the incarnate Saviour of sinners it is easy to see how it is impossible to heighten the one and at the same time possible to enhance the other. It is, indeed, the chief end of the Church and the highest vocation of all creatures to promote the declarative glory of the Redeemer; for while no man can really and truly add to the substance and contents of Christ's honor, which has been fully conferred upon him by his Father, yet it is the highest duty of every creature and the sublimest honor which he can confer upon himself to proclaim the honors of his Saviour abroad. "Wherefore God hath highly exalted him" (Phil. 2:9). "Looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith; who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down

at the right hand of the throne of God" (Heb. 12:2). "And being turned, I saw seven golden candlesticks; and in the midst of the seven candlesticks one like unto the Son of man, clothed with a garment down to the foot, and girt about the paps with a golden girdle. His head and his hair were white like wool, as white as snow; and his eyes were as a flame of fire; and his feet like unto fine brass, as if they burned in a furnace; and his voice as the sound of many waters. And he had in his right hand seven stars; and out of his mouth went a sharp two-edged sword; and his countenance was the sun shineth in his strength. And when I saw him, I fell at his feet as one dead" (Rev. 1:12-17).

II. **Items.**—"The state of Christ's exaltation comprehendeth his resurrection, ascension, sitting at the right hand of the Father, and his coming again to judge the world." The items in the exaltation of Christ as a mediator are: (1) Resurrection; (2) Ascension; (3) Session; (4) Judgment.

III. **Resurrection.**—The Redeemer's first step in the ascensive scale was from the bottom of the grave back into life. He took up the life which he had laid down, overthrowing the very power of death. Nor will he stop in his upward course until he has climbed back to the right hand of the Father, whence he descended when he undertook the mediatorial office. If Christ be not risen: (a) He is not the Messiah, and all Old Testament prophecies remain unfulfilled; (b) His claim to be the Son of God has been unproved and invalidated; (c) God has put no public seal of approval and acceptance upon him and his work; (d) His redemptive undertaking is a failure, and the saints, who went federally with him down into the grave, also remain there in the tomb with him; (e) He is no advocate for those who trust him in the Father's court and all they who have committed their cause to him are relying upon a dead man as a friend and helper. "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain . . . your faith is vain . . . ye are yet in your sins . . . then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished . . . we are of all men most miserable" (1 Cor. 15:14-19).

The resurrection of Christ is therefore of most fundamental import to soteriology, because it does two things at once: (1) it completes the scheme of atonement and (2) proves the divinity and trustworthiness of the whole scheme. The entire cause of Christ and Christianity fails if the resurrection be not a fact. The following is an outline of the argument for the fact of the resurrection of Christ.

(1) It was predicted by the Old Testament prophets, and if he has not risen, they are all falsified; and if they are falsified *quoad hoc*, the old maxim is applicable to all the writers of the Old Testament, *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. "David speaketh concerning him. . . . Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption" (Acts. 2:24-27; Ps. 16:10).

(2) The Redeemer himself predicted his resurrection; and therefore it occurred, else he was a false prophet—a prophet who spoke beyond his knowledge, or, knowing better, lied. Jesus going up to Jerusalem said to his twelve disciples, "Behold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of man shall be betrayed unto the chief priests and unto the scribes, and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him to the Gentiles to mock, and to scourge, and to crucify him; and the third day he shall rise again" (Matt. 20:17-19). "I lay down my life that I might take it again" (Jno. 10:17). The chief priests and the Pharisees, his bitterest enemies, so understood him and reported to Pilate that he had said, "After three days I will rise again" (Matt. 27:63). The angel also reported him as having said that he would rise again: "He is not here; for he is risen, as he said" (Matt. 28:6). There is no denying the fact that Jesus did predict that he would rise from the dead on the third day; either he did it, or he was a false prophet.

(3) A large number of competent and credible witnesses testified to the fact of the resurrection of Christ; either he did rise, or all these witnesses are falsified—either on account of their incompetency or on account of their immorality. Certain women, among them "Mary Magdalene and the other Mary" (Matt. 28: 1, 9, 10); the eleven apostles who knew him well, and associated

with him forty days after the resurrection, "to whom also he showed himself alive after his passion by many infallible proofs, being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God" (Acts 1:3); five hundred brethren at the same time (1 Cor. 15:6); Paul, to whom he made a special manifestation of himself after his resurrection as "of one born out of due time" (1 Cor. 15:8); the angel who had shaken the earth and rolled away the stone from the mouth of the sepulchre on the night of his resurrection (Matt. 28:6); these all testified to the fact of the resurrection of Christ. Either he rose from the dead, or two women, eleven apostles, five hundred Christians, Paul and the angel all gave in false testimony on the subject, either because they did not know any better or, knowing better, deliberately lied.

(4) Circumstantial evidence is sometimes more convincing than the direct testimony of witnesses, for the reason that it is impossible for circumstances to lie. But in the case of the resurrection of Christ from the dead the circumstances corroborate, and powerfully support, the prophecy of the Old Testament, the prophecy of Christ himself and the testimony of above five hundred and fifteen witnesses. The Jewish ecclesiastics had compassed the crucifixion of Christ as the only effective mode of removing him out of their way and delivering the people from the spell of his influence; he was their destructive critic, and the Jewish ecclesiastics secured his death as the only effective way of silencing him and retaining their power and influence. Amid the exciting scenes of the crucifixion of this prominent and well known person near the city of Jerusalem these enemies remembered that he had prophesied that he would rise from the dead, and they are well aware that, if the story gets current that he did rise from the dead, his hold upon the confidence and discipleship of his followers would be stronger than it was prior to the crucifixion; and their whole scheme would be completely thwarted. So they take all careful and necessary precautions to prevent the possibility of any such report getting abroad. They saw the sepulchre sealed up with a stone; and then obtained from the

governor a guard of Roman soldiers to stand by the tomb and see that the body of the Redeemer was not disturbed.

At the crucifixion nothing was so pitifully weak, so abjectly dispirited, so completely disappointed and filled with chagrin and despair, as were his disciples. They all forsook him and fled, feeling that they had been deluded, played upon and brought into ridicule, and to the verge of serious hurt; no person believed less in the resurrection of Christ at the moment of his crucifixion than did his disciples. They all had abandoned his cause and turned away to making a livelihood, thoroughly satisfied that they had been but dupes in following him. There was no heart nor spirit left in these men; they had surrendered in despair.

But on the morning of the third day, and during the days immediately ensuing, the report is bruited abroad that the grave of Joseph of Arimathea, in which Christ had been laid, was empty and that he had actually risen from the dead. How ought such a report to have affected the ecclesiastics who were so deeply interested in putting him to death and in keeping him in the grave? How would it have naturally affected the disciples who had suffered such an awful collapse of faith in him? Every interest of the ecclesiastics called upon them to exert themselves to disprove the rumour; while the natural effect of the story upon his disciples would be to enhearten them and tempt them back to a leadership they had so summarily renounced. The grave was empty on Sunday morning; there is not a scrap of testimony to the contrary; all Jerusalem and enemies and friends could go to it and see for themselves. *Then where was the body?*

There are but three possible answers to this question: (a) it was in the hands of his enemies; (b) or it was in the hands of his friends; (c) or it had risen from the dead.

(a) If it was in the hands of his enemies why did they not produce the body and make a public exhibit of it on the streets of Jerusalem and thus effectively extinguish the rumour for ever? The Jewish ecclesiastics had every motive for pursuing such a course, on the supposition that the body was in

their custody; and they had taken every precaution, even to securing a military guard, that it might be in their keeping on the third day; but they did not even profess that they had it in charge, or knew where it was, but, on the contrary, gave it out that it had been stolen from them. Then the body of Christ was not, confessedly, in the hands of his opponents on Sunday morning; they had somehow, by their own admission, lost control of it.

(b) Then was the body of Christ Sunday morning in the hands of his friends and disciples? So the Jews alleged: "Some of the watch came into the city, and showed unto the chief priests all the things that were done. And when they were assembled with the elders, and had taken counsel, they gave large money unto the soldiers, saying, Say ye, His disciples came by night, and stole him away while we slept. . . . And this saying is commonly reported among the Jews until this day" (Matt. 28:11-15). This Roman guard did not report to the chief priests that it had fallen asleep; the story of their going to sleep was invented after the Jews had "taken counsel," and the guard was given "large money." It was antecedently improbable that all the members of the guard would fall to sleep at the same time; it was highly unlikely that any member of the guard could fall asleep in a graveyard after the exciting scenes of the day before incident upon the crucifixion of the person whose corpse they were set to watch; it was still more improbable that any member of that guard slept when the earthquake that very night rolled away the stone at the mouth of the sepulchre; it is still more improbable that this entire guard fell asleep that night so soundly that the disciples could come and roll away a great stone and carry off the corpse without awaking any of them; it is again highly improbable that the whole guard fell asleep when the Roman military law affixed death as the penalty for falling asleep on duty; and there is nothing to indicate that these men had been subject to such exhausting military duty as to render nature unable to stand the watch. The whole story is improbable and far-fetched from any point of view.

But granted that the guard fell asleep as they subsequently alleged; how did the disciples pluck up the spirit to go and steal the body? They had turned away from the cross in such a subjective state of mind as to render it well-nigh impossible for them to steal the body, assuming that they had an easy chance. What did they want with the corpse? What service could the dead body be to them? They were disappointed; they had expected him to set up a worldly kingdom which would be highly beneficial to them; when he so ignominiously and helplessly died on the cross they had every hope that had heretofore swelled their bosoms dashed to the ground; they felt duped and foolish; what motive could they have for stealing the corpse? The last we saw of these disciples they had had enough of this Jesus of Nazareth and turned to their respective vocations, glad to escape from sharing his fate and now concerned only with the hard question of making a living for themselves. It is preposterous to suppose that these men had such a summersault of feeling within less than forty-eight hours as to encourage them to return to the sepulchre to filch the Redeemer's body with the scheme of propagating a great religion well elaborated in their minds. The mental state of the disciples absolutely forbids the very hypothesis that they stole the body Saturday night while the guard slept.

But assuming that the body was in the hands of the disciples by theft as was alleged by the Jews, how can we account for their continued discipleship of Christ? They now know that he is an imposter and a fraud. They knew he had said that he would rise from the dead; they now know that he did not rise from the dead, for they know that his body is in their possession; whatever others may imagine, they know that he was but a pretender. If what happened on Golgotha on Friday discouraged them until they forsook him, how much more must they have been discouraged and repelled from him by the consciousness of the fact that his dead body is now and here in their hands? Anything approximating a correct psychology demands that we think of the disciples as really believing that Christ rose from the dead; however explained, it is impossible

not to believe that the disciples were sincere in accepting the rumour that he had risen from the grave. The body could not have been in their possession; they did not know where it was.

(c) The only other possible answer to the question, Where was the body of Christ on Sunday morning? is that it had risen from the grave.

(5) To the witness of prophecy, to the witness of Christ, to the witness of contemporaries, to the witness of circumstances, add the witness of certain phenomena of today, and the argument for the resurrection of Christ is complete and conclusive. Every effect must have an adequate cause; there are four effects which can be rationally explained only by assuming the resurrection of Christ as their cause.

(a) The Christian Church is an institution in the world. When we take the back-track and seek for the historical cause of its origin, we are carried back to the resurrection of the Redeemer. No man can account for this institution except by predicating this as its historic cause. Down the centuries it has come, bringing with it the story of the resurrection, not only as its report but also as the very cause of its being.

(b) Similarly, here is a very peculiar institution that has somehow come into being and established itself in the world, namely, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. In our quest for its historic origin we are carried back to the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, and this institution becomes a monument of this event, marking it as a fact as certainly as a Confederate monument proves that there was a Civil War in the United States.

(c) There is another institution which demands a similar explanation, namely, the Sabbath Day. For four thousand years the Sabbath fell on the last day of the week; but somehow it has come to be the first day of the week: How can we account for it? The alleged historical cause of the change was the resurrection of Christ; if that be not the true explanation, then what did cause the change?

(d) Then there is the fact that the world has come to note time differently from what was once the custom in this matter.

For four thousand years time was marked as "B. C." (Before Christ) ; but since his resurrection it is marked as "A. D." (Anno Domini). Something tremendous is responsible for altering the world's calendar. The burden of proof is on the man who denies the resurrection of Christ.

(6) But no argument can be fairly regarded as complete until the reverse side of the question in debate has been examined; for it is always abstractly possible that the truth may be on the other side until it has been adequately searched and the contrary reasonably shown. Those who reject the fact of the resurrection of Christ have done so along three general lines.

(a) The most radical attempt to void the fact of Christ's resurrection is made by an assault upon the gospel narratives. We are told that the very documents which contain the story are fictitious and legendary and we cannot therefore depend upon what they say. But the attempt to deny the historicalness of these gospel narratives has ever proved a failure, and their historicity has won general acceptance at the bar of criticism. This is, consequently, the lamest and most unacceptable counter-proposition of all those which a carping world has to make in lieu of the teachings of Scripture. It may attract the ignorant peasant, but it finds no acceptance with any creditable scholarship even in these modern critical times.

(b) Then there are those unbelievers in the resurrection of our Lord who admit the historical nature of the gospel narratives but take the ground that the Redeemer did not truly and really die on the cross; his death was apparent; he swooned on the cross; he revived in the grave and somehow got out and made his escape. This is not only clumsy, but it is childish; for how could a body as badly damaged as was his get out of the grave, elude the guard and make his escape? The very supposition is preposterous; and there are few bold enough and desperate enough to hold it.

(c) The most plausible and popular theory for denying the reality of the resurrection of Jesus is known as "the visionary theory." The story of his resurrection from the grave originated in the hallucination of a woman; she told the story in her

nervous hysteria; other disciples, being in a proper psychological frame to take it up, received it; and retold it, until they truly and sincerely came to believe it; and so it passed down the centuries, as rumours generally go, and grow as they go, striking deeper into the minds of susceptible temperaments, until the imaginary vision, purely subjective to start with, finally intrenched itself in the faith of sound and balanced men. That is, Jesus really rose only in the excited imaginations of his early disciples, who had a genuine admiration for his character and an affectionate attachment to his person; their devotion and love transformed the imagination into a genuine and sincere belief; and they eventually wrote it down and transmitted it to posterity with all honesty of conviction; and so the story got lodged in the mind of the world. But this is a purely speculative hypothesis without a scrap of historical evidence to support it, and is attractive only to those minds which have antecedently decided against the possibility of any supernatural phenomena being true.

IV. **Ascension.**—This is the second step in the exaltation of the Redeemer. This event took place forty days after his resurrection, from the Mount of Olives, near the village of Bethany, in the presence of the eleven apostles and possibly other disciples and “two men in white apparel,” conjectured to have been Moses and Elijah, while he was in the act of blessing the company and while they were looking steadfastly upon him. “And he led them out as far as to Bethany, and he lifted up his hands, and blessed them. And it came to pass while he blessed them, he was parted from them, and carried up into heaven. And they worshipped him, and returned to Jerusalem with great joy, and were continually in the temple, praising and blessing God” (Luke 24:50-53). “And when he had spoken these things, while they beheld, he was taken up; and a cloud received him out of their sight. And while they looked steadfastly towards heaven as he went up, behold, two men stood by them in white apparel” (Acts 1:9, 10).

“Christ was exalted in his ascension, in that having, after his resurrection, often appeared unto, and conversed with his apostles, speaking to them of the things pertaining to the king-

dom of God, and giving them commission to preach the gospel to all nations; forty days after his resurrection, he, in our nature, and as our head, visibly went up into the highest heavens, there to receive gifts for men, to raise up our affections thither, and to prepare a place for us, where himself is, and shall continue till his second coming at the end of the world."

V. Session.—Passing into the heavens, the Redeemer, in his theanthropic nature, publicly assumed his mediatorial crown and throne and sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on High. The Scriptures must tell us the story of his coronation in their own language.

"The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool" (Ps. 110:1). "So then, after the Lord had spoken unto them, he was received up into heaven, and sat on the right hand of God" (Mark 16:19). "It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us" (Rom. 8:34). "God raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come; and hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all" (Eph. 1:20-23). "Christ sitteth on the right hand of God (Col. 3:1). God "hath in these last days spoken to us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds; who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high" (Heb. 1:3). Christ "is gone into heaven, and is on the right hand of God; angels and authorities and powers being made subject unto him" (1 Pet. 3:22).

SEATED ON THAT MEDIATORIAL THRONE, HE EXERCISES ROYAL PREROGATIVES IN DISPENSING, THROUGH HIS SPIRIT, THAT SALVATION WHICH HE REVEALED AS A PROPHET AND EFFECTUATED AS A PRIEST IN THE DAYS OF HIS HUMILIATION.

PART II.

Salvation as an Experience

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CHAPTER XXI.

Introduction

Offices of the Trinity in Redemption.—There are three persons in the Godhead—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; and these three persons are the same in their substance, equal in their power and glory, and subordinate only in the mode of their subsistence and operation. In the economy of redemption, each of these Trinitarian persons have a distinctive saving office to exercise, and the praises of salvation are to be ascribed co-ordinately and co-equally to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Broadly speaking, it is the office of the First Person in the Godhead (the Father) to draw the plan of salvation, after the analogy of an architect who draws the “design” of a building, and convey to sinful men and women the right and title of occupancy of this “house of many mansions.” In Presbyterian soteriology, the technical term for the saving work of the Father is *Election*. Then it is the economic office of the Second Person (the Son) to take that plan and execute it, like a contractor who takes the design from the hand of the architect and erects the house according to specifications—to build this “house of many mansions.” The technical term for the saving work of Christ is compendiously *Atonement*. Then it is the economic office of the Third Person (the Holy Ghost) to apply the redemption designed by the First, and executed by the Second, to sinful men and women, originating and developing a Christian Experience, like one who actually moves the tenants into the “house of many mansions,” and domiciliates them in their new residence. The theological technicality for this work of the Spirit is *Vocation*. Election by the Father, Atonement by the Son, Vocation by the Spirit—these are the Trinitarian parts of human Redemption, and each is essential to the whole, and each in the order given.

Effects—The effect of Election is to give the sinner a *right* and *title* to all privileges and blessings of Heaven. The effect of Atonement is to *open the door of Heaven* to guilty men and women—a means to salvation as an end. The effect of Vocation is the *conversion* of sinful men and women—the subjective preparation of them for the holy life of Heaven. While these three topics—Election, Atonement and Vocation—are expounded separately in soteriology, they are each necessary parts of the integral whole of Redemption.

Work of Christ.—In the Christian Faith, there are four grand heads in the saving work of Christ, treated under the captions of Incarnation, Prophet, Priest, King. The chief end of the *Incarnation* was to *qualify Christ* to personally exercise the mediatorial offices of Prophet, Priest and King. The central product of his Prophetical (revealing) office was the *Gospel*, of his Priestly (ruling) office was *Conversion*, or setting up his kingdom and reign in the hearts and lives of men and women. All four of these things—Incarnation, the Gospel, the Atonement, Conversion—are essential items in the complete work of the Redeemer, albeit they are presented successively by the systematic theologian.

Conversion.—Is effected not directly by Christ, but through the Holy Spirit as his agent. From the Throne he sends the Spirit to begin and perfect a Christian Experience—to set up his dominion and kingdom in the hearts and lives of men, and so turn the objective title to Heaven, upon the ground of the mediatorial work of Christ, into a subjective Christian Experience—a meetness and fitness of character for a life in Heaven.

Vocation.—But how does the Spirit do this? By what general mode does he apply that Redemption which was decreed by the Father and executed by the Son, to individual sinful men and women, so that they actually experience it in life and destiny? The answer is by *Vocation*. “Vocation” is a Latin word, “calling” is a Greek word, and “preaching” is an Anglo-Saxon word. They are synonyms, and mean the same thing. The Spirit sets up the reign of Christ in the minds, the hearts, the consciences

and wills—originates and perfects a genuine subjective Christian Experience—by vocation, or calling, or preaching. In short, the Spirit *preaches* sinful men and women into the kingdom of God, the kingdom of Christ, the kingdom of Heaven.

The Ordo Salutis.

Grace is a technicality for that power of the Holy Spirit, which applies that Redemption which was decreed by the Father and wrought by the Son. The *ordo salutis* is a technical phrase in the old Latin theology for the logical steps which grace takes in beginning and developing a Christian experience. It undertakes to give the successive acts of grace, in the order of production, in changing a sinner into a saint.

There are three ground-forms of soteriology—the Pelagian, the Arminian, and the Augustinian or Calvinistic. Each of these has its own distinctive *ordo salutis*—its own account of the way in which a sinful human being becomes a Christian and a beneficiary of all that Christ has taught and done in this world of ours.

Pelagian.—(1) Repentance, (2) Obedience.

According to this schedule, all that is required of a sinful man is that he repent, and change his course from one of disobedience to one of obedience. His acceptance with God is conditioned altogether upon his character and conduct, and these are the products of his own power. Grace furnishes him with Christ as an example of correct living, with the Bible as a text-book on character and conduct, and with the Church and the ministry as good helps to be and to do what he ought to be and do. At its most, grace is but a help. In the last instance, the sinner must get and apply to himself all the benefits of the advent of Christ into this world. In “repentance,” the sinner “quits his meanness” and reforms his course of living, and in “obedience” he conforms himself to that course of life and behaviour which is required and commended in the Scriptures. It is salvation by destruction and reconstruction. It is the Pelagian, or Rationalistic or Ethical or Unitarian, gospel.

Arminian.—(1) Repentance, (2) Faith, (3) Justification, (4) Regeneration, (5) Sanctification, (6) Glorification.

According to this order, the sinner, to become a beneficiary of Christ, must first repent—become sorrowful for his wickedness and forsake his evil ways. Then, in the second place, he must accept Christ by faith, and commit his soul to his Saviour for salvation. When he has taken these two steps, then, in the third place, he is justified by God, and set free from all his guilt, and reinstated in the divine favour. When these three things have been done, and conditioned upon them, then in the fourth place, he is regenerated, and made a new creature in Christ Jesus, and restored to sonship in the family of God. Then comes the work of sanctification, by which he eliminates the remnants of inbred sin, by a life of evangelical obedience, or “falls from grace” by lapsing into disobedience, and so takes himself back into the apostate condition from which he first began to recover himself, and so has the whole process to do over again *ab initio*. If, however, he perseveres in evangelical obedience, and carries on his gracious culture to the very end of life and opportunity, he will be finally glorified. In it all grace is a bountiful and generous helper, but always resistible. It is the gospel of mere sufficiency—the love of the Father is sufficient for all men, the atonement of Christ is sufficient for all men, and the grace of the Spirit is sufficient for all men—but everywhere the sinner must himself transform sufficiency into efficiency. The most that the Spirit of God does is to help a man repent, believe, justify himself, and regenerate himself, and sanctify and glorify himself. In the whole process, the sinner is a probationer, and his salvation is in jeopardy every hour. If he ever relaxes his hold upon God, God will relax his hold upon him. It is a gospel of salvation by evangelical obedience.

Calvinistic.—(1) Regeneration, (2) Faith, (3) Repentance, (4) Justification, (5) Adoption, (6) Sanctification, (7) Glorification.

According to this account regeneration is the first and initial act of grace. It is a change of heart which takes place below consciousness and is fundamental and causative of all Christian

life and experience. When regenerated, there are two converting acts—faith and repentance. In believing, the regenerated soul accepts Christ as a Saviour—changes the foundation and premise and reason of life. In repenting, it turns from its evil ways—changes the course and end and aim of life. He repents towards God and believes towards our Lord Jesus Christ, as Paul describes it in the Acts of the Apostles. Then the believing and penitent soul is justified by God upon the ground of the merits of Christ, which are received and presented by faith. Then the sinner is adopted into the family and house of God and given a legal right and title to all the privileges of the children of God. Then begins the work of sanctification, extending over the entire life of the sinner on his way from a state in sin to a state in grace. It consists of two parts—(1) dying unto sin and (2) growth in grace. When this work is completed, the sinful soul is “meet for the saints’ inheritance in light,” and is finally glorified. In it all, grace is the efficient and sustaining cause. As creation is originated and preserved and governed and brought to its final destiny by God, so Christian life is regenerated and preserved and perfected by divine grace. It is the gospel of salvation by grace—from start to finish.

CHAPTER XXII

Vocation

God does every thing by vocation, or calling, or preaching, or speaking. It is his universal method. "He speaks, and it is done; he commands, and it stands fast." Is it creation? He called those things which be out of that which was not (Rom. 4:17). He said in the beginning, "Let there be light: and there was light" (Gen. 1:4). Is it providence? He upholds all things "by the word of his power" (Heb. 1:3). Is it the resurrection of the dead? "All that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth" (Jno. 5:29). Is it the appointment of a Messiah and a Saviour? He called his Son to the saving office (Isa. 6:8). Is it the broad work of redemption? He is "the God of all grace, who hath called us unto eternal life by Jesus Christ" (1 Pet. 5:10). The biblical reader can hardly prevent himself from generalizing that God does all his will by commanding, by speaking, by calling, by vocation. Overwhelmingly is this true, when we restrict our attention to conversion, and the development of Christian life and experience.

nated a "calling" (klesis). Heb. 3:1; Eph. 1:8; Eph. 4:1-2; 2 Tim. 1:9; 2 Pet. 1:10; etc.

2. With great persistency the subjects of redemption are denominated the "called" (kletoi). Rom. 1:6.

Vocation.

Outline :

Efficacious Cause	Holy Spirit.
Material Cause	Bible.
Instrumental Cause	Preaching.
Formal Cause	Sermon.
Final Cause	Conversion.

The Efficient Cause—the power which translates the Election of God and the Atonement of Christ into life and experience—is the Holy Spirit. And the power of the Holy Spirit in the realm of redemption is technically called *Grace*. This alone can prevent the gospel from being a mere theory and convert it into a practical religion—a religion that turns the sinner into a saint. It is this which supports and makes effective the gospel-call upon sinful men and women.

The Material Cause of Vocation—That which the Spirit of God calls into the ear of a sinful world—is the Bible. If the Spirit calls, he calls a word, and that word which he utters is the Word of God. He is the caller, the sinner is the called and the Word is the thing which is called. Hence the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible, is the subject-matter of that preaching which saves and sanctifies sinful men and women. It is by the use of this Gospel Book that the Spirit of Grace transforms sinners into saints and makes the Christian religion a personal experience in the lives of men and women.

The Instrumental Cause in Vocation—That which the Spirit of Grace employs as a medium for sounding the Gospel Call into the ears of sinful men and women—is the Church and its ministry. Preaching, in the broad sense for any thing whereby the Gospel is presented to people, is the great tool which the Spirit of God employs to save and sanctify sinful men. Preaching does not convert *ex opere operato*—by virtue of any power inherent in it—but only as it is blessed of Christ, and made effective by the Holy Spirit. It is the forces of nature which make the farmer's crop grow and fructify, but it is the plowing and the hoeing and the cultivation which are the instrumental conditions necessary to the result. So with Grace and preaching. The Church is a preaching institute—the agency of the Spirit whereby he brings the Word of life into contact with the minds and hearts and consciences and wills of men and persuades and enables them to embrace Jesus Christ freely offered to them in the Gospel. This is its distinct and valuable office. It is the trumpet through which the Spirit of God calls men from darkness to light. If not always through the Word as preached or read or in some manner brought

into contact with the spirits of men, it is never without the Word that they are converted.

The Formal Cause of Vocation—that which is distinctive and peculiar to it, the specific shape which it takes—is, *par excellence*, the sermon. It may be the formal sermon of the ordinary minister as heard or read, or the informal sermon of the Sunday School teacher and Christian worker of every kind—of whosoever hearth or howsoever delivered. The Word of God as called by the Spirit through the Church and her ministry takes the distinctive form of a sermon. And the varieties of the sermon are multitudinous.

The Final Cause of Vocation—the object of the Spirit in calling the Word into the ears of sinful men and women through the Church and her ministry in some form of the sermon—is conversion. This is the purpose, the object, the aim, the teleology of it all. Conversion is sometimes used in a broad sense and sometimes in a narrow sense. In the broad sense, it signifies all that process whereby grace makes a sinner into a saint, but in its narrow sense it is used to signify the initial act of grace in beginning a Christian experience. In its narrow sense it is a synonym for *regeneration*, but in its broad sense it includes regeneration, justification, adoption, sanctification, evangelical obedience and every thing from the beginning of grace to its consummation in heavenly glory. When it is here described as the object of Vocation, it is employed in this larger sense, and the meaning is that it is by Vocation that the Spirit of God completes the work of grace in the sinful soul by its final Glorification. From start to finish redemption is carried on and through Vocation—by the Calling of the Spirit of God, and in no other manner. The soul never reaches any stage, or comes into any condition, when the Spirit of God throws away the Word and resorts to some mystical and direct dealing. From Grace to Glory—he calls.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Grace

Grace is the most precious word in the Christian vocabulary. There is not a more dynamic word in all the theology of redemption. Of it the Christian sings; in it he hopes; for it he prays; upon it he depends. He contrasts the religion of Law and the religion of Grace; he divides the scheme of salvation into the Covenant of Works and the Covenant of Grace. Out of the one issues death and hell, and out of the other comes life and heaven. Every Christian is in full sympathy with Paul, when the great apostle exclaimed, "By grace I am what I am." The saints in glory, around the great white throne, shout, "Grace, Grace." What, then, is *Grace*?

In the Christian Scriptures it is used in three senses: (1) as an attribute, (2) as a power, (3) as an effect. It is the same idea described from three different points of view. As an *attribute*, it signifies that trait in the heart of God from which proceeds the whole programme for the redemption of sinful men—the fountain from which issues the saving stream. ("Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, according to his own purpose and grace." 2 Tim. 1:9). As a *power*, Grace is a technicality for that force or energy which makes the plan of salvation efficient in the life and conscious experience of sinful men. ("My grace is sufficient for thee." 2 Cor. 12:9). The meaning here is not that the kind feeling and sympathy which God entertained for his servant would be sufficient to enable him to bear the thorn which was piercing heart and flesh, but that a divine power would sustain him from within in all his affliction for the cross. As an *effect*, Grace stands for some change wrought in the state and life of its subjects. "Faith," "Hope," "Charity," are celebrated as the three queenliest "graces" of the Christian Religion. There is not a single blessing of salvation mentioned in all the Scriptures which is not referred to Grace as the efficient and producing cause.

If we take the goodness of God as his generic attitude of heart toward the human world, there are several special varieties of it. *Benevolence* is his goodness terminating upon sentient beings. *Love* is his goodness terminating upon rational and personal beings. *Mercy* is his goodness terminating upon miserable beings. *Grace* is his goodness terminating upon sinful beings. Every book needs a preface to introduce it to the reader. Every artist needs a background to give relief to his sketches. Every jewel needs a setting to bring out its beauty and accentuate its flashes of loveliness. So Grace needs its preface, its background, its setting; and that is human *sinfulness*. He who is not a sinner is not a proper subject of Grace.

But when sinfulness is analyzed, as a chemist analyzes water, its two constituent elements are found to be Guilt and Pollution. The one is objective, and the other is subjective. The one affects man's status, and the other his character. The one makes him punishable, and the other makes him offensive. The one makes him obnoxious to the justice of God, and the other makes him obnoxious to the holiness of God. Grace, to be effective, must provide for cleansing away both: it must remove the guilt of sin and give man a new status before God; it must clean away the stain of sin and give him a new nature. The task of Grace is to give the sinner, at once, both a new status and a new heart. Such a double change cannot be accomplished by kindness, nor by love, nor by mercy: it can be done only by Grace.

Speaking in broadest outline, it was the office of God the Father to draw the Plan of Salvation; it was the office of God the Son to take that Plan and execute it by his incarnation, life and death—make it an historic fact; and it was the office of God the Spirit to apply that Plan as conceived by the Father and executed by the Son, and develop a Christian Experience. The architect designs the house; the contractor builds it as designed; the man who runs the moving car moves the family into the house as designed by the architect and erected by the contractor. The Father is the architect of the house of redemption; the Son is the contractor; and the Spirit finds God's people, and domiciliates them in the house of salvation. The Plan originated in the Grace

of the Father, was executed by the Grace of the Son and is applied by the Grace of the Spirit. So that the sinner is a debtor co-ordinately and co-equally to the Grace of the Triune God, and owes the praises of his redemption equally to Father, Son and Holy Ghost.

In theology Grace is prevailingly used as a technicality for that power which makes the Christian Religion effective in the earth. The physicist speaks of "Gravity," "electricity," and other "forces of nature" by which he seeks to explain the phenomena of the world. The force, the power, of the Christian theologian, by which he seeks to explain all Christian phenomena is technically called "grace."

In this day when the physical sciences have made us all familiar with "force" and "power" and "second causes," the preacher and the theologian have fallen into the common custom, and are calling Grace "spiritual power." But I do not think this is happy. (1) Because "spiritual" is vague and ambiguous. In philosophy, it is the immaterial, as in the contrast, matter and spirit. In psychology, it is the mental, as in the contrast, body and mind. In literature and art, it is the aesthetic, as in the contrast, the real and the ideal. In religion, when properly used, the word "spiritual" is an adjective with the Holy Spirit as its noun. "Spiritual power" then, would be synonymous with the power and influence of the Holy Spirit of God in the realm of religion; "spiritual life," the life of which the Holy Spirit is the author and sustainer; "spiritual phenomena," the phenomena of which the Holy Spirit is the cause and producer; "spiritual mind," the mind whose temper and disposition, thoughts and motives, ideals and visions, are products of the Holy Spirit; and "spirituality," that abstract state which results from the gracious operations of the Holy Spirit. When so understood, Grace is "spiritual power"; but we must always be cautious lest our hearer or reader, consciously or unconsciously, get the idea that Grace is just a general "religious force," as gravity is a "physical force." There is always a danger here, that the religionist must ever watch against, or he will misrepresent and injure his cause. (2) Then I think "grace" is a better term than "spiritual power," because it is a dis-

tinctive and definite technicality. Every science must have its nomenclature, its technical terms. The natural sciences all coin such terms as "gravity," "electricity," "wind," "water," etc., all proper names for the specific causes and powers of the facts whose explanations are sought. In an analogous manner, it is far more satisfactory for religion to have proper and exclusive technicality for the power which operates in its distinctive sphere. That biblical and traditional technicality is "grace." Our science and our cause will be altogether the gainer if we persistently preserve it, and familiarize the public with it by insistently using it. So would every man be compelled to go to the Christian Scriptures to learn the meaning of the word, and find out the nature and attributes of this peculiar sort of power.

1. Grace is *power*. It is not merely a trait of the character of God: it is that trait as an energy, a force. It is not simply a well-head in the heart of God: it is a mighty stream flowing from that fountain. It is "the exceeding greatness of his power to usward who believe" (Eph. 1:19). It is the power which saves and sanctifies the sinful soul.

2. It is *spiritual* power. The power of the Holy Spirit of God in the realm of redemption. The Christian Scriptures everywhere represent the Holy Spirit as the efficient in the Christian Religion; and they also represent Grace as the cause of all saving benefits: these two ideas are put together in the biblical phrase, "the Spirit of Grace" (Heb. 10:29). Spirit is the person, and Grace is the power. So the Spirit is the author of all religious life by his Grace.

3. Grace is *personal* power. It is not an impersonal and abstract force, like gravity or electricity. It is free, voluntary power, the power of will, the power of the will of the Holy Spirit. It cannot, consequently, be harnessed and geared and transmitted like the impersonal forces of nature, such as steam, and wind and water. It is sovereign, and operates like a person, by free will and choice and self-determination. This is the consummate blunder in all the rationalistic interpretations of the Christian Religion. They treat Grace as if it were one of the forces of nature, sub-

ject to laws and rules. Grace is the power of a person, the Third Person in the Godhead.

4. Grace is *supernatural* power. It does not belong to the list of "second causes." Drummond's attempt, in his *Natural Law in the Scriptural World*, to wipe out the distinction between the *natural* and the *supernatural*, was an effort to classify Grace among the natural forces in the world, and interpret all religious experience as the evolution of this religious force. Had it been successful the Christian Religion would have been destroyed as something peculiar and distinctive in the earth and it would have been co-ordinated with all other religions and explained as a mere evolution of the religious instinct of the race. That experience which does not recognize the supernatural power of Grace, as the power of that intelligent, voluntary agent, the Holy Spirit, falls far short of the Scriptures and naturalizes the Christian Religion.

What is the method of Grace? How does it operate? What is its manner and means of doing its work? This is a question of fundamental importance both for doctrine and practice.

The nature of the power must determine the manner of its use. The electrician must adapt his appliances to the nature of the power he proposes to employ. The mechanic would be ridiculous who would "rig up" a wind mill for steam, or make a steam-engine to be operated by wind. Power must be geared and harnessed according to its nature, in order for it to be serviceable. Grace is no exception to this rule of common sense: it must be transmitted according to its own intrinsic and essential nature.

Grace is the free, sovereign, voluntary, personal power of the Holy Spirit. To attempt to use it as if it were an impersonal, mechanical force, albeit you call it religious or spiritual, would be equal to the attempt to use a free agent as if he were a mindless, thoughtless, heartless, involuntary thing. It would be just as absurd as trying to make a horse grow in the ground as does a tree. The Spirit is a person, and his "grace" is his personal power, and cannot be machineized.

Here is the supreme fallacy of all Pelagians, Socinians, Unitarians, Rationalists, and Naturalists of every name and variety

in religion: they interpret Grace as a religious force, and endeavor to apply it by mechanisms suitable to only impersonal physical forces. God has given men their faculties, sufficient for all that he requires of them; he has given them a gospel, an excellent text-book on the subject of religion; he has sent his Son into the world to show men how to live and illustrate before them the proper character and course of conduct, he has established the church and all the institutions of the Christian Religion as adequate means and helps for right living. In it all there is nothing supernatural. In the origination and development of a Christian experience every thing is just as natural as the education of an ignorant man in the secular sciences, just as natural as the gardener's growing of cabbages and carrots. Grace is simply a religious influence, a spiritual force the same in kind with the mental and vital forces with which we are familiar. All religious life depends upon heredity, environment, and culture: the desideratum is but an efficient personal and social program.

How then is Grace transmitted to the production of any effect? The Bible answers. It is by *Vocation*. Calling is Greek, vocation is Latin, preaching is the popular translation of both. Grace becomes effective through *preaching*, using the word in its widest sense for any mode of bringing the mind of the sinner into contact with the truth of the gospel. Sinners are converted into saints like Republicans are converted into Democrats, by preaching; except that in evangelical preaching the power which makes the gospel effective is not moral suasion, but the spiritual persuasion of the Holy Ghost. The efficacy of Grace is *via* preaching. Any other method renders it nugatory, because it violates the very nature of the converting power. This also shows us how silly it is to attempt to correct the sinfulness of the world by substitutes for preaching.

Ezekiel was told to prophesy (preach) to the dry bones which filled the Valley of Vision. He did not refuse on the ground that it was absurd and would make him ridiculous. He obeyed, and the Valley became filled with living men. Our Lord stood by the grave of Lazarus, four days dead, and preached, and the dead man came forth under the plenipotent call of the

Redeemer. The Apostles went everywhere preaching, and all that has been accomplished for the cause of Christ in the world has been the product of preaching. Paul has generalized the statement that "it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe" (1 Cor. 1:21). Then he drew out the doctrine in a splendid series of connected propositions: "Whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved. How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? . . . So then faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God" (Rom. 10:13-17). "Calling" is in order to "salvation," "believing" is in order to "calling," "hearing" is in order to "believing," "preaching" is in order to "hearing," and "sending" is in order to "preaching." Grace then is transmissible only through "preaching."

But it is not any and every sort of preaching that Grace will thus honor and make effective. It is a peculiar and distinctive form of preaching—that which holds forth the word of God, which centralizes upon Christ. The Bible is the impersonal Word of God; Christ is the Personal Word of God. They come to the same thing. Translate the Bible into a Person, and that Person is Christ; translate Christ into a Book, and that Book is the Bible.

Christ is the topic, the "subject," of the whole Bible, from Genesis to Revelation—Christ, not as an interesting character in the world's history, but Christ as the Saviour of sinners. This is precisely the doctrine of our Lord himself, "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me" (Jno. 5:39). In all the promises to Abraham, Moses and David; in all the emblems and types of the elaborate ceremonial system; in all the gorgeous predictions of Isaiah and the other prophets; Jesus the Messiah is everywhere the theme. Was it the protevangelium, which flamed like a morning star upon the brow of that night which had settled down upon the world of sin and sorrow? Christ was that "seed." Was it the rainbow that arched the sky after that deluge on whose

wild waste of waters floated the carcasses of a disobedient world? Christ was that bow of promise, that pledge of future security. Was it a childless patriarch who left his native land a pilgrim and a stranger in all the earth, who was promised all that was bounded by the horizon, and a seed in whom all nations should be blessed? Christ was that promised seed. Was it Moses amid the grumblings of Sinai and the awful flashes of moral law? He himself was a type of that Mediator who was to satisfy that law in his own atoning death. Was it the place of Jehovah's worship which stank with the blood of sacrificial victims? It was but the emblem of the saving crimson which was to pour down Calvary's slopes. Was it the sweet singer of Israel, waking the melodies of his harp and filling all the air with the music of his chords? They were but royal lyrics in praise of David's coming Lord. Was it Isaiah standing between the gate posts of the morning and watching the rising sun hang his splendors on the trellis of the sky? He was but proclaiming that daybreak when all the angels of God would burst forth from the galleries of the sky at the birth of the Babe of Bethlehem. Everywhere the face of the Messiah looked out of the windows of the Old Testament. In everything his person and work were prefigured.

It is that preaching which sets forth Christ as he is set forth in the Scriptures which has the promise and the hope of the recognition and blessing of God's Grace by the Holy Spirit.

The Church is a factory; Grace is its power; the Word, Sacraments and Prayer are its tools and machinery; preachers and workers are its employees; and *Christians* are its product or output.

We call the followers of Augustine *Augustinians*; of Luther, *Lutherans*; of Calvin, Calvinists or *Calvinians*; of Christ, *Christians*. The product of this factory is given different names at different stages of the manufacture of Christians. In *posse*, that is in the mind of the Father, as articles to be made, they are the *elect* (eklektói); in the hand of Christ, they are *believers* (pistói); in the hand of the Spirit, to be perfected, they are the *called* (kletói); in heaven as finished and perfected to the satisfaction of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, they are the *saints* (hagaoi).

The persons are the same; the designations vary from the different points of view.

Every manufacturer has two objects in view, at which he aims, and can never be content until they are attained: (1) the serviceableness of his article, and (2) the beauty of his product. Indeed the useful and the ornamental, the serviceable and the beautiful, are the twin objects of human aspiration, and utilitarianism and aestheticism are the attractive philosophies of human life. At the bottom of a woman's soul is the love of the beautiful; at the center of a man's heart is the love of the useful, and man and woman are the complementary halves of the human race. God made man in his own image, and he too loves the useful and the beautiful. It is the task of divine grace to take the worthless sinner and make out of him a useful servant of God who shall satisfy His love of the useful and an ornamental character which shall satisfy His love of the beautiful.

1. The first purpose of a Christian is to be useful, serviceable—"laborers together with God" (1 Cor. 3:9). Grace gives him the *right* to work, and the *heart* to work. Like his Lord, it must be "his meat and drink to do the will of his Master." The Saviour's curse fell upon a fig tree, and that because it bore "nothing but leaves only." Grace is promised that the Christian "be neither barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Pet. 1:8).

What is the office of good works in a scheme of salvation by Grace? Why should a man work for that which cannot be obtained by labor, but which can be had only as a bounty? Character and conduct are not the grounds of justification, nor are they the causes of sanctification, nor do they earn heavenly glorification; but they do condition one's standing in the approbation and praise of his God and Judge. There are but two motives why any man should work: (1) necessity, (2) ambition. Some toil simply and solely because they are obliged to do so; meat and bread and the necessities of life are dependent upon the labor of their hands. Others labor because they are ambitious to own and heap up wealth and possessions. They are not forced by necessity from with-

out, but by a spirit from within. God has never forbidden any man either to aspire or to acquire. He has doomed no man to run with jackals or to dwell with the bats and owls. It is every man's privilege to spread eagle wings and soar to the empyrean. The backward peoples on the earth are those who strive from sheer necessity; the forward peoples are those who have been ambitious and acquisitive. Those at the bottom of society are the thriftless, who are in the main content with the bare necessities of life; those at the top have been irrepressible and mounting spirits, who cannot be content with cramped conditions and meager supplies. The Christian worker in God's vineyard—he cannot earn his redemption by the labor of his hands; that he receives as the gratuity of grace. With these gracious gifts as his capital, as his leverage, he takes pride in climbing higher and higher in his Lord's favour and grace. He is moved by gratitude, and swept on by a grace-born ambition to be a workman that needs not to be ashamed.

There are but four schemes of labor under which a Christian can work in the field of his Master: (1) slavery, (2) peonage, (3) contract, (4) free labor. He is not a free laborer, to go on a strike at his pleasure. He is not under a contract, which binds his heavenly employer to give him his wages and heaven as hire. He is not a peon, like a penitentiary convict, expiating his debt by the sweat of his brow. He is a *slave*, whose master owns his person, his time, his service and all the products of his toil. Given an ideal master and ideal slave, and slavery is the happiest and most honorable relation which can exist between the superior and the inferior. It is the relation between the Christian and Christ and is bowed and burgeoned with the most blessed rewards and heavenly emoluments.

That Christian Life may be truly useful to God and the world, it must be simple and sincere, honest and transparent, enthusiastic and impulsive, moral and intelligent, instructed and imprincipled.

2. But it is not enough that Christian Life should be made sound and ethical, sane and righteous, industrious and

productive. It must also be made *beautiful*. We are not only philosophers and moralists and pragmatists; we are artists also. We are answerable not only at the bar of reason and conscience, but at the bar of good taste also. Usefulness must be clothed with attractiveness. The Scripture calls upon us to "adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things" (Tit. 2:10).

The ornaments of the Christian are the "graces of the Spirit." They are to be set like sparkling gems in Christian character and worn like ornaments in Christian conduct.

Here is a tray of jewels lying upon a mat of royal purple in the artificer's shop. The royal diamond, flashing rainbow splendors; the translucent opal, over whose polished surface elusive tints play hide and seek; the deep green emerald glistening like a verdant island upon the bosom of a purple sea; the blood red ruby, whose colors swirl like a boiling cloud; the fiery jasper, swathed in a lambent flame; the azure sapphire, reflecting the tints of a cloudless sky; the deep red sardius; the yellow red sardonyx; the golden chrysolite; the cerulian beryl; the saffron topaz; the auburn jacinth; the apple-green chrysoprasus—all the precious stones with which the apocalyptic of God framed the heavenly Jerusalem in his effort to set forth the exquisite and entrancing beauty of the final home of the saints. Each gem has its individual crystallization and color-tint, but it is the task of the artificer to set them in groups that will satisfy a higher taste and appeal to a more complex appetency for beauty and loveliness.

Now look in this jewel-room of Scripture, at this tray of Christian Graces—every one of them a gem which flashes the genius and taste of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Grace. "Love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance" (Gal. 5:22, 23). They all, with others, are character gems "of purest ray serene." Grace assembles them, with exquisite artistic skill, in the life of the Christian so as to form that "setting" called "the beauty of holiness." The finished product is fit to hang among the stars in the gallery of Heaven.

Will Grace finally triumph? Will it complete its task and perfect its product? Will its operation be so persistent and effective that the Christian can feel assured of success? Are we justified in holding the doctrine of "the final perseverance of the saints?"

If Grace is the almighty power of the Spirit; if its purpose is truly serious; if its means are really effective as instrumentalities, it would seem that this question could be neither raised nor debated. Israel's history is a good illustration of a Christian's career and course in grace. Egypt was a type of sin, crossing the Red Sea was a type of regeneration, the wandering in the wilderness was a type of sanctification; Jordan was a type of death, and Caanan was a type of heaven. However the people zig-zagged and doubled back upon their course, they never crossed the Red Sea and entered into the land of Egypt. By ways that were circuitous and often mystifying, the people ultimately reached their destination. So will it be with the Christian. He will surely get home bye and bye, when God will stand on the steps of his throne and congratulate himself in the apocalyptic words, "his servants shall serve him, and they shall see his face, and his name shall be in their foreheads" (Rev. 22 :3, 4).

But to discredit this delicious hope, three propositions have been advanced to throw the whole work of grace into jeopardy and uncertainty in its final outcome.

1. "It is impossible for God to make the believer's final salvation absolutely certain without destroying his moral free agency; and if that be destroyed, man is no longer man." The possibility of apostacy is essential to free agency.

Is God a free agent? Is his apostacy possible? Are the angels which "kept their estate" free agents? Is their apostacy possible? Are the glorified saints in heaven free agents? Is their apostacy possible? Are those "who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation ready to be revealed in the last time" (Phil. 1 :6) free agents? Is their apostacy possible if God

is their custodian? A man ought to be careful about asserting what is "impossible" for God. There must be something wrong with the *a priori* metaphysics which asserts that God, who can create and who can destroy, who can raise the dead and regenerate the soul, cannot keep his people from falling, unless he annihilates one of the constituent attributes of their natures.

A free agent is one who does as he pleases—follows the listings of his own mind and the desires of his own heart. Suppose the mind is so changed that it always sees accurately; suppose the heart is so changed that it always feels truly; suppose the conscience is so enlightened that it always judges soundly; suppose the will is so altered that it always acts correctly; such a man would be a free agent, following the judgments of his own accurate mind, the desires of his own true heart, the judgments of his own sound conscience, the volitions of his own correct will. This is precisely what Grace does in regeneration—alters the human soul below consciousness, and the resultant changes for ever manifest themselves in consciousness as the free and self-determined decisions of the person. And so the "impossible" is done, and no one's psychology has been shivered and no man's being has been destroyed. *Teneor et teneo*, I am held and I hold, said the dying Girardeau.

2. "He was free to begin the Christian life or not, as he chose; he is, in the same manner, free to continue this life or not, as he may decide." He who began it may end it. Man began it, and man can stop it; and sometimes does stop it.

As a matter of fact, who "begins" it? Who takes the initiative, and starts the Christian life and career? God or man? "According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world" (Eph. 1:4). Who was the elector before the foundation of the world? "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained you" (Jno. 15:16). Who made first choice? "We love him, because he first loved us" (1 Jno. 4:19). Who was the first and original lover? "He which hath begun a

good work in you, will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6). Who began this good work of making a saint out of a sinner? Our objector says he who began the good work may end it. But our Scriptures say that he who began it will not end it, but will carry it on until the day of Jesus Christ. The fallacy of the whole argument is the unbiblical assumption that man is the "starter" of a Christian experience and career. The doctrine of the Bible is that Grace begins it and that Grace will triumphantly perfect it.

3. "That a regenerate believer may backslide, fall into sin, and be finally lost, is abundantly shown in the Scriptures."

The proof-texts of apostacy and final loss of some Christians. It will be noticed that every one of them contains an "if." They do not dogmatically assert that any Christian does apostatize, but they tell us what would be the consequence "if" a Christian were to apostatize. They describe hypothetical, and not historical, cases. "*If* ye forsake him, he will forsake you" (2 Chron. 15:2). "*If* he trust to his own righteousness, and commit iniquity, all his righteousness shall not be remembered" (Ezek. 33:13). "*If* a man abide not in me, he shall be cast forth as a branch, and is withered" (Jno. 15:6). "*If* a man shall draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him" (Heb. 10:38). "*If* ye do these things, ye shall never fall" (2 Pet. 1:9). "*If* after they have escaped . . . they are again entangled therein and overcome, the latter end is worse than the beginning" (2 Pet. 2:20). "*If* any of you do err from the truth, and one convert him" (Jas. 5:19). "It is impossible . . . *if* they fall away, to renew them again to repentance" (Heb. 6:4-6). "*If* we sin wilfully . . . there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin" (Heb. 10:26, 27). Notice the "if's." Where they are not expressed, they are implied. And yet we are told, "If quotations from Scripture can, by their accuracy, variety, and fulness of expression, establish any doctrine, surely the possibility of a believer's apostacy is proved by the above quotations to be the doctrine set forth in the Word of God."

Proof-texts for the final perseverance of the saints. Notice the absence of "if's." They are assertive. They are declarative. They are categorical. "I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand. My Father, which gave them me, is greater than all; and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand" (Jno. 10:28, 29). "Eternal life"—"they shall never perish!" "I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. 8:35-39). The apostle intends to sweep the gamut of possibilities, and affirm the inseparableness of Christ and the Christian. "Being confident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6). He which began it will perfect it. Paul had no scepticism and no fears. "Kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation ready to be revealed in the last time" (1 Pet. 1:5). The power that converts is the power that will keep. "I am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day" (2 Tim. 1:2). Suppose the bank fails, and the depositor loses his soul! "All things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose (Rom. 8:28). But suppose things work out in such a way that one who loved God and was called according to his purpose finally lost his immortal soul? The "sheep" that strayed on the mountain side was "sheep" when it left the fold, was "sheep" when it was found, was "sheep" when it was brought back; it never became a "goat." The "coin" which the woman lost was a "coin" when she lost it, was a "coin" when she found it, was a "coin" when the angels rejoiced with her; it never became a counterfeit. The "prodigal son" was a "son" when he left his father's house, was a "son" when feeding with the hogs, was a "son" when he was received and feted; he never became a bastard and alien. The children of God may act very ugly, and get very "low," but they never cease to be the children of God, and Grace will recover them every one.

"Grace! 'tis a charming sound,
 Harmonious to mine ear;
 Heaven with the echo shall resound,
 And all the earth shall hear.

Grace first contrived the way
 To save rebellious man;
 And all the steps that grace display,
 Which drew the wondrous plan.

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Grace all the work shall crown,
 Through everlasting days;
 It lays in heaven the topmost stone,
 And well deserves the praise."

CHAPTER XXIV.

Regeneration

In the *ordo salutis* of the Reformers, the schedule of Christian experience, as drawn by Calvinists, is: (1) Regeneration; (2) Faith; (3) Justification; (4) Adoption; (5) Sanctification; (6) Glorification. These are the successive steps which the Spirit takes in the application of the benefits of the atonement of Christ in Christian Experience.

That is, a sinner, becoming the subject of the saving grace of the Holy Ghost, is first regenerated; then he believes in Christ; then he is justified as a citizen in the kingdom of God; then he is adopted, as a child in the family of God; then he is sanctified from all his sins and made perfectly holy, and then he is translated to heavenly glory. This is the logical order in which grace produces the main facts of Christian life.

In the Arminian soteriology, however, there is a marked and fundamental difference in the programme of experimental religion under the gospel. The *ordo salutis* of this school of thought is: (1) Repentance; (2) Faith; (3) Justification; (4) Regeneration; (5) Sanctification; (6) Glorification. That is, a sinner first repents of his sins; then he believes in Christ; then he is justified; then he is regenerated; then he is sanctified; then he is glorified.

In the soteriology of the Reformers and Calvinists, grace is the efficient cause of all the phenomena of Christian Experience; and the very first act of grace, initiating a course of Christian life, is Regeneration.

In the Westminster symbol of doctrine, regeneration is included under the technicality of Effectual Calling, and was not at the time of the formulation of this creed a technicality in theology. "Effectual calling is the work of God's Spirit, whereby, convincing us of our sin and misery, enlightening our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renewing our wills, he doth persuade and enable us to embrace Jesus Christ freely offered in

the gospel.” Here regeneration connotes that revolutionary change in human nature which enables a sinner to embrace his Redeemer.

In the theology of the seventeenth century, it was used as a synonym of Conversion. But in present day soteriology, conversion is an effect of which regeneration is the cause. Regeneration is God’s act changing the sinful heart; while conversion is treated as the initial act of the regenerated soul in turning to Christ as its Saviour. In regeneration, the sinner is passive; in conversion, he is active.

Regeneration is sometimes used in a wide sense, and sometimes in a narrow sense. In its wide sense it signifies the whole process of applying salvation in Christian experience; in the narrow sense it denotes the initial act of that application, the first and sole act of grace in imparting spiritual life to a soul dead in sin. The Romish theology employs the term in the wide sense, as comprehending everything involved in the transition of the soul from a state of condemnation on earth to a state of salvation in heaven; so used, it covers the entire subject of Christian experience. The early Lutheran and Reformed theologians also employed it in its wide sense, yet putting upon its usage certain limitations which restricted it to the subjective changes in Christian life, using justification as a term to comprehend all the external and objective elements in the application of redemption to the sinner.

But this wide and somewhat vague use of the term led to confusion, and modern theology has sought to restrict it to that primary act of grace which inaugurates a course of religious life in the soul.

I. Definition.—In its strict and narrow sense, *Regeneration is that act of grace which changes the governing disposition of the sinful soul of man.* To use other language in which to express the same idea, regeneration is a gracious change of the fundamental moral appetency of the soul. An appetite is a bodily craving; an appetency is a mental craving. Imagine a physical appetite so altered that what is now bitter would be sweet; imagine the nature of a lion so changed that it would possess,

incipiently, the nature of the lamb; imagine the moral appetency of the soul so fundamentally reconstructed, germinally, that it loves the religious virtues which it now hates; and we can arrive at some approximately correct conception of the meaning of regeneration as it is now employed as a technicality in modern soteriology. It is a change of the fundamental religious appetency of the human heart.

In figurative language derived from the Scriptures, regeneration is the opening of a blind eye; the unstopping of a deaf ear; the unloosing of a dumb tongue; the impotentiation of a withered arm; the empowering of an impotent limb; the quickening of a dead body; the sensitizing of a seared conscience; a new birth; a resurrection from the dead; a creating anew; the giving of a heart of flesh for a heart of stone. Almost every figure is employed which connotes the initiation of a radical change, the opening of a new dynamic center, the projection of the sinner in the opposite direction of his moral spontaneity. By whatever figurative name sin's effects are described, the initial act, starting the process of the eradication of those effects, is called regeneration. Every thing but God must have had a commencement—a point of beginning: regeneration is the commencement of a Christian experience, the start of a religious life.

Is the sinner dead? Regeneration is a New Life. Is holiness thought of as non-existent in him? Regeneration is a New Creation. Is he considered as a man born in sin? Regeneration is a New Birth. Is he considered as a corpse in a sinful grave? Regeneration is a Resurrection from the sin-grave. Is he looked upon as a man with a depraved governing principle? Regeneration is a New Governing Principle. Is he regarded as a man with a ruling appetency for evil? Regeneration is a New Appetency for spiritual things. Is he a subject of the Spirit's saving grace? Regeneration is that absolutely first thing which is done in him with a view to his transformation into a saint in the consummation of the whole redemptional process.

II. Nature.—In explicating the nature of regeneration, I shall employ the five metaphysical causes as a good *schema* for the development of the doctrine. A cause is that without which

another thing called the effect, could not be. The *efficient* cause is the power which brings the effect into being; for example, the carpenter is the efficient cause of my desk. The *material* cause is that of which the effect is made by the efficient power; for example, the walnut wood is the material out of which my desk is made. The *instrumental* cause is the tools or implements by which the effect is made; for example, the tools which the carpenter used are the instrumental cause of my desk. The *formal* cause is that which gives definite shape to the effect, and differentiates it from every thing else; for example, the peculiar design which the carpenter has given to my desk is its formal nature. The *final* cause is the end or purpose had in producing the effect; for example, the final cause of my desk was, proximately, the money which the carpenter had in view, but ultimately, it was the uses to which the desk is to be put for writing or other purposes. I shall employ these ideas as a skeleton for presenting the doctrine of regeneration, and ask what is the efficient, the material, the instrumental, the formal and the final cause of regeneration.

III. **Efficient Cause.**—What then is the efficient or producing cause of regeneration? I answer, *The grace of the Holy Spirit.*

But to approach this important point in a more systematic order, there are three leading answers to this question as to the efficient cause of regeneration: (1) the will of man; (2) the truth of the gospel; (3) the will of the Holy Ghost.

1. The Pelagian and Arminian soteriologies posit the efficient cause of regeneration in the will of the sinner who is regenerated. That is, man by his own hand reverses the moral spontaneity and the ruling spiritual appetency of his own soul. The power which effectuates the change is inherent in the creature who is the subject of the change: the dynamic of the Christian life is the will of the sinner.

According to the Pelagian and Rationalistic party, the moral revolution is effected by the *natural* power of the human will; while, according to the Semipelagian and Arminian party, this radical reversal of the governing disposition of the heart is ef-

fected by the *gracious* power of the will. In either view, the agency is the will; the will unaided in the scheme of the one party, the will as containing a deposit of gracious power in the opinion of the other party. Any sinner, every sinner, is able, in and of himself, to reverse himself, as the Pelagian views the case; any sinner, every sinner, is able, by the assistance of divine grace, to reverse himself, as the Arminian sees the case. These schools of thought do not disagree as to the efficient cause of regeneration; with both that cause is the will of the sinner; but they disagree with each other as to the nature of the power which is subjective to that will; with the one it is the power which is in the will by creation, and with the other it is the power which is supernaturally and graciously deposited in that will.

Whatever may be held as to the source and origin of the power of the will, whether it derives its power by creation or by grace, the entire hypothesis which posits the efficiency of regeneration in the sinner's will is objectionable, (1) on metaphysical grounds, and (2) on biblical grounds.

(1) The hypothesis is metaphysically untenable. The faculties of the human soul, the powers by which it performs all mental acts, are intellect, or the faculty of cognition; the sensibility, or the faculty of feeling; the will, or the faculty of volition. Human life is made up of cognitions, feelings and volitions, and man certainly has the power of knowing things, of feeling things, and of doing things, and intellect, sensibility, and will, are the technical faculties by which he performs all these departments of his life.

The order in which these faculties are enumerated is the order in which they act; man first cognizes something, then he feels something, and then he does something. This order is logical, and is and can never be reversed. He never feels, and then knows the thing which excited the feeling, and then wills concerning the matter. He never wills, and then cognises, and then feels. The order of nature, in the genesis of human action, is (a) cognition, (b) feeling, (c) volition. Volition is the effect of feeling; feeling is the effect of cognition, and cognition is

the effect of fact; but the intellect acts according to the subjective laws of knowing, the feeling acts according to the subjective laws of emotion, and the will acts according to the subjective laws of volition which are stamped upon its internal constitution. An object being presented, the intellect, in accordance with its own subjective nature, cognizes it; being cognized, the sensibility is excited according to its own nature, and the feelings being excited, the will volitionates according to the constitution which the Creator has impressed upon this faculty of action.

Man is a fallen being, and all his faculties are affected by the depravity which is all-pervasive of his nature. His intellect is blinded, and does not see truly; his sensibility is perverted and he does not feel accurately upon religious matters; his will is debased, and does not emit a true volition. The desideratum, then, is such a change as will rectify the perceptions and reasonings of the understanding; such a change in the sensibilities as will correct its tastes and appetencies concerning the things of the Spirit; his will needs such a subjective change in the motives which rule it as will lead to correct volition.

Now that theory of regeneration which posits the efficient cause of this change in the human will, reverses the laws of mental life and supposes that the will can change the fundamental disposition of the feelings, which are themselves the causes of volition. Man is, by the theory, supposed to be able to act backwards, and by the power of his will change the governing disposition of his heart, which governing disposition of his heart is the cause of his volition; that is, the effect (the volition) is supposed to change the cause (the fundamental appetency)! Given a new view of the understanding, and a new feeling in the heart, then there may be a new volition of the will; but never otherwise. But this hypothesis proposes to get a new affection of the heart, and a new view of the understanding, by a new act of the will! Man cannot thus command his feelings and his views; it presumes that he can act backwards.

"Man's volitions are practically the shadow of his affections. It is useless to think of a man's volitions separating themselves from his affections, and drawing him towards God, as it is to

think of a man's shadow separating itself from him, and leading him in the opposite direction to that in which he is going. Man's affections, to use Calvin's words, are like horses that have thrown off the charioteer and are running wildly—they need a new hand to direct them. In disease, we must be helped by a physician. We do not stop a locomotive engine by applying power to the wheels, but by reversing the lever. So the change in man must be, not in the transient volitions, but in the deeper springs of action—the fundamental bent of the affections and will.”—*Strong's Theology*, p. 450.

Men act according to what they are; out of the heart are the issues of life; as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he; as is the tree so is the fruit; the acts of life are but the indices of life. But this hypothesis, which supposes regeneration effected by will-power, proposes to reverse nature and nature's laws and change the fundamental moral nature of the human tree by the volitions of the will!

But it is said that if Adam had the power of will to reverse himself in the garden of Eden there is no reason why each one of his children may not exercise the same power and do the same thing today. But there are many things which, being done, cannot be undone; the railroad engineer may “ditch” his engine, but he cannot replace it on the track; a suicide may take his life, but he cannot restore that life again; a man may puncture his heart with a knife, but he cannot heal the wound; a holy man, like Adam, a probationer with the *potestas peccare* may commit moral suicide in the garden of Eden, but he cannot then restore his connection with God. The power of death does not imply the power of life. Man spiritually died when he sinned; he cannot recover himself to life; he must be raised from the dead by some power outside of himself.

(2) But this hypothesis which construes the human will as the efficient in regeneration is not only unphilosophical, but it is unbiblical also. No man can by acts of his will open his blind eyes, or unstop his deaf ears, or unloose his dumb tongue, or stretch out his withered arm, or impotentiate his palsied legs, or quicken his dead soul, or transmute his stony heart, or give birth

to himself, or make himself a new creature, or raise himself from the dead. All these are figures of speech employed by the Scriptures to set forth the moral state into which the fall brought mankind; and there must be some basis in reality to justify the use of the metaphors. These terms denote a work of omnipotent power. The origination of life is impossible to the creature. He can receive life, he can nurture life, he can use and exercise life, but he cannot originate life. His relation to regeneration is that of a recipient. At the *punctum temporis* of the resurrection of Lazarus he was passive, and at the moment of the resuscitation of the soul dead in trespasses and sins the sinner is passive, a patient acted upon and not an agent acting. Neither can a dead man assist in his reanimation. Two forces cannot co-operate except they be co-ordinate and co-incident: God and the sinner must harmonize before they can work together. "The carnal mind is at enmity with God," and pulls against him, until it is changed in its fundamental nature. And if a sinner were to give birth to himself, what kin would he be to himself? If a sinner were to create himself, what relation would he sustain to himself? In making God the agent in regeneration it is denied that man is the agent and affirmed that he is patient.

2. The second hypothesis predicates the truth, as it is in the gospel, as the efficient cause of regeneration. The will, we are told, is determined by motives; the gospel, as preached presents a system of motives, or reasons, why the sinner should reverse his life; hence, inasmuch as the gospel brings into being the new complex of motives which determine the sinful will to the holy choice of Christ, the truth, as presented in the gospel, is the efficient cause of regeneration.

This view is plausibly presented by Anderson, in this language:

"The change of heart in regeneration is produced by a previous change of judgment. The erroneous opinions of the sinner are corrected, and that corrects his feelings. He receives new information, and that gives another direction to his affections. Plainly, the Bible removes his delusions, and, in showing him the true nature of objects, makes him love many things which he

formerly hated, and hate many things which he formerly loved. When he believes its report, when he takes Bible views of objects, looks at them through its telescope, looks at them through its microscope, looks at them through its atmosphere; when he looks at God, looks at Christ, looks at himself, looks at his soul, looks at this world, looks at death, looks at eternity in Bible light, the look revolutionizes him. See what a commotion has been produced among the affections of his spirit, so soon as this heavenly light, altering the decisions of his judgment, has dawned on his mind! He is now with ardor pursuing objects which he formerly despised, or feared, or abhorred, and fleeing, as when a man flees from the plague, or from his house on fire, from objects which he formerly considered harmless, or in which his soul delighted. The Bible light has disclosed friends where he thought there were none but foes, and foes where he thought there were none but friends.”—*Miley, Theology, Vol. II., p. 335.*

(1) This is a charming description of the effects of the gospel—after regeneration has taken place, after the eyes of the understanding has been opened to behold wondrous things out of God’s law; after that “spiritual discernment” has been given, which enables the sinner to see that the things of the Bible are no longer foolishness, after the affections of the heart have been warmed to the religious truths contained in the revelation of God. The gorgeousness of the sunset may be perceived after the blind eye has been opened; the sweetness of the music may be appreciated after the deaf ear has been unstopped; the exhilaration of life may be felt after the dead has been raised; but it is a singular confusion to represent the light as causative of vision, the sound as causative of hearing, the exuberance as causative of living! The superlative desideratum is such a change in the understanding as will enable it to see clearly; in the heart as will enable it to feel truly; in the will as will cause it to volitionate accurately. Regeneration is just the technicality for these necessary subjective changes in the soul which render it responsive to the wonderful complex of motives which the gospel brings to bear upon life. A motive is the resultant of the views of the understanding and of the feelings of the heart,

and prior to regeneration, that resultant is precisely such as sends the will in the opposite direction from heaven; the imperative need is for the Spirit of God to make just such subjective changes in the soul as will give a new resultant of vision and feeling. The gospel truth is precisely the matter presented, the object brought into the field of vision, feeling and action; what is needed is a change in the views and feelings and conduct concerning it. It brings to bear motives, but the soul is dead in sin, and obtuse and insensible and paralyzed. Motives are not external causes of action, but they are compounds of external objects and internal dispositions. Preaching presents the external object, but the Spirit must bring into being the internal disposition which will make the soul sympathetic with the truth of the gospel. The saddest thing about the soul is, being created to know God and love the truth, it yet does not recognize him as incarnated in Christ Jesus, nor love him as thus presented, nor obey him as Lord and Master.

(2) The Scripture passages relied upon to support this view of the truth as the efficient cause of regeneration, only apparently, and do not really yield the doctrine. "The entrance of thy words giveth light; it giveth understanding to the simple" (Ps. 119:130). But before the words of God can give light and understanding, they must have "entrance" to the mind and heart; and it is just the office of regeneration to open that door of entry to the gospel of the Son of God. Another text relied upon reads: "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of firstfruits of his creatures" (Jas. 1:18). While the word of God performs an important office in the regeneration of a sinner, this text does not point to it as the efficient or producing cause of this change, but distinctly puts its finger upon the "will" of God as the power which causes the change. But the text most confidently and frequently relied upon as teaching the casual efficiency of the word of God in regeneration, begins with a participial clause: "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever" (I Pet. 1:23). But the verse just preceding distinctly mentions the "Spirit" as the agent in the begetting of

the soul anew, and the "seed" which that Spirit plants in the heart is not "corruptible," but incorruptible and imperishable—the principles of the word of God which lives and abides for ever. This is precisely what regeneration does, namely, fallows the soul so that the implanted principles of the word of God take root in its soil and thrive imperishably. The supposition that the "seed" quickens the soil is a contradiction of the figure. The great power of the gospel as a system of divine truth lies in just those views which it gives to the understanding about religious matters, and in those practical appeals which it makes to the human sensibility; but for these motives to have any impact and influence upon the soul, it must antecedently be regenerated, so as to be responsive to them.

3. The third view indicates the Holy Spirit as the efficient *causa* of regeneration. "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (Jno. 3:5). "It is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:13). "The sons of God are born not of the will of man, but of God" (Jno. 1:13). "I will put a new spirit within you, and will take the stony heart out of your flesh, and will give you a heart of flesh" (Ezek. 11:19). "A new heart will I give you" (Ezek. 36:26). "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts" (Jer. 31:33). These passages are explicit in assigning the authorship of the fundamental and primary change of regeneration to God, and thereby denying that man is self-regenerated, or truth-regenerated.

But the biblical terms used to describe this great change are such as to make it obvious that regeneration is the sole work of God. "Creating anew" (Eph. 4:24); "begetting" (Jas. 1:18); "quickening" (Jno. 5:21); "calling out of darkness into light" (I Pet. 2:9); "commanding light to shine out of darkness" (II Cor. 4:6); "alive from the dead" (Rom. 6:13); "new creature" (II Cor. 5:17); "God's workmanship" (Eph. 2:10); "born again" (Jno. 3:3-7). Effects such as these demand the supernatural power of almighty God as an adequate cause for their production; the human will, and the truth, are both alike incompetent to bring such phenomena into being.

In inaugurating a course of grace, the power of the Spirit terminates upon the soul and not upon the truth; it is the heart which is regenerated and not the gospel. Hence such phrases as "to energize the truth," "to intensify the truth," "to illuminate the truth," have no true and proper meaning, since the energy of the Spirit does not terminate upon the truth but upon the sinful spirit, converting its unsusceptibility into a responsive receptivity. The Lord opened "the heart" of Lydia (Acts 16:14). Truth is reality; it is what is; it is a fixed, and unchangeable thing, and the power of God can have no effect upon it. If it were the truth of the gospel which is regenerated, it would be the truth of the gospel which would need radical alteration. So God's work of regeneration is done within the soul itself, and not within the lids of the Bible. Consequently they are in error who describe regeneration as that work of grace which "energizes the truth" and renders it effective. The Bible needs no regeneration and the Spirit does not apply his dynamics to it; to take the other view, is to miss the *terminus ad quem* of the grace of regeneration.

While regeneration is an immediate and supernatural act of the Spirit's grace, it is not a miraculous act. The essence of the miracle is the contranatural; as when water is turned into wine contrary to the course and order of nature; or as when Lazarus is raised from the dead in utter contravention of the laws of nature. In regeneration the soul's spontaneity is reversed, but its laws and constitution are in no true sense violated. For a locomotive engineer to reverse his lever and send his engine running in the opposite direction is not in contravention of the nature of his machine; the engine is reversed, but in accordance with its mechanism. So when God regenerates a sinner, the flow of his moral life is reversed, but its moral constitution and intrinsic nature are not violated; the act is not contranatural, the laws of the soul are not contradicted; its governing principle is reversed and it now moves naturally and regularly in the opposite direction from that in which the current of its spiritual life had previously been running. Consequently every conversion is not miraculous; no saint is a miracle. He is not like water

changed into wine; he is a human being with all his natural and normal faculties, living in opposite moral direction, with a reversed inclination, with a counter spontaneity. He is a tree with another "bent," not a tree miraculously changed into something else, but the same tree which had been crooked towards the north, now crooked towards the south. It is the supernatural power of the Spirit—power above nature—which thus alters the moral "bent" of the sinner's nature in regeneration, but it is not miraculous power, which performs in him an unnatural and contranatural change.

IV. Material Cause.—What then is the material cause of regeneration? Wood is the material which the carpenter took, and out of it manufactured my writing desk. What, in the analogue, is the matter which the Spirit of God takes, and out of it makes an article called Regeneration?

Five metaphysical items have been proposed as the specific "material" which the Spirit manipulates in regeneration: (1) Substance of the soul; (2) the Faculties of the soul; (3) the human Spirit (*pneuma*) as distinguished from the body (*soma*) and the animal life (*psuke*); (4) the Relations and Environment of the soul; (5) the Disposition or Appetency of the soul.

1. It is not the Substance of the soul. Regeneration is not a transubstantiation. In the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, according to the Papal theory of this ordinance, the substance of the bread is changed into the substance of flesh and the substance of the wine is changed into the substance of the blood of Christ; the phenomenal properties of the bread and wine remain to the senses but the unseen substance is supposed to have been transmuted into the substance of the body and blood of our Lord; it is a supposed instance of transubstantiation. If the substance of wood were changed into the substance of iron, the wood would cease to be wood and become in reality iron. If in regeneration the substance of the human soul were changed into some other and different substance, then man, after his regeneration, would cease to be substantially man and become some new thing. That is, the saint would be as different from the sinner

as the bread, after the sacerdotal prayer of consecration, is supposed to be different from the bread before the prayer of the priest acted upon it. But a regenerated man is as truly human after this act of grace upon him as he was before he experienced the change of heart, called regeneration. A converted man is conscious that he is not substantively a different sort of being. He is changed, but he is a changed *man*, and not changed into some other kind of metaphysical creature.

Nor yet is regeneration a consubstantiation. According to the Lutheran theory of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, after the prayer of consecration the body and blood of Christ are with, in, under or by the substance of the bread and the wine; two substances are imagined to be mystically joined under the phenomenal properties of the bread and the wine. If wood were consubstantiated with iron, then we should have two substances underlying and supporting one set of attributes; which would be an unthinkable absurdity, for it is an axiom of philosophy that like substances underprop like attributes and like attributes inhere in like substances; and, consequently, if we think of two substances, say wood and iron, conjoined, they would, by this simple metaphysical axiom, reveal themselves by a double set of attributes; the entity formed by consubstantiation would be two things at one and the same time. If, therefore, regeneration were a consubstantiation, if the Spirit created a new substance with, in, under or by the old substance of the soul, then man, after regeneration, would, in strict literalness, be two men, which is a violation of his most elementary consciousness.

Regeneration does not, therefore, terminate upon the soul-substance of man, either to transmute that substance into a new sort of substance or to create another substance with, in, under or by, or in some other mystical relation to, the old substance. In other words, and in short, regeneration does not alter man's personal identity. This is not the meaning, when the regenerated man is called a "new creature." There is a newness, but it is not a newness of substance.

2. Regenerating grace does not terminate upon the Faculties of the soul (a) It does not annihilate one of the old facul-

ties; (b) it does not create and add a new faculty; (c) it does not alter the subjective nature, or the internal laws of operation, of any one of the faculties. The faculties of the sinner's mind prior to regeneration are intellect, sensibility and will; and the faculties of the sinner's mind after regeneration are the same. The psychology, metaphysics and philosophy of the Christian are the same as of the sinner. The laws of thought, the laws of feeling, the laws of willing, abide unaltered and unreconstructed. Indeed the complement of faculties and the modes of their operation are the same in heaven as on earth.

There are those who think that there is a special sin-faculty—a specific organ for committing sin, as there is a specific faculty of cognition. And there are those who think that regeneration annihilates this sin-faculty and creates a specific faith-faculty—a specific mental organ for religion and the eternal verities, as we have a specific power for knowing, feeling and willing. But a sinner exercises the same mental functions in his sinning, in his wrong doing, which he employs in any and every other department of life; he cognizes Christ and the things of the gospel with the same intellectual faculty with which he cognizes the facts of natural science; he loves the Redeemer with the same heart with which he loves his kindred, or his friends, or his country; he obeys the gospel with the same will with which he performs the most common-place acts of his daily life. What is sound logic for the unregenerated man is sound logic for the regenerated man; the laws of thinking are not reversed, so as to upset the axioms of thought. Regeneration destroys no mental faculty, creates no new faculty, nor alters the mode of the operation of any faculty; the psychology of the mind is the same after as before regeneration. Consciousness proves this identity.

There are changes in the way in which the regenerated man looks at Christ, feels towards Christ, acts under Christ, as compared with his views and feelings and conduct prior to this fundamental change, but these variations come about, not through some change introduced into the constitution of mental life. His intellect reverses its former judgment; his sensibility reverses its former feelings, and his will reverses its former conduct in re-

lation to the Redeemer and his religion; but these changes are only sequential, and not causative.

3. Nor is the *Pneuma*, the higher power of the soul, the material upon which regenerating grace terminates with reconstructive influences. This hypothesis assumes the soundness of trichotomy, and analyses the human being into three factors: (a) the Rational Spirit (*pneuma*). (b) the Physical Life (*psuke*). and (c) the Body (*soma*). The *Pneuma* of the unregenerate sinner is evil, the very spirit of sin; in regeneration this evil spirit is supposed to be annihilated and a holy and godly *Pneuma* is imagined to be created in its stead. Regeneration is, therefore, neither psychic nor somatic, but it is precisely and definitely pneumatic. This was the view of the elder Delitzsch.

This view must be discarded: (a) Because the philosophy of trichotomy is fallacious; man is not a triad; the *Pneuma* (*pneuma*) and the *Psyche* (*psuke*) are synonyms, and used interchangeably in Scripture for the second, or immaterial element, in the constitution of man; the pneumatology of man is the same thing, by another name, as the psychology of man. (b) Because the view, if true, would interpret regeneration as only partial; only one-third, the pneumatic third, of human nature would be the subject of the Spirit's regenerating influences; whereas the Scriptures teach that the entire nature of man is radically altered by this operation of the Holy Ghost. Sin affected the somatic and the psychic life of man, and the remedy must be as deep and as wide as the disease. Redemption contemplates, in its consummation, the body, the life and the soul of man; and the regenerate change must be as extensive and as thorough as was the influence of sin. There is a somewhat, to be indicated in the sequel, which, being changed, affects the totality of human life and destiny.

4. Nor does regeneration terminate upon the Relations and Environment of man. His external surroundings are not the materials which the Spirit of God lays hold upon and reconstructs.

In the modern philosophy of evolution, now so popular, so regnant and so fallacious, "environment" is held to be a potent and potential cause of many of the profoundest determinate variations in organic development. Given an inherent force, a subjective dynamic, and the homogeneous can be differentiated, we are told, into the heterogeneous, by successive differentiations under the influences of change in the external environment of the individual. In this way all the lower forms of animal life have been gradually evolved into the higher forms; one species, it is held, has been transmuted into another species by alterations made in its surroundings. Lamarck claimed that "environment," direct and indirect, was the most influential factor in the evolution of species. Drummond defined life as "correspondence with environment," and death as "disharmony with environment." These definitions he thought good for all kinds of life—vegetable, animal, human, spiritual.

If, then, "environment" is so potent and constructive, the superlative desideratum for any and every sinner is an altered environment—another atmosphere in which to breathe, another set of circumstances in which to move and operate. A sinful life is one out of correspondence with a heavenly environment; it needs a new and spiritual environment in which to grow and develop in godliness; regeneration is that precise act of the Holy Ghost which changes the religious environment of the soul. Here is the species *tadpole*; the problem is to change it into the species *homo*; to accomplish the transmutation, all that is required are successive variations in the environment of the tadpole and an indefinite time. Similarly, here is the species sinner, and the problem is to change him into the species saint; all that is required to effect the transmutation are successive variations in the sinner's environment and a sufficiency of time, and the result aimed at will be eventually achieved by the forces which are inherent in the sinner operating under the altered environment.

(1) This view is unacceptable because the philosophy which lies at its base and supports it is the sheerest hypothesis. God created every thing after its "kind," and all organic species have remained, from their creation until now identical and immuta-

ble. There is not an authenticated instance in historic time of the transmutation of one species into another, by heredity, by environment, by natural selection, or in any other mode. But the change of a sinner into a saint is a matter of daily occurrence and of common observation; to postulate a mere scientific hypothesis, unproved and without any established instance, as explanatory of the mode in which these spiritual changes occur is the sheerest absurdity. If "environment" differentiates no organic species, it is absolutely inadmissible to suppose that it is "environment" which differentiates the species sinner into the species saint.

(2) Moreover, there is no such thing as a "species" sinner and no such being as a "species" saint. The classification is not true to fact. The "species" is man (*homo*); and the sinner is an immoral man and the saint is a holy man. The qualities differentiating them are not organic but ethical. If the evolution of species were true the doctrine is inapplicable to the sinner, for the reason that he is not, in any strict sense, a species of being. A sinner is a man living an unethical life; a saint is a man living a godly life; the differences between them are not specific.

(3) Upon the supposition that the race is fallen and that the individual is "dead in trespasses and sins," there is something nonsensical in the proposition to get a new life by merely changing the environment of that life. There must be a living, potential being in the center of the external circumstances to utilize and translate and transform the external circumstances, else they must remain impotent and unemployed. Whitewashing and garnishing the sepulchre leaves it filled with dead men's bones, dressing and adorning the corpse leaves it a corpse still. The feet go wrong because the heart is wrong; the hands go wrong because the heart is wrong; the tongue goes wrong because the heart is wrong; the head goes wrong because the heart is wrong; the life is ethically wrong because the central heart is depraved; and the supreme desideratum is not merely a new set of surroundings but a new central, dynamic heart, out of which are the issues of life.

The gospel and its preachings, the Church and its institutions, constitute for the sinful soul its gracious, Christian "environment," the external influences which make for a better moral life, the opportunity which is created by the divine love for the sinner to change from his evil ways to correct moral behaviour, and it is impossible to overstate the true worthfulness of this set of evangelical surroundings as an external system promotive of the true and higher life of the soul; but such an "environment" would be available for the purpose only on the supposition that the soul is potent and active. It is a broad and true generalization that the circumstances do not make the man but the man makes the circumstances; the circumstances give the opportunity without which the career and the conduct could not be formed, but it is the personality and the force of the individual which lay hold upon these circumstances and transmute them into conduct and character. Upon the supposition that man has never fallen but possesses the full complement of moral powers and self-usefulness with which he was endowed by his Maker, there would be some sense in supposing that all that he needs is opportunity and occasion—a gospel, a Church, its institutions, a sound regime of healthful moral culture, a sanitary propaedeutic, a wise curriculum of ethical education; but upon the supposition that he is depraved at the center of his heart, the moral change must be introduced at the center before it can manifest itself on the circumference of life. A corrupt tree will bring forth corrupt fruit in spite of the character and degree of culture which may be given to it. A grape vine can only bring forth grapes and a bramble vine bramble berries, whether planted in a garden, or growing wild in the jungle. The material cause of regeneration is not the "environment" of life; the "new creature" is not obtainable through a change in the mere external surroundings; these only give to life its opportunities.

5. The "matter" of regeneration, that upon which the efficient power of the Spirit terminates and reconstructs, is truly and properly the soul's governing moral disposition, its regnant moral appetency, its ruling moral passion, the *fons et origo* of its moral life.

Call it by what name you fancy best or the nomenclature of your philosophy makes most appropriate—a disposition, an appetency, a principium, a passion, an inclination, a habitus—there is a something in human nature which determines its moral life, the way in which the intellect looks at Christ and the things of the Spirit, the way in which the heart feels about Christ and the things of his gospel, the way in which the will acts concerning the precepts and ideals of Christ and his religion. By whatever name you may elect to call it, there is a ruling principle which lies below the intellect and determines its cast of view; lies deeper than the sensibility and determines its complexion of feeling; lies behind the will and determines the trend of human conduct; it is the thing which gives definitiveness and uniqueness to moral life. The Scriptures call it the “heart,” the “life,” the “discernment.” But whatever the biblical, the philosophical, the popular name of this governing principle, it is the subject-matter of regeneration, the item in man’s moral spontaneity which the Spirit reverses. Not its substance, not its faculties, not its higher spirit, not its “environment,” but its distinctive moral appetency, is the “matter” which is changed by the grace of regeneration. In this mode a sinner is made a “new creature in Christ Jesus.”

“Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God” (Jno. 3:3). What is it that is “born again?” Not the substance of the soul, for that would convert the subject of regeneration into a different kind of metaphysical creature; not the faculties of the soul, for that would give only new organs of life; not the higher powers of the soul as differentiated from the lower, for that would be but a partial regeneration; not the “environment,” for that would be a change in the external surroundings; but it is the “man” which must be “born again,” man at and in the center of his life.

“If any man be in Christ Jesus, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new” (II Cor. 5:17). It is the “man” which is in Christ Jesus, and the “man” which becomes a new creature; and the change of the “man” is such that old things pass away and all things become

new to his vision, to his heart, to his behaviour. What is central to the "man" is the subject of this predication.

"In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature" (Gal. 6:15). Nothing done *to* a man, nothing done *for* him, nothing done *about* him, but something done *in* him, avails to make him the "new creature" in Christ Jesus. He must be touched and transformed in the dynamic center of his moral life before the environment of the gospel and the opportunities of a godly life are utilizable by him.

These texts describe this regenerate change in such a way as to indicate that it occurs, not in the superficies but at the central and deepest point of moral life. "Even when we were dead in sins . . . hath quickened us together with Christ" (Eph. 2:5). "Put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness" (Eph. 4:24). "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first-fruits of his creatures" (Jas. 1:18). And a multitude of other texts might be cited to show that the change effected in regeneration is a change in the central regnant disposition of the soul.

V. Instrumental Cause.—In the manufacture of my desk the carpenter used certain tools with which to operate upon the wood which was his material; what, in the analogue, were the tools which the Spirit employed in his operation upon the governing moral disposition of the soul in order to make the "new creature in Christ Jesus?" What is the instrumental cause of regeneration? I answer: "*There is none.*"

Upon this topic, however, there are three general opinions: (1) Baptism; (2) the Gospel; (3) the Immediate Power of the Holy Spirit.

(1) Romish, Lutheran and Anglican theologians hold that regeneration is effected by the Spirit through the sacrament of baptism as an instrumentality. These parties differ from each other in the intensity with which they hold this opinion rather than in the substance of the doctrine. The fullest, and vilest form of it is imbedded in that Romish sacramentarianism which brought about the apostacy of the Dark Ages and rendered the Protestant Reformation absolutely necessary in order to pre-

serve the Christian religion in the earth. From this baleful theory the Lutheran and Anglican Reformers never completely divorced themselves, each continuing, after the Reformation, to hold that regeneration is so connected with the ordinance of baptism as to make the one necessary to the other, and the other to follow somehow logically from the one.

But the Scriptures represent baptism to be, not the means of regeneration, but only the sign of this great primary act of saving grace; baptism therefore presupposes and follows regeneration and is not causative of it. For this reason only believers and their infant children were Scriptural subjects of this sacrament. Under the Old economy Abraham believed, and then received circumcision as the "seal" of his faith; the work of grace had been done in him prior to his receiving the external ordinance. Under the New Testament dispensation the disciples were commissioned to first make disciples of all men and then to baptize them. On the day of Pentecost those converted first repented and confessed their Saviour, then they were baptized by Peter (Acts 2:37, 41). At Samaria the converts first believed in Christ and then Philip baptized them (Acts 8:12). And so of all the cases recorded; there was an experience of saving grace prior to the administration of the sacramental ordinance, and consequently regeneration could not have been accomplished through baptism as an instrumentality.

Upon this view of regeneration by baptism there is an intolerable incongruity between the sign and the thing signified. The thing signified is an inward spiritual change; the sign is an outward and physical ordinance performed upon the body of the person baptized. It is not rational to suppose that God reconstructs the fundamental moral life of the soul by a physical performance of somewhat upon the bodily organism. If so, every baptism is a genuine miracle, for water applied to the body is made to cleanse the immaterial soul, which is the essence of the contranatural. The whole view is objectionable as a part and parcel of a general scheme of mechanical, rather than moral, religion and harmonizes more naturally with the materialistic rather than with the spiritual philosophy.

The texts mainly relied upon by the adherents of this opinion do not legitimately support the contention. "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (Jno. 3:5). "Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost" (Acts 2:38). "He saved us by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost" (Tit. 3:5). These may be taken as specimens of the strongest Scriptures for baptismal regeneration. But these texts are to be explained as simple instances of the figure of metonymy, in which the sign is put for the thing signified. Regeneration, the inward change, the thing really indicated, and baptism, the outward sign, are only different sides or aspects of the same fact, and either side therefore may legitimately be described in terms of the other side or aspect. The reality is the Spirit, and the symbol is water, and we find throughout both Testaments that all the saving facts of the gospel are gathered under the two symbolic heads of *blood* and *water*—the one being symbolical of the work of Christ and the other being symbolic of the work of the Spirit. It is legitimate to speak of the blood of Christ and the water of the Spirit, and it is equally legitimate to represent the atoning work of Christ in terms of blood, and the regenerating and sanctifying work of the Spirit in terms of water. Before a man can enter into the kingdom of heaven he must be born of symbolic water, which is the grace of the Spirit. There is not in this famous saying of our Lord the slightest allusion to the sacrament of baptism. And so the whole vicious scheme of baptismal regeneration falls to the ground.

(2) But it is contended by others, with a show of plausibility, that regeneration is effected by the Spirit with the truth of the gospel as his instrumentality. It is not held by this party that the Spirit regenerates the truth, but that the truth is his implement, with which he reaches down into the soul and fundamentally changes its governing moral disposition; the power is the Spirit's grace, the implement is the gospel. This is held to be the prime usefulness of preaching in the world. But this view is radically unsound.

The soul is passive at the *punctum temporis* of regeneration; but for the truth to be available as a means of regeneration the soul must necessarily act upon the truth, receiving and appropriating it. It is therefore thoroughly inconsistent to hold in one breath that the heart is passive in the act of regeneration and in the next take the ground that the truth is the instrumentality of this change. It is equal to saying that the soul is dead and alive at the same instant, which is an unendurable contradiction. Regeneration must take place before the intellect can see truly, or the feelings can act correctly, or the will can energize properly upon the things which are presented in the gospel. The very purpose of regeneration is to put the soul into such a religious condition subjectively as to act upon the truth of the gospel. Consequently regeneration must precede and condition all efficacy of the gospel upon the mind, heart and life of the sinner. When regenerated, then the soul believes the gospel, loves its Saviour, and obeys, relatively, its precepts. The photographic plate must be sensitized before the light can make any impression upon it.

The same Spirit employs the same instrument upon all the members of the congregation; some reject the gospel and others accept it; why? Not, because the Spirit is inefficient; not because the instrument is inadequate; not because the sinner is non-co-operative. Those who hold to the doctrine of sinful inability cannot answer this question, and they consequently surrender a fundamental tenet of the Calvinistic anthropology when they attempt to make the truth of the gospel the instrumental cause of regeneration.

A distinction is needed in order to clarify this phase of the subject. There is some important and indispensable office for the gospel in connection with regeneration; they err who make it the efficient cause of this radical change and they err who make it the instrumentality of this change. In the case of adults, the gospel is a *concomitant* of regeneration. The moment a sinful soul is quickened, it at once stands in need of something to act upon, some Christ in which to believe, some Saviour to love, some precept to be obeyed; this need is supplied by the gospel. To regenerate a man in heathenism would be to open his blind

eyes to look upon moral vacuity, to soften his callous heart to feel sheer emptiness, to potentiate his disabled will to follow no leadership. If, however, the gospel should be present on the occasion of his conversion, the new life has a guide-book of life in its hands and knows whither to turn its opened eye and whom to obey with its renewed will. Here then, I imagine is the correct formula: *Regeneration is not through the truth of the gospel, and yet it is not without that truth.* The gospel, leaving out the exceptional case of the infant which is mentally incapable, is the invariable con-comitant, or companion, of the Spirit in regeneration; and it is the supreme business of the preacher to be present with the gospel when the Spirit regenerates so that the quickened soul may see, on opening its intellectual eye, Jesus, may love him with its vivified heart and obey him with its renewed will. But this is a vastly different thing from saying that the gospel is the instrumental cause of regeneration.

This great and essential and primary change is wrought by the immediate and direct agency of the Holy Ghost, and consequently there is no instrumental cause of regeneration. The initial act of grace is taken without the use of any means whatsoever; the Spirit reverses the spontaneity of the soul with his own hand, but in the presence of gospel truth and direction. The doctrine of regeneration in connection with the word, sufficiently explains such texts as "of his own will begat he us with the word of truth" (Jas. 1:18).

(3) The third view then is the only one consistent with Scripture and tenable in psychology, namely, that regeneration is wrought by the immediate agency of the Spirit without any instrumentality whatsoever through which that power is transmitted to the sinful soul. It is a "creating," and there are no instruments of creation; it is a "resurrection," and there are no instruments of resurrection; it is an "opening of blind eyes," an "unstopping" of deaf ears, a "healing" of withered limbs, and there were no instruments by which these symbolic miracles were performed by the Lord. The sons of God "were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (Jno. 1:13). If it were effected only through the

truth as an instrumentality, then the infant, idiot, and moral incompetent could not be regenerated; and if it were effected only through baptism, then all persons dying unbaptized must necessarily perish; but if it is accomplished by the direct agency of the Spirit, without any external means, this class of persons would be salvable because they are capable of being born again and of using their regenerate powers upon the gospel surroundings whenever they come to the years of moral discretion or to a state of mental soundness and competency, in this life or in the life beyond the grave.

VI. Formal Cause.—What is the formal cause of regeneration? The carpenter took walnut wood and with his tools shaped it into my writing desk; the Spirit takes the governing disposition of the soul, or its moral appetency, and without tools gives it what "shape" or form? I answer: *A holy cast.*

Regeneration is the transformation of a sinful disposition into a holy disposition, the conversion of an aversion to the things of the Spirit into an appetency for the things of the Spirit. The fundamental moral appetite of the heart is changed into a love for the Bible and the Bible's Redeemer. Holiness constitutes its specific, formal and differentiating nature. The old is made new; death is changed to life; blindness is changed to sight; impotence is changed to power; stoniness is changed to flesh; hostility to God is changed to love of God; uncongeniality with the gospel is changed into sympathy with and responsiveness to this scheme of sacred truth; the eye that looked down is made to look up; the face that was set away from heaven is turned towards heaven—this is all done seminally, infolding the prophecy of complete holiness in the final and perfect work of sanctification. The regenerate man can say: Whereas I was blind, now I see; whereas I was deaf, now I hear the sweet music of the gospel; whereas I was lame and impotent, now my feet are strong and swift to run in the ways of the Lord; whereas I was dead in trespasses and sins, now I live, nevertheless, not I, but Christ liveth in me. Sinfulness and holiness are opposites; in regeneration the sinful governing disposition is changed into a holy governing disposition.

Regeneration is an initial act of grace, which is expanded through the broad and progressive work of sanctification into entire and perfect holiness. Regeneration itself is the implantation in the deepest depths of the soul of the "seed" of a holy life; sanctification is the cultural process by which this seed is brought to the perfection of flower and fruit of godliness. In biblical language, regeneration changes the old sinful heart, seminally, into the "new heart," out of which are all the issues of a holy life and career in grace.

Its formal nature may be illustrated by a tree which has an inclination toward the north, which has been subsequently inclined in the opposite direction toward the south; the incline of the tree is called its "bent"; regeneration changes the moral "bent" of the soul from sin towards holiness. The general direction of a mountain range is called its "trend," and regeneration is that act of the Spirit which reverses the moral "trend" of the soul. The flow of the Mississippi river is from lake Itasca at the north, to the Gulf of Mexico at the south; regeneration is that act of grace which changes the "flow" of the moral current of the soul from evil to godliness. We know what we mean by the "nature" of the lion and the "nature" of the lamb; regeneration is that act of the Holy Ghost which changes the fierceness of the lion into the gentleness of the lamb; more strictly speaking, begins the change, which is carried on to perfection in sanctification. One has a taste for the scenery of the flat country and at the same time he has an aversion for the rugged grandeur of the mountains; suppose his "taste" seminally reversed, so that he has an aversion for the flat scenery of the lowlands and an attraction for the elevated views of the highlands; we would have in such a reversal "taste" an illustration of the change effected in regeneration in changing the moral "taste" of the soul. The old Adam and the new Adam; the old man and the new man; the natural man and the spiritual man; the law of sin and the law of life; the principle of evil and the principle of goodness; the goats and the sheep; the children of Satan and the children of God; sinners and saints—these are all so many biblical contrasts and regeneration is that act of

grace which starts the transformation from one kind of moral creature to the opposite kind. Everything has its polarity; the earth has its north pole and its south pole, its boreal magnetism and its austral magnetism; and the soul has its moral polarity, and its magnetism is for sin and its polarity is away from God; regeneration reverses the moral polarity and magnetism of the soul. It opens a new dynamic center of moral and religious life. It changes the governing disposition of the soul from a principle that genders sin to a principle that genders holiness. Regeneration begins the change; sanctification completes and perfects it.

VII. Final Cause.—To ascertain the final cause of anything we must inquire for the ends, purposes, uses, fruits of the thing considered. In making my desk the immediate object which the carpenter had in view was the remuneration which he was to receive, but the ultimate end which he had was to make a desk which would subserve the purpose of a writing table. What was the Spirit's object in taking the sinful governing moral disposition of the soul and, without any means, immediately converting it into a holy governing principle? I answer: (1) Proximally, *to procure the fruits of godliness*; (2) Ultimately, *the glorification of God*.

1. The immediate, or proximate, result of regeneration may be succinctly and generically described as conversion. The sinful soul is passively regenerated in order that it may be actively converted.

"Regeneration is the cause of conversion. The Holy Spirit acts in regeneration, and as a consequence the human spirit acts in conversion. And as the act of regeneration is not divisible between God and man, neither is the act of conversion. The converting activity of the regenerate soul moves in two directions: (a) Faith, which is the converting or turning of the soul to Christ as the Redeemer from sin. (b) Repentance, which is the converting or turning of the soul to God as the supreme good. Regeneration is instantaneous, conversion is continuous. Faith is gradual and unceasing, and so is repentance; but regeneration is effected and completely once for all."—*Shedd; Theology, Vol. II., p. 509.*

This is an excellent statement of the proximate teleology of regeneration. The soul is regenerated in order that it may *believe*, or change the *ground* of moral life from self as a basis to Christ as the basis; and in order that it may *repent*, or change the *end* of moral life from self as the chief good to God as the supreme good. When a man believes in Christ, he changes the foundation of his life; when he repents, he changes the superstructure of life, reforms, "quits his meanness." He is regenerated in order that he may do this twofold thing. In order that he may make such a turning, or reversal of life, he needs three things:

(1) New views of the understanding. In the intellect, regeneration manifests itself as *illumination*. Illumination is not regeneration itself, but one of the phenomenal revelations of regeneration. Prior to regeneration the spiritual eye is blind; the soul looks at God, at the world, at man, at sin, at Christ, at spiritual life, at time, at eternity, at heaven, at hell, at all the contents of religion, but his whole view is false and perverted; but after regeneration the contents of the entire moral horizon have a different appearance to his eye. "God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" (II. Cor. 4:6). "The eyes of your understanding being enlightened" (Eph. 1:18). "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned" (I Cor. 2:14). That unexperimental knowledge which the unregenerate man has of Christ and the gospel is characterized as "ignorance." The effect of regeneration in the understanding is to give to it "spiritual discernment"—a new view of Christ and the gospel. The product of this regenerated cognition is "saving knowledge."

(2) The effect of regeneration in the sensibility is to create a new *affection* for the person of Christ and his work. As the regenerate man sees differently, so he feels differently about the things of the Spirit. "I will put a new spirit within you, and I will take away the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give

them a heart of flesh" (Ezek. 11:19). "Renew a right spirit within me" (Ps. 51:10). "The Lord direct your hearts into the love of God" (II. Thess. 3:5). "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema, Maranatha" (I Cor. 16:22). There is a long list of Christian emotions mentioned throughout the Scriptures which are but the fruits of regeneration as it manifests itself in the realm of human sensibility; there is a saving trust, a saving love, a saving hope, a saving joy, a saving peace, a saving fear, all but the products of the regenerated principle which was implanted by the Holy Spirit when he reversed the governing disposition of the soul.

(3) With respect to the human will, regeneration manifests itself in this department of life as a "*renewal*." Christian volitions and Christian conduct are but the products of this deep and radical conversion of the governing principle of moral life. "May the God of peace make you perfect to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight" (Heb. 13:21). "God worketh in you to will" (Phil. 2:12). "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power" (Ps. 110:3). The regenerate views of the understanding and the regenerate feelings of the heart fuse to make the complexus of regenerative motives which result in regenerate volitions, which are executed as regenerate acts. Consequently the regenerate man acting as he sees Christ and as he feels concerning him, develops his Christian experience freely and spontaneously.

Conversion—the immediate object of regeneration—is consequential of the new views, of the new feelings, and of the new motives which the sinner has as he contemplates Christ and the facts of the gospel; and the new views are the result of the Spirit's illumination of the understanding, and the new feelings are the results of the Spirit's quickening of the heart, and the new volitions are the results of the Spirit's renewal of the will; and these changes in the faculties of the soul are consequential upon that regenerate change of the fundamental and governing moral disposition in a region below consciousness and underneath all the mental organs.

2. The far-off and ultimate end of regeneration is the glori-

fication of God in the salvation of the sinner. God is the chief end of himself as well as of all the works of his hand. The final purpose of regeneration is to contribute to the declarative glory and eternal happiness of the Deity, by whom and for whom all things were created, preserved and developed.

VIII. Consciousness.—Regeneration takes place below consciousness. It produces no internal sensation in the soul. No man was ever conscious of that instantaneous act of the Holy Spirit by which he was made a new creature in Christ Jesus. He cognizes the fact by inference—by an inference based upon the phenomena of his new life in Christ. In this mode, he cognizes power; he sees the effects and infers the power which is the cause of the effects. In this way he knows substance; he perceives its attributes and from them infers its reality. In this manner he knows the existence of his own soul; he is conscious of its acts and phenomena and from them infers the reality of his mind. So he apprehends in consciousness the phenomena of spiritual views, spiritual feelings and spiritual acts and from these he infers the reality of his passage from moral death to moral life. He is not conscious of regeneration; but he becomes aware of it by immediate inference from the fruitage of his life. The nature of the tree is revealed by the character of the fruit. This is our Lord's rule of judgment: "By their fruits ye shall know them." This is the meaning of that great saying of his to Nicodemus: "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit" (Jno. 3:8). The power of wind is inferred from the phenomena of wind; and so the regenerating power of the Spirit is inferred from the phenomena of Christian experience. The changes in the intellect, in the sensibility, in the will, in the conduct, in the life, are the proofs that the change has occurred. "What man knoweth the things of man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God" (I Cor. 2:11). The knowledge of the fact of regeneration is not direct, immediate and conscious, but indirect, mediate and inferential.

(1) The subconscious nature of regeneration proves that this change is effected not by any external means or creature agencies but only by the immediate and direct power of the Holy Spirit; for God only can touch the human soul in the region which lies beneath consciousness and introduce therein that which will manifest itself in consciousness.

(2) The subconscious nature of regeneration likewise proves that infants are susceptible to this change equally with adults, for the reason that the change is predicated upon no conscious states or acts as preconditions of its taking place. "He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother's womb" (Luke 1:15).

(3) The subconscious nature of regeneration protects the doctrine from the vagaries and perversions of mystics and fanatics. By this view, all claims of private communion with the Spirit set up in such phrases as "endowment with power," "the higher life," "the complete surrender," "the infilling of the Spirit," "complete sanctification," are barred. All the operations of the Spirit are below consciousness and manifest themselves in consciousness in the most normal and regular manner, without violent revolutions and spiritual cataclysms. Every claim to regeneration must be evidenced by a sane and balanced and well-proportioned reformation and godly conversation. To himself and to his fellow Christians and to the world, the subject of this change must show it by bringing forth the fruits of the Holy Spirit; in this way only can he, or any one, know that the regenerate change has occurred.

IX. Necessity.—Let no one, however, infer that because he is not immediately conscious of the Holy Spirit in the act of regenerating his soul there is no real change of this character and that it is not necessary to Christian experience that it be considered an essential step in the spiritual transformation of the soul and its religious life. That all men, without exception, need to be changed in their fundamental moral natures is proved both by express Scripture and by rational considerations.

(1) The Redeemer thrice declared to Nicodemus: "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God" (Jno.

3:3). "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature" (Gal. 6:15). "Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt; for the tree is known by his fruit" (Matt. 12:33). "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit" (Matt. 7:18). "Holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord" (Heb. 12:14). Such declarations are too categorical for any honest mind to deny that the Scriptures teach the necessity of a fundamental and radical change of the moral nature of man.

(2) Holiness, or conformity to the fundamental moral attribute of God's nature, is an indispensable condition of harmony with God, with self, with the saints, with the moral universe. Unless such a moral harmony can be secured; if a sinner were transferred to heaven with his tastes and aspirations unaltered; if he carried with him to that blest abode all the impulses and appetencies which now mark and determine his life on the earth; he would be in uncongenial society, in the midst of uncongenial surroundings, breathing an atmosphere which was unpleasant to his sense of smell, hearing music which grated upon his ears, beholding visions which were repulsive to his eye, mingling in communions which were opposed to his desires, a unit in an environment with which he was totally out of accord; he would be miserable, for the prime condition of happiness is subjective to the soul. For heaven to be heaven to him, he must undergo a fundamental change of heart.

(3) The universal moral condition of the human heart, as depraved by nature, and as guilty of actual transgression when it reaches the years of discretion and moral action, is precisely the opposite of God's holiness, without which no man can live in normal and blessed relations with him. As long as the heart remains as it is, the governing disposition leads away from God and against God. The carnal mind is at enmity with him. A radical internal change is therefore necessary in every human being, who hopes or may attempt to live a heavenly life.

"Better never to have been born at all, than not to be born again."

CHAPTER XXV

Conversion

Regeneration is that instantaneous act of grace, in the sub-conscious region of the sinful soul, which radically reverses its regnant moral nature, illuminating the understanding, sensitizing the heart, and potentiating the will. A being, so changed, is able to act voluntarily upon the gospel and the things it presents; he now has the power and the temperament necessary to turn to Christ as his Saviour. With his enlightened understanding he can see Christ and the things of the gospel in a new light; with his sensitized heart he can feel the odiousness of sin and the desirableness of Christ and the things of the gospel; and with his renewed will he can accept his Saviour and turn away from a sinful life. This action on his part is technically denominated in theology *Conversion*.

I. Scripture Texts.—Concerning conversion, there are two classes of Scripture texts: (1) One class represents God as converting, or turning, men to himself; (2) The second class represents men as converting, or turning, themselves to God. In the former, God is the agent and man is the patient; in the other, man is the agent acting upon himself.

(1) "Turn us, O God of our salvation" (Ps. 85:4). "Draw me, we will run after thee" (Song 1:4). "Turn thou me, and I shall be turned" (Jer. 31:18). "Turn thou us unto thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned" (Lam. 5:21). "No man can come unto me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him" (Jno. 6:44). "Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father" (Jno. 6:65). In this group of passages, God is unmistakably set forth as the converting agent.

(2) "Turn you at my reproof" (Prov. 1:23). "Turn ye unto him from whom the children of Israel have deeply revolted" (Isa. 31:6). "And the Redeemer shall come to Zion, and them

that turn from transgression in Jacob" (Isa. 59:20). "Repent, and turn yourselves from your idols; and turn away your faces from all abominations" (Ezek. 14:6). "Wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye" (Ezek. 15:32). "Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?" (Ezek. 33:11). "Turn ye even to me with all your heart" (Joel 2:12). In this group of passages the sinner is exhorted to convert, or turn, himself.

II. **Explanation.**—What rational explanation shall we make of these two sets of texts, one representing God as the agent in conversion, and the other representing man as the agent in conversion? Shall we adopt the doctrine of synergism, and assume that God and man are the co-agents in conversion? Or shall we adopt the explanation that the *regenerate man acts only as he is acted upon by divine grace*? This latter is clearly the truth of the matter.

(1) In regeneration a principle is implanted, a seed is imbedded in the heart; and like the seed buried in the soil, it will not germinate and grow and fructify except as it is acted upon by other influences than those which are inherent in itself. There is latent electricity in the gutta percha rod; but it must be rubbed by the silk or the fur skin before it will yield up the electricity which is latent in it. One may be regenerated in infancy, and yet not manifest it in conscious conversion until he is even an old man; through all these years, the regenerate principle has remained dormant. In the course of time, God exerted his influence, and what was latent in the soul in consequence of its regeneration is brought to light in conversion. There is never a moment in Christian life, never a stage in Christian experience, when the sinful soul becomes an agent independent of divine grace. The Spirit not only implants, but he quickens what is implanted, nurtures it, and brings it to its final perfection. The regenerate man acts only as he is acted upon by grace; the Father draws out what the Spirit implants. Hence it can be said that God converts the soul, because he elicits its action and exercise; and it can also be said that the soul turns itself to the Lord, because it acts

according to the laws of its own nature, and responds freely to the invocation of grace. There is no co-operation, no co-action, no co-agency of God and man in conversion; it has no co-causes; the Spirit acts upon the regenerated nature, and under that influence the regenerated soul responds freely to the gospel call to life and immortality.

(2) The Scriptures sustain this resolution of this matter. "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power" (Ps. 110:3). "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:12, 13). "Working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight" (Heb. 13:21). "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God" (II Cor. 3:5). We work out what God first works in. It is he who regenerates the soul, and it is he who acts upon the regenerated soul, turning it to himself in a conscious Christian experience. If the divine grace ceased with regeneration, the soul would remain quiescent, with the potentialities of a new life silent and unexcited and inactive.

IV. Definition.—Conversion is that act of a regenerated soul, excited by the grace of the Holy Spirit, by which it voluntarily and spontaneously turns from sin to Christ as its Saviour. It first apprehends a point to which to turn, and then a point from which to turn. With its enlightened vision it sees Christ and the things of the gospel, and in the light of this vision it reflects back upon sin; it feels the love of the Redeemer shed abroad in its sensibility, and, loving him in return, it feels an aversion to its own wickedness; with its quickened will it lays hold upon Christ as its Saviour, and then addresses itself to the task of reforming its life and conduct in conformity with gospel ideals. It is the desirableness of Christ which causes it to turn from its sinfulness.

V. Analysis.—There are then two converting acts: (1) Faith, (2) Repentance.

(1) Faith turns to Christ as the *ground* of life. It abandons self as the ground. In believing, a regenerated sinner

changes the foundation and basis of all his hopes and expectations. Christ becomes his all in all. Henceforth his song is,

“Nothing in my hand I bring,
Simply to thy cross I cling.”

(2) Repentance turns to Christ as the chief *end* of life. It abandons self as an object and aim. Christlikeness is now the ideal of the soul. It devotes itself to reformation, to the correction of evils, to the forsaking of sin. As faith has reference chiefly to justification and the obtainment of the objective benefits of experimental religion, so repentance has reference chiefly to sanctification and the obtainment of the subjective benefits of experimental religion.

What must we do to be saved? The Scriptures everywhere answer: Believe and Repent; accept Christ as the ground of life, and accept Christ as the end of life; stand upon him, and live for him.

CHAPTER XXVI

Saving Faith

Faith is the first conscious act of the regenerated soul.

It may follow regeneration immediately; or it may follow regeneration at a longer or shorter time—interval; for a regenerated infant may advance even to old age in its adulthood before it becomes consciously converted. But whenever, and however, the change effected in the subconscious nature of the sinful soul reveals itself in Christian experience, it does so by turning to Christ and reposing upon him as its Saviour. Believing in Jesus is the initial act of a conscious experience in grace. Hence the Scriptures throw the accent of all their prescriptions, commands, exhortations, and entreaties upon faith; it is the way to begin a Christian career.

The opened eye spontaneously looks to the cross; the unstopped ear first hears the voice of its Saviour; the unloosed dumb tongue first calls upon the name of the Lord; the empowered withered arm stretches out first to him who healed it; the potentiated lame limbs go first to Christ; the revived soul comes out of its sin-grave first to him who called it back to spiritual life; the new creature in Christ Jesus elects first its Saviour as the cause and end of its new aspirations and hopes; the new governing disposition directs the soul first to him who is the Lord of life; the new spiritual appetency turns to the Redeemer first as the appropriate food of the soul. The first result of the regenerate change is to give the soul a new teleology, a new chief object for which to live, and that is Christ. These are all so many figures for setting forth the idea of believing in or upon Jesus.

I. **Definition.**—What, then, is faith? What does the soul do, precisely and definitely, when it believes in Jesus? Many definitions have been proposed of faith in the general, and of saving faith in particular.

1. Faith has been defined as "*the intuition of eternal verities.*"

In this definition, faith is generically an "intuition," and specifically an intuition of "eternal verities." The word "intuition" describes the subjective nature of faith, telling us what sort of mental exercise it is; and the words "eternal verities" describe the objects of faith, telling us precisely what it is that the soul sees when it believes.

But this definition is highly objectionable because of the very phraseology in which it is couched. (a) The word "intuition" is ambiguous. Etymologically, it means to look directly upon (*in-tueor*); and if used in this sense, "faith" and "sight" could not be differentiated. Then the word "intuition" is sometimes used to signify the immediate apprehension of a thing in itself; and if employed in this sense, it would be equal to representing faith as immediate and primary knowledge. (b) But this definition is further objectionable because it restricts the object of faith to "eternal verities." But we may obviously believe other kinds of truth than that which is eternal and necessary. We may believe in temporal and mutable truth as well as in eternal and changeless facts. This definition of faith is therefore wrong in its logical genus as well as in its logical species. Faith is not a species of "intuition," nor is it an intuition specifically of "eternal verities."

2. Faith is sometimes defined as *the organ of the supernatural*. The eye is the organ of vision, and the ear is the organ of hearing; in a similar manner, we are told, faith is the organ of the supernatural, the organ by which we apprehend or cognize that which is above nature. But this definition is objectionable: (a) Because it construes faith as one of the "organs" of the mind, which is not a happy designation of any of the mental faculties. (b) Because by faith we apprehend other classes of objects than those which are "supernatural." We can believe natural truth as well as supernatural truth. The facts of natural science are as cognizable by faith as are the facts of supernatural religion. (c) But the definition of faith here given is unsatisfactory because it undertakes to make a specific

class of objects the definitive mark of faith. Any class of objects may be the legitimate objects of faith.

3. Faith has sometimes been defined as *the specific faculty of apprehending the facts of Christianity*. It is thus held that regeneration is the creation of a religious faculty, by which the truths of the Christian religion are apprehended; it would be thus a Christian grace, peculiar to and distinctive of the religion of Christ. But this definition is to be discarded: (a) Because it represents faith as a specific faculty, when it is just as generic to the soul as is perception or reasoning or memory. It is one of the functions of the human intellect, and in no proper sense a peculiar and special power of the soul, existing for some specific and distinctive office. (b) But if faith were distinctively and peculiarly a Christian grace, its exercise would be limited to Christians alone; whereas any man, saint or sinner, may believe and does believe. (c) Then, again, if faith were a peculiar and specific Christian faculty, its exercises would be restricted to the contents of the gospel; whereas a man may exercise faith about anything under the sun. A man may believe that Caesar crossed the Rubicon or that Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown.

4. Then faith has been defined as that *assent of the mind which is stronger than opinion but weaker than knowledge*. Here the logical genus of the definition is assent of the mind and the logical species is a particular degree of assent, namely, an assent stronger than opinion but weaker than knowledge. While generically correct, this definition is specifically unacceptable. (a) It is really no definition at all. It would be parallel to define a mile as a certain distance longer than across my library but shorter than the diameter of the earth. What true conception of a mile would such a definition give any man? Similarly, what true and adequate conception of faith would it give to say that faith is an assent of the mind to something, or to anything, which is stronger than opinion but weaker than knowledge? The lines of circumscription are not drawn sufficiently close by the definition. (b) But the definition is unsatisfactory because it is not true to fact. Faith may some times be

stronger than knowledge and weaker than opinion. There is, indeed, a weak faith and a strong faith, a weak opinion and a strong opinion, a weak knowledge and a strong knowledge. Some things we believe feebly and some other things we believe with all our might; there are some opinions so slightly held as to be scarcely entitled to rank as opinions at all and there are some other exercises of mind put forth with such confidence and boldness as to constitute a most positive and regulative opinion; and there are some things which we doubtfully know and some other things of which we are absolutely certain. We have not got at the heart of faith, therefore, when we attempt to differentiate it from opinion and knowledge by indicating any general and vague, or any specific and definite, degree of mental action towards the object.

5. Faith is sometimes defined as *voluntary assent to the truth*. Here the logical genus of the definition is assent and the specific mark, distinguishing faith from all other sorts of mental assent, is voluntary. If the mind is voluntarily convinced or persuaded that anything is true, then, according to the definition, it believes it to be true; but if the mind gives its assent in an involuntary or necessary way to the truth of what is proposed, then it cannot be said truly to believe that particular proposition. But this definition is not correct in its specific notation of what is distinctive of faith: (a) Because, in a sense strictly true, the mind never yields its assent to anything in any other than a voluntary manner. The will is the faculty of mental action, and every species of mental action may be correctly described as voluntary; and, consequently, if the definition were true, every mental assent would be an act of faith, and believing would have to be described as the sole sort of mental action. (b) But the definition is not true to fact, because we are in a sense compelled to believe some things. For example, we must believe in our own existence, in the existence of the external world, in what is testified to by competent and credible witnesses. In a sense, faith is never optional; it is unnatural and irrational not to believe what is properly certified to; a man must believe what he sees with his own eyes. There are some knowledges which are not elective, but which are thrust

upon us, and we cannot help knowing them; and there are some opinions which are equally forced upon us, and we cannot help holding that the weight of evidence is on one side or the other. Therefore the effort to make the distinguishing feature of faith to consist in its voluntariness breaks down.

6. Again faith is defined as *the persuasion of the truth of things unseen*. "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" (Heb. 11:1). Here the differentiating mark of faith is held to be its peculiar object, namely, "things not seen." According to this definition, for the thing to be believed in, it must be absent from the mind, it must be unseen. (a) But this Scripture text is not a definition of faith; if it were it would settle the question. At most it is but a description of faith, which is the substance, ground, or body, upon which "the things hoped for" by the Christian rest; the evidence, or proof of his ultimately realizing the "things not seen." (b) The definition, moreover, is too narrow. The "things not seen" do not include all the things which may be believed; for a man may truly believe in the existence of the things which are here and now present to his vision. Faith may act upon, and accept, the things which are both seen and unseen. (c) One may know the things which he hopes for and the things which are not seen. He may know the existence of the wealth which he hopes to secure, and he may know the existence of the foreign city which he has not seen. These objects, "things hoped for" and "things unseen," do not, therefore, define distinctively and specifically the nature of faith.

7. Then faith is defined by some as *that assent of the mind which is founded upon feeling*. In this definition, feeling is employed as the definitive factor in faith; it is held to be a feeling conviction of the truth of what is presented. If the mind should be coldly convinced of the truth of anything, then that state of mind could not, according to the definition, be held to be a believing state of mind. (a) But this definition is unsatisfactory because its psychology is erroneous. Feeling is not the cause of intellectual action; we first cognize, then we feel, and then we act. This is the law of mental life and operation; and

consequently to interpret feeling as the cause of the acceptance of anything as true is but to reverse cause and effect. (b) And further, there may be as much feeling, or as little feeling, attendant upon an act of knowledge, or even upon a mere opinion, as upon an act of faith. Feeling is a consequent and not the cause of faith.

8. Finally faith is defined as *assent of the mind founded upon testimony*. This is the true definition. In it *assent* is the logical genus and *upon testimony* the specific differentiation. We assent to the truth of any proposition or the existence of anything because we see it with our own eyes, or because of some demonstration made to our intelligence, or because of the testimony or authority of some other competent and credible persons. We know what we perceive, or re-perceive, or reason out for ourselves; we believe what comes to us upon the witness and authority of others; testimony is the specific cause of faith. I see the books in my library with my own eyes; and I therefore know that they are there. I construe my eyes as witnesses which are trustworthy when they certify to the existence of the books in the shelves; I therefore believe that the books exist. The object, the books, is the same in both cases; in each instance my mind assents to the fact that the books exist; but in one case the assent has been caused by perception, and, therefore, I *know* that the books are there; but in the other case my mind has given its assent under the influence of my eyes, construed as witnesses; therefore I *believe* that the books are there. For another illustration: I saw Jones steal the cow, and therefore I know he did it; but as a juror in the court house, I heard ten good and honest men testify that Jones stole the cow, and I therefore believe that he did it. If there were any weakness in the ground of knowledge, or in the testimony, I would only have an opinion, strong or weak, as to Jones' theft of the cow. Here then is the specific and logical differentiating mark of faith, namely, it is that assent, or conviction, or persuasion, of the mind which is caused by testimony. When we know, we get the fact for ourselves; but when we believe, the fact is given to us by somebody else. When we know, we are self-dependent; when we believe,

we are dependent upon some other, either some real or constructive witness.

It does not matter, therefore, what the object may be;—whether eternal verities, or the supernatural and divine, or the contents of the Christian revelation, or the things hoped for, or the things unseen, or the things which excite emotion, or the commonplace facts of life, or the phenomena of natural science, or the more erudite principles of philosophy, or the multifarious matters of history;—whatever the object, when we accept it upon the ground and for the reason that it is adequately certified to by either real or constructive witnesses, we believe; we commit ourselves upon the ground of somebody else's observation or authority, and rest our acceptance and judgment upon another than ourselves. Testimony, in the widest sense of this word, is the cause of our mental acceptance.

Our faith is strong or weak, our conviction is clear and emphatic or murky and hesitant, our acceptance is positive and firm or nervous and questioning, our persuasion is decided and unwavering or feeble and quivering, according as the testimony to our minds ranks high or low in competency and credibility. In other words, the value of the testimony, as weighed in our minds, determines the degree of faith which we put in what is communicated.

II. Historical Faith.—Let us suppose the object presented to be the contents of the Christian revelation, the facts and truths of the Bible; let us suppose the testimony to be that of the Church and uninspired men, as they have come down the centuries delivering to us these Scriptures as the revelation of God to the world; let us suppose that one hears this report from out of the past, setting forth the evidences upon which all biblical statements and claims rest; let us suppose that such an one yields to this historical testimony and gives his credence to these Scriptures as the very word of God, teaching the exact truth about all things upon which they speak; he would be a believer in the Bible and the Bible's Redeemer, but his faith would rest upon the testimony of men. A preacher, taking his pulpit as a witness-stand, might so utter the testimonies of the past as to convince his hearers of

the divinity of the Scriptures and of the historicity of Christ as the Saviour of sinners; then this hearer would believe as the men of the village believed the story of the Samaritan woman who told them about the wonderful person whom she had met at Jacob's well, but his faith would have no other and no different sort of basing than that of his faith in the existence of the foreign city of which he had no experimental and personal knowledge. This is what theologians call historical, or non-saving faith; called historical, because the facts of the Christian religion are received upon the testimony of history, upon the same sort of testimony upon which we receive the facts that belong to the national career of Great Britain or any other country.

And the production of this historical faith in the facts of the Scriptures constitutes a very important if not the principal part of the duty of Christian ministers and Christian disciples. "Ye are my witnesses." Then, as witnesses, let them prepare themselves and deliver testimony so cogent and so intelligent and so consistent and so effective as will constrain men of the world to accept the facts of the Christian revelation as true. No witness is entitled to bungle his cause by delivering incoherent and inaccurate testimony. A Christian witness ought to be thoroughly informed and skilful in delivering his testimony upon a subject of such moment and have it as his chief object so to tell the story of the Redeemer as to command the assent of his hearers to the truthfulness of what he has to say. The illiterate and uninformed witness for the Saviour's cause in the world is at the bottom of much of the world's historical unbelief of the gospel.

III. Saving Faith.—But let us introduce upon the witness-stand of the auditor's soul another witness who utters himself upon the same subject; who delivers himself concerning Christ and the contents of the Christian revelation. This new witness is the *Holy Spirit*; and he testifies to a regenerated soul that Christ is its Saviour; and upon the testimony of this witness the sinner believes that Christ is his Saviour and cries out, "my Lord and my God." This is saving faith. It is the acceptance of Christ, not upon the ground of the testimony of

history, not upon the ground of any man or set of men, but upon the ground of the testimony of the Holy Spirit.

Faith, any sort of faith, is the assent of the mind to anything upon the ground of some sort of testimony: *Historical Faith* is the acceptance of the facts of the Christian revelation upon the ground of the testimony of men, living and dead; *Saving Faith* is the acceptance of Christ and the facts of the Christian revelation upon the ground of the testimony of the Holy Ghost.

IV. Schema.—But I can better exhibit the nature of saving faith by indicating (1) its efficient cause, (2) its material cause, (3) its instrumental cause, (4) its formal cause, and (5) its final cause.

V. Efficient Cause.—We have seen that the grace of the Spirit, operating in the subconscious region of the soul, changes its governing disposition, or moral appetency, or ruling desire, creating the potentialities of both faith and repentance; but that these potentialities may lie dormant for a longer or shorter time; and that they will continue to lie thus dormant until another act of grace calls them into conscious exercise. The seed lies in the ground until quickened by the forces of nature from without acting upon the germ which is inherent; and the intuitive principles of the intellect concreated and implanted as regulative in the mind by the hand of the Maker, are latent until called into conscious exercise by some experiential conditions; even so the regenerate principle lies quiescent in the human soul until some special and appropriate exercise of the Holy spirit evokes it into conscious exercise. Grace, therefore, terminating upon the regenerated spirit, elicits faith in Christ. Consequently grace is the efficient cause of saving faith, and faith is truly and properly characterised as one of the “graces” of the Spirit.

But there is an important difference between that exercise of grace which results in regeneration and that which results in faith. In producing regeneration the Spirit exercises a creative power and brings into being a new disposition, which did not

exist before, a power analogous to a force which produces a physical effect in a body; but in producing faith the Spirit acts as one person upon another person, persuading him to exercise trust in Christ. Regenerating grace is therefore *dynamic*; believing grace is *vocative*. Regenerating grace is almighty; but the grace of faith is *suasory*. In regenerating, the Spirit is a supernatural power; in producing faith, he is a witness at the bar of the regenerated soul. In regeneration the Spirit acts upon a patient; in faith he acts upon a personal agent. In regeneration the soul is dead in trespasses and sins; in faith the soul is alive in Christ Jesus. In regeneration grace is, therefore, dynamic and creative; in producing faith grace is *testificatory*, if I may coin this word for my needs.

In causing the regenerated soul to believe in Jesus the Holy Spirit does not apply his almighty and resistless strength, and force the sinner to accept the Redeemer; but, on the contrary, he exercises an enlightening, *suasory* and *vocative* influence upon the regenerated soul and induces it, according to the laws of its own rational nature, freely to embrace the Redeemer as he is offered in the gospel. He, therefore, by the gospel and all the instrumentalities of conversion which he employs, excites the regenerated soul to accept the Saviour. The soul, in doing so, acts most freely and spontaneously, according to the governing law of its new regenerate disposition; but without the witnessing influences of the Spirit the soul would not exercise conscious faith at all. It is, therefore, strictly and exactly true that grace is the efficient cause of saving faith. Until he takes the witness-stand and testifies, the regenerate nature will remain dormant and inactive, having potentialities, but not the activities of a Christian life.

While, therefore, the sinner does the believing, grace excites to the action. While the sinner does the seeing, it is regenerating grace which sensitizes the optic nerve; and then there is a second exercise of grace which causes the soul to open its spiritual eye and look upon Christ as presented in the gospel. While the renewed sinner does the hearing, it is regenerating grace which restores the auditory nerve; and then there is a second exercise of

grace which causes the quickened ear to hear the gospel proclamation. While the sinner stretches out his own arms to the Saviour, it is regenerating grace which empowers the withered arm; and a second exercise of grace which causes the free agent to reach out his arms to the Redeemer. While it is the sinner who comes to Christ under the gospel call, it is regenerating grace which potentiates the palsied legs; and a second act of grace which causes him to exercise his new strength and arise and go to his Saviour. While it is the sinner who responds to the call, it is regenerating grace which quickens him in his sin-grave; and a second exercise of grace which causes him to come forth out of the sinful tomb and walk as the disciple of Christ. As the sinner *could not* believe without regeneration, it is equally true *that he would not* believe without the suasive influences of grace. If he were regenerated, and grace should cease at that point, he would never venture upon his Saviour but remain forever with the potentialities of new life implanted within him but without the conscious exercise of his new spiritual powers. Hence it is strictly and literally true that grace is the efficient cause of saving faith, but grace as a vocative, as distinguished from a dynamic, power.

"The grace of faith, whereby the elect are enabled to believe to the saving of their souls, is the work of the Spirit of Christ in their hearts." This quotation clearly proves that the Westminster Assembly held that grace was the efficient or producing cause of saving faith.

That the regenerated sinner believes under the stimulating influence of the gracious Spirit, and that saving faith is truly and properly a "grace," is proved by the following citations from the Scriptures:

"No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him; and I will raise him up at the last day. It is written in the prophets, And they shall all be taught of God. Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father cometh unto me" (Jno. 6:44, 45). "As many as were ordained to eternal life believed" (Acts 13:48). "Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace" (Rom. 4:16). "And my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but

in demonstration of the Spirit and of power; that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God" (I Cor. 2:4, 5). "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them. . . . For God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" (II Cor. 4:4, 6). "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, and faith" (Gal. 5:22). "For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God" (Eph. 2:8). "Peace be to the brethren, and love with faith, from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ" (Eph. 6:23). "For unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake" (Phil. 1:29). "Looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith" (Heb. 12:2). "But ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things" (I Jno. 2:20). "For this is the witness of God which he hath testified of his Son. He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself" (I Jno. 5:9).

Every person who believes must be "drawn" by the Father, and be "taught" of God; they who believe must be "ordained to eternal life"; the religious experience which is by faith is by "grace"; the faith of the Corinthians stood in the "power of God"; those who believe not have had their minds "blinded by the god of this world," and they must consequently be opened by God; in the list of the fruits of the Spirit is "faith"; faith is the "gift of God"; faith with love is "from God"; to believe on Christ is "given"; Jesus is the "author and finisher of faith."

V. Material Cause.—The object of saving faith is *Christ as he is set forth in the gospel*. It is to him, as the Saviour of the soul, that the Spirit bears witness; and it is to him that the soul yields itself under the spell of the Spirit's testimony. The opened eye is directed to Christ, and the soul turns to him and embraces him as its personal Redeemer. Under the influence of the Spirit the regenerated sinner accepts him and rests upon him and trusts in him and looks to him alone for salvation.

I am careful to emphasize the phrase *as set forth in the gospel*, because there is a class of writers who insist upon the *Christ-idea* as the proper object of saving faith. This type of writers put all other religions into comparison with the Christian religion and claim that they find the idea of salvation running through them all, which differs not essentially, but only incidentally, from the Messiah of the gospels. The idea of a Christ, we are told, is more clearly and explicitly set forth in the Christian revelation than in the Vedas, or the books of Confucius, or in the Koran of Mohammed, or in the sacred literature of other religions, or in the vague and unwritten teachings of the lowest fetishisms, yet the essential idea of a Christ is in all and every form of religion known to the race of mankind. The great desideratum, therefore, we are told, is not faith in Jesus of Nazareth, as he is exhibited in the Bible, but faith in the *ideal Christ*, however beautifully he may be exhibited in the Christian Scriptures or however crudely and grossly he may be presented in the lowest forms of religion known to earth. All religions are at bottom one, only differing in the fulness and clearness and completeness with which they respectively set forth the ideal Saviour. Faith in the fictitious Christ of heathen religions, or in the imaginary and ideal Christ of poetic and fanciful literature, or in the Christ of art, is at bottom one and the same. The apprehension of the Christ-idea is the only essential thing.

But if it were granted that a Christic thought threads all religions, the object of saving faith is not the Christ of Buddhism or of Brahmanism, of Confucianism or Zoroastrianism, of Mohammedanism or of Christian Science or any other modern vagary; nor is the object of saving faith the Christ of poetry and art, of literature and idealism. Jesus, looking the Jews in the face who piously believed in a Messiah yet to come and different from himself, said, "If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins" (Jno. 8:24). Faith in the Christ of imagination, or in the Christ of tradition, or in some Christ yet to come, will not serve to save the soul. It is not a pious attitude of mind and heart which is required, but faith in Jesus of Nazareth, the veritable historical person which is exhibited in the gospel. Hence

the Bible must ever go with the preacher in order to show the precise and definite Christ which must be believed in, accepted, loved and obeyed, in order to the salvation of the soul. The object of saving faith is the Christ of the Christian Scriptures; there can be no supposititious, constructive, imaginary, fictitious, or ideal Redeemer, to whom the soul can be committed with safety.

The Scriptures are precisely and accurately the record of the testimony which God has given concerning his Son. "This is the witness of God which he hath testified of his Son. He that believeth on the Son, hath the witness in himself; he that believeth not God hath made him a liar; because he believeth not the record that God gave of his Son" (I Jno.5:10, 11). The Redeemer is the subject and the center of the entire Christian revelation, from the protevangelium of Genesis to the last amen of Revelation. As all the roads in Italy are said to lead to Rome, so all the forms and parts of the Christian Scriptures center upon Christ. The Bible is but a means to an end—a means for the revelation of Christ as the end. But for the Redeemer all biblical histories would be ancient history; all biblical poetry would be but so much vapid sentimentalizing; all the prophecies would be but hieroglyphical enigmas; all its gospels would be but so many fictions and legends; and all its epistles would be effete doctrinalizing. It is the fact that Christ is the living heart of the Bible that makes the book immortal and prevents it finding its sepulchre in the antiquarian's shop. Christ is the personal Word, and the Bible is the impersonal Word. Translate the Bible into a person, and that person would be the Redeemer; convert the Redeemer into a book, and that book would be the Bible. The book sets forth and interprets the person; the person incarnates and illustrates the book. The one is the commentary of which the other is the text. The one is the form of which the other is the substance and the life. To accept the book and reject the person would be to exercise a dead faith, a faith which rests upon the body while denying the soul, a faith which accepts the shadow while it discards the substance.

It is this Christ as he is set forth in this book that is the object of saving faith. Upon the testimony of the Spirit, delivered in the private chambers of the soul, the regenerated sinner receives and rests upon him alone for salvation. Christ without the Bible would be an unknown person; the Bible without Christ would be but a book, having only the influences of a book.

Faith in the Bible as a divine revelation is but *fides generalis*; but faith in Christ is *fides specialis*, or *fides salvifica*. In believing the regenerated soul commits itself, not to the book, but to the person set forth in the book.

That Christ is the object of saving faith is declared throughout the Scriptures in a very catholic, persistent and fundamental manner.

"As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name" (Jno. 1:12). "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life" (Jno. 3:16). "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him" (Jno. 3:36). "I am the bread of life; He that cometh to me shall never hunger, and he that believeth on me shall never thirst" (Jno. 6:35). "If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins" (Jno. 8:24). "He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water" (Jno. 7:38). "To him give all the prophets witness, that through his name whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins" (Acts 10:43). "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved" (Acts 16:31). "The righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe" (Rom. 3:22). "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood" (Rom. 3:25). "And be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith" (Phil. 3:9). "I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me" (Gal. 2:20).

VI. Instrumental Cause.—The witness of the Spirit being the efficient cause, and Christ as set forth in the gospel being the material cause, of saving faith; what is the instrumental cause? I answer, *Every means by which man is brought into connection with the gospel.*

“The Spirit maketh the reading, but especially the preaching, of the word, an effectual means of convincing and converting sinners, and of building them up in holiness and comfort through faith unto salvation.”

For any object to be seen it must be brought into the range of vision; for any sound to be heard it must be within the range of hearing; and for anything to be believed it must be presented to the mind. What lies beyond the reach of the faculties, out of all relation to their powers and operations, cannot become an object of faith. For the soul to believe in or upon Christ the Redeemer must be presented, in some way, to the soul. The Christian Scriptures are God's revelation of Christ; and they are the only vehicle which can bring him within the horizon of the human soul; and reading, and especially preaching, the Scriptures is the only mode of communicating a knowledge of the Redeemer to mankind to be received or rejected. Hence every means which is employed to impart a knowledge of the Scriptures, every agency used in circulating the Bible, every instrumentality employed in making the world familiar with its contents, is an instrument in the Spirit's hands for influencing the regenerated sinner to accept and trust in Christ.

It may be the very text of the Scriptures as read in the Hebrew, Greek, or English, or some other language; it may be the sermon setting forth a larger or a shorter account of some part of the Scriptures by exposition, argumentation, illustration or exhortation, or in some other sense; it may be the tract or the book which deals with some phase of Scripture truth; it may be the newspaper press, from day to day, week to week, month to month, or year to year, presenting facts and truths about Christ and the Christian religion; it may be the Sabbath School teacher, the parent, the friend, who utters some word or more, which brings Christ to the mind; all the multitudinous agencies which

the Church and disciples of Christ have devised for making men acquainted with the Redeemer are but the instrumentalities which the sovereign Spirit may employ, with which to induce the soul to exercise its regenerated powers in believing in the Saviour.

“Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent? . . . So then faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God” (Rom. 10:13-17).

In this splendid Pauline sorites, a sinner must call on the name of the Lord in order to be saved; he must believe in Christ in order to call upon him; he must hear of Christ in order to believe in him; he must have a preacher, or its equivalent, in order to hear. Reversing the order of statement, and going from the bottom of the text to its top; preaching is in order to hearing; hearing is in order to believing; believing is in order to calling; and calling is in order to salvation. “So then faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.” The “hearing” in the text is not to be restricted to cognizing Christ through the ear only; but it is the most prominent and common way of learning of Christ and is clearly used as inclusive of all those modes by which the Christ of the Bible is brought to the attention of sinners.

Of all the instrumentalities employed for the production of saving faith, preaching is the most conspicuous and highly honored. “After that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe” (I Cor. 1:23). He established his Church in the earth and gave it a sacred ministry and directed them to “go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature”; and under this solemn and definitive commission his servants “went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following” (Mark 16:15, 20). Preaching the gospel is, therefore, the pre-eminently ordained means of showing men the Christ in whom they are to believe in order to be saved. While what is read with the eye in the pages of sacred Scripture truly presents Christ,

and may be blessed of the Spirit to conversion, it is the preaching of the gospel, falling upon the ear of the regenerated soul, infused with the emotion and personal power of the preacher, which is the stated and ordinary means employed by the Spirit in calling faith into exercise.

The preacher, having learned out of the Bible some part of the testimony which God has therein given concerning his Son, our Saviour, with all the skill, emotion and unction which he can command, repeats that testimony in the ear of the sinner; at the same time the Spirit utters the story in the inner chambers of the soul with his demonstration and power and illumination; and upon this joint witnessing of the preacher and the Spirit—the preacher delivering his in the outer ear and the Spirit delivering his confirmatory testimony in the inner ear—the soul hears, believes, is persuaded, embraces the Saviour and is converted.

How unspeakably wicked, in the light of this exposition of the matter, for any preacher to testify to the soul any other thing but that truth which is contained in the gospel! How lacking in intuition and perception is that preaching which fails to find Christ in every verse and passage of the Scriptures or stops short of bringing the sinner into his Redeemer's presence! The object of preaching is to put the Saviour before the sinner's eyes, so that when the Spirit does open them, there, in immediate vision, is the saving object for the eye to rest upon. It is simply criminal, even as it is a genuine deception, for a Christian minister to present anything to the sinful soul but the Redeemer.

Here is the great reason and imperative necessity for carrying the gospel to the heathen. Suppose, just for supposition's sake, that the Spirit should open the eyes of some man buried in the depths of darkest heathenism; pray, upon what would the opened eye look? What object would appear to his vision? In what would he believe? There would be nothing present for him to look upon. Hence the necessity of the missionary carrying the story of the cross to the ends of the earth; the gospel is the Spirit's means, not of regenerating, but of producing faith.

Where there is no gospel, there is, and there can be, no saving faith. The glory of the human ministry is to carry the Redeemer, enclosed within the lids of the book, around and about and abroad in the earth as those who wait upon the Spirit of God.

VII. Formal Cause.—The witness of the Spirit being the efficient cause of saving faith, Christ as set forth in the Scriptures being the direct object, or material cause of it and the reading and preaching of the gospel being the instrumental cause; what is the formal nature of saving faith? This brings us to the very heart of the matter. It makes inquisition for that element in saving faith which specifically differentiates it from all other forms of belief. We are now in quest for the very essence of that act which unites the soul with Christ, and results in its salvation.

The formal cause of saving faith is *trust in Christ*.

Upon the testimony of the Spirit, the regenerate soul receives Jesus of Nazareth, as he is exhibited in the Scriptures, and rests upon him alone as its Saviour. It commits itself to him; it reposes upon him, it confides in him, it surrenders itself to him, it trusts in him. Trust is the inner, formal nature of the faith which saves and sanctifies the soul.

The juryman may believe the witness in the box without delivering himself into the hands of the witness; the student may believe his professor without giving himself over to his teacher; the astronomer may believe the Copernican science, but he does not repose his person upon the stars and the heavenly bodies; the mathematician may believe the axioms of mathematics, but he does not trust in them; but when a soul believes in Jesus, it lays itself bodily in his arms.

In the effort to explicate saving faith, the Latin theologians were accustomed to treat it as complex and resolved it into three elements: (1) *notitia*, knowledge; (2) *assensus*, assent; (3) *fiducia*, trust. The reading and the preaching of the Scriptures made the sinner acquainted with the things to be believed, enlightening the understanding as to the objects of faith, thus contributing the *notitia* of faith. The whole body of the evidences of

Christianity being brought to bear upon the will causes the soul to assent to the whole scheme of redemption and thus brings into being the factor called *assensus*. But grace operating upon the regenerated spirit persuades and enables it to trust in Christ as a personal Saviour and thus brings into existence the factor of *fiducia*. This fiduciary element constitutes specifically the formal nature of saving faith. Reading and preaching, and all other modes of coming into a knowledge of Christ, make the soul acquainted with the person to be trusted; the evidences and proofs of Christianity make the soul see, recognize and assent to the fact that Christ is the Saviour of sinners; but the Holy Spirit, by his inner testifying and suasory influences, causes the soul, not only to know that Christ is a Saviour and to consent to the fact that he is truly and certainly the Saviour, but to commit itself voluntarily and consciously to him as its Saviour. The *notitiae* element apprehends Christ as a Saviour; the *assensive* element apprehends him as *the* Saviour; but the *fiducial* element, adopting the cry of Thomas, apprehends him as "my Lord and my God," as the soul's personal Saviour.

Romanists, holding that faith is nothing more than blind assent to the teachings of the Scriptures as they are delivered by the Church, necessarily deny the fiducial element, deny that trust enters into and constitutes the very essence of saving faith. They have fabricated a distinction between explicit and implicit faith. Explicit faith is assent to so much of Scripture as the believer understands; while implicit faith is his assent to the things which the ecclesiastic calls upon him to receive. Hence the ignorant peasant can implicitly believe in a Latin sermon, not one word of which is intelligible to him. If a man therefore exercise explicit faith in the general proposition of the gospel, he therein exercises faith in, or assents to, everything embraced in it. If a man has explicit faith in, or in the general assents to, the proposition that the Church is an infallible teacher, he therein exercises implicit or virtual faith in every doctrine of the Church, albeit he may never have so much as heard of a multitude of them.

But inasmuch as trust is the essence of saving faith, the ignorant man who has been taught that Jesus is the Saviour of sin-

ners can trust him with the salvation of his soul without understanding all the mysteries of the incarnation or the occult symbols of the Apocalypse; because he is trusting within his knowledge. What lies beyond knowledge lies beyond faith. A man may believe when told that a Latin sentence means this or that, but he is exercising faith in what he is told and not in the Latin which he does not understand. Simple, elementary, naked saving faith is trust in that Redeemer who is revealed in Scriptures; the problem thereafter is to instruct, edify and enlighten this primary and infantile faith.

Campbellites, holding that faith is a mere affirmative judgment of the understanding passed upon the truth upon the ground of evidence, also deny the fiducial element in saving faith. They of this way of thinking emphasize only the notitital and assensive elements in faith. But if this were correct, before any person could become an intelligent disciple of Christ he would have to be a graduate in apologetics and able to sift all the reasonings and arguments and sophisms of sceptics and critics. Conversion would logically be restricted to the educated and the learned; the ignorant and unskilled could only put their faith in Christ upon the certification of preachers and others in whom they might have confidence, and fallible men would thus become the ground and authority of their faith. A denial of the fiducial element in it renders religion impractical for the ignorant and unlearned. But admit that trust is the essence of the faith that saves and sanctifies the soul, and then the most ignorant and unlettered and obtuse may have it read to them out of the Bible that Jesus is the Saviour of sinners, and the Spirit of God may use that simple presentation of the Redeemer as a means for illuminating the eye of the poor, ignorant creature and leading it to commit its soul to Christ for time and eternity. Christianity then becomes a simple religion and absolutely practical for all classes of men, ranking from the most profound and scholarly to the densest illiterate. But the scholar believes only so far as the objects of faith are brought into the range of his wide horizon and the peasant likewise believes only so far as the object of his faith is brought within the field of his vision. The object

of preaching and study is for an educative discipline and is designed ever more to bring other truths concerning Christ into the field of cognition of each, that faith may be more and more enlightened and informed. Every believer is under obligation to grow in knowledge.

Some orthodox theologians have held that trust is to be regarded as an immediate and invariable consequence of saving faith, rather than as its very constitutive essence. But if we think of grace as the efficient cause and the Bible as the material cause and preaching as the instrumental cause, putting these phases of the subject by the side of each other it seems clear that trust is the formal, internal, definitive, essential element in saving faith, the factor which constitutes its uniqueness. The fiduciary nature of faith is proved by the following facts drawn from the Scriptures:

(1) The lexicographers tell us that the idea of trust is entombed in the very Greek words for faith—*pistis*, faith, and *pisteuein*, to believe. And it is from the Latin *fides* that we get our English words fiduciary and fiducial. Words never quite lose the aroma of their etymology.

(2) The uniform and single instruction given in Scripture as to the way of life is expressed in the words believe *in* or *on* Christ, while the invariable pre-condition of salvation is said to be faith *in* or *on* Christ. And to believe in or on a person necessarily implies trust in that person.

“Whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life” (Jno. 3:16). “He that believeth on him is not condemned” (Jno. 3:18). “He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water” (Jno. 7:38). “Many believed in the Lord” (Acts 9:42). “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved” (Acts 16:31). “We have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law” (Gal. 2:16). “Ye are all the children of God by faith in Jesus Christ” (Gal. 3:26). “From a child thou hast known the holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus” (II. Tim. 3:15).

(3) There is a class of phrases in the Scriptures which are synonymous with "believing in Christ," which clearly import a trusting in him. For example: "Receiving Christ," "looking to Christ," "flying to Christ for refuge," "coming to Christ," "committing" one's self to him. These all designate the act of saving faith, and manifestly imply trust as the essential element in it.

"As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name" (Jno. 1:12). "As ye have therefore received Christ Jesus the Lord, so walk ye in him" (Col. 2:6). "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth; for I am God, and there is none else" (Isa. 45:22). "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life" (Jno. 3:14, 15). "Who have fled for refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us" (Heb. 6:18). "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest" (Matt. 11:28). "He that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst" (Jno. 6:35). "I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day" (II. Tim. 1:12).

VIII. Final Cause.—The final cause of any thing relates to its end, purpose, service. When, therefore, inquest is made for the final cause of saving faith, inquiry is made for those effects which follow upon this grace. It is so cardinal in the Christian system that it is difficult to keep from making the omnibus declaration that absolutely all the phenomena of Christian experience are but the fruitage of this radical virtue of the Christian religion. But the theologian must always be as specific as possible and enumerate the principal things which follow upon the exercise of this grace.

1. Union with Christ.

In election God nominates the beneficiaries of the atonement and names to himself the persons who are to be the subjects of his grace in the fulness of his time, and this election confers upon such persons all their legal rights and privileges

and title to all the Christian benefits. In the covenant of grace which he makes with the Redeemer he appoints the human beneficiaries, and through this appointment they come into contractual relations with God and so obtain legal standing in his favour. In regeneration these persons are given such a spiritual nature and disposition as puts them in sympathy with the Saviour, which makes the relations between them hearty and congenial. But when these persons actually exercise faith they therein and thereby seize upon their inheritances and enter consciously and experimentally upon their rights and enjoyments. In believing, they experimentally clasp hands with the Redeemer; they join with him; they enter into his fellowship and partake of his blessings. As the coupling pin connects the railroad cars to the locomotive which draws them; so faith is the connective of the believer and his Redeemer, who is the power which draws him from earth to heaven in due time and by the ordained course of grace.

Rowland Hill was fond of singing:

“And when I am to die,
Receive me, I’ll cry,
For Jesus hath loved me,
I cannot tell why;
But this I can find,
We two are so joined
He’ll not be in glory
And leave me behind.”

The covenant of grace was not made with believers, but with Christ as their federal head and representative; and by faith they become partakers of Christ and so parties to this covenant and all its blessings. So do they enter into his fellowship and become sharers and joint heirs with him. Upon the legal principle, *qui facit per alium facit per se*, they have a community with him in his covenant standing, rights, immunities and benefits. Forensically they are “complete in him.” His righteousness and the righteousness of his Father, become theirs. They partake of the transforming and transfiguring power of his

grace and Spirit; they enter into his labors, sufferings, temptations and death and resurrection. His obedience becomes theirs; his standing before God becomes theirs; his justification and glorification becomes theirs. Faith communalizes the life of the believer and Christ. They are the beneficiaries and co-partners of all his mediatorial rewards. Faith thus puts the Saviour beneath the believer's feet as the ground upon which he stands and as the cause and reason for every blessing of grace which he receives in time and eternity. Hence every prayer he makes pleads "for Jesus sake" and every blessing he receives he credits to his Redeemer. All his benefits are conveyed to him in Christ, and on account of Christ. He is the argument of all his petitions, the ground of all his hopes and the theme of all his praises. "That Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith" (Eph. 3:17).

The union of Christ and believers is of two kinds: (1) mystical, (2) federal. The first is subjective, internal, vital; the second is objective, external, pactional. The bond of the mystical union is the Holy Spirit; the bond of the federal union is faith. In the first, the Spirit unites with the believer; in the second, the believer unites with Christ. In the first, God grasps the believer to himself; in the second, the believer grasps God to himself. In the first, the Saviour goes out to the believer and clasps him to his bosom; in the second, the believer goes out to the Saviour and clasps him to his bosom. So Christ embraces the believer and the believer embraces Christ and the fellowship is mutual and reciprocal. The first begins in regeneration and is perfected in sanctification; the second begins with faith and will be perfected when faith is swallowed up in the beatific vision in glory.

(1) One group of texts represent Christ as being in the believer. "At that day ye shall know that I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you" (Jno. 14:20). "If Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness" (Rom. 8:9). "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ, liveth in me" (Gal. 2:20).

(2) A second group of texts represent the believer as being in Christ. "I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you" (Jno. 14:20). "Alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord"

(Rom. 6:11). "There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 8:1). "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature" (II. Cor. 5:17). "He hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world" (Eph. 1:4). "In Christ Jesus, ye who were sometimes afar off are made nigh by the blood of Christ" (Eph. 2:13).

Christ is in the believer as the soul is in the body; and the believer is in Christ as we are in the atmosphere which surrounds us. The Spirit of Christ is the spirit of the believer; and in Christ the believer lives and moves and has all his being. "He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit" (I Cor. 6:17).

(a) This is not a merely natural union, like that between God and all the works of his hand, as held by Rationalists.

(b) It is not a mere moral and sympathetic union, like that between teacher and pupil, or like that between David and Jonathan, as held by Socinians and Arminians.

(c) It is not a union of essences, like that between oxygen and hydrogen in water, or like that of the acid and the alkali in the neutral salt, as held by Mystics.

(d) It is not a mere union in external institutions and ordinances, like that of union with the Church and participation in the sacraments, as held by Romanists, Lutherans, and High Churchmen.

(e) It is not an organic union, like that between the vine and the branches, or like that between the head and the members in the body, as held by Realists and Evolutionists.

(f) But it is an unique union in fellowship, a veritable communion, like that between two friends, wherein the first friend makes the subjective nature of the second person like his own, while the second person lives and moves and has his being in the first, an internal and external brotherliness, as held by conservative and orthodox theologians.

(g) It is mystical in the sense that it is inscrutable in its closeness and intimacy; but it is not mystical in the sense that it is unintelligible and beyond the grasp of the faculties.

(h) It is a spiritual union, in the sense that it is constituted and continued by the Holy Ghost—first by his dynamic power of

regeneration and second by his witnessing power in producing faith.

(i) It is indissoluble, in the sense that to dissolve it the Spirit would have to be first withdrawn in such a manner as to nullify regeneration on the one hand and faith on the other; for as long as he regenerates, the soul must have the Christ-like heart, and as long as he testifies, the soul must assent to that testimony; the believer can fall from grace, and dissolve this union, only by the expulsion of the Spirit, an act which he has neither the authority nor power to perform.

(j) The Scriptures, to set forth the nature of this union, do employ sundry figures; the union of the building and its foundation (Eph. 2:20-22); the union of husband and wife (Rom. 7:4); the union of the vine and the branches (Jno. 15:1-10); the union between the head and the body (I Cor. 12:12); the union of the race with Adam (Rom. 5:12, 21). But there is a literalism often applied in the interpretation of these metaphors which educes from them vicious conclusions. The expositor must faithfully keep before him the point for the illustration of which they were spoken, else he will commit the exegetical crime of making figures of speech the proof-texts of dogmas and extracting from them a kind of doctrine which the Spirit never compressed within them. Since the days of Origen, spiritualizing, or theologizing out of tropes and metaphors, has been the bane of the formulation of the doctrines of sacred Scripture. And nowhere has this vice been more industriously and sophistically practiced than in connection with these metaphors bearing on the union of Christ and believers.

2. The consequent benefits of this union between Christ and believers are: (1) Justification, (2) Adoption, (3) Sanctification and (4) Evangelical obedience or good works. These topics are to be developed successively in their order. But each of these gracious blessings have Christ as their cause and basis and are obtainable in Christian experience as a result of union with him by faith.

Justification is that act of divine grace, predicated upon the righteousness of Christ, whereby the believer is received into the

number and given all the rights and privileges of a citizen in God's kingdom.

Adoption is that act of grace, predicated upon the obedience of Christ as a Son in his Father's house, wherein the believer is received into the number, and given all the rights and privileges, of children in the house of God.

Sanctification is that work of grace, predicated likewise upon the atoning work of the Redeemer, wherein the believer is purged of all his subjective sinfulness and made Christ-like in all his heart and disposition, which renders him meet in character for citizenship in the kingdom and sonship in the house of God.

Evangelical obedience is that result of grace, predicated also upon the atonement, wherein the believer walks according to the precepts and example of his Lord.

All these blessings are given in Christ and on account of Christ and are grasped by the hand of faith and are to be set down as its fruits.

IX. Assurance.—To believe in Christ, and to believe that we believe are entirely different questions. It is perfectly conceivable that a man may believe in Christ and yet be doubtful that he does so believe. He may also believe and at the same time know that he believes. Faith insures the salvation of the believer; knowing that we believe is the assurance of salvation. Good and evangelical works are the true and proper evidence of faith. That faith which does not lead men to act upon, and in compliance with, the commands and promises of Christ, is called in Scripture "dead faith," that is, an unreal and untrue faith.

"What doth it profit, my brethren, though a man say he hath faith, and have not works? can faith (that sort of faith), save him? If a brother or sister be naked, and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be ye warmed and filled; notwithstanding ye give them not those things which are needful to the body; what doth it profit (them)? Even so faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone, (Unaccompanied by fruits). Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works; show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works. Thou believest that there is

one God; thou doest well (that far): devils also believe, and tremble. But will thou know, O vain man, that faith without works is dead? . . . For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead" (Jas. 2:15-26).

Then we are to judge faith as we do the tree, by its fruits. He who is able to discover on the boughs of his life a crop of evangelical fruit may thereby know that he is a believer. But if the fruit be too scanty in quantity, or too poor in quality, he may be thrown into doubt as to whether he be a believer or not. There is no mystical, no secret and occult way in which we may arrive at this knowledge. Wouldst know whether thou art a Christian or not? Examine the tree for its fruit. There is no other mode of coming at this knowledge.

Wouldst improve thy faith? Do the things to thyself which will make thy Christian tree bear better and more bountifully. Exercise thyself in godliness; so shalt thou strengthen faith and bring out the evidences of faith. Withhold thy hand from doing good; and so shall thy soul forfeit its sense of security and salvation.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Justification

There is no more important doctrine, no more distinguished blessing, in all the Christian system than Justification. It is defined by the Westminster Catechism, with which all the Lutheran and Reformed creeds agree, in the following language:

“An act of God’s free grace, wherein he pardoneth all our sins, and accepteth us as righteous in his sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone.”

An analysis of this definition will yield the following propositions as the contents of this symbolic statement, and as the elements of this great doctrine in the Christian system of dogmatics.

1. Justification is an *act* of grace.

The implicates in this statement are: (1) It is an act of grace, as distinguished from a work of grace. An act terminates in the doing of the thing; a work has progress and continuity. There is no process of justifying the believer; it is done instantaneously and completed in the very act of doing it. Its analogue is a mathematical point; while a line or a surface would be the analogue of a work. (2) It is an act of grace, as contradistinguished from the creative and providential efficiency of God. A grace is something given; a work is something done. Justification is a grace, a something bestowed by the kindness and love of God, and not a something which is procured by works, either small or great. (3) It is an act of God’s free grace as distinguished from those blessings, which are conditioned upon something which the beneficiary does. The law of divine providence is, If a man will not work, neither shall he eat; but in a scheme of grace the inquisition is, What hast thou that thou didst not receive? God was not under any primary obligation to justify any sinner. He freely consents to go into court, and issue the case upon the merits of Christ. To the Redeemer

it is just and right; to the sinner it is kindness and generosity. Believers are gratuitously justified by the Deity. He might have held the sinner to judgment and condemnation.

2. The ground of this justifying act is *the righteousness of Christ*.

The propositions herein infolded are: (1) The justification of the believer is not predicated upon the ground of his own obedience. (2) Nor is it based upon some supposititious obedience rendered by the subject before the bar of God. (3) Nor is it the result of divine pity and mere tenderness of heart, which shrinks from inflicting the penalty. (4) But the judgment of justification is based upon the fact that the prisoner impleaded at the divine tribunal is truly and properly righteous; it is no fictitious transaction. (5) This declaration is predicated upon the ground of the righteousness of Christ, which the believer appears with, before the bar of God, and presents as the reason why he should be discharged from the custody of the divine law and dismissed out of court, the peer of the tallest archangel which treads the gorgeous mosaic of the sky.

3. The righteousness of Christ is *imputed* to the believer.

How comes he in the court of God with somebody else's righteousness? What right and title has he to it? Granted that it is good, genuine and *bona fide*, a something which warrants the pronouncement of a judgment of justification: what right has this person to present it, and claim in its name his discharge? The answer is, It was imputed to him. God set it down to his credit. His title to it vests in an act of divine donation; he holds it by a deed of gift from God. A title so grounded is unimpeachable and unclouded, albeit he who presents it is debtor to a benefactor for the gift. The believer did not get the righteousness of Christ for himself and by his own efforts, but it was a donation, an imputation.

4. The righteousness of Christ is *received by faith*.

God extends the obedience of his Son in imputation; the sinner extends the hand of faith and receives it. Entitled by God, authorized and warranted by him, to do so, the believer

grasps it in his hand of faith and goes with it into the presence of God; and upon it offers his defence in the suit, and upon it pleads not guilty to the indictment. This is the precise and definite way in which he lays hold upon and uses a righteousness which did not naturally belong to him.

5. The immediate consequences of justification are two: (1) Pardon, and (2) Acceptance.

Pardon is the non-imputation of sin, that effect of justification which remits penalty and saves the believer from future woe. Acceptance of the believers person as righteous in the sight of God insures that he will henceforth be dealt with and treated as if he had never sinned. These are not infrequently characterized as the first and second elements in justification. But they are more accurately called the effects of justification. But however viewed, the justification of a sinner secures the remission of penalty on the one hand and restoration to the favour of God on the other.

I. **Definition.**—Justificationis that judicial act of God, predicated upon the righteousness of Christ, wherein he declares the regenerated and believing sinner no longer liable to the penalty of the law, but to be a man in good and regular standing in the favour of God as the Judge and Ruler of the universe. In it God reverses his judgment upon the sinner. He had formerly pronounced him guilty and imposed upon him the sentence of condemnation; he now pronounces him righteous and passes an order for his discharge from penalty and for his re-patriation in the kingdom of God. This reversal of the divine attitude is due to what Christ has done and to the manner in which the imputation of his obedience affects the sinner. God did condemn; he now acquits. He did expel; he now receives. He did pass the death-sentence; he now restores to eternal life. In justification, for Christ's sake, God reverses himself. The effect is the restoration of the sinner to good standing in God's rectoral regard and conferring upon him all the rights and privileges of citizenship in his kingdom.

II. **Outline.**—The nature of justification can be fully developed by following the treatment here outlined:

1. Its efficient cause: the grace of God.
2. Its material cause: the righteousness of Christ.
3. Its instrumental cause: faith.
4. Its formal cause: imputation.
5. Its final cause: (1) Pardon, and (2) Restoration.

Sinners are said to be justified by grace; to be justified by righteousness; to be justified by faith, to be justified by imputation, to be forgiven, to be accepted. All these forms of expression are employed in the Scriptures and must be held to be true. The problem is to find the sense in which they are true; the sense in which it is true that we are justified by grace; the sense in which we are justified by righteousness; the sense in which we are justified by imputation; the sense in which we are justified by faith; the sense in which we are forgiven; and the sense in which we are restored to the divine favour. In one sense God is one, but in another sense he is three; in one sense Christ is human, in another sense he is divine; in one sense man is a physical being, and in another sense he is a psychical being; the problem is to find the respective senses in which these various predications may be held without inconsistency and contradiction. So it is the task of the theologian to indicate the office of grace, of righteousness, of imputation, of faith, of pardon, of acceptance, in a scheme of justification, so as to present a harmonious and self-consistent view of the subject. We are not justified by grace in the same sense in which we are justified by righteousness; and we are not justified by righteousness in the same sense in which we are justified by faith; and we are not pardoned in the same sense in which we are justified. Following this outline, we ought to come to clear and self-consistent views of the various offices which these different things perform in respect to the justification of a sinner. Distinctions are absolutely essential to clearness of doctrine.

III. **Efficient Cause.**—The efficient or producing cause of justification, the power which brings it into being, is *the grace of God*.

“Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus” (Rom. 3:24). “Therefore, it is of faith, that it might be by grace” (Rom. 4:16). “For by grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God” (Eph. 2:8). “That being justified by his grace, we should be made heirs according to the hope of eternal life” (Tit. 3:7). “Who shall lay anything to the charge of God’s elect? It is God that justifieth” (Rom. 8:34).

While it is thus easy to classify justification as one of the blessings of God’s grace, the intrinsic importance of the subject, and the many questions which have been raised and mooted concerning it, demand that its definitive predicates be indicated with great regard to detail and discrimination.

I. Justification is an act of God’s grace as distinguished from his creative and providential efficiency. All the acts of God *ad extra* (that is, all his acts terminating upon beings, objects, events and relations outside the circle of the Godhead as distinguished from those immanent and intransitive activities within the unapproachable life of the Trinity) fall under one of three comprehensive heads—creation, providence, or redemption. All the energies and acts of the Godhead proceed from the Father, through the Son, and by the Spirit. The Spirit is the universal efficient of the Trinity. The power of the Deity was applied, *ex nihilo*, by the Holy Spirit and resulted in the bringing into existence of the heavens and the earth and all things in them, as substances distinct from God. The power of the Godhead is likewise applied to the sustentation and government of the created universe through the Son and by the Spirit, resulting in the preservation and regulation of all the works of the divine hand. And the power of the Trinity is also applied to sinners through the Son and by the Spirit, resulting in the production of the saints of God. The power of the Spirit, when thus applied to sinners for redemptive ends, is technically called *grace*. Now justification is an effect, not of creative power, nor of providential power,

but definitely of gracious power. It is distinctively a redemptive act; and the Unitarian and rationalist have need of seeing and realizing this distinction, inasmuch as they are prone to construe it as a mere providential result; that is, a result following in the general exercise of God's moral government over the world, terminating upon those who are obedient to his natural and moral laws. Any scheme of justification by human works issues the case of the sinner in the courtroom of natural law and in accordance with the rules of natural moral government. But, "being justified freely by his grace," means first of all that the case is terminated in a court of grace and under a system where grace is a radical principle. God, then, justifies the believer, not as a Creator, not as a sovereign providential Ruler, but, specifically and exactly, in his character of Redeemer.

2. But justification is not only an act of the gracious operation of the Spirit of God as contradistinguished from the creative and providential actions of this self-same Spirit, but it is a forensic act of grace as contradistinguished from efficiency in regeneration. We are regenerated by grace, and we are justified by grace; but in the production of these two spiritual effects grace does not act in the same mode. There are two general sorts of power set forth in the Scriptures, represented the one by the Greek word *dunamis*, from which comes our word *dynamite*, which signifies force, strength, might, that which has its analogue in muscular power; and the second is represented by the Greek word *exousia*, which signifies authority, the power of an official of government.

In regeneration the power of the Spirit is dynamic; the efficiency of the Spirit is exerted upon the fundamental and governing appetency of the soul, seminally reversing it by his almightiness; in justification, however, the power of the Spirit is declarative; his authority is exercised in formally and judicially pronouncing the sinner at the bar just with God. We are regenerated by the sheer almightiness of the Spirit's power; but we are not justified by the omnipotent strength of the Holy Ghost. On the contrary, justifying grace is forensic, pronouncing a judgment based upon a ground and a reason, as the human judge acquits,

for cause, the prisoner at his bar. The civil magistrate does not deliver the accused from the custody of the sheriff by the naked strength of his physical strength, but in the exercise of the judicial powers which are vested in him by law. So grace justifies the sinner. The Spirit does not forcibly wrench the sinner out of the hand of law, by his sheer almightiness, but he delivers him, for cause, by the exercise of the judicial powers which are economically vested in him. Regenerating grace is dynamical in its nature; but justifying grace is judicial in its nature.

3. So also does justifying grace differ from the grace of faith. In producing faith in Christ the Spirit acts as a witness, and so clearly and forcibly testifies to the regenerated mind concerning Christ as he is set forth in the Scriptures that the soul, under the power of his testimony, commits itself to Christ as its personal Saviour. But in justification, grace considers the imputed righteousness of Christ as a new fact in the sinner's history and upon the ground of this new fact, a judgment of condemnation is changed into a judgment of justification. The grace which produces faith is *testificatory* in its nature; but the grace of justification is declarative and judicial in its character. In bringing faith into existence, the Spirit is a witness; in bringing justification into being, the Spirit is a judge. All the blessings of redemption are graces of the Spirit; that is, all the benefits of the Christian religion are the products of the grace of the Holy Ghost, and the saint has nothing which he did not receive as a gratuity; but the Spirit in bestowing one blessing acts differently from the manner in which he acts in bestowing another blessing. The problem of soteriology consists in detecting, from the Christian revelation, these various ways in which the Spirit, who acts sovereignly and as he wills, brings the various blessings of religious life into the experience of the sinner whose salvation he undertakes. Much error and confusion comes from attempts to rule the Spirit, and construe him as acting in an iron-bound and monotonous mode in producing the various phenomena of religious life and experience.

Regenerating grace is subjective, terminating upon the sinner's heart and, in the sub-conscious region of the soul, changing

the governing moral disposition. Justifying grace, on the other hand, is objective, terminating upon the sinner's legal relations and reinstating him in all his rights and privileges as a subject of God's government. The need of a rectification of his relations to law is as obvious as is the need of a rectification of the fundamental and governing appetency of his soul. Many bad men live in the state without condemnation; and some good men, we may imagine, land unjustly in the penitentiary. This cannot be under the perfect moral government of God, but the illustration serves to direct the attention to the distinction between character and legal relations; and to show how important it is not only to be right-hearted, but also to be properly related to the government under which we live. The sinful subject of God's government needs a change of heart that he may be meet for citizenship in his commonwealth; and he also needs justification that he may have legal standing in that kingdom. The scheme of grace adequately provides for both changes. Regeneration, terminating upon his character and, in sanctification, completing what is begun in regeneration, perfects those changes of nature which are necessary to make the sinner a good citizen. But justification, terminating upon the sinner's relation to law and government, restores the sinner to good standing in the rectoral regard of God and conveys all the rights and privileges of a lawful citizenship.

Believing grace, however, is that testimony of the Holy Spirit which is delivered in the consciousness of the regenerated sinner by which his mind is enlightened so that he sees Christ as he is set forth in the Scriptures and so softens his heart that he gladly embraces the Saviour as his personal Redeemer. Believing grace leads, by divine persuasion, the sinner to lay hold upon Christ as he is offered in the gospel, and upon the presentation of his merits the Lord pronounces upon the soul a judgment of justification. Believing grace is suasive in its nature; justifying grace is judicial in its character. The one draws the sinner to Jesus; the other sends him out of court with peace in his conscience and with the joy of acceptance in his heart.

The Romish soteriology identifies sanctifying and justifying grace and sees no distinction between sanctification and justifica-

tion, between the subjective and the objective operations of the Spirit, between the work of the Spirit within us and the work of the Spirit upon us. The rationalist and Unitarian, on the other hand, perceive no distinction between believing and justifying grace, inasmuch as, in his soteriology, all grace is merely didactic and suasory in its nature. In the theology of the Lutherans and Reformers, however, a sharp distinction is drawn; regenerating grace is dynamical, believing grace is suasory and justifying grace is forensic. The one changes the sinner's heart, the other changes his attitude and the third changes his status.

In the mouth of a rationalist, to justify means to pardon; in the mouth of a Romanist, to justify means to sanctify; but in the mouth of a Calvinist, to justify means to justify—to judicially declare the person at the bar of God to be righteous.

4. What, then, are the proofs of the forensic nature of justifying grace? What are the arguments by which it can be evinced that the sinner's case is issued at the bar of God, and not by the dynamic strength of Jehovah on the one hand and not in the executive chamber of the Deity on the other hand?

We may not determine, in some *a priori* manner, how God ought to deal with a sinner's case. The only legitimate mode of determining this question is to take the Christian revelation and make, by exegesis and exposition, a digest of its teachings on the subject.

(1) The first argument for the forensic nature of the justifying act is founded upon the uniform and persistent usage of the word *justify* throughout the Scriptures..

In the interpretation of any document, its words must be taken in the sense in which the author uniformly employs them. Any word carries the meaning of the author, no matter how widely it may depart from etymologies and dictionaries and lexicons. And the Scriptures constantly and consciously assign to the words *justify* and *justification* the forensic meaning of declaring the person at the bar righteous.

"If there be a controversy between men, and they come unto judgment, that the judges may judge them; then they shall justify the righteous and condemn the wicked" (Deut. 25:1).

This text is from the Mosaic legislation, the code which God prescribed for Israel. It is the language of law. Does to "justify" in the text mean to sanctify? Was the civil magistrate required to make the righteous man a good man in his subjective character? Was he required by this law to make the wicked man subjectively wicked when he "condemned" him? On the contrary, it is intuitively obvious that the justified man must be righteous in order to be legally pronounced righteous by the civil judge and that the wicked man must be wicked in order to ground, in justice, a sentence of condemnation upon him. Righteousness and wickedness were the antecedents of their respective judgments; and the act of the judge cannot be interpreted as creating the righteousness or the wickedness which were to constitute the ground of his decision. Nor can to "justify" in this text mean to pardon; for the law did not prescribe that the judge was to pardon the man whom the judicial investigation found to be righteous; if righteous, he had done nothing to be pardoned for. A citizen who has committed no crime, and who is found truly and strictly blameless, cannot be offered a pardon, nor can he in self-respect accept a pardon. To "justify" in the text can mean nothing but to declare just. The civil magistrate was required, by this law, to proclaim the man whom he found righteous to be just and condemn the man whom he found, in his court, to be wicked. More than this; the pardoning power is never lodged in the hands of any judge; it is a function of the executive and not of the bench.

"I will not justify the wicked" (Ex. 23:7).

Does God here say, "I will not sanctify the wicked; I will not change his moral character?" But this is precisely what he does do in regeneration and sanctification—turns wicked men into good men. If God does not convert the wicked, according to the Scriptures, who can? But does God say in this text, "I will not pardon the wicked, I will not release him from the penalty which he has incurred?" But this is precisely what the advocates of justification by pardon allege that he does do. If "justify" in this text means "sanctify," then God says, "I will not sanctify the wicked;" and if it means "pardon," then God

here says, "I will not pardon the wicked." They, therefore, cut the throat of their own doctrine who so translate to "justify" in this text. But the plain meaning of the text is, "I will not proclaim the wicked righteous." The divine pronouncements from the bench will always be consonant with the facts and the law in the case. Otherwise the divine judge would act corruptly and immorally in delivering his judicial opinions. This, God, under no circumstances, can do.

"All the people that heard him, and the publicans, justified God" (Luke 7:29).

Did the people and the publicans, when they heard Jesus, sanctify God, making him a holy Deity? It were blasphemy to think it. Did they pardon God? It were folly to imagine God under penalties at their bar. Did all the people and the publicans, in the matter referred to, when they heard the Redeemer, proclaim God just and righteous? What other meaning than this conveys any sense?

"A man is not justified by the works of the law" (Gal. 2:16).

Does it mean that a man is not made holy by the works of the law, by his obedience to moral precepts? Does it mean that a man is not pardoned by his deeds under the law and in accordance therewith? Or does it mean that no man is proclaimed just in the court-room of God by the deeds, or on account of the works which he has done in compliance with the law? This is the only sensible and possible meaning which the word can carry in this text.

"He that justifieth the wicked is an abomination to the Lord" (Prov. 17:15).

If "justify" here means sanctify, then the text teaches that whosoever makes a bad subjectively a good man is an abomination to the Lord. If it here means pardon, then we have the doctrine that whosoever pardons a wicked man commits what is an abomination to the Lord. Both conclusions are intolerable. The passage means that whosoever proclaims a wicked man to be a righteous man, and treats him as if he were not wicked, perpetrates an abomination before the Lord.

The common sense of men supports these texts of Scripture. A citizen is impleaded at the civil bar under an indictment which charges him with theft, and the trial issues in his justification, and the judge so announces. Does any sane man imagine that the judge subjectively made him an honest man, or that the judge pardoned him? Manifestly all that has occurred is, the judge has proclaimed the accused man not guilty, but as far as the investigation goes, honest and upright.

(2) The second argument for the forensic nature of the justifying act is founded upon the meaning of its antithesis, *condemnation*.

A good mode of exposition is to show the reverse side of the idea. The contrary to justification is condemnation. These two words, and the two ideas which they symbolize, stand over against each other in sharpest contrast. What one means, the other does not mean. What one affirms, the other denies. If justification means one thing, condemnation means the opposite. If to justify is to pardon, then to condemn is to punish. If to justify is to remit penalty, then to condemn is to inflict penalty. If to justify is to make subjectively good, to condemn is to make subjectively bad. If to justify is to infuse character, to condemn is to take away character. If to justify is to declare righteous, to condemn is to declare guilty. If to justify is to pronounce the prisoner at the bar legally just, to condemn is to pronounce the prisoner at the bar legally guilty.

"If I justify myself, mine own mouth shall condemn me" (Job. 9:20).

Let us test the alleged meanings of both these words in this passage. If we assume that to justify means to pardon, then we have this impossible rendering: "If I pardon myself, mine own mouth shall inflict the penalty upon me." If to justify means to sanctify, then we have this absurd paraphrase: "If I make myself subjectively holy, mine own mouth shall make me subjectively corrupt." If to justify means to declare righteous, we have this natural and acceptable rendering: "If I proclaim myself righteous, mine own mouth will proclaim me guilty."

"There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 8:1).

Let the same experiment be made with this great declaration. Does it mean, "There is, therefore, now no penalty to them which are in Christ Jesus"? Or, "There is, therefore, now no corruption in them which are in Christ Jesus"? Or, "There is, therefore, now no proclamation of the guilt of them which are in Christ Jesus"?

If I condemn the government for declaring war, do I thereby inflict penalty upon the government? If I condemn the government for declaring war, do I thereby make the government subjectively corrupt? If I condemn the government for declaring war, do I do more than proclaim that the government is wrong in its declaration of war? In this supposititious case, I sit in judgment upon the action of the government and pronounce an adverse judgment upon it for its course. The judgment is judicial; it is not executive, nor is it dynamical.

(3) The third argument for the forensic character of the justifying act is founded upon Paul's statement of the question.

The nature of the question determines the nature of the answer. If I were asked, "How many boxes of oranges grow, upon the average, upon a single orange tree?" I should be false and evasive if I replied, "Two barrels of apples is the average yield of a single tree." Such a reply would be no answer to the question about oranges. Now the exact question raised by the Scriptures is, "How shall a man be just with God?" The question is not, "How can a man escape hell, how can he be pardoned?" The question, again, is not, "How can a man be holy before God?" But the exact Biblical question is, "How can a man be just before God?" It is no answer to this question to reply, "By being pardoned." It is no answer to it to reply, "By being holy." These would be answers to entirely different questions. If the questions, "How can a man be pardoned?" and, "How can a man be holy?" are different questions from, "How can a man be just?" then pardon and sanctification are different from justification.

"I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ; for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith; as it is written, the just shall live by faith" (Rom. 1:16, 17).

The gospel is the power of God unto salvation, because therein is revealed the righteousness of God, which is appropriated by faith and presented as the ground of justification. Faith, laying hold of that righteousness, causes, in an instrumentary way, the just to live. Not by laying hold of the pardoning mercy of God; not by grasping the sanctifying power of grace; but by laying hold of the righteousness of God, an unrighteous sinner becomes righteous at the bar of God, and is so declared in his justification.

"Therefore by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifest, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all that believe; for there is no difference; for all have sinned and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom God hath set forth to be the propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness; that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus" (Rom. 3:20-26).

The question raised and treated in this passage is not one concerning pardon, nor concerning sanctification, but distinctly one concerning justification. All are sinners; none can be reinstated in the divine favour by his deeds under the law; but such may be reinstated by acting faith in Jesus Christ, thereby laying hold upon the righteousness of God; so that possessing this *bona fide* righteousness, God may, upon it as a true and valid ground, declare the sinner righteous, and at the same time himself be just in justifying the ungodly.

“Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men unto condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous” (Rom. 5: 18, 19).

This parallel between the first and the second Adam has a conclusive bearing upon our question. As a result of the action of the first Adam in Eden a judgment of condemnation was pronounced upon all his constituent posterity; and as a result of the action of the second Adam on Calvary a judgment of justification came upon all his constituent posterity. The reign of grace is not through sovereign clemency, but “through righteousness.” Sinners are justified, not because they are holy, nor by being pardoned, but on account of the righteousness of Christ, imputed to them and received by faith.

How can a sinner be released from punishment? How can a sinner become holy? These are questions of vast importance, and the Scriptures reply to them both. On account of the imputed righteousness, and as a consequence of their justification, they are pardoned, or delivered from the penalty of sin; and by the subjective work of the Holy Spirit they are ultimately made holy through sanctification. But this is very different from the apostolic question, “How shall a man be just with God?” It is illogical and untheological to identify justification and pardon, or to identify justification and sanctification. Pardon is a benefit conferred by executive mercy; sanctification is a blessing conferred by the Spirit’s operation upon internal character; but justification is a benefit which issues from a court-room, founded upon the righteousness of the prisoner at the bar. The very statement of the question demands such a resolution of the nature of justifying grace.

IV. Material Cause.—Upon what ground does God, an omniscient and honest Judge, pronounce a sinner, confessedly guilty and known by himself to be guilty, to be not guilty but positively righteous? How can such an intelligent and moral Being as God be just and yet the justifier of the ungodly? The

law is against the prisoner; and the facts are against the prisoner; and the Judge knows the law and all the facts in the case; and yet he remits the penalty and proclaims the sinner a righteous man! Does he justify in a purely arbitrary manner? Does he ignore the law? Does he blind his eyes to the palpable facts? Does the Judge of all the earth do a conscious wrong when he discharges the guilty sinner? Is the Deity a hypocrite? Does he lie when he declares the sinner to be righteous?

The argument, so far, has brought the case into court, into God's court. The Judge knows, and his justification of the sinner, who is in reality guilty, cannot be pronounced in ignorance or be interpreted as a mistake on the part of the occupant of the bench. The Judge is absolutely moral, and the judgment of justification cannot be explained upon the ground that the Judge was not fully truthful, honest and sincere when he proclaimed the guilty sinner to be righteous. The accused has not been dismissed as an act of pardoning clemency; nor has he been discharged by the almighty and sovereign strength of God, forcibly wrenching him out of the hands of justice and law; the case has been issued in a court which demands some adequate basis upon which the judgment of justification may rest. The Judge is omniscient, inerrant and immutable; the law is explicit, rigid and uncompromising; the facts are palpably and openly and avowedly against the sinner, constituting him a true and flagrant criminal. How then can God be just and yet the justifier of the ungodly? The argument is bound to ground justification in some real and adequate way in order to vindicate the Almighty and protect his character for intelligence and morals. If he knew what he was doing, when he declared a sinner innocent, then he was consciously immoral. If he did it in ignorance, then he is not omniscient. Upon what intelligent and adequate consideration did he base this pronouncement, which at once vindicates his honesty and righteousness and at the same time exhibits his knowledge and understanding? The character of the Deity is involved in our interpretation of the ground of justification.

The atonement of Christ has changed the original facts in the case. This is precisely the solution of the problem. A new

fact in the sinner's history has come into being—a fact of such a nature as warrants and requires the annulment of the judgment of condemnation and the erection in lieu thereof of a judgment of justification; a fact, which calls upon a court of strict and rigorous justice to reverse itself by now justifying the person which was formerly condemned. What then is this revolutionizing fact which has been imported into the sinner's history, which now alters his status before God? I answer, *The Righteousness of Christ*. This is the new fact in the case, the new fact in the history of the sinner, the meritorious ground of the reversed judgment in the cause. God has not changed; law has not changed; the facts in the life of the accused have changed. Whereas, in the first hearing, he ought to have been condemned as he was condemned, in the second hearing of the case he ought to be acquitted because, in this review, he is found to be literally and truly righteous with the righteousness of Christ. At this point the discussion is not concerned with *how* he got this righteousness of Christ but solely with the *fact* of its possession. Does he possess that righteousness? If so, it constitutes an adequate reason for the sinner's justification and release. But does he possess it? The point must be proved by testimony—testimony from the word of God.

Concerning the ground upon which God justifies a sinner, the following suppositions would seem to be exhaustive categories of hypothesis:

- (1) Upon the ground of no righteousness at all.
- (2) Upon the ground of the sinner's own righteousness.
- (3) Upon the ground of some constructive righteousness.
- (4) Upon the ground of somebody else's righteousness.

1. Taking up these suppositions in their order, the first proposition is: The sinner must be justified upon the ground of some righteousness or upon the ground of no righteousness at all. This proposition is an alternative, one or the other of which must be false.

(1) That the sinner cannot be justified upon the ground of no righteousness of any sort is proved by the fact that, in justifi-

cation, God proclaims the sinner righteous. This he could not truthfully do upon the hypothesis that the sinner is really righteous in no sense whatever. God is not a man that he should lie.

(2) That the sinner cannot be unconditionally pardoned, that is, cannot be justified while possessing no righteousness of any kind, is proved by the fact that justification is a court-room exercise, and no judge can lawfully justify where there is no sort of obedience, or compliance with law, on the part of the prisoner at the bar. But it has already been proved that justification is a judicial act and not a mere executive act, and every judge is bound to declare according to fact and law.

(3) The pronouncement of a judgment of justification without a premise of righteousness of any kind really nullifies the necessity of atonement. "Without shedding of blood is no remission." But why should such a proposition be true if God could, consistently with his own nature, law and fact, arbitrarily justify any sinner who may be impleaded at his bar? That a sinner can be unconditionally pardoned by divine fiat, without any reference to his righteousness or unrighteousness, renders the incarnation, life, death and resurrection of Christ supererogatory. God might have remitted penalty and declared the sinner just without any reference to the mediatorial work of Christ at all.

These considerations are fatal to the hypothesis that the sinner can be justified upon the ground of no righteousness at all. It would set forth the Deity as proclaiming one righteous whom he knew was unrighteous; it would make him, as a Judge, pronounce one righteous who had no sort of righteousness whatever; it would render the atonement of Christ really unnecessary. Inasmuch, therefore, as every sentence of justification must be based upon a premise of some sort of righteousness, it follows that it cannot be true that justification has no basis at all in righteousness. If justified at all, the sinner must be justified for the reason that he possesses some sort of righteousness.

2. Then if the sinner is justified upon the ground of some righteousness, can that righteousness be his own personal righteousness? Can his own obedience and character be made the

righteous reason for God's justification of him? Can any sinner stand and claim his acquittal and acceptance upon what he is and upon what he has done?

"If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness would have been by that law" (Gal. 3:2).

Righteousness is an abstract term for obedience to the law. If there had been a law, any law, Adamic, Mosaic, Sinaitic, ceremonial, evangelical; if there had been any law, whatever its nature or origin, by obeying which the sinner could have obtained life, then verily that would have been the ordained mode of salvation. But there was no such law; there could be no such law; and righteousness, which is the ground and reason of justification, must be by grace, for the simple but effective reason that it could not be by law. Consequently no man's personal deeds and character are available as a condition and reason for justification.

"If righteousness came by the law, then Christ is dead in vain" (Gal. 2:21).

If personal obedience to law of any sort; if any man's behaviour under law of any kind; if any man's character and conduct developed under any law whatsoever, could have been a competent ground of justification, then Christ's death, the very object of which was to provide a justifying righteousness, would have been in vain. By his mediatorial work he brought into a being a justifying righteousness; if the sinner had been able to have made the provision for himself, then Christ need not have died. A conclusion which renders nugatory and futile the death of the Redeemer cannot be accepted as sound.

"By the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified" (Rom. 3:20).

A man's personal righteousness is his obedience to the law under which he lives, and his personal character is that which results from such an obedience. The Scriptures categorically deny that there are any deeds done under the law which can count for justification; deny that there is anything which a sinner can do or be which would constitute a reason for his dismissal out of court with the benediction and blessing of God. There is no limitation upon the word "deeds" in the text, and there is no

limitation upon the word "law." The declaration of denial comprehends every variety and aggregation of deeds, and every variety and type of law.

The parable of the Pharisee and the Publican (Lk. 18:9-14) was spoken precisely to this point, "unto certain which trusted in themselves that they were righteous and despised others." In this story our Lord presents two characters, the moral antitheses of each other and both engaged in the same act of seeking their justification. The Pharisee based his petition for acceptance upon what he was and what he had done; he was a moralist of the most decided puritanical cast, not extortionate, not unjust, not unclean, he was a member of the Jewish Church in good and regular standing and punctilious in the discharge of the duties of his religion, fasting twice every week, and giving tithes of all that he possessed towards the extension of the Lord's cause in the earth; he possessed a good name, a good genealogy, a good character, a good Church and a good behaviour, yet he went down to his house rejected and unjustified. The publican, on the contrary, was the very opposite type; he was without honorable family connection, extortionate, unjust, an adulterer, outside of the Church and negligent of religious duties; yet he was the man who was successful in his quest. The Pharisee had a self-righteousness and the publican was severely destitute of anything that was creditable in his life and history; they were moral antipodes. Relatively, the Pharisee was a far better man than was the publican, and had the divine acceptance been based upon their relative merits, the Pharisee would have been accepted and the publican discarded. But the fact was, God rejected the man who pleaded his character and conduct and justified the publican who cast himself upon the mercy of God as it was in Christ Jesus. The lesson is absolute; no amount and no degree of self-righteousness is adequate as a ground of justification in the sight of God. If character and conduct would justify any man, they would have justified this Pharisee.

All the sinner's righteousnesses are "filthy rags;" he must find some other garb in which to present himself before God if he has any hope of divine acceptance. None is, or can be, good

enough to warrant the divine judge in pronouncing him righteous and granting him remission of sin and reinstatement in the kingdom of God. At best, and at most, no man is ever more than relatively good in himself; but it takes an absolutely flawless righteousness, a perfect obedience, to constitute a ground of justification in the court of God.

The Pelagian and rationalistic theory of justification, upon the ground of personal character and conduct, is a sheer impossibility in a court where the Judge is omniscient and absolutely truthful and exact.

3. If the sinner must be justified upon the ground of some righteousness, and if that righteousness cannot be his own personal property, in which he has a title vested in the fact that he brought it into being by his own acts of obedience under the law, then may he not, under a gracious system of religion, be justified upon the ground of some constructive, supposititious or hypothetical righteousness? May there not be some substitute *for* righteousness which could be utilized in a court of strict and rigorous justice as a true and substantial basis upon which to rest a judgment of acquittal and acceptance? Debts are sometimes cancelled by some substitute for money being offered in lieu of the coin of the realm; in a similar manner, may there not be, particularly under a scheme of grace and accommodation, a something, not in itself a righteousness, yet which is graciously accepted in lieu of the righteousness which the sinner owes but cannot himself pay?

This is the precise contention of Remonstrants and Arminians. No man can be justified without any righteousness whatsoever, neither has any guilty and depraved sinner any righteousness of his own which he can offer as an adequate and acceptable reason for his acceptance; but, according to this school, God has graciously consented to accept faith in Christ as a substitute for righteousness. While faith in itself is not an act of obedience intrinsically and *ipso facto* the obedience which God originally required of man when he created him and put him in this world under moral

demands, yet, since his sinful break-down, God condescendingly proposes to waive the original demands of his law and accept faith in Christ as a satisfactory substitute and upon it to discharge the sinner from all the penal claims of the moral law and reinstate him in the favour of heaven. Faith is thus handled by the school as a constructive, or supposititious, or hypothetical, or vicarious righteousness, and predicated as the ground of the sinner's justification.

"If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory; but not before God Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness Faith is counted for righteousness" (Rom. 4:1-5).

Abraham, the father of the faithful and the type and model of all cases of the justification of sinners, was not justified by his works, his acts of obedience to the law; for the Scriptures expressly tell us that he was not justified by works and that he had not whereof to glory before God. But the same Scripture, we are told, just as expressly declares that Abraham was justified by faith and that his faith was imputed to him for righteousness and was, by God, in dealing with this patriarch, expressly counted for righteousness. Upon this passage the Arminian soteriology has constructed this formula as exactly expressive of the ground of justification: "The imputation of faith for righteousness." Faith is thus held to be, not the mere instrument, but the very ground of justification. The sinner not being at all able to render that perfect obedience which the law demands, God is pleased, under the covenant of mercy, to accept faith in Christ in the place of that real and personal righteousness which the law originally demanded. In the day of the judgment, consequently, the supreme and central question propounded to the sinner will not be, "Did you live on earth in strict compliance with the moral law as summarily comprehended in the Ten Commandments?" but the question will be, "Did you believe in Jesus?" The final judgment will thus be an inquisition for faith, and a man's relation to Christ will determine the final issues of his immortality. The gospel proposition,

in the thought of this school of soteriologists, is precisely and definitely a proposition by God to this sinful world to accept faith in Christ as a substitute for the obedience which was owed by the sinner.

"Two facts should be specially noted. One is, that it is faith itself, and not its object, that is thus imputed. This is certain even where a pronoun is the immediate antecedent to the verb. Here is an instance: 'For what saith the Scripture? Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness.' Here only the faith of Abraham can be the antecedent to the pronoun it; and hence only his faith could be the subject of the imputation. Further, faith itself, as so named, is repeatedly the nominative to the imputation. Here are instances: 'His faith is counted for righteousness'; 'faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness.' Hence any attempt at a metonymical interpretation of faith, so that it shall mean, not itself but its object, that is Christ, and hence mean the imputation of his personal righteousness, is utterly vain."—Miley, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II., p. 319.

The issue between Arminianism and Calvinism is thus sharply drawn over the ground of justification. According to the one scheme of soteriology, faith in Christ is itself the ground of justification, and, according to the other scheme, it is the object of faith, or the righteousness of Christ, which is that ground. According to the one, the sinner is justified by faith in Christ; according to the other, the sinner is justified by the righteousness of Christ, which is received by faith. According to the one, faith is the basis upon which God predicates the declaration that the sinner is just in his sight; according to the other, faith is but the human instrumentality which lays hold upon Christ and presents him as the ground of justification. Faith is thus dealt with in the scheme of Arminianism as a constructive, or supposititious, or hypothetical righteousness, a something which God accepts in lieu of a *bona fide* and genuine righteousness.

Against this view the following arguments are offered as effectively discrediting it:

(1). It makes justification a farce, and God the perpetrator of that farce. The law is real, its demands are real, it calls for a *bona fide* and genuine righteousness. But this theory proposes to satisfy these real demands for a true righteousness, with faith, which is no righteousness in itself, but only a substitute for righteousness. It is not what the Adamic law required; it is not what the moral law demanded. It is no real and genuine righteousness, but only a make-believe, a something which divine fiat is supposed to force to serve the purpose. In truth the believer possesses no righteousness, neither his own, nor another's; but God, knowing the exact facts in the case, yet proclaims him righteous and justifies him! It is a farce! It is a fiction! It is a pretense! It is not honest! It is not truthful! By sheer omnipotence and almightiness the Deity could, if he could do this, do anything. He could have blindly and forcibly decreed that the blood of bulls and goats was adequate to atone for human guilt. The sham transaction touches the veracity of the Deity.

(2). If faith is imputed instead of righteousness, then man has whereof to glory; boasting would not be excluded. It is man who does the believing, it is his act. He is fairly entitled to the praise of what he does. While, under the hypothesis, God furnishes the object of faith, man does the believing and presents his faith as a reason why he should be dismissed out of court with the favour of the Deity. But the Scriptures everywhere show us that no man can do anything which would create a claim upon God or put the Deity under any sort of obligation to him. "Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? of works? Nay, but by the law of faith" (Rom. 3:27).

(3). The view that faith is the ground of justification contradicts all those texts which represent the righteousness of Christ as the ground of justification. "Jesus Christ, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God, to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness" (Rom. 3:25). Faith must

be either the reason or the instrument of our justification. If the ground or reason, then what office shall be assigned to the righteousness and merit of Christ? If the instrument or mere bond of connection between the sinner and the merits of Christ, then the righteousness of Christ performs the office of a ground or reason for justification, and faith stands in the schedule only as the hand which lays hold upon that righteousness.

(4) To construe faith as a constructive righteousness and rest the judgment of justification upon it as a ground is inconsistent with the generic and prevailing office which the Scriptures ascribe to faith. It is always *dia pisteos*, or *ek pisteos*, but never *dia pistin*; that is, the Greek preposition used with the genitive case always expresses the means or instrument. The uniform use of the Greek in the New Testament thus settles the debate as to whether faith is the instrumentality of justification or the ground for it.

(5). The doctrine which construes faith as the material cause of the justification of the sinner leads more logically to Antinomianism than does the view that faith is only the instrument of justification. Man believes; it is his act, it justifies him in the sight of God; what is to prevent him from sinning at pleasure? What respect has he for a law which can be satisfied in all its demands by mere faith? In lieu of all the duties imposed by the Ten Commandments he is privileged to offer faith, and upon it receive justification. Why should he keep the law? The obvious thing for him to do is to believe, and let obedience alone; the one will save him and the other will not.

(6). This view misinterprets the passage about Abraham, in which it is said that "faith was imputed for righteousness," and that other passage in which it is said that "faith was counted for righteousness." It is a simple instance of the rhetorical figure of metonymy, where the instrument is put for the thing itself. The apostle in the context has argued that there is none righteous; that by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified; that the righteousness of God by Jesus

Christ is the only ground of justification; that this righteousness is received by faith and imputed by God. Now, in the light of this context, when he says Abraham's faith "was counted unto him for righteousness" it can mean nothing else but that faith was the instrumentality by which Abraham laid hold upon the righteousness of Christ. Faith was reckoned the means by which the justifying righteousness was obtained. Better a figure of metonymy here than a fictitious justification; better a figure of rhetoric than a contradiction of the context, both near and remote.

4. If the sinner must be justified upon the ground of some righteousness, and that righteousness cannot be his own personal obedience, and that righteousness cannot be some supposititious or constructive righteousness, like faith; then the only other supposition left is that he, if justified at all, must be justified upon the ground of another's righteousness.

Against the Pelagian and rationalist, who predicate a sinner's own obedience as the reason for his acceptance by God; against the Arminian who predicates some constructive obedience as the reason for the sinner's acceptance by the Deity; Calvinists allege that the sinner is justified upon the ground of the obedience of Christ. That is, a sinner is pardoned and restored to his citizenship in the kingdom of God on account of what Christ has done for him and in his room and stead. That is, the sinner is justified upon the premise of Christ's mediatorial conduct and not upon the ground of either his ethical obedience or his evangelical obedience.

Paul declared that he was not ashamed of the gospel of Christ," for therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith" (Rom. 1:17). He then, in the first chapter of this epistle, shows that the entire Gentile world is an object of "the wrath of God revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men" (Rom. 1:18). In the second chapter he shows that the Jews are no better, and that there is "wrath, indignation, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil; of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile" (Rom. 2:9). He then makes the broad and

universal generalization, "There is none righteous, no, not one" (Rom. 3:10). Then he concludes that "by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight" (Rom. 3:20). Since all have sinned and come short of the glory of God; since none can be justified by the deeds of the law; how shall any man ever be justified? The apostle answers, "the righteousness of God without the law is manifest," "even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe" (Rom. 3:21, 22). Justifying righteousness is here characterized as the "righteousness of God," which is represented as imputed to the sinner and received by faith. He then illustrated his proposition with the story of Abraham, the "father of the faithful," who was not justified by his works but by the righteousness which he received by his faith in God.

Then in whom does the title of justifying righteousness vest? Not in the sinner himself, which would be the case were he justified by works, and which would still be the case were he justified by some moral, or ceremonial, or evangelical obedience; but the title to justifying righteousness is clearly vested in the Deity, because it is denominated "the righteousness of God."

V. Formal Cause.—But how does the "righteousness of God" become the righteousness of the sinner, so that he can be dealt with upon that premise? How shall we ground a sinner's title to a something which does not naturally belong to him? How can we account for his bringing the righteousness, not of himself, but of another into court and pleading what somebody else has done as a reason why he should be absolved from all the penal claims of the law? What is the peculiar formal nature of the justification of a sinner under a scheme of gracious religion?

He, whose righteousness it is, must bestow it upon the sinner. The sinner is not strong enough to forcibly take it away from the Deity, and he would be but a blameworthy robber if he did secure it in this mode; he is not adroit enough

to outwit the Deity and get this righteousness by cunning and craftiness, and he would be a thief if he did so secure it; and he cannot perform acts by which he can earn this righteousness of God and so present it in court as a wage he has earned or as a commodity which he has purchased. Then how does he get it—the righteousness of God? By deed of gift. He, whose it is, donates it to him. God graciously imputes it to the sinner. "Imputation" is that theological technicality which describes the divine action in giving the sinner a right and title to the "righteousness of God." It is set down to the sinner's account.

There is nothing abhorrent about "imputation." It is a biblical word. It describes that action of God by which he vests in the sinner right and title to the merits of Christ. It means to reckon, to set down to the account of, to make over to, to place to the credit of. The matter here disposed of is the righteousness of God which was wrought out by Christ. God imputes, places to the credit of the sinner, this righteousness of Christ. The technicality tells us how the sinner, at the bar of God, comes to be in possession of another's righteousness. He did not steal it; he did not capture it; he did not earn it; he did not buy it; yet he is entitled to it, and can be dealt with on the ground that it is his; how did he get it? The answer is: By the imputation of grace. He, whose it was, gave it to him. "David describeth the blessedness of the man to whom the Lord imputeth righteousness without works" (Rom. 4:6). "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth" (Rom. 10:4). It was set down to the account of Abraham, and then he was dealt with as righteous with the "righteousness of God." He was no highwayman, no thief, no purchaser; he was the beneficiary of a divine gift. If he did not get the righteousness of God by imputation, then how did he come by it?

Imputation then is that theological and biblical term which defines the divine action in making over the righteousness of Christ to a sinner. There is nothing outrageous in supposing that the sinner thus comes into possession of the

righteousness upon the ground of which he is justified. It was God's; he had the right to bestow upon whomsoever he desired; he is pleased to set that righteousness down to the account of some sinners; who can dispute the legitimacy of his so doing? Though the sinner's title in it is by a deed of gift, it is yet a valid title. It is his, truly, literally, genuinely his; God gave it to him. Being his, he can offer it as a reason why he should not be condemned but acquitted and openly acknowledged and truly justified. Why not? The righteousness he has is *bona fide*; his title in it is indefeasible; it is his very own, albeit it was given to him; why does it not constitute a valid and true ground of justification? It is intrinsically a worthy reason for acquittal; it is truly the sinner's very own by divine gift; where is the immorality and crime in dealing with him upon the premise of his facts and his possessions?

The debtor brings good money into court; his title in the money is genuine, albeit a good friend made him a present of every dollar of it; why can he not, in law and justice, cancel his debts with this sound money which is truly and ethically and indisputably his? Imputation is that act of God which gives to the sinner this money; this sound and competent money. If he did not get it by divine imputation, how did he come by it? It was God's; it grounds his justification; if it were not given to him by God, how did he get it?

Every child is born into this world depraved and condemned; where did he get his depravity and condemnation? Did he create it? Did he steal it? Did he rob another? Did he buy it? Did he earn it? Where did he get his original sin? If not from Adam by imputation, where did it come from? "As in Adam, so in Christ." Condemnation was imputed from the first Adam, so that all human beings are antenatally condemned; so justification is imputed from the second Adam, so that all Christians are antenatally justified. If the sinner does not get the righteousness of Christ from God by imputation, where does he get it from? If God gives it to him, what is that but saying that God sets it down to his account and makes it over to him?

Why did Christ suffer and die? Was he personally guilty? Was it for the personal sanctification of his character? Was his death penal? Was his death disciplinary? Do not the Scriptures teach throughout that he suffered and died for others than himself? How are the beneficiaries to get the benefits of that atonement unless they are set down, imputed, to them? If he suffered in the room and stead of sinners, it could only have been because he was putatively guilty; and if sinners are declared righteous and just in the court of God it can be only because they are putatively righteous. The conception of Christ as putatively guilty in order to find a basis for his suffering and death is no more violent than to conceive of Christians as putatively righteous in order to account for a judicial declaration by an omniscient and absolutely just God that they are justified from all their offences.

This doctrine of the imputed righteousness of Christ, as the formal nature of justification, stands or falls with the entire Calvinistic system; stands or falls with election, the covenant of grace, the nature of the atonement as a true satisfaction of broken law. By it, imputation, it is intended to say that the righteousness of God, in Christ Jesus, is officially set down to the account of God's people by Jehovah and by this action of his the sinner is given a legal title to and an ethical right in the merits of the mediation of the Redeemer. Since the work of Christ is indisputably the ground of justification, where did the sinner get it, if not by gift from God? How else will any man found a sinner's ethical and legal claim to the righteousness of Christ if it were not given to him by him who had the right to bestow it?

VI. Instrumental Cause.—While God makes over the righteousness of Christ to the sinner by an act of imputation, the sinner receives that righteousness by an act of faith. God extends the merits of the Saviour's mediation in the hand of imputation; the sinner receives that righteousness by the hand

of faith. Faith is the instrumental cause of justification. By it the sinner seizes upon the offered righteousness of the Redeemer. Faith is not the ground and reason for the justification of the sinner, but it is the hand which grasps the righteousness of Christ and presents that righteousness as the ground and reason for the acquittal of the soul from all the guilt of sin.

The sinner is not justified *on account of* faith, but he is justified *by* faith. Faith in itself is not the basis upon which God declares the sinner not guilty but righteous; but it is what faith holds in its hand, namely, the righteousness of Christ, which is the premise of the divine judgment. For the righteousness of Christ to be available for justification two things are necessary: (a) God must make an assignment of that righteousness to the sinner, in order that he may have a right and title in it, and this the Deity does by imputation; (b) and the sinner must himself lay hold upon that righteousness and bring it into court as the reason upon which he bases his plea for acquittal, and this he does by faith.

"Therefore being justified by faith" (Rom. 5:1). "Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law" (Rom. 3:28). "Seeing it is one God, which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith" (Rom. 3:30). "The righteousness of God is revealed from faith to faith" (Rom. 1:17). "By grace are ye saved through faith" (Eph. 2:8).

It defies the wit of man to deny that the Scriptures assign some important office to faith in justification. Now what is that office? There are but two hypotheses: (a) it is the ground of justification; or (b) it is the instrument of justification. Insuperable difficulties, already pointed out, emerge the moment we construe faith as the ground and reason of justification in the court of God. But if we take the traditional view and interpret faith as the human hand which lays hold upon the merits of Christ and presents those merits as the reason and ground of justification, we have an important

and indispensable office for faith to perform, which justifies all the emphasis which Scripture and theology throw upon it; and, at the same time, have a basis for justification upon which God can truly rest a judgment of justification without the semblance of a farce and without the shadow of any unreality in the pronouncement.

If a debtor went to the bank and there got the money with which he cancelled his debt, it could be truly and accurately said that he paid his debt by going to the bank, while in strict literalness he paid his debt with the money which he got at the bank. So a sinner is justified *by* faith, but he cancels his criminal debt with the righteousness of Christ. God imputes that righteousness; the sinner receives it.

Described from God's action, the sinner is justified by imputation. Described from man's action, the sinner is justified by faith. Described from Christ's action, the sinner is justified by the righteousness of Christ. Described from the impelling motive in the bosom of God, the sinner is justified by grace.

The Scriptures do represent the sinner as being justified by grace, by righteousness, by imputation, by faith; the problem is to get the point of view from which these various predication are made, or the respective offices grace, righteousness, imputation and faith play in the justification of a sinner.

VII. Final Cause.—The immediate results of justification are two: (1) Pardon, or forgiveness, or the remission of punishment; and (2) Acceptance of the person, or the restoration of the sinner to the favour of God. These two effects are frequently described as the first and the second elements in justification; but they are more accurately fruits, or sequences, or results of justification. Because the sinner is justified, therefore God remits the penalty which was assessed on account of his transgressions; and because justified, therefore God accepts him as righteous and reinstates him in an unchallenged citizenship in his blessed kingdom. On account of the justifying transaction, the hand-writing which was against the sinner is taken away and a hand-writing in his favour is entered upon the record.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Adoption

Man's original relation to God was that of a subject of his government and a son in his house. Both relations were probationary; that is, they were conditioned and dependent upon his behaviour under the arrangements imposed by his Maker. At the beginning his character was holy, and he was fit for life both in the divine state and in the divine house. Had he stood the tests to which he was subjected; had he successfully endured his probation, he would have been indefectibly and blessedly established, beyond all the possibilities of falling, both in the society and in the family of God; that is, he would have been both justified as a subject and adopted as a son; his dual relation would have been immortal and his double blessedness would have been uncontingent.

But he sinned and fell. Under the covenant arrangement disaster overtook him in both relations. His standing in the favour of God as the Ruler of the universe was destroyed and his standing in the favour of God as a Father was wrecked. His exact status now is that of a proscribed and outlawed citizen on the one hand and a disinherited and outcast son on the other. He has neither civil nor filial rights and privileges. Having become bad-hearted, he is fit neither for divine subjectship nor for divine sonship. If the fall had left him good-hearted, then he would have had fitness for positions, but no legal right to them. If the fall had affected only his subjective character, then he would have had legal rights for which he was by nature utterly unfit. The fall affected both his legal standing and his personal character, leaving him neither titles nor character. He is an outlawed and bad-hearted citizen of the kingdom of God; he is a banished and evil minded son of the house of God. He is wrecked everywhere in all relations and in the center of his moral being.

This status of his case raises before his mind two serious and awful questions: (1) How can he regain lost character; (2) How can he regain lost rights and privileges?

The gospel is the divine prescription for both situations. The first problem—relative to lost character—is provided for by the doctrines of Regeneration and Sanctification; the second problem—relative to lost rights—is provided for by Justification and Adoption. That is, over against the badness of sin you have the Spirit and his regeneration as it expands in the broad and thorough work of sanctification; and over against the guilt of sin you have Christ and his atonement as they are applied in justification and adoption.

“All those that are justified, God vouchsafeth, in and for his only Son Jesus Christ, to make partakers of the grace of adoption; by which they are taken into the number, and enjoy the liberties and privileges, of the children of God; have his name put upon them; receive the Spirit of adoption; have access to the throne of grace with boldness; are enabled to cry, Abba, Father; are pitied, protected, provided for and chastened by him as by a father; yet never cast off, but sealed to the day of redemption, and inherit the promises, as heirs of everlasting salvation.” (West. Conf., Chap. 12). “Adoption is an act of God’s free grace, whereby we are received into the number, and have a right to all the privileges, of the sons of God.”

The efficient cause of adoption—that which brings it into being—is the grace of God; forensic, or judicial, grace, as distinguished from his dynamic, or witnessing, or any other forms of the gracious operations of the Holy Spirit. The material cause of Adoption—the ground upon which this benefit rests, or the matter out of which it is made—is the filial righteousness of Christ—the obedience which he rendered as the Son of God, as the Elder Brother in the household of God. The Scriptures warrant this distinction between the servile obedience of Christ as the voluntary subject of law, as the federal head of his people, and his filial obedience which he rendered as the Son of God. “Though he were a Son, yet

learned he obedience by the things which he suffered." Because men were to be redeemed not only as subjects of the divine government but also as sons of the Father's house, therefore it was necessary that the Redeemer should be flesh and blood, partaking of the very nature of those who were to be redeemed, identifying himself with them as a true kinsman. We have in this fact a hint as to the propriety of the selection of the Second Person in the Godhead as the Saviour of sinners; he was the monogenetic Son of God, and through this fact, coupled with his incarnation, he was able to present to God not only a Church of citizens but a congregation of brethren and sons. The formal nature of adoption—that which is peculiar and distinctive about it, differentiating it from every other species of adoption—is the imputation of the filial obedience of Christ to elect sinners. The domestic virtues of our Lord become the possessions of his people because grace sovereignly sets them down to the credit of those nominated in the divine election. The instrumental cause of adoption is faith; that is, filial faith connects us with the filial righteousness of Christ and causes us to enter consciously into the enjoyment of our divine adoption. The great formula of "justification by faith" can be exactly paralleled with "adoption by faith." In both instances faith performs precisely the same office—the office of an instrumental connective. The final cause or purpose of adoption is the reinstatement of the fallen and disinherited child in his patrimony. It gives him legal title to the privileges and pleasures of divine sonship. It restores to him his property rights in the house of many mansions.

The moment a sinner is united to his Saviour, grace, simultaneously and inseparably, effects in him two radical changes: (1) A change in his relations to God, and (2) a change in his spiritual nature. The first is objective; the second is subjective. The first is outward; the second is internal. One alters his status; the other alters his heart. Both are indispensably essential to the integrity of his conversion. A new footing, and a new spirit are his twin needs.

For the changed relations, our soteriology has two great technicalities—Justification and Adoption. For the new changes in character, it likewise has two technicalities—Regeneration and Sanctification. Faith performs the catholic and persistent office of an instrument—a *sine qua non*—throughout the entire development of Christian experience, from regeneration to the glorification of the saint beyond the stars.

The *ordo salutis* in the theology of the Reformers—the successive steps in the logical order of the application of the benefits of redemption to the individual sinner—is as follows: (1) Regeneration, (2) Faith, (3) Justification, (4) Adoption, (5) Sanctification, (6) Glorification. The merits of Christ, derived from his atoning death, are assumed at every point as the absolutely indispensable pre-condition of the entire series of saving acts. Every blessing, from conversion to heaven, is conveyed *in* Christ as the federal head, *through* Christ as the Mediator and *on account* of Christ as a meritorious ground. He is therefore “all in all.”

For the clearer explication of the subject of Adoption let us now put it into comparison with these great acts of the Spirit’s vocation.

I. Regeneration conveys seminally the *nature* of a child; Adoption conveys the *rights* of a child.

The distinction between a filial nature and filial rights is as real as it is obvious. We often observe in human families a child who has all the rights and privileges of the house but who is at the same time utterly destitute of the spirit and disposition of a child. He is lacking in love and reverence and respect and consideration for his parents, under whose roof he dwells, whose clothes he wears and whose food he eats. He has no sense of the obligations which grow out of the fact that he is a member of that family. His spirit is that of a stranger and an alien. Yet his rights at the fire-side and at the family board are neither disputed nor restricted. On the other hand, it is easily conceivable, though not so commonly observed, that there may be a son whose heart

palpitates with filial affection, and whose will is fond of his father's commands, but whose rights and privileges in the house have been annulled and whose inheritance has been cut off by the caprice or wickedness of some eccentric parent. Or we may imagine, and if we look around we may see children who have neither the temper nor the title of children. Their ill-nature has terminated their connection with the household. On account of their wantonness, they have been cast out of their domicile and cut off from all share in their father's estate. They are disinherited and disowned because their characters are stript of every filial^l virtue.

Such were sinners—disowned, unacknowledged, debarred by their Heavenly Father because of the depravity of their hearts, the unfilial wickedness of their conduct and their utter unfitness for fellowship in his holy family. In their fallen state they possess neither the disposition nor the rights of children.

Regeneration communicates the one; Adoption the other. In Regeneration the sinner becomes the born-child of God; in Adoption, the law-son and heir. In the one he is made the child of God; in the other he is recognized as a child. One act constitutes him a child in nature; the other acknowledges him as a child in law. Both acts are necessary to complete the wholeness of his sonship.

But if he be born by regeneration into the house and family of God, where is the propriety of adopting him? Is there either sense or fitness in a father adopting his own son? Let us remember that the progeny of the first birth was a moral monster, which could not be tolerated in the family, and we will at once see the propriety of a second birth. Then let us remember that a decree of disinheritance was formally entered *in foro Dei*, barring him in law from all the rights and privileges of his Father's house, and we can easily see how it is necessary that this decree shall be annulled and another recognizing him must be entered before he can have legal standing in the family of God. Adoption is that act of grace wherein God formally and forensically acknowledges the sin-

ner to be his son and reinstates him in all his legal rights in his house and family. Regeneration without Adoption would make the sinner a child without the rights of a child; Adoption without regeneration would give him the rights of a child without the spirit of a child. They are different acts of grace, but both are essential.

To set the heart right, to renew the springs of a dead filialness, to awaken the domestic sense—such is the office of Regeneration as it affects man contemplated as a son. To entitle the alien to cry “Abba, Father,” to reinherit the disinherited, to legally domiciliate the outcast—such is the office of Adoption as compared with that of Regeneration.

II. Faith is the *instrumental cause*, or indispensable precondition, or *sine qua non*, of Adoption.

Faith is the assent of the mind to whatever is proposed upon the ground of testimony. In his definition, *assent* is the logical genus and *upon testimony* is the differentiating mark. It is that specific sort of mental assenting which is caused by testimony, evidence, witnessing, or authority. The mind may accept the existence of an object present to it upon the ground of perception; this would be Sight. Or the mind may accept a truth upon the ground of a longer or shorter demonstration; this would be Reasoning. All mental acts are denominated specifically from the nature of their causation. Whenever, therefore, we accept anything upon the ground of testimony, or whenever the acceptance is caused by anything like evidence or authority, the conventional name for such action is Faith.

When the Bible is the object presented and we receive it as true upon the testimony of history, we exercise historical faith. When, however, it is received upon the testimony of the Holy Spirit delivered *in foro conscientiae*, we exercise saving faith. When the righteousness of Christ as a Federal Head is the specific object presented and that righteousness is received upon the witness of the Spirit, we have justifying faith. When, however, it is the righteousness of Christ as the Elder Brother in the Father’s house, which is the object

presented and we receive his filial obedience upon the witness of the Holy Ghost, we have Adopting Faith.

The Holy Spirit is the efficient cause of all saving faith, but he exerts his efficiency not in the way of naked force but in the way of a persuasive and convincing witnessing. But there are many varieties, or aspects, or phases of saving faith—such as justifying faith, adopting faith, sanctifying faith, assuring faith, and so forth. These are not different species of saving faith, for the essence of this grace is always the same, but only special phases of it resulting from changing points of view. There is a great and glorious variety of benefits which accrue to the believer from the mediation of his Redeemer; all these benefits are received by faith, which is generically denominated saving faith; but these benefits are each received individually, and the special act of faith upon each of these benefits gives rise to the distinctive characterizations as justifying, adopting, sanctifying, and so forth. Consequently the whole Christian life is a life of faith and all its stages are stages of faith. It is the *sine qua non* of every factor in Christian experience. "The life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." Every blessing presented is receivable only by that faith which is induced by the witnessing of the Holy Ghost in the inner consciousness of the soul.

The great Protestant formula—Justification by faith—has its exact parallel in—Adoption by faith. I need but one proof-text. "As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name; which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. (Jno. 1:12, 14). In this passage, "receiving" Christ is a synonym of "believing on his name." Those who thus believe on his name have the "authority" (power), the right, of the sons of God. This "receiving" or "believing on his name," is the result of the witnessing of the Spirit: "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God" (Rom. 8:16).

III. Justification conveys *citizenship* in the kingdom of God; Adoption conveys sonship in the house of God.

The distinction between citizenship and sonship is perfectly obvious. One is an abstract term for civil rights; the other for filial rights. One connotes membership in the State; the other, membership in the Family. Human society is both—a Polity and a Race. There must be social institutions for the protection and well-being of both. The destruction of either insures the destruction of the other. They are poles of the same magnet; hemispheres of the same sphere. Distinct in concept, but twinned in reality. The superlative desideratum in this life is good Government and a good Home. Right-minded men defend both with their treasures and their lives.

The sinner has neither. He is a proscribed and outlawed citizen; a disinherited and outcast son. He is under the ban of the divine government: under banishment from the heavenly home. Retributive justice follows upon his heels with drawn sword; outraged love pursues him with indignant anger. He can expect nothing but condemnation in the court of God; nothing but resentment in the house of God. He is doomed at the bar; he is doomed at the fireside. He is out of favour with God as a Ruler; he is under the displeasure of God as a Father. There is no peaceful place for his spirit in heaven or earth; he has but one right—the right to die and dwell forever with devils in hell.

Justification recovers his lost citizenship; Adoption recovers his lost sonship. In justification, he is absolved as a subject of government from all the charges of the law and he is accepted as a citizen in good standing in the commonwealth of God; in adoption, he is absolved from all filial disobedience and reinstated in all his rights and privileges in the house of God. The one introduces him into the Church considered as a polity; the other introduces him into that Church considered as a family. The one fixes him for ever in God's rectoral regard; the other fixes him for ever in God's

paternal regard. Justification terminates upon him as a servant and subject; Adoption upon him as a son and heir.

In Justification the civil righteousness of Christ is imputed to the sinner; is received by faith; and upon the ground of this righteousness the sinner is reinstated in the kingdom of God with all the rights and privileges of a citizen. Adoption is parallel in nature. It is that act of grace wherein the filial righteousness of Christ is imputed; is received by faith, and upon the ground of that righteousness the sinner is reinstated in the house of God. They are co-ordinate. They are similar in their legal character. But they differ: (1) as to their grounds and (2) as to their aims. The ground of the justifying act is the servile righteousness of Christ, or his obedience as a subject in the kingdom of God; while the ground of adoption is the filial obedience of Christ, or his obedience as the Son of God. The aim of the justifying act is to restore the sinner to citizenship in the kingdom of God; while the purpose of the adopting act is to restore him to sonship in the house of his Heavenly Father.

It is quite wrong, therefore, in Turretin to identify adoption with the second element in justification. The first element is pardon and the second element is the acceptance of the person of the sinner, or the bestowal upon him of title to eternal life. This great Genevan, therefore, construes adoption, not as distinct from justification, but as its culmination and glory. Dr. Dabney agrees with Turretin, and argues the case in this way: "This is evidently correct; because adoption performs the same act for us, in Bible representations, which justification does; translates us from under God's curse into his fatherly favour. Because its instrument is the same, faith. And because the meritorious ground of adoption is the same with that of justification, viz.: the righteousness of Christ." But the reasoning does not strictly hold. (1) Because, while justification translates us from under God's magisterial wrath into his rectoral favour, adoption, on the other hand, translates us from under God's fatherly wrath into his paternal favour. (2) Because, while faith performs essentially the

same office in both justification and adoption, there is yet this difference, viz.: in justification faith apprehends Christ as a vicar for legal obligation, while in adoption faith apprehends him as a substitute for filial guilt. (3) Because the righteousness which is the ground of justification is, strictly speaking, Christ's servile obedience, or his obedience as the mediatorial Servant of God; while the righteousness which is the ground of adoption is the obedience of Christ as a Son, or his filial obedience. For he was at once the Mediatorial Servant of the kingdom and the Mediatorial Son of God. It would therefore seem to be illogical to construe adoption merely as the coping of justification.

Complaint must also be entered against the view of Dr. A. A. Hodge, who gives the following description: "Adoption presents the new creature in his new relations—his new relations entered upon with congenial heart, and his new life developing in a congenial home, and surrounded with those relations which foster its growth and crown it with blessedness. Justification effects only a change in relations. Regeneration and Sanctification effect only inherent moral and spiritual states of the soul. Adoption includes both. As set forth in Scripture, it embraces in one complex view the newly-regenerated creature in the new relations into which he is introduced by Justification." This great theologian thus construes Adoption as a genus, having Regeneration, Justification and Sanctification as its species or varieties. It is thus the culminating blessing into which all the processes of grace finally ultimate. It would, therefore, seem to be identified with Glorification. But Adoption is that forensic act of grace whereby the regenerated and justified sinner is received into the number and given all the rights and privileges of the sons of God. Regeneration is that act of grace which gives the sinner a filial spirit in its rudimentary form. Justification is that forensic act of grace whereby the regenerated sinner is received into the number and given all the rights and privileges of the servants and subjects of God. Consequently, Adoption does something for the believer entirely distinct

from these other forementioned graces. They are, therefore, not mere phases of Adoption, but acts of divine grace truly distinct from it.

Justification and Adoption are alike, (1) in that they are both objective, effecting changes, not in the subjective character, but in the believer's relations to God; (2) and in that they are both forensic acts, in which God formally acknowledges and proclaims the new relations which have been constituted by his grace. But they are unlike, (1) in that they terminate upon different relations—one upon the servile, and the other upon the filial; (2) and in that they convey two distinct blessings—one legal citizenship in the kingdom of God, and the other legal sonship in the house of God. One act repatriates; the other reinherits. One nationalizes, the other affiliates. They are partitive acts in the great scheme of salvation, performing two distinct offices in the restoration of the sinner to God.

IV. Adoption is a title-deed to Heaven as a Home; Sanctification communicates the fitness necessary for a blissful residence in that Home.

The glorified saints may be thought of as a body of citizens, basking in the favour of their Sovereign, delighted with their position, spontaneous in their obedience, swift-footed in the discharge of commands, exulting in all divine precepts, abounding in the fellowship of one another, crowned with glory and honor before the burning throne of their Lord. Or they may be thought of as a Heavenly Family, a Holy Brotherhood, possessing all the domestic virtues and graces of character, superabounding in fraternal love and exuberant in the confidence, affection and companionship of their Heavenly Father. Both conceptions are true beyond the heart of man to foreimagine.

Plunged into such a household the unsanctified sinner would be miserable. Everything would be uncongenial. All his appetencies would be for other companions and other employments. His moral gravitation would be away from all his surroundings. His religious polarity would be contrary

to all his associations. The glory of God would blind his eyes and the goodness of God would freeze his heart. He would be out of his element, out of sympathy, a wretched misfit. Fire could not be more painful to sensitive flesh than would the holiness of the heavenly society be to his corrupt spirit. Happiness is harmony; misery is disharmony. The "prodigal son" could not endure his father's house.

But not only would a depraved taste render heavenly life insipid and intolerable to one introduced in an unsanctified condition into the family of God, but it would also insure his apostacy from his position in the family. "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh" is not only a law of Scripture but a doctrine of common experience. "A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit" is a dictum of our Lord. "A bitter fountain cannot send forth sweet water." A depraved heart is a corrupt tree, a bitter fountain. Out of such a heart would proceed all manner of evil words, unfilial feelings, disobedient conduct, infracting the discipline and peace of the heavenly family. An evil nature would operate in the surroundings of glory precisely as it does in the environment of earth. It is what is in a man that comes out of him; not that which is in his surroundings. The vicious character would be true to itself and insure banishment from the heavenly house just as it has secured expulsion from God's presence in this life.

These are truisms for a member of the family as well as for a member of the kingdom. They demand the office of sanctification for the son as imperatively as for the subject. Subjective evil must be purged away; meetness for fellowship in the house of God must be communicated that life in that circle may be congenial and blessed, secure and perpetual. A bare legal title would not be sufficient to attain the ends contemplated. It is conceivable that a child in human society may have, by the ordination of providence, the rights of a family, in which he is utterly incapable of appreciating the parents, whom he cannot love because his spirit is alien to

theirs, a home-life in law which is utterly irksome in fact, an estate for whose enjoyment he has not the faintest instinct, an inheritance for which he has no fitness. A legal right to cross a father's threshold and fitness of nature to dwell under his sacred roof are entirely distinct matters. The one may exist without the other.


"Meet for the saints' inheritance in light"—it is Adoption which creates the "inheritance" but it is Sanctification which creates "the meetness." This exactly differentiates the offices of these two graces in the scheme of grace. One terminates upon character and transmutes it into Christlikeness; the other terminates upon a relation to God and transforms it into a legal sonship. One transplants the sinner from the family of Satan into the family of God; the other fits him subjectively for genuine happiness in that relation. Sanctification makes a good son and Adoption makes a lawful son.

I have now compared Adoption with the other cardinal acts of saving grace for the purpose of showing its theological position and its definitive office in soteriology. It is the office of Regeneration to create, incipiently, a filial spirit; of Adoption, to convey filial rights. It is the office of Faith to receive, as an instrumental hand, those merits of the Saviour's mediation which constitutes the grounds of Adoption. It is the office of Justification to restore, indefectibly, a lost citizenship in the kingdom of God; of Adoption, to restore, immutably, a forfeited sonship in the house and family of God. It is the office of Sanctification to communicate meetness for sonship in the Father's home as well as fitness for membership in the Ruler's kingdom; of Adoption, to put into the hand indefeasible titles to the heavenly inheritance considered as a patrimony. It is therefore entitled to be considered as a distinct, co-ordinate, and glorious head in divinity. Three reasons support this decision.

1. It promotes clearness. Regeneration is a step in Sanctification, the initial step; yet it is distinguished from this great work of grace in the interest of a more crystal develop-

ment. Birth and growth are considered separately in nature, yet one is but the beginning of the other. Conscience may be regarded as an aspect of the reason, as it deals with moral matters, yet it is conducive to the science of ethics to treat it as a separate faculty. So, while Adoption coincides with regeneration at one point and with Justification at another and with Sanctification at another, all because the scheme of grace, however analyzed in thought, is in reality a unit, it is eminently helpful in the comprehension of the science of soteriology to regard it as a separate article in the Christian system. The articulation is primarily made for the sake of analytical convenience.

2. But there are real facts which require this articulation. The elements of redemption fall apart into two general classes—those which are external and objective in their natures and those which are internal and subjective in their natures; that is, those which being done for sinners affect their legal standing and those which being done in them affect their hearts and characters. The first group are symbolized in Scripture by Blood; the second group are symbolized by Water. A more exact statement of the case is this: (1) There are two changes made in the sinner's relations to God, made by Justification and Adoption, the one confirming them as members of the kingdom of God and the other confirming them as members of the family of God; and (2) there are two changes in their natures, effected by Regeneration and Sanctification, the one initiatory of a new life and the other gradually developing it into complete harmony with the character of God. The first are unified under the symbol of Blood; the second are unified under the symbol of Water. If the analysis is warranted with respect to the Water elements, it is likewise justified with respect to the Blood-elements. Theological science has long ago vindicated the distinction between Regeneration and Sanctification; a parallel distinction between Justification and Adoption ought to be recognized. The following tabular exhibition is offered for greater clearness.



3. Adoption deserves to be singled out as a special head in soteriology and not merged with other grand doctrines, because the filial relation is too conspicuous, too important and too precious to be sunk into a general consideration. It is an exhibition of unspeakable love for God to bring back man to himself a disobedient and run-away slave, but grace is magnified upon grace, and love is laid over upon love with more than a threefold thickness, when man as the child of sin and banishment is translated from the family of Satan into the family of God's dear Son and made an heir to a glory incorruptible, undefiled and that fades not away. The grace of Adoption deserves to be richly magnified by all those who glory in the achievements of divine grace.

CHAPTER XXIX.

“Good Works” in a Scheme of Grace

The Scriptures, throughout and persistently, distinguish between “works” and “grace.” They present us with two schemes of religion—the religion of “works” and the religion of “grace.” The generic form of all biblical religion is federal, and under this heading there are the two covenants—the Covenant of “Works” and the Covenant of “Grace.” Besides these two—“works” and “grace”—there is no third variety of religion discoverable in Divine Revelation.

A “work” is definable as anything done by man—no matter how large or small the deed nor whether it be a mental or a physical act. Of a “work” man is the efficient cause—no matter whether his causative power be regarded as primary or secondary, original or derived; that is, the source of his power, whether from within or from without, whether he is enabled by God or by circumstances, or by his own will—the origination of the power by which he performs the “work” does not enter into the account in such a manner as to change the definition. In a scheme of religion developed by “works” man is not a patient, acted upon, but an agent, acting, doing, performing; and it is immaterial to the definition whether he be thought of as a first cause or as a second cause in the acting, the doing or the performing. Adam ate the forbidden fruit; his eating was a “work,” a deed; the ability to eat was derived from the Creator. Our Lord obeyed the Moral Law in both its preceptive and penal demands; his conduct, *quoad hoc*, an atoning “work”; the power by which he obeyed was the result of his theanthropic constitution. A plowman follows his land, or a mason builds a stone wall, or a servant performs the task assigned by his master; all the strength, the intelligence, the energies, engaged in these labors are not originated by the workmen, but are traceable to the hand of their Maker; nevertheless, they are strictly and properly their “works.” It would obliterate the possibility of any “work,” of any kind

whatever, to describe it as a deed which an agent performs by virtue of a power which he has antecedently originated. All human power is created and dependent power. A "work" is any effect of human power.

A "grace," on the other hand, is a gift, without any reference whatever to the substance, the form, or the value of the gift. It may be material, like money; it may be mental, like intelligence; it may be spiritual, like faith and repentance. It may be given directly or indirectly, as when a donor places his benefaction with his own hand into the hand of the beneficiary, or sends his beneficence, as through the United States mail. A "grace" is a donation; neither the nature of the gift, nor the mode of making it, enters into the essence of the definition.

The benefits of religion are obtainable, theoretically speaking, in either of these modes—by a mode of "works" or by a mode of "grace." Money may be obtained *ex labore*, or *ex gratia*. If in the one way, it is a "wage;" if in the other way, it is a "present." The "wages of sin" and the "gift of God" is a biblical contrast. All the blessings of religion, summarily comprehended under the notion of heavenly happiness, are obtainable, abstractly speaking, in either way—*ex labore*, or *ex gratia*. Primarily they were offered as a "wage" to be earned; but man having failed in his task and so lost the promised reward, God was pleased to offer him the same blessings *ex gratia*, as gifts of His love instead of rewards for his service.

The Scriptures distinctly teach us that the relation between "works" and "grace" is a relation of contrast and opposition. They mutually exclude each other. If you hold your money *ex labore*, then your title in it is not *ex gratia*; and if you own it *ex gratia*, then you do not hold it *ex labore*. So if the benefits of religion are secured *ex labore*, then they are not obtainable *ex gratia*; and *vice versa*. "If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law" . . . (Gal. 3:21). "If righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain" . . . (Gal. 2:21). "Therefore by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight" . . . (Romans 3:20). Salvation, with all its contents, is by

"grace" because it could not be by "works." If it could have been by "works," then it would have been *ex labore* and not *ex gratia*. The human laborer has broken down; he has fallen by the way; if he ever reaches heaven, he must be carried to the skies, because he cannot walk. The relation between "works" and "grace" is not the relation of polarity, such as exists between positive and negative electricity; nor is it the relation of affinity, such as exists between water and quicklime; but it is the relation of opposition and exclusiveness, such as exists between light and darkness, life and death.

In the scheme of "works" man is an *agent*; in a scheme of "grace" he is a *patient*. In the one, he is a wage hand; in the other, he is a beneficiary. A saint, under the one scheme, would be self-made; a saint, under the other scheme, would be grace-made. One scheme provides for the justification of a righteous man, *ex labore*; the other provides for the justification of a sinner, *ex gratia*. Under both, the blessing, summarily described as heaven, is the same, but the subject is different under each; under the one he is active, and under the other he is passive, under the one he is innocent, and under the other he is guilty; under the one he is competent, and under the other he is incompetent. Under one scheme the mode of obtaining the blessing is *ex labore*; under the other, the mode is *ex gratia*. The two systems, therefore, cannot be conjointly operated. They mutually bar each other. If man has his career under one, he cannot have his career at the same time under the other.

But the Scriptures insistently require that the subject of "grace" shall also be a doer of "works." They pointedly press it upon believers that, "denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, they should live soberly and righteously and godly in this present world." "What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, to keep the commandments of the Lord, and his statutes, which I commanded thee this day for thy good?" . . . (Duet. 10:12). This programme of religious life contains a large schedule of obediences. James also laid down the maxim

in his practical epistles, "that faith without works is dead." . . . (James 2:20). It surpasses the wit of man to exclude "works" from that system of gracious religion which is inculcated in the Scriptures and preached by an evangelical pulpit.

The Antinomians, under the leadership of John Agricola (1538), standing upon the premise that "works" and "grace" are mutually exclusive, flatly denied that there was any logical place for "works" in a system of "grace," or that there was any practical utility in human obedience in the evangelical programme of the gospel. From this point of view the religion of "grace" is fairly resolvable into a religion of licentiousness. Libertinism, while not the historic result of Christianity, was, according to this party, clearly its logical consequence.

Arminians, ever on the alert to stingingly criticise their Calvinistic opponents, have zealously and persistently identified it with Antinomianism. Because the Gospel strenuously excludes "works" from the religion of "grace" they preposterously conclude that the Calvinistic interpretation of the scheme excludes all "works" from personal holiness. They concede that men do not gather grapes from bramble vines nor figs from thistle bushes, but they claim that they ought to do so. That is, Calvinism, while historically virtuous, ought to be vicious. The practical goodness and conscientious scrupulousness of Calvinistic lives are, Arminians being the judges, glorious inconsistencies.

These criticisms challenge the Calvinistic theology to find the place and to define the office of good "works" in a scheme of "grace." But the apologetic motive is not the whole reason, nor the main reason, why we should make these definitions and descriptions. The Scriptures present us a problem, and our love of truth and clearness and consistency unite in demanding that we meet it squarely and solve it truly. "Works" and "grace" are set forth in revelation as opposites, and we are distinctly taught that sinners are saved not *ex labore* but *ex gratia*. But we are also taught that Christians must "work" as well as "believe," must "do" as well as "receive." The problem is real and difficult. It has had a wide influence upon the history of doctrine, been a bone of contention among religious parties and a cause of dis-

turbance in the conscience of many Calvinists. What is the logical place of "works" in a system of "grace?" What is the office of good deeds in Christian life? What is the proper relation between Christian life and Christian conduct?

First. Human conduct plays no part in the Justification of the sinner.

Justification is a change in *status*. It is primarily *in foro Dei* and secondarily *in foro conscientiae*. The sinner as guilty is under proscription of the law and without civil standing in the magisterial favour of God. He has no legal rights and no standing in law. Justification repatriates him—conveys to him legal life and gives him footing in the rectoral regard of God. It removes the cloud from his title to citizenship, clears away all precariousness in law and registers the sinner as a member of the Divine Commonwealth in good and regular and indefeasible standing before God. The right to be redeemed must precede and condition the right of the Spirit to operate subjectively upon the character and behaviour of sinful men. A change in character and through character and, consequentially, a change in conduct, is the ultimate goal of all the schemes of gracious religion. The great desideratum is a good character and a good conduct—both a character and a conduct, each without blemish under the eagle eye of divine Justice. But antecedently, the legal right to produce these changes must be secured. The object of justification is to *entitle* the bad sinner to be made into a good saint.

Now in justification human conduct, or "works," can perform no part whatsoever, and for these reasons:

1. The Scriptures categorically teach us that "works" are excluded therefrom. "By the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight." That is a square denial that "deeds" can be employed in justification. But not only this negative; we are told pointblank that we are "justified by grace." This is clear: we are not justified by "works"—we are justified by "grace." The Pharisee and the Publican—in the

parable—are presented to us in the temple; both in quest of the same thing—justification; the Pharisee was a man of good character and of good behaviour—not extortionate, not unjust, not unclean, but scrupulous in moral behavior and punctilious in the discharge of religious duties; the Publican, on the contrary, was pictured as namelessly wicked—extortionate, unjust, adulterous, without conscience and without even the semblance of religion; yet the Publican was justified and the Pharisee condemned. If judgment had been rendered upon the ground of the relative decency and goodness of the two men, the Pharisee would have been justified and the Publican condemned; because the Pharisee was a better man than the Publican, according to all human standards. We are obliged to infer that human character and human conduct, according to our Gospel, play no part of any kind in justification. The best man is condemnable; the worst man is justifiable—upon what premise? Upon the premise that God pronounces the judgment of justification upon some other ground, upon some different data, than those presented by those with whom he deals. The judgment of justification has a basis; but the Gospel explicitly rules out of the count—throws out of Court—absolutely every fact which the sinner can present. “Works” are severely and rigorously excluded. “The thief on the cross” may be justified and the law-abiding and moral citizen and zealous churchman of Jerusalem may be damned. And upon what premise? Upon the premise that human conduct and human character—human “works” and human “deeds”—do not figure in such a transaction.

2. All human “works” are excluded from justification because that transaction is distinctly said to be based upon the “works” of Christ. We are justified either upon the ground of our own righteousness; or upon the ground of somebody else’s righteousness. These alternatives are exhaustive; no other supposition can be made. We are not justified upon the ground of our own “works” because we are pointedly told that we are justified upon the ground of the “works” of Christ. Two bodies cannot occupy the same point

in space at the same time. If the sinner is justified upon the ground of what Christ did, he is not justified upon the ground of what he himself does; and if he is justified upon the ground of what he himself does, he is not justified upon the ground of what Christ did. If we base our justification upon ourselves, we cannot base it upon Christ. One, or the other; it cannot be both. The "work" of Christ effectually displaces the "work" of man.

3. The "works" of man are entirely shut out from justification because they are always and inevitably more or less imperfect. That conduct which can be said to entitle a man to justification in a court of absolute intelligence and justice must be entirely free of the least flaw, because true judgment must be rendered according to the fact, and, if the subject is only relatively good judgment must be pronounced in accordance with that fact; that is, he could be only relatively justified. A course of human conduct to be absolutely good must be so from the beginning to the end; it must be marred neither by commissions nor by omissions; it must be both formally and materially good; it must be in accord with the demands of duty and it must spring from the proper motive. No course of human conduct is thus absolutely correct. At some time, at some point, there has been blunder or wrong; it is always qualified by the impurity of heart from which it issues, on the principle that the stream is like the fountain. Until perfectly sanctified and glorified, there is no human heart which is taintless. Human motive is always more or less compromised. With all the subjects of God's moral government possessed of hearts depraved in one degree or another, and with a Judge who always sees correctly and feels truly and pronounces exactly, any scheme of justification conditioned upon human conduct and human character must be purely theoretical and impracticable. The man has never lived since the fall of Adam who could comply with such conditions and meet such demands. All apparent cases of this kind in the Scriptures are hypothetical. All instances referred to in profane history are the creatures of imperfect

biography. "None are righteous; no, not one." There is no absolutely sinless human being, other than Jesus of Nazareth.

4. But grant, for argument's sake, the existence of an absolutely sinless man, still there is no promise of his justification. To justify is to terminate probation—to put an end to trial—to end all precariousness of moral standing—to confirm and to render indefectible in righteousness and holiness. The justification of an accused man in the civil court not only acquits him of the charges and dismisses him from the custody of the officers of the law, but it confirms him, *quoad hoc*, in his civil and political and social privileges—takes him out of jeopardy and puts him in security. The analogy holds with respect to justification *in foro Dei*. If therefore a man were born innocent, and continued sinless all his days in the earth, God has entered into no engagement to end his probation and confirm his standing at death, or after death. He would not be damnable as long as he was innocent and obedient, but there is no promise on the part of God, at some given moment, to take away from him the *potestas peccare*, the removal of which is the very essence of justification. The divine covenant with such a character is, "Do, and while you do, and only so long as you do, shall you live. Disobey, at one point, at any time, in all the stretch of your immortality, and that instant you are condemned, and you die." God's engagement with Adam was quite different. With him he entered into a covenant that if he would obey for a season and in respect to a particular matter, then the Maker would sovereignly put an end to probation and terminate the possibility of falling. That arrangement was made with Adam only, but with no other member of the human family. Consequently, if one could live up to and through death a sinless being, he would die without the promise that death would be the *mordant* of his probation—the annihilation of the *potestas peccare*. This conception of the case excludes "works" from justification.

5. There is another idea that is effective in excluding "works" from all place and all influence in the justification of sinners. Before a man can earn wages *ex labore* he must have *right to work*. It is not every laborer in the country who is permitted at

his own option to become a workman upon any "job." He must antecedently be employed, engaged, authorized. Before the laborers could work in the vineyard, it was necessary that the landlord "hire" them. Before a sinner can lawfully set out to "work" out his salvation, he must be engaged to that end by the divine Master. This is precisely what is done in justification—it puts into a sinner's hand the legal authority to become God's workman. It follows, therefore, that justification must precede all "doing" and condition its very legality, and it cannot, consequently, come after "works" and be conditioned upon deed and behaviour. This is a point too frequently overlooked. The right to "work" is not one which every man possesses *ex natura*, by virtue of his creaturehood. He has forfeited that right by sinning—his infidelity to trust, his incompetency, his bad-heartedness have caused his discharge from his Master's service. He stands before God a dishonored, a discredited, a dismissed servant. He can get employment only at the Master's will. He is out of favor with that Employer. Justification reinstates him in the good-will of God as his Lord and Master. It must precede and condition "works."

These arguments are adequate to support the proposition that human "works," whatever their nature or quality, have absolutely no place in a scheme of justification by "grace." Consequently, God, in justifying sinners, completely ignores human character and conduct. The record neither of the best nor of the worst of men receives as much as a passing notice. His justification of sinners is purely and solely *ex gratia*. In his Court the most moral and the most debased are on an equal footing where all are guilty sinners.

According to the Pelagian, Rationalistic, or Ethical gospel God justifies men upon the ground of their character and conduct; what men are, and what they do, determines the judgments upon them. Human "works" are introduced as the ground of justification in such a manner as to exclude "grace" in reality, however it may be given a verbal place in the system. The moral gospel fairly issues in a scheme of justification *ex labore*.

According to Arminians, Semi-Pelagians, and all Neonomians, "works" are first transmuted into "gracious works" and then made the grounds of justification. This transmutation is effected in a very sophistical manner. The fallen will, *ex natura*, is impotent, but "grace" potentiates it, and then it "works," and the products are denominated "gracious works. Thus the scheme of "grace" rehabilitates the scheme of "works" and fuses with it. The relation, then, between "works" and "grace" is not the relation of opposition, but the relation rather of affinity, like the relation of oxygen and hydrogen which yearn for each other. The high purpose of "grace" is not to save, but to enable the sinner to save himself. "Evangelical obedience," rather than the obedience of Christ, becomes the *raison d'être* of redemption. Justification, in this view, is *ex gratia et ex labore*. This solves the problem concerning "works" by raising a harder question concerning "grace." This solution is destroyed by the text, "And if by grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be by works, then it is no more grace; otherwise work is no more work."... (Romans 11:16). Men impose upon their own minds when they preach salvation by "grace," and then explain "grace" to be equivalent to "gracious works." A truer representation of such a gospel would be, we are saved by "works," but these "works" are not natural "works" but "gracious works." It would then be necessary to define a "work" as something done by man and "grace" as a power which enables him to do something and a "grace" as a "something done by grace." This explanation makes "grace to be no more "grace," but a species of "work."

The Romish party grapples with our problem and seeks to solve the difficulty by distinguishing between two sorts of justification—*justificatio prima*, and *justificatio secunda*. The first justification is *ex gratia*, in ecclesiastical baptism; the second justification is *ex labore*, in obedience to ecclesiastical law. "Works" cannot wipe out original guilt; that must be done by "grace," but "works" must atone for and cancel post-baptismal sins. In this scheme "grace" gives an ecclesiastical status; and individual "works" perfect the life of that standing. "Works"

and "grace," consequently, are not mutually exclusive, but combine—"grace" producing the first justification and "works" the second justification. But in the Scriptures, "Being justified freely by his grace," is synonymous with "being justified by faith without the deeds of the law." (Romans 3:28.)

It is left, therefore, for the Calvinistic soteriology to maintain the Scripture doctrine that "works" of every kind—whether "natural," or "gracious," or "ecclesiastical"—are excluded from every place and from all influence in the justification of sinners. Whatever may be the position and use of "good works" in the plan of salvation, the Calvinistic soteriology insists that they have absolutely nothing to do with justification.

Second: *Works are as rigidly excluded from sanctification as they are from justification. Whatever may be their office in a system of "grace," they do not sanctify sinful life.*

The superlative desideratum of all religion—the *terminus ad quem* of all its operation—is *Conduct*. To obtain this result—correct behaviour—is the proximate final cause of all divine revelation and of all divine institutions. This is the object upon which the heart of God is set. At the close of the wondrous march of his providence over men and angels of which the Bible traces his footsteps—as the consummation of his manifold dealings with his intelligent creatures of all kinds—by much sacrifice and long waiting—as the final triumph of "grace"—God writes over the doorway of heaven, "And his servants shall serve him" ... (Revelation 22:3). These words express the divine satisfaction with the work of his gracious hands. They remind us of those laudatory words which he uttered when he beheld the primal creation of his power, and declared all to be "very good." As he contemplates the white-robed multitude whom he has gathered by "grace" out of the nations of the earth, engaged in the solemnities and delights of heavenly worship, he seems to cry out in the exultation of achieved purpose and in the infinitude of satisfaction, "Now they are forever obedient and well-behaved." If the chiefest end of

God in all gracious operations among men is the glorification of his perfections, the next highest end is such human conduct as will delight his heart.

To achieve this end—to realize a human Conduct which shall be perfectly satisfactory to the Deity—there are two pre-conditions which are indispensably necessary: (1) a *right* to “work” and (2) a *heart* to “work.” A workman who has not been authorized to do what he does is an offensive intruder; and a workman who has been formally engaged, but is bad-spirited—having no sympathy with his Master, no appreciation of his purposes and aims, no zeal for success, no devotion to the enterprise, no congeniality with the task—who finds his duties to be drudgeries, his orders irksome, his position galling, his appetencies aversions, his heart bitter and antagonistic—such a workman would be a nuisance. To manage such a crew of laborers, God must needs convert himself into an Egyptian task-master or into an offensive slave-driver. To obtain satisfactory service, God must either convert himself into an offensive character, or he must convert the sinner into an agreeable and harmonizing laborer. The Scriptures show us that the change will be made in the servant and not in the Master.

Justification gives the sinner the *right* to “work”; Sanctification gives him the *heart* to “work.” As a sinner he is a discharged servant and an ill-natured creature, possessing neither the privileges nor the fitness for service in the employment of God. Justification gives him a new *status*; Sanctification gives him a new *habitus*. Legal right is the grant of one; moral character is the benediction of the other. One defines a title to service; the other the quality of service. Both are indispensably necessary. Neither is *ex labore*; both are *ex gratia*. Neither the right nor the spirit of a satisfactory workman is communicated by “works”; both are imparted by “grace.”

That Sanctification is *ex gratia* and not *ex labore* is proved by the following arguments:

1. The Scriptures explicitly so teach. One group of texts represent the Father as the author of sanctification. “The very God of peace sanctify you wholly”... (1 Thess. 5:23). “The God

of peace.....make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ.”.....(Heb. 13:20, 21). According to these statements, the worker in sanctification is God, and the subject worked upon is man. Another group of texts teach us that it is the Son of God who is the efficient cause of the purification of the Christian heart. “That he (Christ) might sanctify and cleanse it (the Church) with the washing of water by the word, that he might present it unto himself a glorious Church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish”....(Eph. 5:26, 27). “Our Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works.” .. (Titus 2:13, 14). A third group of passages represent the Holy Spirit of God as the sanctifying efficient. “But ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God”....(1 Cor. 6:11). “God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth”....(2 Thess. 2:13). There is not a fourth group predicating of man that he is the efficient agent of his own sanctification. Instead, therefore, of working himself into a good character—instead of “living down” the bad reputation he has made before God, men and angels—this character and good name are wrought in him by the Triune God.

2. Instead of character being the product of conduct, conduct is the product of character—character is cause and conduct is effect. This is Scripture and common sense. The vine makes the grapes; not the grapes the vine. The tree qualifies the fruit; not the fruit the tree. Out of the heart are the issues of life; not the heart out of the issues of life. As a man thinketh in his heart so is he; not that deeds produce thoughts. Purpose is the matrix of acts; not acts the matrix of purpose. “Grace” is the cause of “works”; not “works” the cause of “grace.” Men do good because they are good; they are not made good by doing good. “Grace” is the genesis of character; character is the genesis of

conduct. Nothing but confusion and illogical absurdity can result from reversing the order—"Practice makes perfect"—is true in the realm of Providence, but it is an abounding heresy in the realm of "grace." By judicious exercise, physical manhood may be developed to its highest possible perfection, but a sinner could never exercise himself into a saint. By the indulgence of appetite habit may be established, but by indulging ourselves with persistence and abandon in holy exercises we could never acquire a settled character of holiness. The article is not made in this mode—*non ex labore, sed ex gratia*.

3. But if good character were producible by good behaviour as an original proposition, such a method would not be available for sinners. All their "works" are more or less bad; and if character must be generated by "works," then we would have the illogical process of producing a perfect effect by an imperfect cause. The effect can never be greater or better than the cause. An eternal series of imperfect acts could not issue in a perfect character. If a thorn-bush should bear figs for a hundred centuries, it would still be a thorn-bush. If a man performed the acts of an angel for a million of years, he would not transmute his species or change his identity. Character lies below conduct and is not within the reach of conduct; how much more does it lie below the range and influence of imperfect conduct? The sinner cannot be transformed into a saint *ex labore*; because the imperfect could not, in an eternity of effort, evolve the perfect. Species are immutable; "Like begets like"; nature is uniform; everything after its own kind. To change the genesis, the supernatural must be invoked. A sinner can be altered into a saint *ex gratia*, but never *ex labore*. When cabbages can bear carrots, or tadpoles breed men, then—but not until then, when all nature has reversed itself—can sinners evolve themselves into saints. No bad man can ever make himself a good man by practising religious duties.

4. That character cannot be produced by conduct—that sanctification cannot be by "works"—is further proved by the fact that, if it were so originated, it would be intrinsically meritorious and bring God under obligation to man. The hypothesis

supposes man—a sinful man at that—to be a creator—a creator of character, of a holy character, the sublimest product of all creative energy, overtopping in importance and glory all suns and moons and stars as specimens of creative taste and power. No sinless creature, and particularly no sinful creature, can possibly merit anything of its Maker. Says Dr. Thornwell, “The source of the error in many minds is the unfounded notion that grace is whatever is opposed to merit. They judge of the former by comparing it with the latter, and hence they suppose that they are contending for salvation by grace when they are only denying salvation by merit. According to the conception which we usually frame of merit in our intercourse with one another, it is impossible that a man can deserve anything at the hands of his Maker. Wrapped in the blessedness and immensity of His own nature, the Eternal Jehovah stands in no need of any services from us, and our constant dependence upon His benevolence and bounty for all the blessings which we enjoy renders our holiest obedience nothing more than a suitable expression of gratitude. We only give Him of His own. The purest angels that surround His throne strictly and properly speaking deserve nothing at His hands; their joy and blessedness are nothing but the results of unrestrained loving-kindness on His part. To suppose that a man can merit any of the blessings of God is just to suppose that the obedience of men is a full equivalent for the favor of his Creator—that it constitutes a value received, an actual benefit, which God is under a moral obligation to acknowledge. If grace, then, is only that which is opposed to merit, such a thing as salvation by grace in distinction from any other scheme is utterly impossible. The necessary relations subsisting between the creature and the Creator preclude forever, even from the holiest, the most remote approximations to merit. Hence every scheme of justification would stand upon the same footing upon the score of *grace*, and one could no more be said to be of grace than another. If Adam had kept his first estate, and secured the fulfillment of the promise to him and his posterity, he would have been just as far from *meriting* eternal life as the sinner redeemed by Christ, and, consequently, according to this absurd conception of the matter,

would have been just as much saved by grace. We are not, then, to look into the antithesis of *merit* for just conceptions of grace. The Scriptures nowhere speak of the merit of the creature. This idea, unknown to the holy and the good, is to be found only in the hearts of the ruined and the lost. Its only lodgment is in that cage of unclean birds, the unsanctified heart of man. Strange that the wretch who is so far from God, who is dead in trespasses and sins, should enhance his guilt by inflated conceptions of his worth!" . . . (Collected Writings, Vol. 2, page 391). Holiness is the most precious and priceless thing in the annals of time or in the records of eternity; it is worth more than all the gold of Egypt, than all of the gold of the world, than all suns, moons, stars and planets; it is the essence of God's own moral character and that which is appraised at an infinite maximum. If, therefore, a creature could by a course of conduct, condensed or long-drawn, made up of a few or of a multitude of "good works," build up a character of holiness, he would lay before the Almighty that which had intrinsic merit and stand in his presence, not as a suppliant, but as a demandant. Such an issue is preposterous in the extreme, and exhibits the fact that a holy and a sanctified character cannot be developed *ex labore*, but must be given *ex gratia*.

God's desire, then, is for a Christian conduct which shall be at once spontaneous and inerrant—a life of obedience which is intelligent, holy and satisfactory to all his perfections; and for workmen who need no overseers, and inspectors who need no orders and no stimulations and no disciplines, whose "works" are without flaw and superior to criticism, whom he need never scold nor reproach, who "work" with joy and achieve without blemish—workmen who are a delight to his eye and a perfect satisfaction to his heart. This is the goal of gracious administrations. Such workmen must be (1) clothed with the *right* to labor in God's kingdom and (2) imbued with the *spirit* of his service. Neither is obtainable *ex labore*—by working no man can create the right to "work" and by working no man can create the heart to "work." Both the right and the heart are created *ex gratia*—by "grace" a man is given the title of a ser-

vant of God, and by "grace" man is given the spirit and disposition of a servant of God. Whatever position, therefore, which may be assigned to "good works," they are excluded from both justification and sanctification. They are available neither for the one nor for the other. Sinners are not justified by "works," neither are they sanctified by "works." In soteriology "grace" is the only active principle. In all the applications of the Gospel to sinful men from regeneration to heavenly glorification God is agent and man is patient. It is a system neither of human monergism nor of divine-human synergism.

I am logically obliged to combat the popular error which prescribes a system of spiritual gymnastics as a ritual for sanctification—that magnifies the reflex influence of the exercise of the virtues of religion into transformations of subjective character—that recommends to the world to make itself better by doing better. The end proposed can never be achieved in this manner. The exercise of godliness is right and proper, but it is at once grossly misleading and humiliating to give a utilitarian basis to the entire precept of gracious religion. Sinners ought to obey God, but not for the sake of the dowry of a good character supposed to result therefrom. The center—the heart—can never be reached from the circumference—the conduct. The inside of the platter cannot be cleansed by washing the outside of the vessel. The dead in the sepulchre can never be quickened by white-washing the outside of the tomb. The whole process is wrong. God works from the center towards the circumference, from the inside to the outside of life. Hence a ritual of "good works" as a prescription for a sanctified life is preposterous.

That, too, is an error which grounds justification in the federal righteousness of Christ and sanctification in the personal righteousness of the believer. This is using the "work" of Christ to account for man's *title* to be a servant of God, but the believer's "work" to account for the origin of his *fitness* to be the servant of God. His *right* to serve God rises out of the *imputation* of the righteousness of Christ, and his *fitness* to serve his Master springs out of the *infusion* of that righteousness. That is, the disciple is Christianized both externally and internally—

both legally and morally. Christ does something *for* him—places in his hand the warrant to “work” in God’s vineyard. He also does something *in* him—puts into his heart the spirit to “work” in God’s vineyard. It is incorrect, therefore, to represent justification as a federal benefit and sanctification as a personal blessing. Both are from Christ; both are *ex gratia*.

It is also a grievous error to represent the means of grace—such as the Word, the Sacraments and Prayer—as sanctifying *ex opere operato*. Fire burns *ex opere operato*; water quenches thirst *ex opere operato*; the magnet attracts the iron filings *ex opere operato*. But plowing corn does not make it grow *ex opere operato*; the carpenter’s tools do not cut wood *ex opere operato*; leading a horse to the trough does not make him drink *ex opere operato*. We must distinguish between the efficient and the instrumental cause—the *causa qua* and the *causa sine qua non*. Second causes do their “work” by virtue of the power which is inherent in them—that is, *ex opere operato*; but they are not independent of conditions and opportunities. The cultivation of the corn is a means by which the forces of nature cause it to grow; casting fuel on the fire is an instrumentality by which the caloric consumes. The wheels, the bands, and the pulleys are the machinery upon which the power of water depends for grinding the corn in the mill. By using the Word of God, the Sacraments of the Church and Prayer we subject our souls to that discipline which the Spirit of God may use as an occasion to improve our piety—but they are *means*, while he is the exclusive *cause* of all advancement in goodness. “Works,” therefore, may become the occasion of “grace,” but they cannot supplant it. In doing good the Spirit of God may make the soul better, but it is not the doing of good which makes the soul good. The Fourth of July may be the occasion for patriotic demonstrations by the American citizens, but that day is not the cause of patriotism in the heart. Its utter obliteration from the history and the life of the American people, so that it would have no distinctive meaning to them, would be obliteration of all those patriotic phenomena which mark that period of jubilation. So, the obliteration of the Bible, the Sacraments and Prayer, would be the

removal of those occasions which the Spirit employs to quicken religious virtue in the soul, and would be a tragedy in Christian life. But it is not man working with these tools—the Word, the Sacraments and Prayer—which makes him a good man; on the contrary, it is the Spirit of God who uses them to benefit believers. They are to be described, therefore, not as *means of "work,"* but as *means of "grace."* It turns out, finally, that there is in the scheme of "grace" not so much as any means or tools of "work."

So far as justifying yourself before God, and showing that you ought not to have been discharged from his service, or in showing that, being discharged, you ought to be reinstated in his employment, your mouth is stopped and you are a deaf and dumb and blind paralytic; and, if you labored at the problem with the persistence of the fabled Sisypheus, trying to roll the stone up the hill, your toil would meet with the same tragic failure, for God holds out no promise to justify any sinner *ex labore*. And so far as sanctifying yourself is concerned, endeavoring to make your character fit for the service of God so that you would be a workman in whom his work could rest with complacential delight, if you piled good deed on top of good deed, as the ancients piled Pelion on Ossa, you could never, by the very weight and multitude of your "good works" press the unfitness out of your heart and press fitness into it, for God holds out no engagement to sanctify *ex labore*.

Third: "*Good Works*" graduate the Judgments of God.

My conclusions, down to this point in the reasoning is that sinners are justified and sanctified *ex gratia* in order that they may perform "good works." Faultless Christian conduct is the end, the goal, of all God's gracious operations upon the relations and upon the hearts of men. Justification and sanctification are preparatory to obedience—the one conveying to the sinner the legal right to obey and the other conveying to him the spirit and the temper of obedience. Hence "grace" is in order to "works." "Grace" is means; "works" the end. "Grace" is

cause; "works" are effect. This is precisely the conclusion of James: "A man may say, thou hast faith, and I have works; show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works." . . . (James 2:18). It is also the conclusion of Paul when he contracts "the works of the flesh with "the fruits of the Spirit" . . . (Gal. 5:19-22). It is also the doctrine of our Saviour when he says, "Every branch in me that beareth not fruit he taketh away; and every branch that beareth fruit, he purgeth it, that it may bring forth more fruit." . . . (John 15:2). "Grace" precedes "works" as the "vine" precedes the "branch." "Grace" causes the "works" as the vine causes the grapes. The purpose of "grace" is to give the tree the right to bear good fruit and the power to bear good fruit. "Grace" restores the dismissed servant to the employment of the divine Master, and creates within him a heart fully congenial with his employment. The religion of "grace" is in order to a religion of "works." It is *ex gratia* that it may become *ex labore*. In heaven, "his servants shall serve him"—this is the Apocalyptic vision of the consummation of the scheme of "grace."

"Works," then, are the ground of final judgment. This is their precise, their exact function. They condition the judgments which God will pass upon men at the last day. It is easy to support this proposition from the Scriptures. "Wherefore we labor, that whether present or absent, we may be accepted of him. For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." . . . (2 Cor. 5:9, 10). Paul here says "we labor that we may be accepted"; and that we shall be "judged according to that which we have done." Judgment, unlike justification and sanctification, is not *ex gratia*, but *ex labore*. "God; who will render to every man according to his deeds; to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life; but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil." . . . (Romans 2:6-9). The generic principle is, "To every

man according to his deeds"; specifically, "To those who seek, eternal life; but to those who "obey not, indignation and wrath." There can be no debate here as to the position "works" will occupy in the final distribution of the awards of destiny.—"Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." . . . (Gal. 6:6). The "harvest," if we can accept this great announcement, will not be *ex gratia*, but *ex labore*. "With good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to man, knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free." . . . (Eph. 6:7, 8). Here again our doctrine is unequivocal—"whatsoever good thing any man doeth" shall be fairly acknowledged by the Lord. "Whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men: Knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance; for ye serve the Lord Christ. But he that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong that he hath done; and there is no respect of persons." . . . (Col. 3:23-25). Here is an abounding exhortation to "do," and "the reward of the inheritance" is made to hang on the character of the deeds; "and there is no respect of persons." The final reward and the final condemnation are not therefore *ex gratia*, but *ex labore*. "Behold, I come quickly; and my reward is with me, to give every man according as his work shall be." . . . (Rev. 22:21). This verse is in the last chapter of God's communication to men. It tells the earth that the Second Advent of Christ is impending; and that when the momentous event, now swelling in the bosom of eternity, breaks into historic fact, the Saviour will distribute to "every man according as his work shall be." There remains to be added to complete the induction the scenic passage which our Lord himself drew of the last judgment in which he adopted "works" as the principle of division, and with it separated the nations of the earth into "sheep" and "goats," the former on his "right hand" and the latter on his "left hand," and according to their deeds admitted the "sheep" into "life eternal," and dismissed the "goats" into "everlasting punishment." This completes the biblical proof of the doctrine that the final judgment is according to human "works." God's

wrath and God's favor are measured to men according to the moral quality of their *deeds*. He judges them not *ex gratia*, but *ex labore*—not according to his love, but according to their labors. They will be judged out of "the books" which contain the story of their earthly lives, and according to the contents of those volumes—the heathen according to his biography, and the Christian according to his biography, and the infant according to his biography; there is "no respect of persons," and there is no fact, however insignificant or however important, which will be overslaughed; and there will be no overestimating and no underestimating of a solitary item in the history of any human being. Omniscience will parole the facts, and Justice will hold the scales, and Grace will not so much as be present in the Court-room, and Mercy will retire into the bosom of God without a plea on her lips or a tear in her eye. Grace and Mercy will have finished their career with men and will not so much as appear upon the scene. Omniscience and Justice will rule that hour—the one to obtain the facts and the other to mete out the deserts.

The rule of this judgment will be the law—the Moral Law—and not the Gospel. The question as to whether those at the bar have accepted or rejected Christ will not so much as be raised. The solitary fact to be determined will be whether those who have been arraigned are or are not in conformity with the law of God, and the further question as to the extent of their agreement with it or departure from it. Omniscience will detect the facts and Justice will render judgment with absolute equity, neither in excess nor in diminution of the moral deserts of each individual. All will be done with such absolute exactitude that every mouth will be stopped and every tongue be dumb, and the righteousness of God be universally confessed. The Gospel will not supplant the Law, in that judicial proceeding, else would those who never had the Gospel have reason to complain; but each will be dealt with according to the facts in his own biography—those who had the Law written on their consciences as men who had not the written Law, and those who had the written Law in addition to conscience, as men who had the written Law, and those who had not the Gospel as men who had not the Gospel,

and those who had the Gospel as men who had the Gospel, and those who were infants as infants, and those who were idiots as idiots, and those who were responsible as those who were responsible, and those who sinned much as those who sinned much, and those who sinned little as those who sinned little, and those who did few good works as those who did few good works, and those whose days abounded in good deeds as those who abounded in good deeds, and those who were murderers as murderers, and those who were thieves as thieves, and those who were adulterers as adulterers, and those who were penitents as penitents, and those who were believers as believers, and those who were the children of God as the children of God, and those who were the children of the Devil as the children of the Devil—every man without discrimination and without partiality according to his “works,” according to the facts which are contained in his life-record. Who can complain? The righteousness of God will be universally confessed. Many will bewail their record and wish that the mountains and the rocks might fall on them; but they will enter no protest against the equity of their judgment. Many will rejoice that their record is as it is, and will break the silence of heaven with congratulatory hallelujahs. The Gospel is not the rule of judgment; it is remedial in its nature; it prepares those who accept it to meet with joy and triumph the challenges of the Law. It repeals no statute; it modifies no precept; it sets aside no command; it relieves from no duty; it mitigates no demands; it makes nothing easier. Its sphere is not the Law, but facts. It alters the contents of the human biography of those who accept it, but it makes no change in the rule under which man will be tried. All will be tried upon the same footing under that Law which is summarily comprehended in the Ten Commandments; but ere that day dawns, Grace and Mercy will have imported the facts of justification and sanctification into the lives of the elect; and may consequently retire from the judicial scene knowing it shall be well with all those who were “chosen in Christ Jesus before the foundation of the world,” and who were in time and *ex gratia* justified and sanctified.

If sinners are justified by "grace" without "works," how can they be judged by "works" without "grace?" This is the problem. Both facts are taught beyond question in the Scriptures—the fact that sinners are justified by "grace" and the fact that they are judged by "works." The Bible seems to persistently discredit, deny, and denounce those very "works" which will become the very basis upon which God will at last make the awards of destiny. Here they are worth nothing; there they are worth everything. How can man be saved under a scheme of "grace" and be finally judged under a scheme of "works?" How can Christian life be made up *ex gratia*, and then be pronounced upon as *ex labore*.

1. This perplexing problem is by some pronounced insoluble and relegated to the same category as that concerning divine sovereignty and human free agency. We are quietly told that we must be justified and sanctified by "grace" in order to meet with divine acceptance; and then we are told in the same breath that we must "work" the works of God to be acquitted in the day of Judgment; and when we ask, why the two contradictory precepts? we are told that no man can answer; and exhorted to wait in patience until the day of judgment and the future revelation of God. There is a "needs be" for both "grace" and "works"—but the relation between the two is thought to be indefinable. Such an answer may satisfy piety, but it does not satisfy intelligence.

2. The favorite mode of solving our problem adopted by Anti-Augustinian theologians is to distribute salvation as a whole between "grace" and "works," and represent some factors as the contribution of "grace," and some other factors to be the contribution of "works," so that the final result is the joint product of "grace" and "works." If this were a correct exposition of the matter, then sinners would be saved neither by "grace" nor by "works," but by *both*. This evades the difficulty without answering it. The Scriptures categorically teach us that we are saved by *grace without works*, and just as categorically teach us that we are judged by *works without grace*. Neither expression can be explained by constituting some sort of partnership between "grace" and "works" and conceiving of them as the concauses

of the effect. According to Romanism "Grace" is effective up to baptism; at which point "works" take up the story of personal salvation and carry it on to the day of Jesus Christ. According to Arminians, "grace" deals with original sin and its consequences, carrying them away from penitent believers, at which point "works" called "evangelical" take up the issue and complete it fully and finally. So that there is a kind of partitioning and prorating of redemptive facts and experiences between "grace" on the one hand and "works" on the other. The results, then, cannot be fairly said to be of either, but must be credited to both in common. Then the judgment ought to be according to "grace and works," whereas it is always said to be according to "works" only. One of the partners in the achievement ought not to be eliminated from the judgment.

3. It is quite popular at the present time with certain theological expositors to draw a distinction between a "legal judgment" and a "gracious judgment." This distinction is yielded and made logically necessary by the fundamental conception of God as love. A "legal judgment" is one in which God as a Judge pronounces upon the conduct of men in the light of the Moral Law according to a strict and an exact Justice. A "gracious judgment" is one in which God as a Father pronounces upon the conduct of men according to the Gospel in accordance with a true and tender paternal Love. In the one Justice is on the bench; in the other Love is the presiding genius. In the one the Moral Law is the statute under which the cause is tried; in the other the Gospel is the precept which must be applied to the entire issue. One is the verdict of a Court of Law; the other is a verdict of a Court of Love. One is the process of Judaism; the other is a process of Christianity. "Grace" brings suit in the Court of Love; "works" bring suit in the Court of Law; "grace" wins; "works" lose. The purpose of the Gospel was to supersede the Law—to change venue—to take the sinner's case out of the Court of Law and issue it in the Court of Love. Hence the conclusion—Salvation is *ex gratia* in order that judgment may not be *ex labore*.

This distinction, made by Baur, Pfleiderer, Reuss, Weiss and others, is well set forth by Stevens in these words: "There can be no reasonable doubt that the Apostle has retained, in regard to the judgment, Jewish phraseology which belongs to the scheme of debt and works that he so energetically rejected and opposed; in other words, he did not extend the application of the terminology of his doctrine of grace and faith to that subject. The principles of his system obviously require a distinction to be made between the basis of judgment for such as refuse God's grace and insist upon standing upon a plane of law and works, and for those who renounce all claims to merit and accept the gracious salvation through faith. The principles of equivalence can apply only to the former class, because they adhere to the sphere of law, and make their claim upon the work-and-wages principle. But Paul teaches that on this basis there can be no acceptance with God, because no one can furnish proof of the requisite obedience to the divine requirements. Salvation is obtainable only on the principle of a gracious concession on God's part toward sinful men. This is the ground of their acceptance in justification, and must equally be the basis of their final acceptance in the judgment." . . . (Pauline Theology, page 362).

But the Scriptures do not divide the human race into two classes—and then judge one class according to "grace," and the other class according to "works." All classes, without any distinction whatsoever, are judged according to their "works," and no human being of any class is said to be judged by "grace." If this be the basis of divine judgment, then how shall those heathen, who never had so much as a chance to accept the scheme of "grace" be judged? Not by "grace" because they have never heard of "grace;" not by "works," because their "works" being bad would damn them all—a consequence these expositors are zealous not to allow to overtake the heathen world. Then there would be no possible vindication of the justice and fairness of that proceeding in Court which makes "concessions" to some sinful men which are not made to other sinful men; there would be no semblance of equity in trying one sinner by love and an-

other sinner by law, for the sinner that would be damnable by law would be salvable by love, and the sinner that was salvable by love would be damnable by law; that is, "grace" would acquit in the day of judgment and "works" would damn in the day of judgment. Such is not the problem; the question is, how is it that "grace" without "works" justifies, while "works without grace" acquits? The fact is not as stated, namely—that "grace" acquits one "class" in judgment, while "works" condemn another "class" in judgment—but, on the contrary, the fact is that "grace" does not appear at all in the judgment, and nothing enters into the reckoning but "works" only. There is no such concept in the Scriptures as a "gracious judgment," and, if there were, it would be utterly inexplicable how such an adjective and such a noun could be yoked together. What would be thought of the human court which would pronounce "gracious judgments" upon one class of criminals, as a result laying in their hands most priceless privileges, and then pronounce "legal judgment" upon another class of criminals, and as a result incarcerating them in the penitentiary for life? The so-called "gracious judgment" would be absolutely and atrociously illegal and immoral. Our Calvinism never went into court to ask for judgment for our client by concessions and favor and for judgment against the remainder of the world by fact and law!

According to this party salvation is ex gratia in order that judgment may not be *ex labore*. "It follows that all judgment is Christian judgment. Paul does, it is true, give an exposition of judgment upon a basis of nature showing that God will according to his works judge every man (Romans 2:1-16), but this is for the purpose of proving that God has placed all men upon a new basis of grace on the ground of Christ's atonement, and that the benefits of the Saviour's redemptive work are freely offered to all who will accept them. He makes the results of Christ's work co-extensive with the evils of the fall (Romans 5:12-21). We have, therefore, reason to believe that no man will be judged upon a basis of pure nature, but that all will receive the benefit of Christ's work. This is the ground of our hope in the salvation of those heathen who have not rejected the light

God has given them. They will be judged according to Christ, and their potential and imperfect faith will for his sake be counted to them for righteousness. And as this principle of Christian judgment will inure to the benefit of all those who have known Christ in this world, so it will enhance the condemnation of those, who having known of Christ, have rejected him." (Present Day Theology, by Stearns, page 527).

Here, again, is the distinction between a *natural* and a *Christian* judgment. The basis of the natural judgment is said to be "works"; of the Christian judgment "grace." All men are represented as having been removed from under natural judgment by Christ, and given a common standing under Christian judgment.

4. The Calvinistic proposition is that we are saved by "grace" in order that we may be judged by "works." The purpose of a scheme of "grace" is not to supplant the scheme of "works," as one party incorrectly teaches; nor is it the purpose of a scheme of "grace" to supplement a scheme of "works," as another party vainly teaches; nor is it the purpose of a scheme of "grace" to make possible a scheme of "works," as others falsely teach; but it is the purpose of a scheme of "grace" to translate into fact the scheme of "works." Sinners are justified and sanctified *ex gratia* in order that they may be judged *ex labore*. "Grace" prepares the Christian to stand a judgment based upon "works"—it is his propaedeutic for that great and notable day which marks final assignment to heaven or hell.

All God's judgments, whether commendatory or condemnatory, will be based upon the conduct, the deeds, the behaviour, the life, the "works," of men; the inventory will be made by Omniscience, and will, consequently, be absolutely and infallibly complete; Justice will weigh all with inerrant accuracy, and apportion reward and punishment with absolute exactitude and perfect equality.

That all sins are not equal in their turpitude and guilt is at once a doctrine of common sense and of Scripture. To say that there is as much malignity in a foolish jest as there is in a vile slander, that an angry word is as heinous as a cold blooded

murder, that the theft of a farthing is equal in quality to the theft of chastity, is to contradict and outrage the moral sentiments of mankind. All sins are *equally* sin, but all sins are not *equal* sins. The adverb predicates quality—the adjective degree. All poisons are equally poison, but all poisons are not equal poisons—prussic acid is more deadly than nicotine.

That we may truly use the adjectives greater and less in connection with guilt, the Scriptures clearly warrant. Bethsaida and Capernaum had accumulated a greater guilt than Sodom and Gomorrah. "That servant which knew his Lord's will and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more." . . (Luke 12:47, 48). "He that despised Moses' law, died without mercy under two or three witnesses; of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace?" . . . (Hebrew 10:28, 29). "All transgressions of the law of God are not equally heinous, but some sins in themselves, and by reason of several aggravations, are more heinous in the sight of God than others." . . . (Larger Catechism).

As evil "works" differ in the degree of their reprehensibleness, so "good works" differ in the degree of their virtue. To say that it is as virtuous to save a drowning dog as to save a drowning patriot, or that it is as commendable to feed a starving criminal as to feed a starving saint, or that it is as praiseworthy for the same man to build a cabin as to build a hospital—to say that all deeds are of the same rank in their benevolent quality is to shock and outrage the common conscience of the race and to obliterate distinctions which men know to exist. Nothing can be gained by so leveling an extravagance. The widow who cast her "mite" into the treasury cast in "more" than all. The Word of God exhorts Christians to "abound" in "good works." The

thief who died on the cross cannot be compared in respect to good deeds to the Apostle Paul, whose labors were abundant in the cause of Christ.

Now, the divine judgments are according to human "works." This is but saying that God sees truly and feels accurately and judges faithfully. Every "work" which is generically evil meets with his disapprobation, and the intensity of that disapprobation is measured by the enormity of the evil which has been done—he beats with many stripes or with few stripes according to the grade of the wrong which has been done; and every "work" which is generically good meets with his approbation; the intensity of that approbation is measured by the degree of the goodness of the deed. There are degrees in hell, and there are degrees in heaven. He who is evil at all is hell-deserving, but he who is intensively bad will receive a deeper damnation; and he who is good at all is worthy of heaven, but he who is intensively good is worthy of the highest heaven. This is but saying that God deals with men according to the facts which make their history.

Note the twin parables of the Talents and the Pounds (Matt. 25:14-30 and Luke 19:12-27). In the former the Lord "gave unto one five talents, to another two, and to another one; to every man according to his several ability." The five-talent man doubled his Lord's money, and so did the two-talent man, and they each received the *same* reward for their service. In the parable of the Pounds the nobleman "called his ten servants, and delivered them ten pounds"—a pound each. One servant increased his money tenfold, and was rewarded with ten cities; and another increased his gift fivefold, and was rewarded with five cities. The one-talent man had made no use of his Lord's money, and was severely punished. And one servant, who had received his pound, but made no use of it was severely punished also. In the parable of the Talents there was, (1) inequality of ability, (2) inequality of gift, (3) equality of increase and (4) equality of reward; while in the parable of the Pounds there was, (1) equality of ability, (2) equality of gift, (3) inequality of increase and (4) inequality of reward. The useless, doless servant in both cases

was cast out. These parables justify the doctrine that God recognizes the difference in the capacity and equipment of his servants and blesses them in proportion to their *fidelity* in his service; while those who are utterly *unfaithful* will be dismissed under his frown out of his presence. Ability and endowment are *ex gratia*, and are not taken into count in the judgment; but fidelity is *ex labore*, and becomes the very ground of judgment, elevating the most faithful servant to the highest favour, the next in fidelity to the second position, and casting the unfaithful steward into darkness and despair. We are all quite familiar with the barren fig tree which was cursed because it bore no fruit.

The argument, then, has conducted us to this double conclusion, (1) "good works" are essential to entry into heaven and (2) they determine the grade of glory which will be bestowed by the Master upon any of his servants—both the fact and the amount of the reward are conditioned upon the labors of God's workmen. Judgment will be rendered according to the deeds done in the body. The "branch" which bears no fruit at all will be burned; the fig tree which bears nothing but leaves will be cursed and will wither away; the servant who wraps his pound in the napkin, or buries his talent in the ground, was despoiled of what he had and cast into outer darkness as an "unprofitable servant." Judgment will be passed upon men according to their "works"—conduct will be at a premium on that great and notable "day of God Almighty and the Lamb." Jehovah's aim is to have in the consummation of all things "servants who shall serve him."

How shall sinners meet such a demand? By their sins they have lost the *legal right* to serve God, and been dismissed from his employment under his scowl and curse. To re-enter his service they must first be *authorized*, for no laborer can enter another's vineyard except he be first "hired." Justification is that act of "grace" which reinstates the sinner, as a servant, in the favor of God, as Lord and Master—putting into his hand the indefeasible title to "work" for God. But it is not enough to have the *right* of a servant, one must also have the *heart* of a servant—that spirit which renders his duties congenial and spontaneous—that love which transfigures employment into pleasure and duty into delight—that contentment and satisfaction into

doxology and worship. Sanctification does this—conveys a *heart* to the servant which makes his duties congenial, delightful, inspiring, the very climax of his happiness. As long as sanctification is imperfect, so long will the service of God and the duties of religion be more or less irksome, creating more or less of irritation of heart, because the servant has not been brought into perfect sympathy with his employment. But when grace shall have finished purging the spirit of the laborer, and shall have planted in his bosom a heart of perfect holiness, his life will be one endless hymn of praise rising out of the absolute harmony between his soul and his employments. His meat and his drink will be to do the will of God; no more divided heart—no more divided desire. The work of his hands and the love of his heart will have met and kissed in the unity of perfect happiness. God will at last have a human servant in whom his soul delights—a servant who works as he sings and sings as he works—whose loved employ, whose exuberant joy, is to do the will of God. In “the new heavens and in the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness,” every redeemed servant will cry, with the exuberance of the chief servant of all, “Lo, I come; in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy will, O my God.”

Justification gives to the sinner the *right* to serve God; sanctification imparts to sinners the *heart* to serve God; and judgment is according to the service rendered. It is *ex gratia* in order that it may be *ex labore*. Sinners are redeemed *for* service—redeemed that they may obey God with spontaneity and happiness.

Will a sinner's deeds save him? No; he must be saved in order to *do*. Will his “works” justify him? No; he must be justified in order to have the *right* and the *privilege* to work. Will his labors sanctify him? No; he must be sanctified in order to have the *heart* to labor. Will his deeds be mentioned in the day of judgment? Yes; every one of them will figure in the reckoning which God will make with his soul. Are “good works” necessary to salvation? Yes; by his fruits the sinner will be known and judged at the last day. He who has done little will receive little; and he who has done much will receive much; and he who has done nothing will be cast into outer darkness.

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
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